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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



INTRODUCTION 



STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY 



J. H. W. STUCKENBERG, D.D. 










NEW YORK 
A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON 

1888 



*|V 



Copyright, 1888, 
By A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON. 



TAB LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS 

WASH«NGTOH 



RAND AVERY COMPANY, 

ELECTROTYPERS AND PRINTERS, 

BOSTON. 



PREFACE. 



The title indicates the specific aim of this volume. 
It is not an encyclopaedia ; nor is it intended as an 
introduction to any particular philosophical system, or 
to the history of the various systems, but to the study 
of philosophy itself. The book was not written for 
philosophers, but for students and others who desire to 
prepare themselves for philosophic pursuits. While 
especially adapted to beginners in philosophy, maturer 
students will find it helpful as a review. It may serve 
to concentrate and crystallize the thoughts which have 
been confused and bewildered by the perplexing prob- 
lems of philosophy, and by the antagonistic views in 
the different systems, and thus may prepare the thinker 
for a new and more vigorous start in philosophic re- 
search. The urgent need of such a work is the apology 
for its existence, — a need evident to all who under- 
stand the inherent difficulties of philosophy, the con- 
flicting notions respecting its nature, aim, divisions, and 
method, and the numerous mistakes of students, and 
their failure to secure the best results from philosophic 

inquiries. 

iii 



iv PREFACE. 

The specific aim has not merely determined the gen- 
eral character of the volume, but also its particular 
parts, so as to limit the contents strictly to the scope 
of an introductory work. No labor has been spared to 
present, in the clearest manner, such thoughts as are 
regarded most essential for the beginner. The reader 
who knows the difference between floundering in a 
subject, and thinking through it, is in no danger of 
mistaking obscurity as synonymous with philosophical 
profundity. But even an elementary work in philos- 
ophy is obliged to discuss subjects which require pro- 
found study, and furnish food for the deepest thought. 
Particularly is this the case with those great problems 
which have enlisted the best energies of thinkers ever 
since the birth of philosophy. The student who has 
the acumen and thoroughness which adapt him to phil- 
osophical investigations will appreciate the importance 
of grappling early with themes which most severely 
test his intellectual powers. While intent on securing 
all possible help to put him into the right attitude to 
philosophy, he will value all aids only as means for 
becoming independent of foreign help. Philosophy is 
not taught, but thought; and even an introductory 
work presupposes that the student will do more for 
himself than others can do for him. Particularly in 
philosophy is it true, that what one gets depends on 
what he brings. 

The best introduction to philosophy is not so much 
an accumulation of materials of thought, as the develop- 



PREFACE. V 

ment and proper direction of the energy of thought. 
While the following chapters aim to give a clear state- 
ment of problems, and hints for their solution, it is evi- 
dent that their full discussion must be left to philosophy 
itself. Where mere statements are all that the philoso- 
pher requires, the beginner may need the processes 
themselves which lead to the results attained by ma- 
ture thinkers ; and here such processes are frequently 
given, so that, by means of the genetic method, the 
student may learn that only by thinking through a 
thought can it be appropriated. At the end of each 
chapter, hints are found under the head of Reflections, 
intended partly as a review, but mainly as suggestions 
for independent inquiry and for mental discipline. 

Aside from the nature of the subject, the character 
of the volume has been determined by the author's own 
experience of the difficulties of philosophical studies, 
and by extensive observations, in America and Ger- 
many, of the perplexities and mistakes of students of 
philosophy. Particularly have these observations been 
valuable in Berlin, where students congregate from all 
parts of the world. A careful consideration of the need 
of beginners has led to the treatment of certain subjects 
with greater fulness than required in ordinary philo- 
sophical works ; while other topics have been only men- 
tioned or briefly discussed, their full consideration being 
left to a period of greater maturity. A clear view of 
philosophy itself and its divisions, a definite statement 
of the problems involved, and specific directions for 



VI PEE FACE. 

thorough and successful study, have been the constant 
aim. While the views of philosophers in past ages may 
be learned from their books, or from the history of phi- 
losophy, the student generally finds it exceedingly diffi- 
cult to form a comprehensive view of present tendencies 
in philosophic thought, — tendencies which are the more 
important because he is continually, though perhaps 
unconsciously, subject to their influence. Frequent 
reference is made to the present status of philosophy, 
in order that the student may learn what special de- 
mands the age makes on the philosophic thinker, and 
against what dangers he must guard. Wisdom does not 
lose itself in random thinking, but it selects timely and 
useful subjects, which the historic development justi- 
fies and the age makes urgent, and which are capable 
of richest development and most fruitful application. 

Much valuable help has been derived from the numer- 
ous volumes consulted ; but as none of them has exactly 
the same aim as this volume, they could not determine 
the general plan and particular method of the book. 
It is hoped that the student will find in the work that 
independence respecting prevalent systems which the 
book itself is intended to promote. So far as justice 
required, special mention has been made of the authors 
used. The student will be grateful for the views of emi- 
nent philosophers on the most important problems ; and 
he who makes reading subordinate to thinking will not 
regret the opportunities for reflection furnished by the 
interruptions occasioned by footnotes. The longer 



PREFACE. Vii 

notes are thrown into the Appendix, and to these the 
numbers in the text refer. 

In discussing the relation of philosophy to science, 
it would have been easy to treat the subject wholly 
from the philosophical standpoint. But this relation 
has become so important, that both sides should be 
heard ; and for this reason the views of scientists, as 
well as those of philosophers, are presented: hence 
numerous references are made, both in the text and in 
the Appendix, to leaders in science. 

In addition to the works referred to in the text, a 
list of books is given at the end of the first chapters, on 
the subjects therein discussed. This list may be valu- 
able as an introduction to the literature on philosophy, 
particularly to the philosophical journals. Besides a 
knowledge of current philosophical tendencies, these 
journals furnish valuable aid to the student for the 
selection of works on the general subject, and on the 
various departments of philosophy. 

J. H. W. STUCKENBERG. 

Berlin, Dec. 21, 1887. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER PAGE 

Introduction 1 

I. Definition of Philosophy 11 

II. Relation of Philosophy to Religion 57 

III. Philosophy and Natural Science 93 

IV. Philosophy and Empirical Psychology .... 129 
V. Division of Philosophy 159 

VI. Theory of Knowledge (Noetics) 175 

VII. Metaphysics 242 

VIII. ^Esthetics 268 

IX. Ethics 310 

X. The Spirit and the Method in the Study of 

Philosophy 345 

APPENDIX 399 

INDEX 421 

ix 



INTRODUCTION. 



If philosophy is the object of our search, the ques- 
tion respecting the means for its attainment is funda- 
mental. But not less important is an inquiry into the 
state of the person who is to engage in this search, and 
to use these means. The apprehension of the subject, 
and the application of the means, depend on the stu- 
dent's intellectual grasp and energy, his previous train- 
ing and mental possessions. Since these vary so greatly, 
their peculiarities in each individual case cannot be 
taken into account here : only what must be required 
of all can be indicated. Although we are obliged to 
leave the matter mainly to himself, the greatest emphasis 
must be placed on the state of the beginner in the study 
of philosophy. Thrown upon his own resources more 
than in any other pursuit, a fault in himself or in his 
attitude toward philosophy may prove fatal to success. 

Not only must philosophy in the abstract, and what 
the student is in himself, be considered. The develop- 
ment attained by philosophy and the general condition 
of thought, particularly in his immediate surroundings, 
are also important factors in determining his course. 
Even mature philosophers cannot ignore the current 
tendencies of their age ; still less can this be done 
by beginners. The earnest student of philosophy, an 
inquirer into deepest thought, is supposed to be exempt 

i 



2 INTRODUCTION. 

from ' ordinary errors and prejudices respecting the 
nature and value of his pursuit. The severe labor re- 
quired of the philosophic thinker is evidence that the 
best truth may lie farthest below the surface, and cannot 
be received as a direct impression through the senses, or 
as an inspiration. Other views calculated to embarrass 
him may, however, be worthy of serious attention, — 
views infecting the air we breathe, and unconsciously 
becoming a part of our very being and intellectual life. 

In every age opposite tendencies prevail, animated by 
different spirits, pursuing methods which are in conflict, 
and terminating in results which cannot be harmonized. 
Frequently these antagonistic movements are extremes 
which beget and develop one another. When the error 
in an extreme is discovered, the mind is apt to reject 
even the truth with which it is associated, and to adopt 
one-sidedly the truth which was ignored or denied ; but 
truth out of right relations, or developed in undue pro- 
portion to other truths, is itself an error. It requires 
rare breadth, depth, and impartiality, to discern, appro- 
priate, and properly relate all that is true in a system, 
while rejecting all that is erroneous. 

Amid the numerous currents of our agitated age, there 
are two fundamental tendencies which are radically 
antagonistic. On the one hand, we discover the maxim 
which confines thought to external objects, as the only 
source of valid and valuable knowledge. Observation 
and experiment are pronounced the only means of com- 
municating with the real, and the mind is solely esteemed 
as the agent which unites the materials thus gathered, 
and which draws from them such laws as give the intel- 
lect a comprehensive view of the facts, and enable it in 
some measure to foretell coming natural events. Nature 
being regarded as the chief object of investigation, 



INTRODUCTION. 3 

empiricism, aided by mathematics, domineers thought. 
The mind is treated as the passive tool of the sense, 
subject to its laws, run in its grooves, and limited bj 
its authority. The human interests receiving supreme 
attention are those most closely connected with nature, 
and with the animal creation at large. As the facts of 
the natural world are made the germs of science, so the 
facts of human history become the seeds of ethics, 
sociology, and politics. A deep distrust of mind is fre- 
quently revealed by minds controlled by this tendency, 
and vigorous efforts are made to suppress aspiration be- 
yond the limits of natural law. Much formerly regarded 
as real, or at least as a mental representation of reality, 
is now mercilessly assigned to poetry and fiction, while 
the sense is endowed with an intuitive knowledge of 
things as they are. To thought preferring the limits 
of its own law to those of empirical realism, the region 
of mythology is generously donated. Cherished ideals 
are treated as pleasant and perhaps harmless illusions ; 
faith is regarded as effete ; and theology and meta- 
physics are interpreted as aberrations of mind on its 
way to positivism, the Ultima Thule of reliable thought. 
This tendenc}^ is not, however, confined to positivists. 
Sacrificing depth to breadth, it is a widely diffused spirit 
with various manifestations, agreeing in its negations 
rather than in its positions. Thus experience may be 
lauded as the sole guide, and yet the results obtained 
may differ greatly. The theoretic rejection of faith does 
not prevent assumption revealing astounding credulity. 
Theology can be rejected as worthless, and then, to meet 
the cravings of the mind, something termed natural 
religion can be invented, or a cultus of reason, genius, 
or humanity can be instituted. If a practical rest can 
be found in a theoretical void, agnosticism may be 



4 INTRODUCTION. 

pronounced final. Facts may be regarded as most 
valuable in their naked, unconnected reality, while a 
system of them is viewed as suspicious because too 
mental. Above all else, that is esteemed as having 
worth which can be weighed and measured, and ex- 
pressed in mathematical formulas. 

Numerous evidences of this spirit are found in life 
and literature. Socialism boldly proclaims that science 
has abolished the spiritual world and the ideals, and that 
consequently the most illiterate, by placing himself on 
the conclusions of science, will be consistent with it if 
he limits his desires and pursuits to the immediate inter- 
ests of this life. Selfishness and passion have much to 
do with determining these interests. Unless some altru- 
istic notions can be communicated to him, he is freed 
from the dominion of all authority outside of himself, 
that of blind force or the penal laws of society alone 
excepted. With the dominion of empiricism, new 
methods of education are also to be introduced. Men- 
tal science is treated as vague and unreliable, because 
it does not submit to tape-lines and scales. Even history 
is depreciated, because it does not square itself to the 
rules of mathematics. Humanity has so meandering 
a course, that it can be studied to best advantage in the 
severer scientific regularity of brutes. The classics are 
objectionable, because by promoting ideals they disturb 
the mind's possession of the reals. 

Not indeed all who cherish this spirit go to these 
extremes ; but one need only be familiar with the press 
of the day, to learn that potent factors in society tend 
to destroy the ethical and spiritual basis, to interpret 
what is termed mental by the mechanical, to deprive the 
soul of confidence in its peculiarities and deepest inter- 
ests, and to involve it in that pessimism which has 



INTRODUCTION. 5 

become so marked a feature of the most sensitive and 
most cultured among those controlled by this spirit. 

So general and so dominant is this spirit, that all who 
eagerly enter the domain of science, to become masters 
of its principles, are likely to come under its influence. 
In proportion to the zeal with which an object is pur- 
sued, does it abstract the attention from other objects. 
Not in enthusiasm for a specialty is there danger for the 
mind, but in affirmations respecting the reality or char- 
acter of the territory lying outside of that specialty, 
and not even entered by the intellect. It is a common 
human failing to make the knowledge obtained in one 
sphere of thought the light to illumine the darkness of 
every other sphere. Not unfrequently has nature been 
interpreted by the knowledge obtained of mind; and, 
in our day, the reverse is common. 

The correctness of the claims made by this spirit will 
be considered later; here we want only to contrast it 
with another tendency. In science itself there are 
numerous illustrations that the best scientists are not 
exclusive. Not a few of them admit that science is 
neither the measure of reality nor the limit of the intel- 
lect. Tyndall, Huxley, Haeckel, Helmholtz, Du Bois- 
Reymond, and many others, prove by their works that 
science is but the basis for thought in its progress to 
broader generalizations and higher flights. There are 
even scientists who compensate for the absence of fancy 
in their themes, by liberally supplying it themselves. 

But it is outside of the domain of science that a spirit, 
the opposite of that described, is most manifest. All 
religion proves that the mind is unwilling to be confined 
to the dogmatism of empiricism. But also in other 
departments thought rebels against the prescribed limits, 
strives to free itself from the trammels of gross objects, 



b INTRODUCTION. 

revels in poetry and fiction, and thus proves that it 
wants to supplement the known realities of nature with 
creations of its own, in order that it may obtain satis- 
faction. The age which seeks to curb thought has not 
a few who hail even Emerson's poetry as philosophy, 
failing to discriminate between the rational and imagin- 
ative elements in his works. Plato has been subject to 
the same treatment in all ages. And it looks as if in 
realistic America an era of Hegelistic idealism were 
about to be inaugurated, — an idealism farthest removed 
from the dominion of facts, and blending the subtlest 
fiction with the profoundest reason. Look where we 
will in the most practical and most scientific lands, 
thought proves by a fact, by its own energy, that it 
cannot be buried under a mass of sensations. 

It is not necessary to prove to the student of phi- 
losophy, that there are aspirations which a cramped 
knowledge cannot satisfy. Nor is it worth while further 
to pursue this spirit in its efforts to move in a sphere 
which transcends the phenomena of nature. One need 
but understand himself, in order to know that the real 
of the senses is not the limit of the real of reason. 
Never has the intellect been limited to the former, ex- 
cept by a theory not fully understood by its advocates. 

Looking at these opposite tendencies, both equally 
marked in our clay, what is their lesson ? What posi- 
tion respecting them shall we take? Empiricism is 
liable to err in limiting thought to sensations, while 
speculation is in danger of ignoring the data of the 
senses. The one treats as final what is but a beginning ; 
the other treats as the beginning what still requires a 
solid basis. The mind cannot be content with the facts 
of nature bound together in a rigid system of laws, 
while all reality beyond the visible and the tactual is 



INTRODUCTION. 7 

denied. Nor can we build solid structures on creations 
of the fancy. The mind conscious of itself demands 
a certainty that is absolute, and at the same time the pur- 
suit of thought to its utmost limits. This means the union 
of what is good and reliable in both tendencies, without 
the adoption of their extremes. It means actualism and 
realism, whether found in the highest or lowest domains 
of thought. The intellect can only be true to itself 
while moving in a freedom whose sole law is the neces- 
sity of reason. 

The above result justifies the demand for philosophy. 
Numerous other reflections lead to philosophy and illus- 
trate its scope. 

1. The concrete is endless. The mind cannot remem- 
ber all individual objects ; if it did, they would only 
prove a useless burden. But every step it takes from 
the concrete toward the abstract, from percepts to 
concepts, and from concepts to principles, decreases 
the number but increases the comprehensiveness of the 
objects before the mind. There is a strong innate 
tendency to unite under as few heads as possible all 
the objects of knowledge. However far separated at the 
start, as they increase in depth, the thoughts converge 
and tend to union in the ultimate principles. 

2. Besides this tendency to seek the fundamental 
thought which lies in many or all < other thoughts, the 
mind also wants to find the various relations of concepts. 
It seeks so to unite fragmentary thoughts as to form 
a system. Not content with the spontaneous association 
of thoughts, it aims to discover their hidden relations, so 
that it may construct an intellectual cosmos in which 
nothing is isolated. 

3. Numerous objects appear before consciousness, and 
then vanish to return no more. In this way a fleeting 



8 INTRODUCTION. 

world is presented, and because continually vanishing 
it fails to satisfy. Does the mind exist merely for the 
sake of these ever-changing impressions, or has it a value 
of its own ? It is hard to believe that the universe has 
no other meaning than to furnish passing phenomena. 
As the same underlying consciousness abides amid the 
changes of its objects, so the mind seeks the eternal 
substance behind the vanishing forms. It inquires into 
the ultimate real ; asks whether its nature changes, or 
whether in what we term phenomena there is seen only 
the effect of changing the relations of the real. Can we 
conceive of the substance as unchangeable, and yet as 
the source of all changes ? 

4. Our opinions vary. We make mistakes, and cor- 
rect them. Much once held as established beyond all 
question is now pronounced false. Its experiences may 
lead the mind to question its ability to discover the 
truth. The differences of opinion, the conflicts between 
systems, and the numerous disputes on the most signifi- 
cant and most trivial subjects, shake its confidence in 
the ordinary thinking. As the intellect becomes critical, 
it distinguishes between subjective views (opinions) of 
truth, and the truth itself. Are there criteria which 
furnish an absolute test of systems and an invariable 
standard of truth ? 

5. The greatest interests are attacked. The exist- 
ence of spirit is questioned; the freedom and immor- 
tality of the soul are denied ; reason is eliminated from 
the universe, and blind force is thought to banish design ; 
God being dethroned, atoms are made omnipotent. Is 
there still a reliable basis for religion ? Or is faith an 
empty vision, and hope a dream? What are the objects 
of supreme worth ? 

6. Much that appears I condemn, and much that I 



INTRODUCTION. 9 

think desirable does not exist. How to destroy the one 
and promote the other, thus becomes an important 
problem. In one domain of values, taste rules; in 
another, conscience. What is their authority? How 
can they be satisfied ? 

7. As soon as the intellect penetrates beyond the 
surface of ordinary thought, numerous perplexing prob- 
lems appear. The effort to solve them leads deeper and 
deeper, and reveals a world formerly hid. Far away 
from the phenomenal, the mind is thrown wholly on its 
own resources, and depends on the penetrative energy 
of its thoughts. How can it discover the laws of reason 
and move safely in the realm of pure thinking ? 

These hints give an idea of some of the ways which 
lead to philosophic thought, and also indicate the sphere 
in which the discussions of this book move. The logi- 
cal arrangement of the chapters is seen at a glance. 
First the Nature of philosophy is considered ; then its 
Relation to adjacent subjects ; its general Divisions are 
then given, and these are followed by an explanation of 
each division ; and last of all the Spirit and Method in 
the study of philosophy are discussed. 



INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER I. 

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Intellect is energy, great equally in discovering as 
in solving problems. The leading systems of thought 
have revealed difficulties before unseen, and exposed 
fallacies in reasoning before supposed to be perfect. 
The works of Plato and Aristotle, of Hume, Kant, and 
Hegel, teem with problems ; and some supposed solu- 
tions given by them are found to contain greater prob- 
lems than they themselves knew. Difficulties multiply 
as we go deeper ; and whoever discovers a new unsolved 
question proves that he has thought more correctly or 
more profoundly than his predecessors. The discovery 
of such problems, where the ordinary thinking sees 
none, is the first step toward philosophical thought; 
and the determination of their exact nature is a condi- 
tion for all successful attempts at solution. The diffi- 
culty which arrests thought tests the mind's quality, 
and tends to develop its capacity. Resistance makes 
the intellect conscious of itself, and arouses its greatest 
energy. The supposed limits of the understanding, 
for instance, provoke to almost superhuman efforts to 
transcend them. Unless the tension is too great, it will 

11 



12 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

develop the utmost strength. The spontaneous flow of 
thought which we do not master, and are scarcely con- 
scious of, may become so habitual as to unfit the mind 
for riveted attention to profound themes, and for the 
control of its own processes ; while problems requir- 
ing penetrative thought, and long, absorbing investiga- 
tion, are of inestimable value for intellectual discipline, 
even if their study ends in no solutions. Only with 
severe labor can we rise from a life lost amid sensations, 
to a steady contemplation of concepts. These are at 
first taken for what they seem to be, just like the im- 
pressions through the senses ; only after severe training 
to the task can the mind fathom their meaning, discover 
their problems, discern their relations, and learn what 
they imply, but do not explicitly state. This life in 
the concepts, if deep and consistent, moves among the 
problems which have enlisted the best energies of the first 
thinkers for thousands of years, and have given birth 
to philosophy. 

All who use this term intelligently recognize it as 
designating a sphere which lies far beyond the range 
of ordinary thinking, though numerous avenues lead 
from the one to the other. The profoundest efforts to 
solve the mysteries of thought and being have usually 
been regarded as characteristic of philosophers. The 
first and final causes, and the great concepts lying 
between them, are the realm of philosophy ; but such 
statements are too general to convey any tangible 
meaning. 

It is a popular conviction, that the object of philo- 
sophical contemplation lies beyond ordinary scholarship, 
as well as beyond the search of the masses ; and hence 
but few in any age, even when scholarship was not 
unusual, have been honored with the illustrious name 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. Y6 

of philosophers. But the reverence accorded to them 
has been based on vague notions of the excellence of 
their pursuit, rather than on a clear conception of its 
exact nature. The recognition that depth characterizes 
philosophy has not served to dispel the mysteries con- 
nected with the term. The popular mind associates 
with it wisdom and reason, — peculiar endowments and 
a peculiar sphere of inquiry; but however eminent 
and solitary the position thus assigned to philosophy, 
its real character has been but little understood by the 
popular mind. All this becomes self-evident so soon 
as we appreciate the truth, that Ave understand only 
what we intellectually elaborate or work out for our- 
selves. 

The use of the term on the part of scholars is scarcely 
less vague than in the popular mind. The proof is 
found in works of scientists and philosophers, and in 
general literature. The thoughtful reader is conse- 
quently constrained to ask, What constitutes philoso- 
phy? An inquiry into the mysteries of being? The 
objects which philosophers contemplate ? The method 
of inquiry? The results attained by the investigation? 
Whoever seriously reflects on the word will apprehend 
the difficulty of determining its exact sense. With the 
prevailing vagueness in its use, what wonder if those 
beginning the study of philosophy are puzzled by the 
nature, aim, relations, and limits of the subject? 

In many problems an exhaustive study is the condi- 
tion of clear conception ; still it is evident that at the 
very outset the exact place of a discipline in the whole 
system of knowledge should be determined in order to 
insure its successful investigation. Perhaps even this 
can be done only after long inquiry ; in that case no 
effort should be spared in the beginning to determine 



14 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the subject proximately and as clearly as possible. The 
limitation given a subject by the definition is essential 
to concentration and perspicuity of thought. We must 
find'a subject, must separate it from its attachments, and 
possess it intellectually, before we can apply to it predi- 
cates or use it effectively. The rational and successful 
pursuit of a study, therefore, necessarily depends largely 
on a clear conception of its nature. Only when an 
object is in some measure known, can the way to it be 
found ; only then can it be recognized when discovered; 
only then can its importance be appreciated, and direc- 
tions for its pursuit be valuable. With no definite end 
in view, the most diligent study is in danger of losing 
itself in distractions, in fruitless search ings, and idle 
wanderings. 

Definitions are a mental necessity. In every defini- 
tion, two things are to be distinguished ; namely, an 
object defined, and the mind giving the definition. 
When two persons define the same word differently, 
the reason is found in the knowledge, the needs, the 
preferences, the prejudices, and perhaps the whims, of 
the persons. An object may be viewed in two lights. 
We can ask what it is in itself, or we can content our- 
selves with the impression it makes on our minds or 
what it is to us. In the latter case we consider only 
what the object seems to be, or how it strikes us. We 
do not go beyond this to inquire whether our impres- 
sion is correct, but we take it as final. Superficial as 
this is, it is the common way of viewing objects. An 
inquisitive energy is required to lead the mind from the 
naive to the critical standpoint, which demands an 
investigation of the impression itself in order to deter- 
mine its truth or falsity. So long as uncriticised impres- 
sions or mere opinions are taken for real knowledge, we 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 15 

must expect definitions to be personal and arbitrary, 
with a flavor of the defining subject rather than the 
characteristics of the object defined. 

A sharp distinction between the mind as subject and 
the object before it, and a discernment of the difference 
between what seems to be and what zs, are the best evi- 
dences that the mind has passed from its spontaneous 
to the critical and philosophical stage. By abstracting 
(separating) the object from the subject, and by concen- 
trating the attention on it, the mind seeks the (not a) 
definition. It is an epoch in the history of intellect, 
when it begins to make objective truth the standard 
of subjective value. 

We must not imagine that definitions alone change 
while the objects remain the same. A word may be 
variously defined ; but then the same word stands for 
as many different objects as there are definitions. Both 
Hegel and J. S. Mill wrote on logic, but they did not 
discuss the same subject. We speak of the philosophy 
of Plato and of Comte, but the latter rejected from phil- 
osophical inquiry what in Plato's system is the essence. 
And, as the same word may stand for different things, 
so different words may stand for the same object. 
There is thus much that is accidental and arbitrary in 
the use of words ; and where clearness and exactness 
are sought, it is of the first importance to come to an 
agreement on the sense in which words are to be taken. 

Aside from these general considerations, tliere is spe- 
cial need of determining the meaning of philosophy. 
It would be difficult to find another word of the same 
prominence which has been subject to as many changes 
and to such a variety of definitions. At different times it 
has been made to include all that is possible and real on 
earth, in heaven, and in imagination. It is no wonder, 



16 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore, that teachers of philosophy and authors of 
philosophical works find it extremely difficult to define 
the term, and be consistent in its use. This is espe- 
cially true of the historians of philosophy, who are 
perplexed to know what to admit and what to exclude 
of the materials regarded in the various ages as philo- 
sophical. While some standards limit these to rational 
speculation, others embrace science and a large part of 
general literature. When we consider the heterogeneity 
of objects designated by the term at present, we must 
first define " system of philosophy," when used, if it is 
to convey any definite meaning. Indeed, in the same 
university, philosophical systems may be taught which 
really exclude each other. 

It is evident that this indefiniteness must interfere 
both with the study and the progress of philosophy. 
The stream flowing through history for thousands of 
years has at last separated into so many rivulets that 
it is in danger of losing itself in the sand. Philoso- 
phers, therefore, recognize the necessity of coming to 
an understanding on the use of the term, so that they 
may concentrate their efforts, and also understand one 
another. Consequently, in philosophical journals and 
books, the definition of philosophy is one of the subjects 
most frequently discussed. So long as those regarded 
as philosophers cannot agree as to the object which 
engrosses their attention, it is not surprising that phi- 
losophy itself is regarded with suspicion, and treated 
by many as unworthy of serious inquiry. Not a few 
earnest thinkers are inquiring whether philosophy stands 
for any thing definite and valuable ; whether it is pos- 
sible as a distinct department of thought. If it is an 
independent subject worthy of profound consideration, 
why do not philosophers limit the word and their inves- 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 17 

tigations to that subject? Some have become suspi- 
cious that under cover of that attractive name men 
have sought for something which is unattainable. May- 
it not be that the progress of knowledge shows that 
philosophers have been dreaming, and that, being aAvake 
now, they are searching in vain for the reality in their 
dreams ? Some are ready to put philosophy on a level 
with astrology and alchemy; they accordingly assign 
its place to the past wanderings of the human mind 
in its progress toward knowledge. 

This confusion discourages the beginner, and makes 
the study difficult. The vague use of the term also 
encourages looseness in thinking, and deceives the stu- 
dent into the belief that he has attained something real 
and precious, when he has nothing but a word that is 
almost meaningless, and includes the most heterogene- 
ous materials. Of the many who study what is called 
philosophy, not a few at the end of their collegiate 
course cannot define the word. It may even happen 
that those who have studied the elements of psychology 
or logic imagine that they have mastered philosophy ! 

We might yield to the temptation either to drop the 
term altogether, or to leave it in its present indefinite- 
ness, with no particular object and no peculiar sphere, 
were it not for the treasures of the past which it holds, 
and for the conviction that it stands for something too 
precious to lose. Subjects are often difficult in propor- 
tion to their intrinsic value, and the terms used vaguely 
to designate them may only indicate the eagerness of 
the mind to grasp the subjects themselves. There is 
no other word to take the place of " philosophy ; " but 
the concept for which it stands is so difficult, because 
it lies beyond the usual objects of contemplation, and 
this naturally contributes to the present confusion. 



18 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

But no one who forms and appreciates the concept will 
begrudge the labor it costs. The student with patient 
thoroughness in the beginning may discover a light 
which shall illumine his course till the end. 

PRINCIPLES WHICH DETERMINE THE DEFINITION. 

In a definition we aim at a full and clear apprehen- 
sion of an object. This is only possible by so limiting 
that object as to be readily distinguishable from others, 
especially from those most closely related. Brevity 
being essential to clearness in definitions, we cannot 
give a full description of an object by defining it ; the 
characteristic marks by which it can at once be recog- 
nized will meet all requirements. In order that an 
object may be known, its own peculiarities, as well as 
its relation to other objects, must be indicated. The 
most essential elements are the determination of the 
class or genus to which the object belongs, and its 
peculiarities in that genus (the genus proximum and 
the differentia specified). 

Where a subject is complicated, it is more easy to 
determine what the general requirements of a defini- 
tion are than to fix the principles according to which it 
is to be found. With all the learned and laborious 
efforts to define philosophy, these principles have not 
been sufficiently considered. We cannot expect agree- 
ment respecting the definition, unless it is understood 
with what conditions it must comply. Our first inquiry 
must therefore be : What rules should be followed in 
defining philosophy ? 

Owing to the variety of objects at one time or 
another included under this name, there may be a 
strong temptation to let preference or prejudice or a 
mere whim decide to which the term shall be applied. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 19 

Every arbitrary, merely subjective definition, must, 
however, be rejected. Whatever its authority to the 
mind giving it, objective value it cannot claim. We 
are not seeking any one's opinion, but philosophy itself, 
— an aim according to which the reader is expected to 
accept or reject all presented in this chapter. 

For the same reason we cannot let any existing sys- 
tem determine the sense of the word, unless the system 
itself has been proved the true philosophy. It is com- 
mon to adopt a system taught at a university, and then 
make it the test of other systems. Those pursuing 
this method should remember that there is a difference 
between philosophy and philosophical systems. Every 
system is apt to have some peculiar views respecting 
philosophy ; and it is to be regretted if the beginner 
accepts these, and lets them determine tbe whole course 
of his inquiries, instead of waiting until the mind can 
compare and critically test the various systems, and can 
either form its own or adopt one rationally. The philo- 
sophic mind can wait. 

Not a few define the term according to what they 
think philosophy can and ought to accomplish, thus lim- 
iting it to what they regard as most important or within 
the reach of the mind. This, however, makes the sub- 
jective state the principle of the definition, while the 
historic use of the term is ignored. If this rule is 
adopted, there may be as many definitions as definers. 
Besides, it has by no means been determined what the 
limits of the knowable are ; this, in fact, is one of the 
most important problems of philosophy, and it would 
be unreasonable to close the investigation by making 
any one's opinion on the subject the last appeal. 

Useful as the etymology may be in determining the 
original sense of a word, it does not necessarily indicate 



20 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

its meaning afterwards. Words are but symbols of 
thought, and their meaning is liable to change with the 
concepts for which they stand. It sometimes happens 
that in the course of time the sense of a word changes 
to the very opposite of the original. The development 
of a subject is also a development of the corresponding 
term, which grows with it in definiteness and richness. 
Yet the etymology may be useful, the original meaning 
of a word being in many cases like the seed which 
determines the future growth. As all development is 
according to law, each stage of progress depending on 
the preceding growth, the etymology is important in 
giving the root of the meaning, the concept of those 
who first used the term, and the nature of the subject 
then designated by it. While, therefore, we do not 
expect the etymology to give the use of the term " phi- 
losophy " in the different ages and the various systems, 
it will, nevertheless, be valuable in determining impor- 
tant elements in the historic use of the word. 

The history of the term is far more important than 
its etymology. It gives the notions attached to the 
word by the leading philosophers and in the prominent 
systems. Even if the historical use has varied greatly, 
there is in all probability something common, some 
leading thought which underlies the various senses, at 
least in the principal systems. If this common element 
can be found, it will give the central thought of philos- 
ophy in all ages, or that which makes an historical sys- 
tem philosophical. Those who ignore this historical use 
of the term must regard the standard histories of phi- 
losophy misnomers, and must sever the word arbitrarily 
from its past associations. The history of philosophy is 
a summary of the thinking of all philosophers, even 
the greatest of whom constitutes only a small part of the 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 

whole course of philosophical development. If, then, 
we prefer the whole to its parts, we must place the his- 
toric nse of the term higher than the conception of any 
philosopher, unless that conception is either a legitimate 
product of the historical development, or else proves 
that development to be fundamentally wrong. 

Useful as the historical development is in determining 
the sense of the term, it has unfortunately terminated 
in no generally accepted definition. We cannot there- 
fore appeal to the present use of the word to determine 
its sense, nor is any system so prominent as to make any 
particular meaning generally prevalent. Still the con- 
sciousness of the age, especially of its best thinkers, 
must be taken into account. 

A careful study of the subject will show that the con- 
fusion is largely verbal. Philosophy really has a sphere 
of its own, clearly defined, and very important ; and no 
other subject can either take its place or make it un- 
necessary. Its separate existence and continued study 
are thereby justified. It will be found that there is a 
sense which gives the essence of the etymology, as well 
as of the historic use of the term ; which contains what 
is common to the great systems ; which marks an impor- 
tant and distinct department of thought; and which 
also gives the idea on which the present intelligent use 
of the word is based. 

We shall now, under the guidance of these principles, 
proceed to determine the meaning of the term. 

ETYMOLOGY AND HISTORY OF THE WORD. 

The etymology * primarily indicates a certain spirit 
and tendency, namely the love of wisdom, and the striv- 
ing to become wise. So long as wisdom was a pursuit 

* $iAos and ao<f>ia. 



22 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

and not an attainment, its exact nature could not be 
determined. The sphere of inquiry and the goal 
reached were to each seeker the measure for his appre- 
hension of the desired object. Thus wisdom as the 
chief excellence of man might be differently appre- 
hended according to the views, preferences, and results 
of the inquirers. It might be viewed as the summit of 
speculation in any particular department, or as the cul- 
mination of all theoretical inquiry ; or it could be taken 
as the practical guide of life or as skill for attaining par- 
ticular ends, — a skill in which the highest theory and 
best practice are united. It was not unusual to ascribe 
wisdom to persons who excelled in an art or learning. 
Pythagoras is said to have been the first who employed 
" philosophy " to designate a particular subject ; and it is 
claimed, that he called himself a philosopher rather than 
wise,* because he thought God alone wise, while man is 
merely a friend of wisdom, and strives to attain it.f 
This sentiment, however, corresponds most fully with 
the spirit of Socrates, and many think it should be at- 
tributed to him rather than to Pythagoras. Plato also 
repeatedly states that wisdom belongs only to God, 
but that it becomes man to be a friend or lover of 
wisdom. 

In the historical use of the word, we behold a reflec- 
tion of the various, views of philosophy itself in the 
course of its development. We must, however, distin- 
guish between the popular and the technical use of the 
term. In the former, some phase of philosophy is usually 

* $(.A6o-o0os rather than <roj>6<;. 

t On the use of the terra among the Greeks, I have found of special 
value " Philosophie," hy R. Haym, in Ersch nnd Gmber's Encyklopaedie ; 
Paulsen, " Ueher das Verhaltniss der Philosophie zur Wissenschaft," in 
Vierteljahrsschrift fur loissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1877, first number; 
and Ueberweg's Gnuidriss der Gcschichle der Philosophie, Einleitung. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 

seized, or a general characteristic designated ; but it is 
of little service in determining the technical sense. 

While originally the word indicated merely a mental 
attitude toward wisdom, and the striving to which that 
led, it was soon used also to designate the result of this 
striving.* For a long time, however, the word was used 
vaguely. Thus Herodotus employs it to designate the 
desire for learning, while Thucydides uses it in the sense 
of striving after intellectual culture. Among others, 
sophists and rhetoricians were called philosophers, and 
the contents of their instruction were designated phi- 
losophy. Isocrates, for instance, uses the term for rheto- 
ric. Even in the Socratic school the sense of the word 
was by no means fixed. Plato employs it for study, for 
learning, for love of learning; but. the knowledge to 
which he especially applies it is that sought for its own 
sake and not for practical application. Thus he speaks 
of himself as a philosopher, in distinction from the 
sophist, who makes a trade of imparting instruction, 
and from the politician, who seeks knowledge for practi- 
cal ends. Like Plato, his pupil Aristotle also uses the 
word in various senses. 

Besides this general use of the term, we, however, 
find that Plato and Aristotle also employ it in a techni- 
cal sense. Thus Plato, as already intimated, uses it to 
designate the purely theoretical activity of the mind, 
aside from any practical application of the results 
attained. While the artist seeks skill, and the rhetori- 
cian and politician eloquence, in order to influence 
popular assemblies, the philosopher seeks truth, simply 



* The word io-ropia has been subject to a similar development as 
<f>iA.o(ro(£(.'a. Both originally designated merely a subjective state or atti- 
tude, and afterwards the results attained, namely histories and philoso- 
phies. The same is true of many other terms. 



24 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILOSOPIIY. 

because it is the truth. The philosopher also differs 
from the historian, who merely describes events. Plato 
wants to get behind phenomena, and seeks to attain an 
intellectual apprehension of existence ; and he holds that 
u a philosopher is one who sees the essence of things, 
the true things, the ideas." * Not satisfied with the tran- 
sient and the particular, Plato sought the eternal and 
the universal ; instead of what seems to be, he aimed to 
get at reality itself. From the world of sense he with- 
drew to the world of ideas, the archetypes of all exist- 
ence, the contemplation of which he regarded as the true 
philosophy. The term, however, is not confined to this 
contemplation or to any mental attitude, but is also 
applied to the knowledge or system which is the result. 
But as a system philosophy was not distinguished from 
mathematics and physics; and in one instance Plato 
speaks of geometry as included in philosophy. 

The verb " to philosophize " is used by Aristotle in 
the sense of inquiring or searching after knowledge 
or truth, and he pronounces philosophy the science of 
truth. It is thus a general term for learning, especially 
for deeper knowledge. Like his teacher, Aristotle did 
not separate science from philosophy.! He, however, 
makes a distinction in favor of what he calls the " first 
philosophy," afterwards designated metaphysics. But 
in philosophy he. also includes physics, mathematics, 
ethics, and politics. In its widest sense Aristotle, in 

* Paulsen. 

f 4>i.\o<ro4>la is at times used by him as synonymous with <ro<t>ia, and 
also with ejri(rT7JM>7. Paulsen says of Aristotle's use of the term, " No 
knowledge whatever is excluded. Aristotle thinks he philosophizes 
when he investigates the natural history of animals or household 
economy, as well as when he contemplates the nature of things in gen- 
eral, or the essence of knowledge. He, however, manifests a tendency 
to limit the term to a narrower sphere : he wants philosophy to con- 
sider being in general, not any particular part of it." 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 25 

fact, embraces within it all the knowledge which he 
himself systematized. But in a more specific sense it 
is the science of the first principles, and of the causes 
of reality. Haym says that according to the Aristo- 
telian conception, " the science of the philosopher is the 
science of being, so far as it is being, — being in gen- 
eral, not in particular." It thus comprehends all that 
pertains to being, such as its matter, its form, its effi- 
cient and its final cause. Philosophy is thus found 
to consist in the ultimate explanation of all existence. 
He also employs the term to designate particular sys- 
tems, for instance that of Thales. 

The character of the Greek mind, the state of learn- 
ing, and the wanderings necessary in the search for 
what above all other things entitles one to be desio;- 
nated wise, explain the variety of senses in which the 
word was used. The various meanings were so many 
hypotheses respecting its real nature, which were des- 
tined to be confirmed or rejected by later investigations. 
The term " philosophy " more than any other expressed 
the deepest desire and highest aspiration of the Greek 
mind. Wisdom was prized more than aught besides, 
and philosophy was intended to embody the eagerness 
and the striving of the mind for its attainment. All 
the varied results thus attained were also designated 
philosophy, a fact which accounts for the comprehen- 
sion under this term of all that was supposed to make 
men wise. But distinctions were made in these attain- 
ments, some being regarded more excellent than others. 
What philosophers of one age established, those of the 
next generation tried to surpass ; thus age after age 
they strove to get nearer the goal of all thinking. 
The highest attainments in any period were naturally 
regarded as wisdom in the truest sense, and their pos- 



26 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sessor was emphatically the philosopher. It is evident 
that a real desire for wisdom could not rest content 
with inferior knowledge ; it was a restless impulse to 
attain the most exalted. This enables us to understand 
why, with all its varied applications, the term " philoso- 
phy," in its most specific sense, should designate the 
ultimate object of all search, namely the first princi- 
ples. The only explanations with which eager inquiry 
could stop are those which need none themselves, or 
for which none can be found. While all that lay be- 
tween the beginning and these final explanations might 
be viewed as part of philosophy, it was nevertheless 
but means to an end, its value consisting in that it 
aided the mind in the discovery of the last thought. 
As wisdom culminated in the first principles, they were 
called philosophy par excellence. Thus both Plato's 
ideas or archetypes, and Aristotle's " first philosophy," 
regard as the essence of philosophy those principles 
which are explanatory of all things, but which them- 
selves require no explanation. 

What the Greeks meant by philosophy, in its techni- 
cal sense, may be inferred from the systems usually 
designated by that name. In their methods and results 
they vary greatly ; they, however, have this in common : 
they aim to get beyond phenomena to their source and 
final interpretation. The first Greek philosophers were 
intent on finding the primitive substance, or the ele- 
ments from which the universe was compounded, or out 
of which the present order is developed. The inquiries 
of the Ionian philosophers were cosmological. Thales 
regards water as the source of all existence. Anaxi- 
mander postulates an eternal, self-moving, indefinite 
something,* as lying at the basis of the universe. Anax- 

* diretpop. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 

imenes makes air the primitive substance, while Hera- 
clitus holds that fire is the original element. They all 
viewed matter as the source and the sufficient explana- 
tion of the cosmos, and hence they merely sought its 
primitive form. 

Pythagoras and his disciples made a specialt} 7 of math- 
ematics, and viewed number as the principle of all exist- 
ence. In the Eleatic school * the notion of being was 
the absorbing theme, — being as one and eternal (God 
and the universe are one), and its distinction from that 
which merely appears and is not real (the distinction 
between the real and the phenomenal world). The 
inquiries of this school were therefore metaphysical, and 
its principal subjects were : being and nothing ; the real 
and the apparent ; the one and the many ; that which 
is, and what seems to become and then vanishes again, 
or the eternal and the transient ; the stationary and 
motion. 

Some of the later Greek philosophers who inquired 
into the origin of nature recognized the existence of 
gods, while others ignored them. Empedocles believed 
in their existence: nevertheless he explained nature by 
making earth, water, air, and fire the first things, with 
love and hatred as their ruling principles. Anaxagoras 
held that originally there was a mixture of the primitive 
elements, a chaos, from which the divine spirit con- 
structed the universe. Leucippus and Democritus estab- 
lished the atomic theory, and were pure materialists. 

In all these cases, philosophy meant an inquiry into 
the real nature and the cause of things ; but it also 
included the result of this inquiry, or the explanation 
found. Philosophers were those who sought to under- 
stand the essence, the principles, the cause of existence, 

* Xeuopliaues, Paruieuides, Zeuo, Melissus. 



28 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

or the first substance from which every thing else sprang. 
Wisdom thus meant for them the ultimate thoughts 
obtained by inquiring into the nature and origin of the 
universe. 

However interesting and absorbing these problems, 
they could not permanently limit the inquiries of the 
mind. The failure or despair of a solution, as well as 
the importance of other questions, served to direct 
attention to a different class of objects. Problems them- 
selves are evolved in the process of intellectual develop- 
ment ; and an age may be better characterized by the 
questions which occupy the attention of its best thinkers, 
than by the solutions given. Philosophy began with 
nature, but it could not be confined to nature. As if 
exhausted by its fruitless attempts to unravel the mys- 
teries of what was outside of itself, the mind now 
directed its attention to itself. The sophists gave 
prominence to the hitherto neglected subjective ele- 
ment. In spite of their later degeneracy, which justly 
subjected them to severe criticism, they had an impor- 
tant share in the development of Greek philosophy, 
and mediated the way from the naturalistic to the 
Socratic school. Instead of permitting nature to absorb 
the attention, they concentrated their thoughts on man, 
and made him the measure of all things. This doctrine, 
which is certainly true, so far as it makes the laws of 
our being the condition and measure of all our concep- 
tions, was perverted to mean that truth itself is merely 
a matter of opinion ; and even if something more than 
this, it Avas held that the truth cannot be discovered. 
Hence, instead of eternal principles, subjective prefer- 
ences were made the rule of life. Knowledge and skill 
were esteemed simply because useful in discussion, or 
for the attainment of personal ends ; and dialectic was 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 29 

valued as an instrument for selfish interests, without 
regard to truth and right. So far as the later sophists 
had any claim to philosophy, it was permeated with 
sceptical, eclectic, and utilitarian elements. 

The appearance of Socrates makes an epoch in phi- 
losophy. He opposed the conceit, together with the 
superficial and sceptical tendencies, of the sophists, and 
directed attention from mere observation and opinion 
to careful definitions and correct thinking. He esteemed 
a knowledge of self as the essence of wisdom ; self- 
knowledge was consequently the aim of his instruction. 
While the sophists claimed to possess wisdom, he mod- 
estly professed to be still a seeker. Tn the whole his- 
tory of philosophy, Socrates is the best embodiment of 
the etymological sense of the term. He thought, if 
any thing could entitle him to claim wisdom, it was the 
knowledge of his ignorance. Regarding virtue as the 
highest good, he made truth its basis and correct 
knowledge its source. Virtue had, indeed, been dis- 
cussed by Pythagoras, Democritus, the sophists, and 
others ; but Socrates made the moral element the essence 
of philosophy, and is properly regarded as the founder 
of philosophical ethics. 

If, now, in connection with this hasty glance at the 
early systems of philosophy, we inquire into the tech- 
nical use of the term among the Greeks, what do we 
find respecting its meaning? Although the inquiries 
of the early philosophers were confined to nature, they 
were not those pursued by the physicists of our day. 
They were allied to what the Germans call Natur- 
philosophie, being purely speculative and really a part 
of metaphysics. The speculations of the Eleatics, as 
we have seen, were also metaphysical. The essence 
of Plato's philosophy and the "first philosophy" of 



30 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Aristotle belong to the same category. There can, 
therefore, be no question that among the Greeks meta- 
physics has peculiar claims to the title philosophy. In 
it, as a rule, philosophical inquiry culminated. We 
should, however, have to ignore not only the sophists, 
but also Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, if we did not 
include in philosophy dialectics (logic) and ethics. 
In a still more general sense, as already intimated, 
mathematics and other subjects were also included, 
especially by Aristotle. 

In Aristotle the development of Greek philosophy 
and of the term itself culminated. However vaguely 
the word was used at times, in its technical sense it 
designated the aim to discover the final explanation of 
things. It indeed included many reflections which do 
not bear directly on this aim ; but they were generally 
such as were supposed to aid in understanding the real 
nature of things. 

Among the successors of Aristotle, namely the Peri- 
patetics, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, philosophy 
lost the high standard it had attained; and the term 
was again used indefinitely, frequently designating a 
certain mental tendency rather than a special study. 
Its use for particular systems, however, continued. 
But it was also applied to any study regarded as spe- 
cially important and as leading to wisdom.* Strabo 
puts Homer among philosophers, and regards geography 
as a part of philosophy. Josephus speaks of three phi- 
losophies of the Jews, meaning Pharisaism, Sadducee- 
ism, and Essenism. The Church fathers applied the 
term to Christian doctrine, and in the early Christian 
Church theologians were called philosophers. In the 

* Cicero, Be Or., says, " Omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in Us 
exercitutio philosophic, nominata est.'* 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 31 

Middle Ages the term was employed very much as 
among the Greeks, except that, in distinction from the- 
ology as the science of God and divine things, it was 
used to designate worldly wisdom.* 

In modern times the word has not only been taken 
in previous senses, but new ones have also been added. 
From the time of Bacon and Descartes it has frequently 
been employed to designate inquiries into the causes of 
things, as well as for systematized knowledge in general. 
Until recently a clear distinction between philosophy 
and the experimental sciences was not made. Indeed, 
the Middle Ages handed the term down to modern 
times in that general sense in which Aristotle some- 
times uses it.f 

In England, philosophy and science have been used 
interchangeably, and to a considerable extent this tra- 
ditional use still prevails. Bacon regards the results of 
the experimental method as philosophy. Newton called 
his great work, Philosophic Naturalis Principia Mathe- 
matical and his scientific investigations are usually 
spoken of as his philosophy. With Locke, philosophy 
and science are synonymous. At the close of his work 
on Human Understanding, he calls physics, which is 
"the knowledge of things as they are in their own 
proper beings, their constitutions, properties, and opera- 
tions," natural philosophy. It is, in his sense, much 
more metaphysical than like modern physics ; still he 
regards it as the first part of science, of which the 
second is ethics, the third logic. In the " Epistle to 

* Sapientia sazcularis or inundana. 

f In Descartes' Principia Philosophic are found, among other things, 
mechanics, astronomy, physics, and chemistry. In 1729 Bourguet pub- 
lished his Lettres Philosophiques sur la Formation de Sels et Christeaux. 
In the middle of the same century appeared the celebrated work of 
Linnaeus, entitled Philosophia Botanica. 



32 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the Reader," he pronounces philosophy "nothing but the 
true knowledge of things." The philosophical societies 
of England, the Philosophical Transactions, and the Phil- 
osophical Magazine, are chiefly devoted to scientific 
investigations. 

In England and America, philosophy is often taken 
in a more comprehensive sense than science, but fre- 
quently they are also made synonymous. Thus natural 
philosophy is either the same as natural science, or one 
of its branches. English writers in particular are in 
the habit of using "philosophy" and "philosophical" 
very loosely. Nor can an improvement be expected, 
so long as the terms "philosophy" and "science" are 
not more carefully distinguished. 1 * 

In England there is now, however, a tendency to 
make a clearer distinction in the application of the 
terms. Scientists attack philosophy, and speak dis- 
paragingly of its study, thus proving that, even if they 
do not know exactly what it means, it is not science. 
Present discussions excite the hope that the two will 
eventually be recognized as occupying entirely distinct 
spheres. But among English writers who recognize the 
peculiarity of philosophy, there is no agreement as to 
its proper sphere. Not unfrequently what has from the 
first been regarded as its peculiar province is excluded. 
From the time of Racon, English thought has been pre- 
dominantly practical, and this has determined the char- 
acter of its significant conquests. Instead of inquiring 
into first principles, it has cherished an aversion to specu- 
lation, and a horror of metaphysics. There is not in all 
England a journal devoted exclusively to (speculative) 
philosophy. When, in 1870, "Mind, A Quarterly Re- 
view of Psychology and Philosophy," was begun, the 

* See Appendix. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 33 

editor said, "That no such journal should hitherto have 
existed, is hardly surprising. Long as English inquiry 
has been turned on the things of mind, it has, till 
quite lately, been distinguished from the philosophical 
thought of other countries by what may be called its 
unprofessional character. Except in Scotland (and 
even there Hume was not a professor), few British 
thinkers have been public teachers with philosophy for 
the business of their lives. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, did their philosoph- 
ical work at the beginning or at the end or in the 
pauses of lives otherwise active, and addressed for 
the most part the common intelligence of their time. It 
may not have been ill for their fame ; but their work 
itself is not what it otherwise might have been, and 
their manner of thinking has affected the whole charac- 
ter and standing of philosophical inquiry in England. 
If their work had been academic, it would probably 
have been much more sustained, — better carried out 
when it did not lack comprehension, more comprehen- 
sive when it was well and carefully begun. The in- 
formality of their thought has undoubtedly prevented 
philosophy from obtaining the scientific consideration 
which it holds elsewhere." Paulsen, in the article 
already quoted, referring to English philosophy, says, 
"Philosophy or science aims at a knowledge of the 
laws of the real. Beyond this there are no objects for 
scientific knowledge. There may be objects for faith, 
but that is the concern of the Church. Metaphysical 
or critical investigations like Hume's are received coldly, 
and viewed with suspicion." 

The practical character of the English mind, with its 
tendency to observation and experiment, has given par- 
ticular prominence to psychology; and it has been 



34 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

common to regard " mental science " as the whole of 
philosophy. In the few sentences devoted to the article 
" Philosophy," in the eighth edition of the Encyclopae- 
dia Britannica (1859), this occurs : " Philosophy may 
be defined as the science of first jjrinciples ; and the term 
is now limited almost exclusively to the mental sci- 
ences." An effort is, however, now made in England to 
exclude psychology from philosophy, and to introduce 
more speculative elements into the latter. German 
philosophers, especially Kant and Hegel, have gained 
considerable influence ; but this, instead of fixing the 
sense of the term "philosophy," has added new mean- 
ings to the word, and increased its indefiniteness. One 
who studies its present use in English literature almost 
despairs of attaching to the term any definite meaning ; 
it is applied to subjects so heterogeneous, that it indi- 
cates nothing in particular. Sometimes philosophy is 
spoken of as a mere habit of mind. Thus one writer * 
limits the term to a mental tendency, and regards phi- 
losophy useful as a kind of literary training, "concerned 
with moods of mind rather than with objective truth," 
and declares " that it is as much beside the mark to 
wrangle over the truth of a philosophy, as over the truth 
of Paradise Lost." This view would consign the deep- 
est thinking of the ages to the realm of fiction. Phi- 
losophy, indeed, implies a certain habit of mind : it is 
not, however, that habit, but its product, — the result 
of the sincerest love and profoundest search for truth. 
Others make it synonymous with metaphysics, or regard 
it as a theory of knowledge. The editor of " Mind " f pro- 
nounces metaphysics the same as "general philosophy." 
In another place % he says that philosophy " is theory 
of knowledge " (as that which is known), but declares 

* Mind, vol. iii. 240. t i. 5. \ viii. 16. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 35 

metaphysics "the most widely accepted synonyme for 
any thing that can be called philosophy." In replying 
to the writer quoted above, he, however, regards phi- 
losophy as a "rational interpretation of the universe 
in relation to man," and says, " In philosophy we are 
going to consider what may be said more or less deter- 
minately concerning the whole frame of things and 
man's relation thereto." In the same journal * we read 
"that the term 'philosophy' may fairly be applied to 
what is primarily a doctrine of the criteria of knowl- 
edge, without reference to any ontological conclusions 
which such a doctrine may be held to establish." This 
variety in the definition is a fair index of the prevalent 
confusion of thought on the subject. 

Not only does one look in vain for unanimity in the 
use of the term in England ; but other interests so en- 
gross the attention, that, with the exception of a few 
eminent thinkers, there seems to be no serious effort 
to come to an agreement. The influence of English 
thought in America has promoted a similar state of 
things in this land. Instead of agreement as to its 
application, the narrowest as well as broadest use of the 
term prevails, the definition, of course, depending largely 
on the system adopted. Much more attention is paid to 
philosophy in Scotland than in England ; but there, too, 
the term lacks definiteness. Indeed, among the multi- 
tude of current definitions, it might be difficult to find 
one which in each of these three countries has not some 
advocates. 

For more than a century Germany has taken the 
lead in philosophy. At the very beginning of its pre- 
eminence, the foundation was laid for distinguishing it 
from empirical inquiries. Kant held that philosophy 

* vii. 533. 



36 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

starts with reason, natural science with experience. 
The domain of philosophy is therefore the rational, that 
of natural science the empirical.* His immediate fol- 
lowers completed the work of separation begun by him. 
They aimed to construct a purely speculative system of 
a priori knowledge, and this they termed philosophy. 
Since Kant it has, therefore, become common to dis- 
tinguish sharply between speculative or philosophical, 
and empirical systems. In the division of the faculties 
in German universities, the traditional use of " philo- 
sophical " is, however, still retained. The " Philosoph- 
ical Faculty" includes all learned branches outside of 
theology, law, and medicine. 

Since Hegel's philosophy lost its supremacy (about 
1840), no other system has gained such general influ- 
ence as to determine the meaning of the term. Much 
attention has been devoted to the history of philosophy, 
as well as to psychology, logic, aesthetics, and ethics ; 
but metaphysic has been viewed with suspicion. It is 
a general conviction, that philosophy needs reconstruc- 
tion, and that the first requirement is a new and immov- 
able basis. But the tendencies indicate that the age is 
critical, sceptical, and destructive, rather than favorable 
to the construction of new systems. 

We have inherited the ruins of the philosophical sys- 
tems of former ages. Among them are fragments of 
inestimable value ; but they cannot be used as they are 
for the construction of new systems. Those who stum- 
ble over these ruins, in search of a satisfactory definition 
of philosophy, are apt to be bewildered and lost in the 
confusion ; and yet, until that definition is found, they 
have no criterion to judge which of the fragments are 

* It seems that Kant was also the first on the Continent who separated 
mathematics, as well as psychology and physics, from philosophy. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 37 

genuine and fit for use in the new structure. This phil- 
osophical chaos is a characteristic of the age and of all 
lands. It is generally supposed, at least in Germany, 
that if the last dominant schools fairly represent its true 
character, philosophy is not worthy of the best efforts 
of serious minds. But while those who strive to re- 
construct philosophy may have learned much from these 
schools, they are not so unphilosophical as to identify 
any existing system with the ideal or with philosophy 
itself. 

In the various lands in which considerable attention 
is paid to philosophy (besides Germany, Great Britain, 
and America, the principal ones are France, Italy, 
Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Holland, and Scandi- 
navia), the question is seriously asked, whether it desig- 
nates a peculiar object, or sphere of thought. Some 
regard its sphere the same as that of the natural sciences, 
but hold that its method is peculiar, doing speculatively 
what they do empirically. But if science does its work 
successfully, what demand is there for performing the 
same by another method? Others assign to it the mind 
as its special sphere, making it mental science (" Geistes- 
wissenschaft"), so that, as nature is the sphere of natural 
science, philosoph} r is essentially psychology. This, how- 
ever, is too narrow, excluding much that has always 
been regarded as belonging to it. Quite recently there 
has been a disposition to make it synonymous with the 
theory of knowledge ; but there already existed systems 
of philosophy before this theory became a special object 
of study, and it cannot be made to absorb the whole 
subject. Not a few regard philosophy as the synonyme 
of metaphysics, while others view it as giving the laws 
of the sciences, or as drawing the conclusions from them 
so as to constitute the unity of all knowledge. 



38 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

While the popular use of the term is altogether too 
loose and general, some of the definitions given are 
too partial, taking a particular element of philosophy 
and regarding it as the whole, instead of seizing the 
essence and making it the nucleus around which all 
that belongs to the subject may be gathered. If any 
historic element of philosophy is to be excluded, a suf- 
ficient reason for doing so must be given. There may 
be much in the historical development which was 
merely temporal or accidental, and which can without 
serious loss be now ignored. The sand carried along 
by the current is not the stream. But if now we must 
abandon the elements which from the very beginning 
constituted what was called philosophy, then with its 
sense let us also abandon the word. 

THE MEANING OP THE TERM. 

It has become evident that neither the etymology nor 
the history of the term, nor the development of phi- 
losophy itself, nor its present status, can give us the 
true sense of the word. Yet they must all be taken 
into account. If the essence of all can be found, it 
will make philosophy, with all its variety, a unit, so 
that its past, present, and future must constitute an 
organism which always changes and yet is ever the 
same. It is the same tree, whose bark, leaves, and fruit 
differ with the seasons. Sometimes it grows vigorously ; 
at others it produces only wild wood, which must be 
lopped off in order to insure health and future growth. 
It may be subject to many vicissitudes without losing 
its essential character. Those, however, who take from 
it a twig, and plant that so as to secure a new growth,! 
may have something valuable ; but they have not the/ 
tree itself. Those who, on the other hand, root out the 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 39 

tree in order to plant another in its place, sever their 
connection with the past, have not the same tree, and 
only mislead by calling the new organism by the old 
name. Trimming may be necessary ; but if the future 
is to grow from the past, the tree itself must be spared. 
Its fruit may have become unpalatable, so that it is time 
to change its products ; every limb may have to be cut 
off in order to graft on new scions ; but they must be 
ingrafted on the tree itself, if the fruit is still to be its 
product, 

The development of philosophy in the individual 
mind is similar to the process in history ; and whoever 
interprets aright his own philosophizing will obtain the 
clearest knowledge of philosophy itself. In the genetic 
method of defining a term, we do what we want to 
know. Philosophy thus becomes a matter of experi- 
ence. 

Consciousness precedes self-consciousness ; percepts 
precede concepts ; individual concepts precede systems ; 
and for systems we seek the final thought which is the 
bond of union for all systems, concepts, and percepts, — 
a thought that is the seed from which all our thoughts 
are developed. In its earliest processes the mind sim- 
ply lets itself go, its operations being determined mainly 
by objects of sense and by spontaneous reflection. 
This naive stage may be called historical or psycho- 
logical, but no one thinks of calling it philosophical. 
The mere observation of phenomena cannot produce 
philosophy, even in its shallowest sense. Those remain- 
ing on this standpoint never give an account to them- 
selves of their own operations and of the contents 
of their minds, but accept the opinions of others as 
thoughtlessly as the impressions through their senses. 
When, however, the mind is checked in this course, and 



40 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

aroused to reflect on itself, it is impelled to seek an 
explanation of what is given spontaneously. The mind 
become conscious of itself is not merely receptive, but 
also penetrative. It wants to know, but it soon learns 
that it only truly knows what it interprets. The very 
energy of the mind, when once aroused, leads to in- 
quiries into the causes of phenomena. Much that 
transpires is calculated to excite its curiosity ; it begins 
to wonder, which Plato pronounces the beginning of 
philosophy. In its efforts to explain mysteries, the 
mind finds former views, which were naively adopted, 
incorrect; and with increasing efforts at explanation it 
also finds the problems deepening and the difficulties 
growing. Wonder increases, and doubt becomes its 
constant companion. Doubt is developed by the dis- 
covery that opinions have been held without sufficient 
reason, and even contrary to reason ; and repeated fail- 
ures may lead to questioning the possibility of solving 
the riddles of mind and nature. But wonder and doubt, 
unless the scepticism becomes absolute and induces de- 
spair, are mighty impulses to seek an explanation of what 
is obscure. They create and intensify an eagerness for 
deeper knowledge, and the love of wisdom becomes the 
inspiration of the most searching inquiries. This is 
the spirit which is characteristic of all philosophy, and 
is the essential element in the etymology of the word. 

There is in this impulse a peculiarity which was par- 
ticularly emphasized by Plato and Aristotle. It has its 
birth directly in the energy and necessity of the mind 
itself; the impulse is wholly innate, a purely mental or 
intellectual affection. The reason for philosophizing is 
different from the impulse leading to studies undertaken 
for a livelihood or ambitious ends. In a peculiar sense, 
therefore, philosophy is free and human ; in it the 



DEFINITION OF PniLOSOPUT. 41 

intellect most fully expresses its own nature, and follows 
its own laws. Because so free, not a servant to attain 
other ends, it has been called the " divinest and worthi- 
est " of all studies. The fact that the impulse of the 
mind itself is its creative energy, of course does not 
imply that philosophy is not in the highest and best 
sense useful ; but its use, aside from meeting the intel- 
lectual needs, is secondary, and wholly conditioned by 
what it does for the mind and makes that mind. 

Impelled by wonder and doubt, the mind in its 
search for the solution of problems is a law unto itself. 
Behind the psychologic process and the transitory char- 
acter of phenomena, it wants to discover the reason, the 
underlying thought, the eternal principles. When 
doubt has brought thought to the stage of the sophists, 
where all is uncertain, the mind, with Socrates, inquires 
for the permanent, and, with Plato, seeks the archetypes 
and ideas. The laws of reason being the standard of 
judgment, mere external authority loses its binding 
character. Opinions, traditions, mythologies, and all 
dogmas are subjected to the rational test. These, no 
mind conscious of itself can adopt uncritically ; its aim 
is purely and solely the truth, and it cannot rest short 
of the highest truth, which is the most complete 
embodiment of wisdom. It is therefore evident, that, 
whilst it may use the descriptive and historical, the 
reason cannot view them as final ; they may give what 
transpires, but cannot furnish its ultimate explanation. 
They do not constitute philosophy, though they may 
furnish materials for philosophizing. Poetry and the 
arts are also excluded from philosophy; they do not 
explain what is, but are themselves subjects for expla- 
nation ; they increase, instead of satisfying, intellectual 
wonder and doubt. Nor is philomathy philosophy : it 



42 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

may be mere breadth, while the latter always demands 
depth ; it may be mere learning, while the latter is 
always the explanation of learning itself; it may be 
the product of a mind predominantly receptive, while 
in philosophy the energy of the mind is the essential 
thing. 

It is not strange that in history the philosophical 
impulse first attempted an explanation of nature. The 
same is true in the genesis of knowledge in the indi- 
vidual mind. The natural phenomena are most striking, 
and first arrested attention. But the mental facts could 
not be permanently ignored, and in the course of time 
both nature and the mind were subjected to philosophi- 
cal inquiry. The ultimate principle or principles of nat- 
ural and mental phenomena and being, therefore, early 
formed the object of philosophy. 

In history, as well as in the genesis of philosophic 
thought in the individual mind, the usual objects of 
attention and interest are the ones which demand an 
explanation. Thought need not go out of its usual 
path to discover mysteries ; it cannot go anywhere with- 
out finding them. The early philosophers, besides 
nature and the mind, found religious faith existing — a 
belief in gods. This faith had to be explained. And 
by the time Greek thought reached its climax, there 
were three objects, of supreme importance, namely 
nature (cosmology), man (psychology), and God (theol- 
ogy). The investigation of these was an inquiry into 
being itself, — the effort to discover its essence and 
interpretation. We have already seen how to these 
objects of inquiry the dialectical and ethical elements 
were added. 

In its efforts to explain what is, the mind always 
depends on existing knowledge, at least for its starting 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 

point. The way to the explanation may be but little 
prepared. The first work in that case is of an element- 
ary character, largely a groping in the dark, method and 
means still obscure, and imagination, as Avell as reason, 
active in the process of discovery. Originally the prog- 
ress toward the wisdom sought required an examina- 
tion of many things which the philosopher now finds 
explained, just as the geologist or ethnologist may at 
first be obliged to perform the work afterwards done 
for him by the miner and the traveller. In seeking the 
final explanation, philosophy took up one department 
of knowledge after another as it needed them, but each 
belonging to it only as means to an end. When suffi- 
ciently developed to become independent, they no longer 
needed the fostering care received in the past ; and it 
was against the interest of the mother, as well as of 
the son, to keep the man in childish subjection. This 
explains the fact that at one time philosophical investi- 
gations may include more subjects than at another. A 
subject may also at one time be thought to lie within 
the domain of philosophy, and afterwards be found to 
belong to another department, when it is dropped. 

We can thus be true to the Greek notion of philoso- 
phy without including the same disciplines as Aristotle. 
Although philosophical inquiry began with nature, we 
do not include physics. Mathematics has long been 
independent. 

But after eliminating the natural sciences, what sphere 
remains for philosophy? The fundamental and ulti- 
mate problems. These have in all ages been assigned to 
it, though their nature has at various times been differ- 
ently apprehended. Whether it started with the inter- 
ests uppermost at the time, or with concepts which 
engrossed the attention of preceding thinkers, the final 



44 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

aim has alwaj^s been the solution of the problems 
regarded as ultimate. Many other themes have been 
discussed in the name of philosophy ; but that was 
merely incidental, or because they were supposed to 
lie on the way to the last solution. They can, how- 
ever, be consigned to other departments, or dropped 
without serious loss. But those problems which per- 
tain to the last things cannot be dropped without the 
destruction of philosophy itself; they, as every one 
who reflects on what is known as philosophical litera- 
ture must admit, constitute its very essence. These 
problems are the centre from which the whole circum- 
ference of philosophical speculation is drawn. Their 
solution has always been regarded as the highest intel- 
lectual wisdom ; hence that solution is the most eager 
and the last aim of the love of wisdom. That this is 
a correct view of the distinctive characteristic of phi- 
losophy, is proved by its entire history, and by the fun- 
damental thoughts of its great systems. The elements 
of the universe, sought by Thales and his successors ; 
the principles of being, discussed by the Eleatics ; the 
atoms of Democritus ; the efforts of the sophists to 
solve the final problems in mental phenomena ; the 
search of Socrates for the eternal reason underlying 
thought and morals ; the ideas of Plato ; the " first phi- 
losophy " of Aristotle ; the nominalistic and realistic 
controversies of the Middle Ages, and the speculations 
of the school-men respecting God and the universe ; the 
innate ideas of Descartes ; the theory of knowledge 
given by Locke ; the monads of Leibnitz, and his pre- 
established harmony ; the substance of Spinoza ; the 
absolute scepticism of Hume respecting the final prob- 
lems ; the Kritik of Pure Reasons, by Kant ; the Ego 
of Fichte, the subject-object of Schelling, and the 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 45 

panlogism of Hegel ; common-sense or intuitionalism, as 
the ultimate appeal, of the Scotch school ; the rejection 
of theology and metaphysics by Comte, and the claim 
that the results of the positive sciences are the ultimate 
of the intellect; Schopenhauer's will as force, Spencer's 
unknowable, and Hartmann's unconscious ; the conflicts 
between idealism and realism in Germany ; and the 
various efforts in different lands to determine the limits 
of thought, and to get a safe method to reach these 
limits ; the prevalent doubts respecting the solvability 
of the ultimate problems, and the consequent suspicion of 
philosophical solutions, — all furnish indubitable proof 
that the final problems have been the peculiar domain 
of philosophy from its origin till the present. 

Having now found the sphere of philosophy, it 
remains to be seen how it deals with its problems. 
Mythology and theology largely move in the same 
sphere; and frequently mythological and religious views 
are mixed with philosophical elements. But mythology 
is the work of a creative fancy, and religion is the out- 
growth of faith ; while philosophy is purely the product 
of reason. Hence the test applied to a philosophical 
system is always rational, history and external authority 
having no weight in its final decisions. While the history 
of thought shows what has been held as truth, philosophy 
seeks to discover the truth itself. Reason as the instru- 
ment and creator is also the sole test of philosophy. 

In summing up all that has been said, we find that from 
the first the most general characteristic of philosophy 
is, that it is a rational inquiry into ultimate princijiles* 

* As the student is an inquirer, and cannot be prepared to give the 
content of the final system, it is of especial advantage to apprehend 
distinctly the aim of all his inquiries. Only when he has found the 
ultimate principles (in idealism, materialism, or something else), will 
philosophy cease to be for him an inquiry. 



46 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

This inquiry must not, however, be viewed as merely 
a mental act, but as the product of the inquiring mind. 
In this sense the word is frequently used in literature, 
as in Hume's "Enquiry concerning Human Under- 
standing." Every product of such rational investiga- 
tion is philosophical. All the philosophies of the past 
may be brought under this definition. Not one of 
them can be pronounced the philosophy : they are but 
attempts to construct it. Hence we treat them as ten- 
tative, as essays and inquiries. This is no disparage- 
ment of those systems : they are simply on a level with 
all other systems produced by the human mind. 

While the definition just given applies to all real 
systems of philosophy, it does not give the ideal ; and 
yet this is what we want when a subject is defined. 
We must, therefore, go beyond this definition, in order 
to learn what that idea is which philosophy, as an 
inquiry, seeks to realize. Looking solely at the idea of 
philosophy, not at the actual attainments, we define it 
as follows : — 

Philosophy is the rational system of fundamental prin- 
ciples. 

By Principles we here understand more than is usually 
designated grounds, or reasons, or causes ; they include 
all required to explain a subject. They involve the 
nature, the grounds,, and the design of objects. As the 
word " principle " is frequently used for other than 
the last explanation, it is qualified in the definition by 
fundamental, to indicate that it is the last or ultimate 
principles that are sought. When we speak of the prin- 
ciples of science, we mean those first truths which inter- 
pret science itself, constitute it what it is, and thus give 
its essence. He who knows these principles has the 
characteristic marks of all that is scientific, that which 



DEFINITION OF PniLO SOPHY. 47 

is peculiar to all the details of science, and yet is not 
these details. The ultimate principles are those which 
lie behind all others, and yet are involved in all of them ; 
they are the solutions from which all other solutions 
spring, as plants from seeds. Philosophy wants to dis- 
cover the last thought respecting what is, whence it is, 
why it is ; or it seeks to learn the essence, the origin, 
and the purpose of (real and ideal) being. It aims 
to find the idea of that which is. Instead of merely 
inquiring into the immediate causes of phenomena, it 
wants to penetrate to the reason which manifests itself 
in the universe. It therefore seeks that principiaut 
truth which is the solution of all problems. The words 
theism, atheism, pantheism, materialism, idealism, real- 
ism, and numerous other terms which give the charac- 
teristic marks of systems, all contain the idea of a 
principle which is viewed as the ultimate of thought. 
Philosophy is, accordingly, the highest possible demand 
of the human mind, and marks the utmost limit of intel- 
lectual aspiration ; it is reason objectified. 

In philosophy we want System, not merely isolated 
thoughts. If one principle, ultimate and all-embracing, 
can be found, then the system may be deduced from 
that ; but if this is not possible, the different principles 
found must be put into proper relations, and the infer- 
ences drawn from them must also be systematized. 
With our imperfections and limitations, we may be 
unable to form one system of fundamental principles, 
a system containing the ultimate of all thought; in that 
case we must be content with a number of systems, 
each controlled by a principle to us ultimate. 

The system must be Rational ; that is, it must be the 
product of reason, and in all its parts meet the require- 
ments of reason. 2 As an impulse to truth, reason is also 



48 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the norm for its search, and the standard of its attain- 
ment. The word "rational," therefore, indicates the 
sphere and character of all philosophical investigation. 
The inquiry may start with experience or history ; but 
if limited to these, it cannot produce philosophy. There 
may be other systems with principles professedly ulti- 
mate ; but their basis is not the sole authority of reason. 
Irrational elements may also be attached to philosophical 
systems ; but they are to philosophy itself what dross is 
to the gold to which it adheres. 

As already intimated, our definition gives the ideal 
of philosophy, indicating its aim, not an actual attain- 
ment. In this there is nothing peculiar, but a charac- 
teristic of all definitions. They want to give the idea 
of the subject itself, without regard to the degree of 
realization attained, unless they profess to be merely 
descriptive. This is not only true of theology, philol- 
ogy, history, and the like, but also of every one of the 
natural sciences. Physics, chemistry, geology, biology, 
are ideals, compared with which the real works, individ- 
ually and collectively, are very defective. The ideal 
science of nature has not yet found its way into books. 
There are many attempts at science, but they are only 
attempts. The same is true of philosophy. It repre- 
sents the end sought, and the actual systems are but 
efforts to attain that end. If, instead of the true idea 
of philosophy itself, we want simply to indicate what 
has been already attained, we shall have to go back to 
the previous definition, and say that every system is 
a rational inquiry into ultimate principles. 

As a rational system of ultimate principles, philosophy 
has a clearly defined sphere which distinguishes it from 
all other departments of thought. It is neither descrip- 
tive, nor historical, nor experimental ; its province is 






DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 

not the imaginative, nor the emotional, nor the artistic. 
It does not come under the special sciences, each of 
which is limited to a class of objects with whose expla- 
nation it is satisfied ; nor is it a science of the sciences, 
since it aims to explain more than can ever be made 
a direct object of science as now technically used. 

Looked at in every light, the definition meets all the 
requirements of the case. The principles sought are 
the highest wisdom ; hence the definition harmonizes 
with the , etymology. It is also justified by the history 
of the specific use of the term, and by the history of 
philosophy itself. Every great system aims at these 
principles. Trendelenburg, in fact, divides all the sys- 
tems according to their first principles ; namely, those 
which start with matter, with mind, or with a union 
of both. This gives materialism, idealism, and pan- 
theism. It would be difficult to get all the systems 
under this classification ; nevertheless, it is true that 
the character of a system is determined by its ultimate 
principles. In many instances these were thought to 
have been found, as in the case of the early Greek 
philosophers and Plato, and also Spinoza, Leibnitz, 
Berkeley, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and 
Hartmann ; while other systems were rather an inquiry 
into the possibility of discovering these principles, as 
those of Locke, Hume, and Kant, which are essentially 
a theory of knowledge. But in all systems the ulti- 
mate principles were the object of inquiry. 

While the definition gives the aim (namely, the fun- 
damental principles) within the sphere (the rational) of 
philosophical inquiry, it is not intended to intimate 
that the principles sought are the only contents of phil- 
osophical systems. These may also include whatever 
is connected with the discovery of the principles, and 



50 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

likewise the rational inferences drawn from them. A 
developed system of these principles embraces at least 
the general ideas of all objects they comprehend. As 
the search for the ultimate concepts implies a journey 
over the road leading to them, so when discovered and 
systematized they may be applied to the explanation 
of whatever they include. Philosophy is thus both 
inductive and deductive ; and both in its search and 
application, its sphere is limited solely by reason. Phi- 
losophies are consequently not mere skeletons of these 
principles. Indeed, philosophy is the most comprehen- 
sive of disciplines, including principiantly all that is 
real and ideal. Its principles are the apex of a great 
pyramid ; but in passing toward the base, there is a 
constant increase of space and content. 

In spite of the present confusion in the definition of 
philosophy, it will be found that the one given harmo- 
nizes with the intelligent specific use of the word now, 
containing the essence of what is sought but, perhaps, 
not clearly expressed. By common consent, philosophy 
aims at the highest and most universal truth, which 
can be nothing short of the ultimate principles. This 
is implied by those even who pronounce philosophy 
itself impossible, for they regard these principles unat- 
tainable. 

That our definition largely agrees with the common 
consciousness as to the specific sense of the word, is 
evident from the application of the term to various 
other subjects. Thus we speak of the philosophy of 
law, of language, of religion, of history, and the like. 
What is meant by philosophy when thus applied? 
Simply the principles involved in these subjects, and 
explanatory of them. Thus the philosophy of religion 
contains the principles which underlie religion, and 






DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 51 

explain its existence and character. If now, when 
applied to other subjects, philosophy is an inquiry into 
the principles involved in them, then taken by itself, 
or absolutely, it must be an investigation of principles, 
not indeed of any particular subject, but of all subjects, 
— it must be an investigation into the absolute or final 
principles ; and at its completion, it must be a system 
of those principles. 

Although the definition meets all the requirements, 
the beginner will probably have difficulty in clearly 
apprehending the subject. This arises partly from un- 
familiarity with it, partly from its inherent difficulties. 
It will, however, become clearer, the more he reflects 
on the aim to attain the final explanation, and the far- 
ther he progresses towards this goal. Such is the depth 
of philosophy, that those who never attempt to follow 
thought to its limits can form no conception of its real 
character. But whoever rationally inquires into the 
essence, the origin, and the purpose of all things, phi- 
losophizes; and, as intimated, in the processes of his 
own mind he will find the best interpretation of the 
aim and the sphere of philosophy. 

Every subject, unless purely rational, may be viewed 
empirically, or historically, or rationally. We may 
learn what a language is ; we can trace its history ; we 
can investigate its principles. Instead of limiting our 
researches to facts, we can also inquire into what must 
or ought to be ; we can investigate particular phe- 
nomena, and search for their laws ; but we can also seek 
what is universal. In all such cases it is easy to recog- 
nize the function of philosophy. In contrast with the 
phenomenal, it seeks the substance ; instead of the em- 
pirical, it seeks the rational ; in contrast with the acci- 
dental, it seeks the necessary ; in distinction from the 



52 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

particular, it seeks the universal ; instead of the de- 
scriptive, the historical, and mere classifications, it 
seeks the principiant ; instead of the world of sense, 
it seeks the idea, or the last thought ; and, in distinc- 
tion from the derivative, it seeks what is primitive, or 
the first principles. 

Many of the current definitions agree essentially with 
that given ; while there are others which are included 
under it, as designating some part but not the whole of 
philosophy. Ulrici says, " To philosophize is to seek 
principles." Ueberweg (^History of Philosophy, Intro- 
duction) states that in the various systems, philosophy 
is viewed as a science, and that, as a rule, it is distin- 
guished from the other sciences in that its sphere is not 
limited like theirs. It does not, however, include, to 
their full extent, the sum of all the spheres of knowl- 
edge ; but it seeks the essence, the laws, and the con- 
nection of all that is real. He gives this definition : 
" Philosophy is the science of principles." This might 
be adopted without hesitation, were it not that "science " 
is used almost as vaguely as the term it is intended to 
define. " Principle " is also used in various senses. In 
order to avoid ambiguity, I have used " system " and 
" fundamental " or " ultimate " principles. In his Logik 
(Introduction), Ueberweg defines philosophy "as the 
science of the universe, not according to its details, 
but according to the principles which condition all par- 
ticulars ; or, as the science of the principles of what 
is knowable by means of the special sciences." In 
another place * he states that the various philosophical 
systems are indeed not science, but that the aim of 

* In Ficlite's Zeitschrift fur Philosophie and philosophische Kritik, 
1863. " Ueber den Beyriff der Philosophie." A valuable discussion of 
the subject. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 53 

philosophy has all along been to become " science in the 
strictest and highest sense." As science it is distin- 
guished from art and practice. It is theoretical ; even 
what is called practical philosophy is only a theory of 
practice. 

Whatever the differences in the definitions given, 
they, as a rule, make the universal and the ultimate 
the aim of philosophy. Trendelenburg regarded it as 
aiming at the idea of the total and universal, which lies 
at the basis of the parts and of all that is particular, in 
distinction from the empirical sciences, which contem- 
plate the individual as separated from the totality. 
Lotze held that it is the aim of philosophy to bring 
into unity and connection the scattered thoughts, to 
follow them to their first presuppositions, and also to 
their last consequences, and thus to secure a consistent 
idea of the universe. It aims especially to subject to 
new investigation those thoughts which, in life and in 
the sciences, are the principles by which other thoughts 
are judged, in order to determine their validity and 
limits. He therefore viewed philosophy as fundamental, 
examining the principles on which all the sciences rest, 
and as going backward and forward to the utmost limits 
of thought.* Harms {Abliandlungen zur si/stematischen 
Pldlosophie) also regards it as fundamental, being that 
general science which investigates and explains the 
nature and the connection of the sciences. " Since 
philosophy is the science of the fundamental principles 
of knowledge, which include logical, ontological, ethi- 
cal, and physical conceptions, it has a large sphere ; and, 
by means of the fundamental principles of knowledge, 
it is connected with all the sciences." Wirth defines 
philosophy as "a striving after the principiant knowl- 

* Grundziige der Logik vnd Encyclopaedic der Philosophic. 85. 



54 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

edge of all being, which knowledge must not, however, 
be based on assumptions." He held that there is a law 
of thought which impels the mind to seek the unity 
in the variety of knowledge.* Joseph Beck f says : 
" Philosophy is the rational knowledge of the truth of 
the facts of human consciousness ; or the science of the 
nature, the last principles, and the highest ends (design) 
of things." Its aim is truth ; its objects are man, the 
world, and God. Its mission is to follow phenomena 
to their ultimate grounds, in order to comprehend their 
nature and connection, so that their relation as parts to 
the whole may be understood. Stockl (Lehrbuch der 
Philosoplde), an author whose works are used in Cath- 
olic schools, defines philosophy as "the general, specu- 
lative, rational science ; or, as the science of the last 
and highest grounds of being, so far as they can be 
known and proved by mere reason." Frohschammer, 
professor of philosophy at Munich, regards truth, not 
as found in history or experience, but ideal, perfect 
truth, as the aim of philosophy. It seeks the ultimate 
reason of being and of thought, and of the ideal; it 
wants to explain the essence, and give the reason, of all 
real and ideal being. Schmid J says, " Philosophy is 
a rational science of reality : namely, of the nature, 
reason, and design of things, as well as of the means 
for the accomplishment of the design." According to 
Paulsen, u He is a philosopher whose inquiries are 



* Ficlite's Zeitschrift, of which he was one of the editors, 18G3. 186. 
The original is : — 

" Es gibt also ein im Wesen ties Denkens, seiner nothwendigen Form 
gegriindetes, niitlrin apriorischos und allgemeingultiges Denkgesetz der 
Totalitat oder des Ganzen, welches also lantet : strebe alle deine Er- 
kenntnisse znr Einheit der Totalitat zn verkniipfen." 

t Encyclopaedic der theoretischen Philosophic, a book for gymnasia. 

\. Philosophische Monatshefte, iii. 388. 



DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 55 

guided by the aim to attain the ultimate unity of all 
knowledge ; while he who stops with isolated facts as 
the final truth is an empiric." 

LITERATURE. 

The references made in the chapter will serve as a 
general guide to the literature on the subject. For the 
views of philosophy in the different systems, the various 
histories can be consulted, particularly that of Ueber- 
weg, translated by Professor G. S. Morris. The most 
scholarly discussion of Greek philosophy is by Professor 
E. Zeller, Die Philosophic dcr Grieclien. Some of the 
best discussions of the definition of philosophy are to 
be found in philosophical journals, which must also be 
consulted if the student desires a survey of present tend- 
encies in philosophy. In the following list of journals 
the number of volumes in 1886 is indicated. The Jour- 
nal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 20. Williams T. 
Harris : New York. — Mind : A Quarterly Review of 
Psychology and Philosophy, vol. 11. George Croom 
Robertson : London. — Revue Philosophique de la France 
et de V Mr anger, vol. 11. Th. Ribot : Paris. — La Critique 
Philosophique. Nouvelle serie, vol. 2. M. Renouvier: 
Paris. — Revista de Fdosofia Scientifica, vol. 5. Enrico 
Morselli : Milan. — La Filosofia delle Scuole Ltaliane, 
vol. 33. T. Mamiani : Rome. — Philosophische Monats- 
hefte, vol. 23. C. Schaarschmidt : Heidelberg. — Zeit- 
schrift fur Philosophic und i^hilosophische Kritik. Neue 
Folge, vol. 87. Founded by J. II. Fichte and H. Ulrici. 
A. Krohn and R. Falckenberg : Halle. — Vierteljahrs- 
schrift fur ivissenscliaftliche Philosophic, vol. 10. R. 
Avenarius : Leipzig. — Philosophische Studien, vol. 4. 
W. Wu nclt : Leipzig. — Zeitschrift fiir exacte Philosophic, 
im Shine des neuern philosophischen Realismus, vol. 14. 



56 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

T. Allihn and O. Fliigel: Langensalza. — In the first 
volumes of Mind, a series of valuable articles on phil- 
osophy in England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Italy, 
Sweden, America, and Germany, appeared, written by 
prominent philosophical thinkers in these countries. 
In a book entitled Einleitung in die PJiilosophie vom 
Standpunkte der Geschichte der PJiilosophie, by Professor 
L. Struempell, 1886, the definition and leading problems 
of philosophy are discussed. The volume aims to 
introduce the student into the historical systems of 
philosophy. 

REFLECTIONS. 

The significance of Definitions. Difference between 
Definition and Description. Vague use of " Philoso- 
phy." Reasons for this vagueness. Popular and tech- 
nical sense. Principles determining the Definition. 
Etymology, history, and present use of the term. How 
used in leading systems. Distinction between Philoso- 
phy and Systems of Philosophy. Is the gulf between 
the ideal and real Philosophy peculiar to it? Difficul- 
ties in the Definition. Define Philosophy. Its Aim. 
Its Objects. Its Sphere. Relation to Empiricism, 
to the Practical, to History, to Art. Philosophy as a 
mental habit, and as a product of this habit. Indicate 
the agreement of the Definition with the Etymology, 
the History, and present Use of the term. 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 57 



CHAPTER II. 

RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 

The .nature and sphere of philosophy will be better 
apprehended by determining its relation to subjects 
with which its connection is most intimate. Its distinc- 
tion from history, poetry, and art, is too marked to 
require discussion ; but its relation to religion, natural 
science, and psychology, is worthy of special consider- 
ation. While a subject is outlined by the definition, it 
is brought into bold relief by comparison with adjacent 
parts. Distinctness means distinction from what is most 
similar. 

When only their striking peculiarities are viewed, 
philosophy and religion are as distinct as two peaks ; 
but by going deeper, numerous points of contact are dis- 
covered. They are, in fact, two circles which intersect. 
Different in spirit and method, their objects are largely 
the same. Both consider the origin, nature, relation, 
and tendency of objects ; but they view them in differ- 
ent lights, and each has a peculiar aim in their contem- 
plation. Their intimate relation accounts for their 
mutual influence, and the frequent efforts to control or 
absorb each other. Their harmony respecting the cause 
and design of the universe has always been signalized 
by vigorous co-operation ; but in disagreement their very 
intimac}^ makes the conflict between them one of life 
and death. 



58 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The objects held in common by philosophy and reli- 
gion are viewed from the standpoints of faith and reason. 
Co-operation is consequently possible only in the union 
of these two : namely, in a believing reason, or its 
synonyme, a rational faith. This implies that both 
coalesce so far as their objects are the same. If reason 
and faith ignore each other, it must be at the sacrifice 
of their perfection. But even in their union the pecu- 
liarities of each must also be distinguished. Whatever 
the beginning of the religious impulse, it reaches its 
climax in faith, while philosophy always culminates in 
pure reason. Psychologically religion is much broader 
than philosophy, enlisting the whole spirit and affecting 
intellect, heart, and will ; philosophy, on the other hand, 
whatever object it contemplates, is always purely intel- 
lectual, subjecting even the heart and will to theoretical 
treatment. While religion, therefore, so apprehends its 
objects with the spirit as fully to possess them and to 
be possessed by them, philosophy speculates, it beholds 
them intellectually ; if it loses itself in them, as the 
mystics did, it ceases to be philosophy. Philosophy is 
always conscious of itself, keeps subject and object 
apart, and is cold ; religion is feeling as well as intel- 
lect, hence is capable of great enthusiasm. The state- 
ment which dates from the Middle Ages, that philosophy 
seeks the truth, theology finds it, and religion possesses 
it, at least indicates the relation to the truth claimed by 
each. In their origin they differ widely ; religion, being 
more naive and more intuitive, is much earlier than phi- 
losophy, which requires more maturity of intellect for 
its origin. The objects of religion are usually given 
historically, in sacred books or tradition, while philoso- 
phy is required to search for its objects by a long and 
laborious process of thought. 



RELATION OF PTIILOSOPHV TO RELIGION. 59 

But they differ somewhat respecting their objects, as 
well as respecting their standpoints and methods. So 
much of belief lies outside of its sphere, that religion 
is far from including the whole domain of faith. But 
even the range of religious faith may be much larger 
than that of demonstration, and thus include many 
objects which philosophy still seeks. The historical ele- 
ment being a potent factor, religion may receive from 
it objects which reason alone could never have dis- 
covered. The impulse of the heart may also present to 
religious faith objects beyond the sphere of demonstra- 
tion. On the other hand, philosophy also deals with 
subjects foreign to religion. Being thrown wholly on 
itself for its method of research, philosophy must estab- 
lish its authority ; reason must justify itself to itself, 
and thought must prove thought. Consequently phi- 
losophy deals largely with the processes of thought, 
testing them so as to discover their validity, their laws, 
and their limits. Why we think as we think ; why we 
reach certain conclusions, and form certain systems ; why 
we accept certain inferences as true, and reject others 
as false ; these are problems of primary significance for 
philosophy, while religion only considers them so far as 
it becomes philosophic. Like all other subjects, religion 
looks to philosophy to settle for it problems purely 
rational. While religion is a relation of submission and 
obedience to a will, person, or power, recognized as 
supreme, philosophy is a purely theoretical (contempla- 
tive, rational) relation to the same, and to all that per- 
tains to principles and being. 

When the relation of the two is here considered, it is 
of course intended to discuss them only so far as the 
circles intersect. Their agreement and conflict concern 
us most, and these pertain entirely to objects and inter- 



60 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ests held in common. Religion is here taken in its most 
general sense. Neither a particular system of theology, 
nor the faith of a particular church, is taken into account. 
Theologies are a product of development, and change 
with their growth. Even when they are subject to 
great changes, religion itself, at least its essence, may 
not be affected thereby. If, however, the dogmas lying 
at the basis of religion are overthrown, then the super- 
structure must also fall. Usually theology is a union 
of religious and philosophical elements, faith striving 
to become rational, and reason seeking to become faith. 
It is consequently in the domain of theology that the 
fiercest conflicts between faith and reason occur. The 
battle ranges around the dogmas of theology, they being 
the border-land where philosophy and religion meet and 
claim equal right to possession. 

Lying wholly within reason, philosophy cannot tran- 
scend this limit and still remain true to itself. Its 
agreement and conflict with religion and theology there- 
fore pertain to these so far only as they lie within the 
domain of reason. Religion and theology are, conse- 
quently, directly related to philosophy only in their 
natural or rational elements. Speculative or rational 
theology is, in fact, a part of philosophy. 

Recognizing the rational element in religion as its 
sole point of contact with philosophy, Kant entitled his 
book on theology, " Religion within the Limits of Pure 
Reason." 3 He did not, however, mean to indicate that 
there are no objects beyond these limits, and that faith 
in them is not valid. Kant repeatedly affirms that 
there may be many things of which our limited reason 
has no knowledge. This every profound philosopher 
admits ; and this admission is the basis of hope that, 
with all their differences, and even conflicts, philosophy 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 61 

and religion can exist together. It is the narrow, shal- 
low, and exclusive tendencies, on both sides, which 
destroy the hope of final agreement. The usual limita- 
tions of our thoughts, together with the tendency of 
the mind to take one object, hold it before conscious- 
ness to the exclusion of others, and to develop it by 
itself, and therefore one-sidedly, is not only a great 
barrier to final harmony, but prevents the very recogni- 
tion of the differences, and the appreciation of the need 
of agreement. All discussion is simply beating the air, 
so long as there is a lack of depth and comprehensive- 
ness, and of that modesty which is a requirement 
equally of religion and philosophy. The two need 
each other as complements. A religion that ignores 
philosophy is in constant danger of superstition and 
fanaticism ; while an exclusive philosophy attempts to 
compress the whole of life into logical formulas, at 
which the heart rebels. For the healthy development 
of both, it is essential that their spheres be exactly 
defined, that each be kept strictly in its sphere, and 
that each recognize the just claims of the other. 

While there is much in the emotions and the life of 
religion which transcends the power of exact philo- 
sophical expression, they are not wholly beyond the 
influence of reason. If, for instance, it could be demon- 
strated that the objects of faith are products of the 
fancy, mere creations of the brain, as Feuerbach held, 
all worship would necessarily cease. The very points 
which philosophy and religion have in common are the 
ones on which the latter depends ; namely, the ques- 
tions respecting ultimate principles. 

The origin of religion cannot be determined by specu- 
lation. Recent ethnographical studies have led to vari- 
ous theories, and it may also be impossible to determine 



62 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILOSOPIIY. 

the matter historically, the given data being insufficient. 
Whether the first religious impressions were the result 
of a direct revelation, or came from dreams, the sight of 
a corpse, or, as Max Miiller says, "from an incipient 
perception of the 'infinite pressing upon us through the 
great phenomena of nature, and not from sentiments 
of surprise or fear called forth by such finite things 
as shells or bones ; " whether fetichism, polytheism, 
or monotheism came first ; whether there were not in 
reality different occasions for religion in different places, 
and different emotions as its basis in different persons, 
may never be absolutely settled by history. The phe- 
nomena bearing on this subject are so various, often 
so uncertain and contradictory, that there is abundant 
room for different theories. But, whatever its origin 
may have been, the philosophical value of religion can- 
not be determined thereby. If the lowest fetichism 
was its source, that is no more against it, than the 
fact that all knowledge began in the crudest way is an 
argument against science and philosophy. 

There is dispute even as to whether there are or have 
been peoples wholly devoid of religion. In some cases 
the question was answered affirmatively, when after- 
wards it was discovered to be a mistake, founded on 
ignorance of the language and customs of the peoples.* 
For philosophy this question is not essential. If a peo- 
ple were found with no notion of general principles, it 
would argue nothing against their validity. What pre- 
vails in a higher stage of development, not in a lower 
one, may only prove the superiority of the former. 

* Thus far there is no satisfactory evidence that any people exists, or 
has existed, wholly devoid of religion. It is often extremely difficult 
for travellers to learn the religious views of savage peoples, and many 
of their statements have to he taken with caution. 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 63 

Religion is established as a fact, and is so deeply rooted 
in human nature, and so much a need of man, that we 
may be sure it is here to remain. It is incredible that 
from the earliest records till the present time religion 
existed, and yet is nothing but the " baseless fabric of 
a vision." While errors may be attached to it, religion 
itself must have a true basis in the human heart. It 
may need purification ; it cannot be exterminated. So 
far as philosophy can draw religion within its circle, it 
must consider the subject as one of the deepest and 
worthiest problems of humanity, demanding explana- 
tion. If originally a revelation, then the origin of 
religion is of course removed beyond the domain of phi- 
losophy. But whatever supernatural elements it may 
possess, it must also be natural, and subject to evo- 
lution, and therefore an object of philosophical inquiry. 

Religion, indicating the personal relation of man to 
God, implies that the spirit is both receptive and active, 
so that it both receives and gives. Instead of putting 
its seat in the intellectual, emotional, or volitional ele- 
ment, religion lies behind the various faculties of the 
mind, and gives coloring and direction to all of them. 
Its seat is in the person or spirit, and indicates the 
character of the heart in the scriptural sense, namely as 
the centre of human nature and the source of all human 
manifestations. Religion is a spiritual energy in thought 
and feeling and volition, so that it has concepts, inspi- 
rations, and acts. The intellectual elements, and the 
conduct springing therefrom, are naturally more com- 
pletely within the comprehension of philosophy than the 
emotions. Yet these emotions are too essential an 
element of religion to be ignored in the philosophy of 
religion. 

Nothing is more absurd than to claim that all views 



64 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

based on religious feeling are reliable. In this way 
the most contradictory opinions and wildest fanaticism 
might be established. Philosophy boasts that its logic 
is heartless, and therefore not subject to influence by 
feeling. But this does not mean that reason can neither 
give light to the emotions nor learn lessons from them. 
The religious feelings are as truly facts as those we 
become aware of by means of the external senses, and 
they reveal the human heart and our real nature with 
at least as much perfection as external phenomena 
reveal the nature of the substances which produce 
them. We are undoubtedly more fully conscious of 
self than we can be of any thing external. That our 
emotions are a real, and apparently the most immedi- 
ate, revelation of self, is a fact of deepest significance, 
whose importance is not decreased because it is so gen- 
erally ignored in our day. The philosopher Jacobi may 
have gone too far in identifying reason so largely with 
the higher emotions, and thus making it a kind of 
intuitive faculty for the objects of religion ; but he was 
evidently right in emphasizing the value of the emo- 
tions beside the reflections of philosophy. To say with 
a sneer, " It is nothing but feeling," and thus dismiss 
summarily what concerns humanity most, is an insult 
to human nature. There may be in emotion a depth of 
reality which philosophy can neither fathom nor formu- 
late. The religious feeling demands explanation ; and 
reason confronted by it cannot but ask, What is its 
meaning? What its source? What does it reveal 
respecting man? What elements of truth does it 
embody? How is it to be intellectually apprehended? 
To what inferences does it lead? If religion is a senti- 
ment, so is irreligion ; and the question still remains, 
Which sentiment rests on the truth ? It is no wonder 



BELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 65 

that the deep mysticism of the middle ages — of Master 
Eckhart, Tauler, Nicholas of Basle, Suso, and others — 
arrested the attention of philosophers, and led to the 
inquiry, " What must that nature be which is capable 
of such things ? " The theosophy of Jacob Boehme may 
be false, nevertheless its very possibility demands expla- 
nation. Only when things are exalted, and personality 
is depreciated, can this be questioned. All the great 
teachers of religion and their doctrines, Jesus and his 
gospel included, present problems to the philosopher : 
if philosophy cannot explain them, it must give the 
reasons for its inability ; if it could explain them as 
natural phenomena, this very explanation would give 
new revelations of nature, and wholly change our 
views of its character. 

We must recognize as proper the effort of philoso- 
phy, particularly the Hegelian, to resolve emotion into 
thought. The intellect is only true to itself when 
its energy seeks to think what the heart feels. Yet not 
strength but weakness of intellect ignores the limits of 
thought, and frivolously rejects as frivolous what the 
logical scales cannot balance. A healthy reason trans- 
forms the emotional into the rational when possible, 
and expresses feelings in concepts ; but whatever does 
not submit to this transformation, it seeks to explain 
as emotion. Philosophy may not be able to put the 
substance of impulse and aspiration and longing into 
rational equivalents, and yet may find in them an 
important revelation of the nature of the seed from 
which they grow and of the soil on which they flourish. 
A system of human nature which destroys its mental 
life, the emotions included, for the sake of gaining pure 
abstractions, is as valuable as a botany and an anatomy 
which exist for the destruction instead of the interpre- 



66 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tation of organisms. Life, spirit, freedom, God, may 
contain more than can be limited philosophically, the 
concrete necessarily being richer than our abstract for- 
mulas. Our highest intellectual generalization is poorer 
than reality, and we may put an abstraction or an un- 
related absolute for what is the real source of the uni- 
verse. We know that there is personality, but we may 
not be able to find a single principle deep and broad 
enough to comprehend personality. Perhaps in feeling, 
a reality, a personality supplements the manifestation 
of itself in thought. Even reason cannot free itself 
wholly from the impulse of the emotions, and feeling 
may become a mental guide when thought is bewildered. 

No one questions the perfect harmony of truth with 
itself: we are convinced of the existence of that har- 
mony, even if we fail to discover it. This is a postu- 
late on which all reasoning is based. But if there is 
harmony in truth, tlien the establishment of one truth 
means in some measure the establishment and support 
of all other truth ; and the advocacy of error means 
hostility to all truth. Truths in science, philosophy, 
religion, and history, are not destructive, but promotive 
of each other ; and if there is antagonism, it is either 
imaginary, or .else between truth and error. Therefore 
truth in one department always welcomes as an ally 
truth in another, so" soon as it is recognized. And truth 
alone can recognize truth. 

The harmony claimed for the truth, we also claim for 
reason. All logic, all the processes of thinking, rest on 
this as a fact. It is a primary law of reasoning, that 
two conflicting concepts cannot both be true. I may 
hold as rational, views which are in reality destructive 
of each other ; but this is only possible by mistaking as 
rational what is not rational. Progress from error to 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 67 

truth is simply the elimination of the irrational (which 
was held as rational), and the apprehension of the 
rational. There may be much error in what we re- 
gard as rational : there can be none in what is rational. 
As we distinguish between what is subjectively held 
as truth, and objective truth, so we must distinguish 
between what is subjectively regarded as rational, and 
what is really or objectively rational. All true thought 
tends to make the subjective the same as the objective : 
to have the truth, not merely to think we have it. 

These are axioms of thought to him who has not 
merely moved in the forms, but has also grasped the 
principles, of logic. Strange that those who accept 
these axioms do not take the next step which they 
really involve. If I can trust my intellectual nature 
or reason when properly understood, why not the rest 
of my nature properly interpreted ? The emotions, so 
far as a correct expression of the true self, cannot be 
in conflict with each other or with the truth. If the 
true self is reliable when it expresses itself intellect- 
ually, why not when it expresses itself emotionally? 
There are false emotions, just as there is false reason- 
ing ; but this is no more an argument for rejecting all 
emotions than for rejecting all reasoning. We want to 
eliminate the false ones in order to get those which 
really express our true being. We may not always 
interpret correctly the truth deposited in our feelings, 
but there can be no doubt that there is much there 
which cannot be revealed in any other way. And reli- 
gious faith, as an expression of the true self, as a real 
and legitimate demand of our nature, has as reliable a 
basis as that reason which is an expression of the same 
nature. True reason and true faith can no more con- 
flict than a true thought and a true emotion. 



68 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

We might go still farther, and show that there can 
be no conflict between the real interests of our nature. 
The conflicts which occur are only between supposed 
interests. What my nature truly demands, it has a 
right to demand ; indeed, it is a necessity, and my 
nature must demand it. Unless there is that which 
my very constitution must demand, all ethics is over- 
thrown, and all reasoning based on the final harmony 
of thought and being rests on a false postulate. 

These thoughts are fundamental for the investigation 
of the rational basis of religion. It is an unjustifiable 
one-sidedness to regard our nature as the ultimate 
appeal intellectually, and then to reject the same appeal 
when made with respect to the emotions. It is indeed 
very difficult to get at the intellectual factor in our 
emotional nature, and to draw the correct inferences, 
particularly at a time when it is fashionable to regard 
the mind as valuable in proportion as it studies things 
and not itself. The time may, however, not be distant 
when the truth revealed in and through ourselves shall 
be prized as highly, at least, as that which comes to us 
from a foreign source. 

The thoughtful mind will not mistake the fool's 
sneer at the most serious subjects, for an expression 
of wisdom. The student who is tainted with that 
frivolous tendency, which regards the moral and reli- 
gious problems as not worthy of his best efforts, lacks 
the spirit which produced the greatest systems, and 
animated men like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, 
Fichte, Hegel, and Lotze. 4 

Were philosophy and religion perfect, they of course 
could not conflict. But both err, hence the strife ; both 
are liable to claim infallibility, hence the dogmatism. 
Each is apt to throw the entire blame on the other, 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 69 

instead of revising its own status to discover whether 
it may not itself be at fault. Sometimes the hostility 
leads to a war intent on extermination ; at others, the 
grounds of the conflict are only apparent. The first 
thing required, therefore, is that they understand each 
other perfectly, so as to learn whether really antago- 
nistic. Thus certain forms of philosophical scepticism 
are not unfavorable to religion ; the proof that a sphere 
lies beyond the region of demonstration does not imply 
that it is beyond the domain of valid faith. There may 
be good reasons for believing in the existence of God, 
though we know that no argument can leap from the 
finite to the infinite. 5 In his Kritik of Pure Reason, 
Kant examines thoroughly all supposed proofs of the 
Divine existence, and claims to have overthrown them ; 
yet he was too great a philosopher to think he had 
proved that there is no God, or to imagine such a 
proof possible even. True to his convictions of the 
limit of human knowledge, he declared, "It is indeed 
necessary to be convinced of the existence of God, but 
it is not equally necessary to demonstrate it." In fact, 
he went so far as to declare that he was obliged to 
destroy knowledge in order that he might find room 
for faith. He held that God, freedom, and immortality 
are undemonstrable, and yet established beyond ques- 
tion, by what he termed the practical, in distinction 
from the speculative, reason. In the ultimate regions 
of thought, Kant was obliged to resort to postulates ; 
but he chose such as the necessities of the case seemed 
to require. When, in dealing with the final problems 
in religion, philosophy passes from demonstration to 
postulates, it naturally resorts to such as have potency 
to account for what is and transpires, — feelings, ethics, 
and religion included. Surely reason is not reprehen- 



70 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sible if it makes the First Cause rich enough to account 
for all things, instead of an abstraction which has no 
reality itself, and cannot be the source of any other 
reality. And is the reason to be blamed if, in the First 
Cause, it seeks something rational, in order that reason 
may at least account for its own existence ? 

Forms of agnosticism are possible which are not hos- 
tile to religion. All depends on the sense and signifi- 
cance attributed to knowledge and faith. All Christians 
are agnostics if knowledge is limited to objects of sense 
and to mathematical demonstrations. Agnosticism is 
only destructive of religion when it claims that nothing 
but absolute knowledge, in the scientific sense, is worthy 
of assent, or when it denies the possibility of a valid 
basis for faith. Not the proofs but the implications of 
agnosticism endanger religion. 

In grappling with the momentous problems of reli- 
gion, the serious thinker maybecome involved in per- 
plexities which ordinary minds cannot appreciate ; and 
his faith may be affected just because his love of truth 
is so deep as to induce him to attempt its pursuit to the 
ultimate sources and final consequences. If such plod- 
ders appreciate their ignorance, and hold in abeyance 
their decision on the problems of the ages, nothing can 
be gained for religion if, in its name, they are subjected 
to flippant attacks, by such as answer the profoundest 
questions without even an effort at thought. 

With the ages the problems have deepened, and the 
attempts to solve them have only made the difficulties 
of the solution the more apparent. Hume's despair of 
knowledge is shared by many who are not his disciples. 
One need but appreciate the difficulties of every theory 
of knowledge, and the agnosticism, scepticism, together 
with the despair of the age and its consequent pessi- 



B ELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 71 

misro, in order to learn that it is most irrational and 
irreligious to attack men on account of the results of 
honest and deep thought, whatever those results may 
be. The convincing power of the fury of passion has 
vanished. It must be frankly admitted by the religious 
that the philosopher and scientist may be perfectly 
honest in their researches, and because of that very 
honesty, and freedom from bias, may find their early 
faith beset with difficulties. Under such circumstances, 
if their view conflicts with the prevalent religious dog- 
mas, they cannot but be repelled by theological abuse, 
while they respect every honest defence of religion. 
Philosophy, as well as religion, has its martyrs. 

The philosopher must be free from all bias respecting 
religious dogmas. So far as he is purely philosophical, 
he must treat them as unfeelingly as he would a ques- 
tion in logic. He can do this with the full consciousness 
that there is much in religion which he cannot grasp in 
this way, just as he is convinced that there are many 
things which the chain of his logic cannot measure. 
He begins his philosophical investigations solely as an 
inquirer after truth so far as this is an object of rational 
inquiry. If any thing else than philosophy determines 
the truth for him, he can dispense with the aid of phi- 
losophy, and should not profess to conduct his researches 
under its guidance. Slow and cautious in accepting 
statements, the philosopher is equally slow and cautious 
in rejecting them. The names and catch-words of par- 
ties have no significance for him, except so far as they 
embody truth. For the beginner in philosophy, this 
attitude of perfect freedom from prejudice is extremely 
difficult, but of the utmost importance. He must learn 
to estimate aright both the unthinking faith, and the 
idiotic sneer at religion, fashionable in some quarters. 



72 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Nor must lie be frightened by the terms " pantheism " 
and "materialism." They are to him, like religion, 
subjects for deep study. The most devout mystics had 
pantheistic elements, and the Apostle Paul uses expres- 
sions which border on pantheism : as when he says of 
God, "For in him we live, and move, and have our 
being ; " " For of him, and through him, and to him, are 
all things." Who will draw the exact line between 
theism and pantheism ? Indeed, it may be that much in 
a philosophical pantheism only expresses intellectually 
what is implied in the devout religious feeling, when 
the soul loses itself in God. Even materialism has be- 
come largely a bugbear. Although frequently claiming 
to be scientific, it is not, and, from the nature of the case, 
cannot be. Science never deals with the ultimate prob- 
lems, unless it becomes philosophy. To the scientist, 
materialism can never be any thing but a postulate or 
a working hypothesis. Atoms and matter are symbols 
to him, as those of algebra and chemistry ; and as such 
the}^ are useful, without leading to atomism or material- 
ism as an interpretation of the universe. In its sphere, 
science is absolute ; out of its sphere, it ceases to be 
science. Thus science as science cannot recognize God, 
unless it abandons the sphere of observation and its 
laws. The terms "theism" and "atheism" have no 
relevancy for science, simply because it limits itself to 
objects which are affected neither by the one nor the 
other, just as it is not affected by poetry, history, or 
aesthetics. The questions which the scientist asks of 
nature have nothing to do directly with his religion, 
and this should not have the slightest effect on his 
search for the answers. The only atheistic influences 
which science can exert spring from the habit induced 
by the constant study of subjects in which God is not 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 73 

considered, and in the use of methods which can never 
lead to Him, — a habit which may deaden the religious 
sensibilities. Jacobi once said, " It is to the interest of 
science, that there should be no God." He uses " sci- 
ence " in a wider sense than the strictly technical one ; 
but, if we put " empirical " before the term, we must 
say that neither in its aims, nor in its methods, nor in 
its results, is pure science concerned with the existence 
or non-existence of God. The fact is, that the supposed 
influence, of science on religion is, as a rule, simply the in- 
fluence of philosophical speculations, for which the defi- 
niteness and exactness of science are claimed, though 
without the least title to that claim. Although usually 
termed scientific, materialism, dealing with the ultimate 
problems, belongs to the domain of philosophy. It is 
a word whose sense is apt to vanish in proportion as 
the effort to fathom its meaning is deep. Whoever is 
haunted by materialism can get no better advice than 
to make clear to his mind what he means by it, and by 
the term " matter," whose atoms are imagined to be the 
seed of the universe. The vulgar materialism of the 
day cannot bear the light of intellect. Expressions 
which seem to involve the crassest materialism may be 
harmless. Professor Huxley, in " La}^ Sermons," has an 
address on " The Physical Basis of Life," in which he 
uses expressions, which, taken by themselves, might 
lead to the conclusion that their author must be a ma- 
terialist. Yet he holds that we are totally ignorant of 
what matter is, and consequently he is not a materialist 
in the ordinary sense. The same is true of Herbert 
Spencer ; he claims to be neither a spiritualist nor a 
materialist, because he thinks we can attach no intel- 
ligent meaning to these terms. The suspicion with 
which metaphysic is generally regarded has made 



74 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

scholars cautious in drawing inferences respecting the 
nature of things, and especially of the substance which 
lies behind all phenomena and is the ultimate source 
of all. 

In one aim philosophy and religion perfectly agree : 
both want the truth respecting the origin and tendency 
of things, and respecting our relation to this truth. Phi- 
losophy, however, seeks this truth theoretically, while 
religion also wants it for the heart and life. If now the 
one can help the other in this aim, its aid should be wel- 
comed exactly in proportion as it overthrows prejudice 
and false notions, and leads to pure truth. This is 
omnipotent, and nothing will be able to check its con- 
quering march. Nothing else is eternal ; and only he 
who resolutely attaches himself to the truth can hope 
to do work which will abide. In this conviction the 
philosopher and believer can unite in their labors, each 
in his sphere doing his utmost to discover and promote 
the truth, and cheerfully co-operating with the other to 
attain this end. The best friend of the honest thinker 
is the man who destroys his dearest errors, and substi- 
tutes for them despised truth. 

Since religion involves the deepest interests of man, 
the defence of its fundamental dogmas, with intense 
feeling, can easily be understood. This very fact is of 
significance to the philosopher. Why is the spirit so 
deeply attached to religion ? If not a demand of man's 
nature, how can we explain the fact that religion is 
adhered to so persistently, and defended so passion- 
ately ? The inquiry into its psychological basis reveals 
in religion elements so thoroughly human, that he who 
would banish it from the world must first rob humanity 
of its heart. Not only is religion older than philosophy, 
but it has also at all times exerted a deeper and wider 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 75 

influence.* Those who appreciate it as a necessity of 
human nature, do not fear that its right to existence 
will ever be successfully questioned, and are the last to 
shield it from the severest tests. They cannot share the 
fears of those who imagine that the development of 
science and philosophy may weaken the religious sen- 
timent. Such fears are apt to prevail most in times 
when the agony of doubt is experienced, and in minds 
where faith and criticism are in antagonism, and whose 
confidence in religion has been shaken. They therefore 
have a subjective rather than an objective basis. Jacobi, 
who declared that with his head he was a heathen, but 
with his heart a Christian, feared that philosophy tended 
to Spinozism, and that with its progress its deleterious 
influence on religion would increase. But such fears 
can only be justified if philosophy perverts the truth, or 
else if religion is not true and does not meet the real 
needs of man. With a true philosophy, genuine religion 
must also advance. " Every fresh advance of certain 
knowledge apparently sweeps off a portion of (so-called) 
religious belief, but only to leave the true religious ele- 
ment more and more pure ; and in proportion to its 
purity will be its influence for good, and for good 
only." f 

Whatever is really valuable must retain or even in- 
crease its value after the most thorough investigation. 
If, after such investigation, its value vanishes, it is con- 
clusive proof that it is a delusion which ought to be 

* Herbart, Einleitung in die Philosophic, 2d ed. 213, says that religion 
"is much older than philosophy, and strikes its roots much deeper in 
the human soul." He doubts whether religion loses from the fact that 
it is a matter of faith instead of demonstration. This faith he regards 
as a complement of our knowledge, a complement which theoretically 
is a necessity. 

t W. B. Carpenter: Contemporary Review, vol. xxvii. 



76 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

banished as soon as possible. A faith that fears 
scrutiny is a very weak faith as far as its contents, or 
else as far as its confidence in the power of truth, is 
concerned. 

To reject the claims of philosophy, respecting its right 
to investigate religion, may spring from three motives : 
either because religion is not thought worthy of philo- 
sophical attention ; or because it does not need attention 
from philosophy; or because it is supposed that phi- 
losophy can determine nothing respecting religion. The 
first has already been disposed of as totally ignoring 
the significance of religion, and the important part it 
has played in human history. The second is based on 
a false view of philosophy, and of the rights of reason, 
and also ignores the fact that, whether religion wants 
it or not, philosophy will examine its claims. The third 
assumes what can be determined only by philosophy 
itself; and, while philosophy may not solve the deepest 
problems of religion, it will at least reveal their true 
character, and expose the fallacies of false solutions, thus 
performing an important work for religion. Philosophy 
does not solve the problems involved in moral and 
physical evil ; but while it cannot construct a satisfac- 
tory theodicy, it may do much to show that atheism 
meets with just as many difficulties as the religious view, 
or with still more. And if some philosophical systems 
have been used against the very existence of religion, 
the latest which is of special significance, that of Lotze, 
has much which is in harmony with religion in general, 
and with Christianity in particular. He declares that 
faith in a personal God is not in conflict with any of the 
metaphysical convictions he is obliged to maintain, and 
rejects the supposition that the spiritual may have had 
its origin in the material, or that anthropomorphism 



RELATION OF PIIILOSOPIIY TO RELIGION. 77 

necessarily vitiates the religious notions.* If for noth- 
ing else, religion should hail with joy a true philosophy 
as a corrective of the false prevalent systems. 

Among the cardinal points in determining the rela- 
tion of philosophy to religion are the following : Is 
one supreme and the other subordinate? Or are they 
co-ordinate? Or are they partly co-ordinate, partly 
different in rank? A complete answer would settle 
their relation, and avoid many difficulties common in 
their disputes. Conflicts often arise because religion 
and philosophy attempt to encroach on each other. 

If religion arrogantly claims dominion over thought, 
its tendency is to make philosophy in the true sense 
impossible. Degraded to a tool of theology, it ceases 
to be philosophy. Nor can it be expected to develop 
freely, so long as it is limited to a sphere in which there 
is no possibility of a conflict with theology. This was 
its position in the Middle Ages. Philosophy was viewed 
as the servant of religion, whose dogmas were regarded 
as absolute, and therefore a norm for the philosopher. 
Plato and Aristotle, especially the latter, were used to 
form and prove the systems of theology. As soon as 
philosophy came in conflict with the dogmas of the 
Church, as in the case of Abelard and others, the de- 
mand was made unconditionally that it should be aban- 
doned or modified. Those to whom the works had to 
be submitted were usually not the persons best able 
to appreciate their contents. To save themselves from 
the anathema of the Pope, some of the philosophers, or 
rather philosophic theologians, invented the doctrine 

* Gmndzuge der Reliyionsphilosophie, 99. He pronounces foolish the 
notion that the highest principle of the world is an unconscious, blind 
substance, whose conception is for us perfectly dark and impenetrable. 
Thus his views antagonize the pantheistic systems, which strike their 
roots in Spinoza, as well as the systems of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. 



78 INTBOBUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

that what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, 
and vice versa. It is self-evident that a philosophy 
which starts with the presuppositions of a Church, and 
moves along the line marked out for it by that Church, 
can have authority only for him who occupies the same 
ecclesiastical standpoint ; and it has authority for him 
merely because it has no authority of its own, but only 
that of the Church. A system that fetters the reason 
cannot be rational. 

In the Roman-Catholic Church this servile position 
is still assigned to philosophy. Where the Church or a 
council or the Pope is pronounced infallible, the final 
appeal will always be to this infallibility ; and the su- 
premacy of reason, as well as the freedom of philoso- 
phy, is out of the question. A prominent teacher in 
that Church says that there are truths which belong 
both to theology and philosophy, but that the former 
always treats them as truths of revelation, while the 
latter regards them as truths of reason. He adds, " In 
rank philosophy is not co-ordinate with theology, but 
subordinate. For theology has, on the one hand, a much 
higher source of knowledge than philosophy, namely rev- 
elation ; and on the other, it has a higher and more 
extensive sphere of truth than philosophy, because it has 
the Christian mysteries, which philosophy of itself can- 
not attain." * This view is evidently the only one which 
can consistently be held in that Church. The author 
claims that philosophy is actually exalted, instead of 
being degraded, by this position. " Philosophy stands 
to theology in a certain relation of servitude, and that 
in a twofold way. First, it gives to theology a scien- 
tific basis, because it contains logic and methodology ; 

* Lehrbuch der Philosophic, by Dr. A. Stockl, professor in Eichstadt, 
4th ed., 1876, vol. i. 14. The Italics are in the original. 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 79 

and, second, it furnishes those speculative results on 
whose basis theology, so far as it is possible for the 
human mind, attains a speculative knowledge of the 
Christian mysteries. This is the sense and significance 
of the well-known device : Philosophia est ancilla theo- 
logice. From this it is seen, that, in accepting such a 
position of servitude in its relation to theology, the 
dignity of philosophy is not lessened; for it surely is 
no degradation of philosophy if, in the way indicated, 
it can be and is used for the purposes of a higher 
science." On such soil a pure philosophy cannot flour- 
ish ; and it is not surprising, that of recent philosophers 
not one of eminence has come from the Catholic Church. 
It goes back to Thomas Aquinas, not forward. 

If such views are still possible in Germany, we can- 
not be surprised if in the countries of Southern Europe 
philosophy is held in bondage. Barzellotti,* in speak- 
ing of Gioberti and Rosmini, says of the latter, "He 
never allows the freedom of his thought to go the length 
of admitting that any tiling can be true to a philoso- 
pher which is incompatible with religious faith. That 
is to say, Rosmini regards the agreement of the latter 
with the results of philosophical investigation as a post- 
ulate. Gioberti, in his earlier works, goes even farther 
than this. Not only does he identify philosophy and 
religion, but he recognizes in the spirit a faculty sui 
generis, superior to reason, and having the supernatural 
for its object. Viewing the doctrine of Rosmini and 
Gioberti mainly from this point of view, Cousin, there- 
fore, had ground for asserting that Italian thought was 
still in the ' bonds of theology.' " 

Only a Church which regards its dogmas as absolute 
and final can degrade philosophy to a mere tool, and 

* Philosophy iu Italy, Mind, 1878. 



80 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

rob reason and conscience of their rights. That philos- 
ophy in any worthy sense is thus destroyed, must be 
evident to all who understand its character. If dogmas 
are absolutely true, all possible antagonism cannot affect 
them, and all thorough inquiry can only serve to make 
their truth more evident. That mind must be strangely 
constituted which holds that a force is so great as to 
overcome all resistance, and yet claims that no one is 
permitted to test that force or attempt resistance. 
When both the dogmas and the infallibility of the 
authority establishing them are questioned, as in our 
day, such claims create the suspicion that the Church 
lacks confidence in its own teachings. 

But even in the Protestant Church philosophy has 
not always enjoyed that freedom which enabled it fully 
to express and develop its principles. Wolff, Kant, 
Fichte, and others had their liberties restrained, or were 
subjected to persecution.* Heusde, a recent Dutch 
professor, said of his countrymen, " In philosophizing 
we ask for simplicity, good sound sense, and especially 
good principles, that should in no wise disagree with 
those of our religious faith." Let any one in America 
or Great Britain attempt to develop a philosophical sys- 
tem in conflict with the prevailing faith, and he will 
soon discover that there is a marked difference between 
nominal and real freedom of thought. In these lands 
the law may not interfere with freedom of expression ; 
but there are other than legal restraints. There is a 
constant growth of toleration ; but there are many who 
still have to learn that the wounds made by philosophy 



* Wolff was banished from Halle, but was restored by Frederick II. ; 
Kant received a reprimand from the Caltnsminister for publishing a 
certain article on religion ; and Fichte, being charged with atheism in 
Jena, lost his professorship, and iled to Berlin. 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 81 

and science can only be healed by the same, while 
abuse and passion only turn them into festering sores.* 
Sometimes the question of toleration becomes in the 
highest degree difficult. Can a state permit teachers in 
its institutions, appointed and supported by itself, to 
advocate views which tend to undermine the very 
principles on which it is founded? Its first law is self- 
protection. Communism will probably teach the states 
which have not already learned the lesson, that a sharp 
line must be drawn between liberty and licentiousness. 
In an institution established by a religious denomina- 
tion, for religious purposes, it cannot be expected that 
instruction subversive of this end should be tolerated. 
No honest philosopher would accept or retain a position 
in which the perfect freedom necessary for a full devel- 
opment and free expression of his views cannot be 
maintained. This does not imply that a teacher must 
express all he imagines or believes, no matter with what 
consequences it may be fraught. The wise man is 
reserved in the utterance of mere opinions on weighty 
subjects, — opinions which may be false and injurious, 
and which he himself may have occasion to change 
afterwards. Freedom is not temerity ; and philosophy 
is not contempt of authority, though it recognizes no 
authority as not subject to its tests. 

If religion has repeatedly attempted to make philoso- 
phy subordinate, the latter has frequently tried to over- 
throw religion, or, at least, to transform it into harmony 
with itself. The Kantian rationalism, the use made of 
Hegel's dialectics, and Hartmann's pessimism, are ex- 
amples. Theologians have repeatedly tried to harmonize 

* Julius Muller says in one of his sermons, " Wounds which have 
been inflicted on humanity by knowledge, can be healed only by 
knowledge." 



82 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

their doctrines with the prevalent school of philosophy, 
often with indifferent results. Sometimes, when the 
harmony was supposed to be complete, the philosophical 
system itself changed, and then no one cared for the 
reconciliation. Theologians may be obliged to pass 
through many transformations in order to keep in har- 
mony with the rapidly changing philosophies.* There 
can hardly be a more absurd proposition than to claim 
that religion must adapt itself to the current philosophy. 
Even the disciples themselves are not always agreed as 
to the religion most in harmony with their philosoph- 
ical sj^stem. In the school of Kant, and still more in 
that of Hegel, the followers have disputed fiercely about 
the religious attitude of their philosophy ; and even on 
the doctrines of God and immortality conflicting views 
were held. Some philosophers modified their own sys- 
tems (as Reinhold and Schelling), so that at different 
periods of their lives different religious doctrines would 
have found most favor. And what a time theologians 
would have in our age to determine which philosophical 
system shall fix their dogmas ! Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 
Comte, Spencer, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze, and 
perhaps a score besides, would have to be taken into 
account. Religion has been subject to many changes, 
but it has been stability itself compared with the evo- 
lutions and transformations of philosophical systems. 
The failure to harmonize the two has repeatedly led 

* Karl Daub, formerly theological professor at Heidelberg, is an inter- 
esting illustration. He began his career as a Kantian, and his first 
works are written from that standpoint. Then, after being under 
Fichte's influence for a while, he adopted Schelling's system, and wrote 
a number of dogmatic works in the spirit of that philosophy. Finally 
he became a disciple of Hegel, and his latest works bear the impress of 
that philosopher. His change of views cannot be attributed to lack 
of character. He was thoroughly sincere, as well as scholarly and 
speculative. 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 83 

to efforts to separate religion from philosophy.* That 
this is impracticable, is frequently proved by its very 
advocates. One might as well attempt to keep the two 
elements apart in his own mind. A philosophical sys- 
tem may influence the mind very deeply, yet uncon- 
sciously. 

Conflicts are inevitable. When they do arise, which 
is the final appeal ? The fact that a religion claims to 
be absolute has no significance for the philosopher. The 
Catholic, the Protestant, the Jew, the Mohammedan, 
the Buddhist, all claim to possess the truth ; but who 
shall decide between them ? In order to be the crite- 
rion, a faith must first legitimate itself; it must prove 
its authority before its claims can be recognized by phi- 
losophy. The appeal to revelation or inspiration may be 
made by any religion : the very thing to be established 
is the genuineness of the claimed authority. A faith, 
in order to gain the approval of reason, must be rational. 
This implies that reason is the ultimate appeal in case 
of conflict. Properly understood, there can be no ob- 
jection to this on the part of faith. As the appeal to 
reason as the final authority, even in religious faith, is 
often perverted, it is worth while to determine exactly 
what is meant by such an appeal. 

The claim that faith must be rational does not mean 
that all the objects of belief can be comprehended by 
reason. If this were the sense, faith might as well be 
abandoned at once. Reason neither comprehends itself 
absolutely, nor the soul, nor the world, nor God. So 
far as it understands its limits, it has the best grounds 

* Schleiermacher attempted this at the beginning of the century. 
Ritschl of Gottingen advocates the total exclusion of metaphysics 
from theology. He already has numerous followers, and his school is 
growing. 



84 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

for modesty. The deeper thought of the age tends to 
despair rather than to arrogance. Much may be true 
whose full meaning we cannot fathom. 

Nor does it mean that faith is only to accept what 
reason or the understanding demonstrates. If this were 
done, faith would be superseded by knowledge. This is 
the tendency of positivism and allied systems, though 
they themselves, in the name of knowledge, usually start 
with some supposition which itself needs proof, so that 
their positive knowledge itself rests on faith. Such 
tendencies, narrow, unconscious of their real character, 
often conceited as well as exclusive, are opposed by a 
philosophy which is broad as well as deep. A rational 
faith means the continuance of faith as faith, and not 
the foolish attempt to transform its emotional elements 
into mathematical formulas. Faith may contain much 
which reason cannot discover or demonstrate and com- 
prehend, and yet be perfectly rational. It must not, how- 
ever, contain any thing in itself contradictory ; and one 
of the most important functions of philosophy in relation 
to theology is the test of the consistency of theological 
dogmas and systems. Not only does the reason claim 
that doctrines must be consistent with themselves, but 
also that they must not be in conflict with the estab- 
lished laws of mind. When evidence is produced in 
favor of facts or doctrines, it must be in accordance with 
the laws of evidence. So far as its objects are subject 
to demonstration, faith has only that logic whose appli- 
cation is universal. The logic of faith, unless the ex- 
pression is figurative, is exactly the same as that which 
proves the revolution of the earth around the sun. The 
data, indeed, differ greatly, but not the reasoning founded 
on them. 

So far as the doctrines of faith are comprehensible by 






RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 85 

reason, they must be rational. But we go a step far- 
ther, and claim that faith, whether its doctrines are com- 
prehensible or not, must itself be rational ; that is, there 
must be sufficient ground for the faith. The fact that 
a doctrine is not self-contradictory is no evidence of its 
truth. The ontological proof has lost its force, because 
it is seen that a consistent idea of the Divine Being is 
no proof that God really exists. Whether it is held 
that faith is based on revelation, or on history, or on 
the study of nature, or on the impulses, demands, and 
experiences of man, or on all these combined, it can 
only substantiate its claims by showing that its grounds 
are rational. The objects of the claimed revelation may 
transcend the limits of our minds ; but if I am to believe 
in them, I must have reasonable grounds for the belief, 
otherwise I might as Avell accept mythology, or make 
some other arbitrary choice. For historic facts we 
justly demand historic evidence. Philosophy, in spite 
of the attempt of Hegelians, cannot determine a priori, 
or according to any valid process, what the historical 
development must have been, and what may have oc- 
curred at a particular time. But reason has criteria 
according to which historical events, whether sacred 
or profane, must be tested. Faith in events which 
stand this test is rational, while unbelief would be irra- 
tional. It is certainly not rational to determine by 
philosophy what belongs exclusively to history. A phi- 
losophy which decides a priori that providence, prophecy, 
and miracle are impossible, disposes of these subjects 
summarily, wholly regardless of the testimony of his- 
tory. All in history which comes under these heads is 
interpreted as mythology, or fiction, or deception, or 
mistake. There is much construction of history where 
there should be simply interpretation. We must judge 



86 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PniLOSOniY. 

experience by experience, not by any supposed philoso- 
phy of experience which ignores experience itself; so 
history must be judged by history, according to the 
laws of historic criticism. 6 

In affirming that reason is the last appeal, we mean 
that reason is fundamental ; it determines the laws of 
probability and certainty. It must not, however, be 
expected that reason can reconcile all principles, or 
explain all mysteries. If the accomplishment of this is 
to be the rule, then the religion that is rational must 
be barren, and will hardly rise above the level of rigid 
morality. Philosophy cannot fully explain even its 
own principles, or completely harmonize them ; and it 
is too much to expect of it an explanation of all that 
pertains to religion. Principles which are true may 
form a union at a point which lies beyond the reach of 
our intellects. Even Hume, with his empirical basis, 
his clearness and acumen and scepticism, could not 
limit his mind to what he could explain and demon- 
strate. At the close of his Treatise he says, "There 
are two principles which I cannot render consistent, 
nor is it in my power to renounce either of them ; viz., 
that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, 
and that the mind never perceives any real connection 
among distinct existences.'''' If these problems baffle the 
power of the mind, is it any wonder that the deepest 
may have much for faith and little for intellectual sight? 

The specific rules of reason as applicable to faith may 
be thus summarized : — 

1. The fact that a notion is perfectly consistent with 
itself is no evidence that there is a corresponding reality. 

2. No reality can correspond with a notion that is 
self-contradictory. A cannot at the same time be B 
and not-B. 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 87 

3. No doubt many objects exist of which reason has 
no conception, and which it cannot comprehend. The 
power of reason is not the measure of existence. 

4. Faith in such objects must be based on sufficient 
evidence ; that is, it must be rational. 

To reject rules as evident as these, is simply to deter- 
mine that faith shall be unreasonable ; that it shall rest 
on grounds which the mind itself finds inadequate. 
One need but understand what this means, in order to 
see that it is in reality faith against faith ; that it is 
an effort to force the mind to assent to what it cannot 
accept. Rejecting this negation of its own laws as 
impossible, nothing remains but genuine rationalism, 
as indicated in the rules given. But it is not what has 
commonly been called rationalism. Heretofore this 
name has usually been applied to the efforts to bring 
all the objects of faith within the comprehension of 
reason, or to admit as valid only those which reason 
itself could discover and demonstrate. This rational- 
ism was itself most irrational, because it ignored both 
the reasonable claims of the heart and the limits of 
reason. It viewed as rational only what was within 
the grasp of reason, which reason was often used in a 
low and narrow, not in an ideal, sense ; but it forgot 
that there may be rational grounds in histcry and ex- 
perience for a faith which is not limited by the powers 
of the reason to comprehend. The rationalism which 
the above rules establish simply claims that there should 
be a reason for the faith in us, and that we should prove 
all things, and hold fast that which is good. It is a 
rationalism which religion demands as much as philoso- 
phy; which, in fact, faith demands if it is to be faith. 
It admits that objects of faith may be above reason, but 
insists that they cannot be against reason; it admits 



88 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

that reason may no more he ahle to discover them than 
it can historic events, hut claims that faith in them 
must he reasonable. Whatever the ground of faith may 
be, whether in history, Scripture, nature, the heart, or 
the will, it must have a rational basis. 

If faith has at times sinned against reason by 
ignoring the rational claims, philosophy has also sinned 
against faith by ignoring its character and rights. But 
the sins of faith against reason are against faith itself; 
and when philosophy sins against faith, it also does vio- 
lence to its own nature. A philosophy which eagerly 
interprets the phenomena of the external world, but 
ignores those which are inner, which reveal man him- 
self and concern him most, may ignore religion, but it 
is not worthy of the name " philosophy." " 

It may be claimed that sin has so weakened reason, 
that it cannot test the truth ; but this objection cuts 
off the very limb on which the objector himself must 
stand. If it is valid, how can we know whether we 
have the truth ? How can we determine what to be- 
lieve ? The power of faith must also have been per- 
verted by sin. The argument which robs man of the 
ability to test the truth, also robs him of the possibility 
of attaining a reliable faith. The man who wants an 
ethical and spiritual basis of faith must, of course, him- 
self be moral and religious. 

A few more hints may be of service to the student. 
By its attacks, philosophy may help to make religion 
conscious of itself. The fact that certain views have 
been held for ages, does not establish their truth. But 
neither does it prove them false. Neither antiquity nor 
novelty decides any thing in philosophy. An object 
may be real, and yet our grounds for believing in it 
may be irrational. A man, after discovering that he 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 89 

has believed without sufficient reasons, may abandon 
his faith ; but the fact that his faith was not well estab- 
lished is no proof that the objects in which he believed 
do not exist. Our belief and unbelief do not affect the 
truth itself. The earth moved, though the whole world 
denied it. It is necessary to distinguish between the 
objects of faith and the psychological basis of faith. If 
faith is not valid without sufficient grounds, neither 
should it be rejected without sufficient reasons. "A 
logical apparatus that is to overturn the deepest of 
human beliefs, must have an extremely firm basis, and 
must have these parts so firmly articulated that there 
is no dislocating them." * 

The conflict between reason and faith has probably 
not yet reached its climax. Much as we may desire 
peace, the mind cannot rest until it has fought the 
battle to the end. No truce is possible until the com- 
batants have learned thoroughly to understand each 
other, and have become willing to give each other their 
dues. He who enters the conflict must be prepared 
for severe trials if he wants to make thorough work. 
Whatever else may be destroyed, the truth cannot be 
finally overthrown. If he has this confidence coupled 
with modesty, deep sincerity, and a religious love for 
truth, the student may safely enter the battle, assured 
that truth will at last hold the field. 

Confidence in the truth, and the resolute purpose to 
seek it, and it only, may unite in the closest bonds 
philosophy and religion. Both are free, but both are 
bound by the truth. Co-ordination, union, and freedom 
claimed by each for the other, as well as for itself, are 
the conditions of success. The progress made in our 

* Herbert Spencer uses these words with reference to Hume: Psy- 
chology, 2d ed., ii. 350. 



90 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

age is a guaranty to the scholar that he shall enjoy 
greater freedom in his inquiries than former ages 
• granted. That may, of course, be claimed as liberty, 
which is really an abuse ; but if true freedom is op- 
posed, progress cannot be permanently checked. The 
triumphs of intellect may be somewhat more slow, but 
they will eventually overthrow the last remains of 
bigotry. Helmholtz attributes the superior success of 
German investigators, in some departments of science, 
to the fact that they are "more fearless than others 
of the consequences of the entire and perfect truth. 
Both in England and France we find excellent inves- 
tigators, who are capable of working with thorough 
energy in the proper sense of the scientific methods ; 
hitherto, however, they have always had to bend to 
social or ecclesiastical prejudices, and could only openly 
express their convictions at the expense of their social 
influence and their usefulness. Germany has advanced 
with bolder step : she has had the full confidence, which 
has never been shaken, that truth fully known brings 
with it its own remedy for the danger and disadvantage 
that may here and there attend a limited recognition 
of what is true. A labor-loving, frugal, and moral 
people may exercise such boldness, may stand face to 
face with truth ; it has nothing to fear though hasty 
or partial theories be advocated, even if some appear to 
trench upon the foundations of morality and society."* 
Whatever else may be feared, we cannot abandon 
our confidence in the beneficence of truth. The whole 
truth will fit the heart as well as the head, and will be 
promotive of pure religion as well as of sound philoso- 
phy. " From science, modestly pursued, with a due 

* Aim and Progress of Physical Science, in Lis Popular Scientific 
Lectures. 



RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION, 91 

consciousness of the extreme finitude of our intellectual 
powers, there can arise only nobler and wider notions 
of the purpose of creation. Our philosophy will be an 
affirmative one, not the false and negative dogmas of 
August Comte, which have usurped the name and mis- 
represented the tendencies of a true positive philosophy. 
True science will not deny the existence of things 
because they cannot be weighed and measured. It 
will rather lead us to believe that the wonders and 
subtleties of possible existence surpass all that our 
mental powers allow us clearly to perceive." * 

LITERATURE. 

The subject of this chapter is frequently discussed in 
philosophical and dogmatic works, but not always with 
impartiality. Often it is too evident that there is more 
concern about the claims of some system, than to give 
an objective view of the relation of philosophy and 
religion. Deism in England, and rationalism in Ger- 
many, necessarily led to a discussion of the subject. 
Under the influence of Lessing, Kant, and Hegel, special 
attention was devoted to the relation. The works on 
natural or rational theology all bear on the subject. 
In works on the philosophy of religion (Kant, Fries, 
Schelling, Hegel, Caird, Plieiderer, Lotze), an effort is 
usually made to determine what religious elements are 
demanded by, or consistent with, certain philosophies. 
On the Continent the recent efforts to harmonize reli- 
gion are mostly based on the works of Kant, Herbart 
(Drobisch : Religionsphilosophie ; Fliigel : Die spekula- 
tive Tlieologie der G-egenivarf), Hegel (Biedermann : 
Philosophie und Christenthum, also Dogmatik ; Lipsius : 
two books on the same subjects as Biedermann's), and 

* Jevons, 768. 



92 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Lotze. RitschTs effort to exclude metaphysics from 
theology has led to discussions, mostly among theolo- 
gians, which have produced an extensive literature. 
(Ritschl : Theologie und Metaphysik ; Herrmann : Die 
Metaphysik in der Theologie ; Kaftan : Das Wesen der 
Religion). It has also been attempted to construct 
religions on the basis of positivism, evolutionism, and 
pessimism (Hartmann). The religious questions com- 
mon to philosophy and religion may be- concentrated 
under theism, and the doctrine of the soul or immortality ; 
the former including, besides the existence and attri- 
butes of God, such themes as creation, design, providence, 
miracles, revelation (Flint, Ladd, Pressense's Origins). 
On the relation of faith and knowledge (Glauben und 
Wisseri), there are numerous works in German, and the 
subject is also frequently discussed in philosophical 
journals. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Religion a personal relation to God. What basis and 
objects has it in common with Philosophy ? Difference 
between Philosophy and Religion. Between Religion 
and Theology. Reason and Faith. Rational Faith. 
Historical Rationalism and Deism. Reason and Com- 
mon Sense. Philosophy and Mysticism. Arguments 
for the existence of God. Views of Anselm, Descartes, 
Kant. Significance of the emotional and volitional 
elements in Religion. Philosophical and historical crit- 
icism (Tubingen School). Limits of thought and of 
being. Religion and Materialism, Pantheism, Positiv- 
ism, Agnosticism. Science and Religion. Basis for 
Religion in human nature. Moral argument for Reli- 
gion. Does the psychological basis of Religion furnish 
an argument in favor of the objects of Religion? What 
is meant by the self-evidencing power of truth? 



PHILOSOFHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 93 



CHAPTER III. 

PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 

Philosophy and science, the two departments in 
which modern intellect has attained its greatest achieve- 
ments, are both coldly intellectual, and, in theory at 
least, rigorous in method and absolute in the finality 
of their results. The advocates of each usually claim 
independence in their respective sphere, and contend 
for the supremacy in the domain of thought. It is but 
natural that with so great similarity they should often 
be confounded, and that with so much to distinguish 
them their hostility during rivalry and encroachments 
should become intense. But while at times they severely 
repel, they at others attract each other, and tend to 
coalesce. That they interlace, or even amalgamate, is 
evident from expressions like "scientific philosophy," 
and " philosophy of science/' * 

Under these circumstances it is peculiarly difficult to 
determine their exact places and relations ; but it is as 
important as difficult, particularly since they are the 
departments in which the severest efforts of intellect 
culminate. 

* In the beginning of this century, it was common in Germany to 
regard philosophy as science ( Wissenschaft) ; the same is still the case, 
but it meets with more opposition. A distinction is now made between 
philosophy which is scientific, and that which is not, as is evident from 
the Quarterly for Scientific Philosophy (ivissenschaftliche Philosophie), 
and also from the Italian journal Revista de Filosofia Scientiftca. 



94 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The student who watches the development of thought 
in the growth of language, will observe that "philos- 
ophy " and " science " are not so commonly as formerly 
employed as synonymes. As a branch in its growth 
may separate into two with different directions, so it has 
been with intellect in developing philosophy and science 
together and afterwards separating them into distinct 
tendencies. While both terms are at times still used for 
the same spheres, we shall see that the process of dis- 
crimination and analysis is rapidly assigning to each a 
peculiar class of objects, and a peculiar aim. The term 
"natural science" of course implies that there is other 
science also ; and for the present, for the sake of deti- 
niteness, we shall distinguish between philosophy and 
natural science, but with the conviction that the time 
is not distant when philosophy and science itself shall 
be generally admitted to have distinct spheres. 

If a word with different senses is used, it will be found 
that its leading or most apparent sense absorbs, as it 
were, the others, and is ordinarily the only one present 
to the mind. When used with a meaning different from 
the leading one, it requires special discrimination to 
discern it; so that we frequently get a meaning of a 
word, but not the one intended. When a technical term 
is popularized, some prominent shade of meaning is gen- 
erally seized, and applied to many objects to which it is 
not technically applicable. " Science " and " philosophy " 
are thus employed and made vague. But this law is also 
promotive of serious error, which can only be overcome 
by carefully observing the exact sense of a word in its 
connections. To such use, or rather abuse, the word 
" natural " is subject. In theology it has actually come 
to mean unnatural (sinful, the opposite of man's origi- 
nal, true nature). In science it is at times used in dis- 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 95 

tinction from the supernatural, in which case it includes 
the mental in man. When this is done, the mental is 
apt to be assimilated to what is most prominent in 
nature, namely the material and mechanical. But we 
also use "natural" in distinction from "mental," in 
which case man's peculiarities are most emphasized. 

When natural science is here contrasted with phi- 
losophy, we use " natural " as distinct both from the 
mental and the supernatural. Natural science thus in- 
cludes the whole domain of nature, but not psychology. 

There are two leading meanings in the term " science " 
which have led to confusion even in its technical use. 
Thus it is employed on the one hand to designate sim- 
ply certainty in systematized knowledge, whether that 
knowledge be formal or material ; * and, on the other, it 
designates systematized material knowledge that is cer- 
tain. Thus, when the mere element of certainty is con- 
sidered, there are two departments of thought which 
have the strongest claim to the term " science," namely 
mathematics and formal logic. They are both specula- 
tive, mathematics being based on space and numbers, 
logic on indisputable axioms, and both being developed 
according to inexorable laws of mind, independent of 
observation and experiment in the ordinary sense. That 
tins formal knowledge is the most certain of all, is evi- 
dent from the fact that mathematics and logic are not 
liable to the errors possible in observation and experi- 
ment ; besides, all material knowledge, natural science 
included, depends on formal knowledge for its construc- 
tion, so that, even if its materials are absolutely certain, 
material knowledge can at best but attain the absolute- 
ness of the formal laws by which it is constructed. 

* Material in the sense of containing objects as well as forms of 
knowledge. 



96 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

If certainty, then, were the sole point of considera- 
tion, we should not hesitate to pronounce the specu- 
lative departments of mathematics and formal logic 
pre-eminently science. But when we come to material 
knowledge we find that the conditions for the strict 
application of these formal systems are given only in 
nature, so that in the domain of material knowledge the 
term " science " is strictly applicable only to nature. If 
we distinguish between formal and material science, 
there can be no danger of confusion, since in that case 
the former will include mathematics and logic, while the 
latter will be limited to natural science. So promi- 
nent, however, has natural science become, that it is 
generally meant now when the term " science " is used ; 
and to avoid confusion it would be well to confine the 
term to that department. 

Even among scholars the term is employed in various 
senses. When used technically, they are apt to attach 
to it what is only incidentally associated, and has no 
claim to its exactness and severity, while when employed 
popularly they designate by it systematized knowledge 
of any kind. Thus heraldry is called " the science of 
conventional distinctions impressed on shields, banners, 
and other military accoutrements." History, jurispru- 
dence, music, politics, theology, aesthetics, ethics, logic, 
mathematics, chemistry, and many other subjects, have 
been called sciences. Now, a glance shows that neither 
in their objects, nor foundation, nor method, nor degree 
of exactness and reliability, is there any agreement 
between these heterogeneous subjects. No wonder, 
then, that scholars are not agreed as to the meaning of 
the term.* 

* Different writers, having different conceptions of what constitutes 
a science, have assigned different dates to the birth of geology and other 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 97 

When we speak of natural science, we are apt to 
think chiefly of a certain method and its results ; but 
we also imply a particular class of objects. The phe- 
nomena of nature are peculiar in that they cannot 
merely be observed like other facts before the mind, but 
they can also be tested so as to yield exact and definite 
results not dependent on subjective states. The mind, 
if viewed as a part of nature, cannot be subjected to 
the same tests throughout. Even biology presents 
greater obstacles than physics. The character of its 
experiments, and the method of drawing and testing its 
inferences, give natural science a peculiar severity and 
exactness. The physicist subjects objects to various 
modifications in order to discover the effect of different 
relations. Something is added or subtracted, or differ- 
ently placed, in order to discover new properties or 
facts. Professor Tait says, "The essence of experi- 
ment is to modify the circumstances of a physical phe- 
nomenon so as to increase its value as a test." The 
perfect uniformity, the absolute exactness, and the cer- 
tainty attainable in these experiments, make them 
peculiar ; and the laws to which they are subject deter- 
mine what is technically called the scientific method. 

Not more severe is natural science in its experiments 
than in observing and recording phenomena, whether 
occurring naturally or the result of experiment. The 
same experiments can be repeated at will and by any 
number of scientists, thus insuring greatest accuracy. 
But observation and experiment furnish only the mate- 
rials of science, not science itself. All the processes 

sciences. Professor Huxley defines science as " organized common 
sense : " and Mr. Spencer, as " partially unified knowledge." Science 
has also been defined as systematized knowledge, rationalized knowl- 
edge, verified knowledge, classified knowledge, etc. — H. M. Stanley, 
Mind, 1884, 2(>6. 



98 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

founded on them are mathematically exact. Whatever 
suppositions may be tentatively adopted, science itself 
is limited to demonstrations; so that in the strict sense, 
and according to its true idea, natural science is abso- 
lute. For this reason the term " science " is so often 
assumed to help along mere hypotheses and assumptions 
which have no claim either to exactness or finality. 
We must distinguish between the claims of science and 
the claims of scientists. 

Strict scientists are only consistent when they refuse 
the application of the term " science " to objects which 
will not submit to the tests of their method. If their 
conditions are correct, music, theology, history, politics, 
and similar subjects are not sciences. This of course 
does not imply that they are neither valuable nor relia- 
ble, but only that they do not comply with the condi- 
tions necessary to constitute science in its technical 
sense. When we speak of a man of science, we do not 
mean a theologian, metaphysician, historian, mathemati- 
cian, or logician, but one who devotes himself to natural 
science. Such expressions as " student of science, scien- 
tific study, scientific discovery, scientific progress," and 
many similar ones, are generally used in the sense indi- 
cated. From the more general meaning of systematized 
knowledge, the term has thus come to be appropriated 
for knowledge of a certain kind, obtained in a particu- 
lar way, subject to definite tests, and absolutely exact 
and reliable ; and nothing will be lost by limiting the 
word to what is, in the strictest and most technical 
sense, scientific. In doing this, science will not only 
be different from philosophy, but will also have a pecul- 
iar sphere, distinct in method and limitation, and clearly 
separated from all other departments of learning. 

Natural science seeks to discover the causes of physi- 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 99 

cal events, and attempts to construct a system of the 
laws of nature. " To find the law by which they are 
regulated, is to understand phenomena. For law is 
nothing more than the general conception in which a 
series of similarly recurring natural processes may be 
embraced." * 

The declaration that natural science aims to discover 
the laws of nature, is essentially the same as affirming 
that it seeks the forces of nature. The laws are simply 
statements of how the forces work, giving the formula 
of the operations of natural causes.f "Force" and 
" cause " are, however, words which seem to furnish 
explanations of phenomena which they in reality do 
not give. In using them, the mind should determine 
whether they interpret facts otherwise than by the sub- 
stitution of another fact. Do we know what a force is, 
or how a cause works to produce an effect ? We are apt 
to imagine that we have explained how a thing is done, 
when we have only shown that it is done. It is a deep 
inquiry to determine whether with what we call force 
we ever get farther than from one fact to another. In 
its last analysis a law gives only a method of procedure, 
or a general fact which embraces all facts of the same 
kind. The law of gravitation is itself a fact which 
includes many others ; but neither Newton nor any 

* Helmholtz, Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects (Appleton), 370. 
P. 393 he says " that what physical science strives after is the knowl- 
edge of laws; in other words, the knowledge how at different times, 
under the same conditions, the same results are brought about." Pro- 
fessor Tait states : " The object of all pure physical science is to en- 
deavor to grasp more and more perfectly the nature and laws of the 
external world." — Recent Advances in Physical Science, 347. 

t " Our desire to comprehend natural phenomena, in other words, to 
ascertain their laws, thus takes another form of expression, — that is, we 
have to seek out the forces which are the causes of the phenomena." — 
Helmholtz, 372. 



100 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

other human mind conceived the explanation of the law 
itself. 

Its aim to reduce phenomena to laws attaches natural 
science closely to the facts it attempts to formulate. 
"Nothing can be learned as to the physical world, save 
by observation and experiment, or by mathematical 
deductions from data so obtained." * These deductions 
of course include all the direct logical inferences from 
the facts, and it is in these that scientists most of all 
reveal their intellectual power. It would be trivial to 
state that science demands the severest mental efforts, 
were it not that in some quarters the view prevails that 
science is the product of mechanical routine, as much 
within the power of the shallowest as of the profoundest 
minds. Then, pretenders so often obtain popularity by 
palming off their thoughtless empiricism as science, that 
beginners are liable to forget that mere observers and 
experimenters are to the scientist what the hod-carrier 
is to the mason. All phenomena are valuable in pro- 
portion as they are elaborated and mastered by thought. 
Newton's great discovery required few facts, but enor- 
mous intellectual effort. Profound scientists recognize 
the need of emphasizing the mental vigor essential in 
scientific pursuits, for the reason that so many imagine 
that science requires nothing but a registering and classi- 
fying of facts. It is forgotten that the facts observed 
in nature can only be connected and related by the 
mind, and that the laws of nature are mental products 
from the given data. " Isolated facts and experiments 
have in themselves no value, however great their num- 
ber may be. They only become valuable in a theoret- 
ical or practical point of view when they make us 
acquainted with the law of a series of uniformly recur- 

* Tait, 342. 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 101 

ring phenomena, or, it may be, only give a negative 
result showing an incompleteness in our knowledge of 
such a law, till then held to be perfect." * Science, in 
dealing with facts for its highest purposes, is as purely 
intellectual as is philosophy in relating and developing 
concepts. 

Not mere observers, but the thinkers, have made this 
" the century of natural science." The victories ascribed 
to the laboratory are really the triumphs of reason in 
the laboratory. It might be misleading to speak of a 
philosophic element in the profound scientists from New- 
ton till the present ; and yet it would express their con- 
stant tendency to pass from the concrete to the abstract, 
and from facts to laws, principles, and system. The 
materials with which science deals being more apparent 
than its method, the sense has been honored with the 
functions of the reason, and it has been overlooked that 
the progress in physical studies has been due to a scien- 
tific empiricism, mastered by a scientific rationalism.! 
However unpopular speculation may be among empirics, 
it can be healthy as well as sickly, and is too deep an 
impulse of the mind to be ignored by real scientists. 
But the difference between science and philosophy is, 
that in the former the speculation is limited by facts 
and their laws, while in philosophy the concepts and the 
mental laws are the limit. Whoever has passed from 
the facts of science to science itself will agree with 
Whewell J in emphasizing the need of facts and reason, 
the "observation of things without, and an inward effort 

* Helmholtz, 369. 

t The indications given by the senses, unless interpreted by reason, 
are utterly unmeaning. But when reason and the senses work harmo- 
niously together, they open to us an absolutely illimitable prospect of 
mysteries to be explored." — Tait, 342. 

J History of the Inductive Sciences, Introduction. 



102 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of thought." He adds, " The impressions of sense, 
unconnected by some rational and speculative principle, 
can only end in a practical acquaintance with individual 
objects ; the operations of the rational faculties, on the 
other hand, if allowed to go on without a constant 
reference to external things, can lead only to empty 
abstraction and barren ingenuity. Real speculative 
knowledge demands the combination of the two ingre- 
dients, — right reason, and facts to reason upon. It has 
been well said, that true knowledge is the interpretation 
of nature : and thus it requires both the interpreting 
mind, and nature for its object ; both the document, and 
the ability to read it." 

Nature does not write or impress its facts and laws 
upon a passive mind, and it is no such immediateness 
of scientific knowledge which distinguishes it from the 
philosophic. Science is not the product of sensation- 
alism, though the denial of the possibility of knowledge 
anywhere else than in regions accessible to the senses 
has led to the more exclusive study of the phenomenal 
world. The merit of turning thought from scholastic 
subtleties to empirical investigations belongs largely to 
Bacon ; but those who regard his emphasis on the obser- 
vation of facts, as giving the essence of the modern 
scientific spirit and tendency, have failed to appreciate 
the intellectual energy in science. Bacon's great ser- 
vice to science consists rather in the general direction 
he gave to thought, than in the introduction of a com- 
plete method of scientific processes. He did much to 
banish useless inquiries, and to substitute for them 
researches which promise fruitful and certain results ; 
but it was an impulse to a certain course of inquiry, 
rather than a full indication of the route to be 
taken. 8 



PniLOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 103 

In discussing the relation of philosophy to science, we 
must distinguish the true scientist from mere empirics. 
While the aim and method of the latter put all recon- 
ciliation with philosophy out of the question, because 
they depreciate thought and exalt the sense to the throne 
of reason, the philosopher has much in common with the 
former, and can easily come to an agreement with him 
respecting many essential points in science and philoso- 
phy. The purely intellectual element in his pursuit 
brings the scientist into sympathy with the philosopher, 
while the philosopher unhesitatingly admits all that the 
scientist can justly claim for his method and its results ; 
and if both the philosopher and scientist are deep and 
broad, there can be little danger of conflict. 

Although the advance of science is due to the intel- 
lectual use of the facts, it is still the explanation of the 
facts that is sought; and scientists are usually suspi- 
cious of conclusions wholly beyond their reach. The 
facts are held to be the test of all speculations respect- 
ing nature. If scientists admit, that, in any department 
of thought, there may be knowledge of objects which 
cannot be subjected to the test of facts, they deny that 
it is scientific. In natural science, therefore, thought 
is limited, being tethered to the facts. Besides observa- 
tion, experiment, and mathematics, it is found that spec- 
ulation, hypotheses, and theories are indispensable ; but 
they must be based on facts and tested by them, and 
their sole value consists in their ability to explain the 
facts. In the strict sense, the work of natural science 
is completed when the laws of nature have been dis- 
covered and systematized ; inferences and generaliza- 
tions transcending the test laid down by science cannot 
be regarded as lying within its domain, however reliable 
in themselves. 



104 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Our liability to error induces us to seek in sense and 
reason a corrective of each other, and to regard the truth 
as resulting from the harmonious action of both. Only 
an unthinking sensationalism can claim that the last 
appeal should be made to the immediateness of our per- 
ceptions. Science has clearly demonstrated that our 
sense-impressions need correction by the judgment. I 
see light, and hear sound ; but no number of impressions 
can convince me that, aside from eye and ear, light and 
sound exist in nature. I touch a piece of iron and a 
cloth in the same room, and find the one colder than the 
other ; and yet I know that both have the same tempera- 
ture, my sensations being determined by the power of 
objects to conduct heat. Thus our intellect is the ulti- 
mate appeal, not the sense. As in its inferences, so also 
in its observations and experiments, natural science 
makes the reason supreme. The difference between 
ordinary and scientific observation and experiment is 
simply this, — that the latter use the sense and its ob- 
jects according to rational principles, while the former 
do not. Instead of the usual assumption, therefore, 
that sense and reason are to each other a corrective, Ave 
shall be nearer the truth in saying that reason uses the 
data of sense as aids in drawing legitimate conclusions. 
And natural science must be viewed as the rational in- 
terpretation of nature, based on a rational use of the 
facts, and subjected to the rational test by facts. 9 

So far there will probably be no dispute between the 
philosopher and the scientist. Whoever objects to the 
expressions "rational use" and "rational test," and to 
the supremacy of reason and the subordination of sense 
implied, need but substitute the word "irrational," to 
see the absurdity of his position. By eliminating the 
rational, he cuts off all dispute, for there is no basis left 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 105 

on which the disputants can stand. The only contro- 
versy possible between the philosopher and scientist 
would be respecting the sense of the word " rational," 
— a dispute which cannot be settled by science with its 
appeal to the test of facts (where is the standard reason 
given as a fact ?), but only by philosophy. 

No one questions the reliability of the results obtained 
by means of the scientific method. Formerly philos- 
ophers, indeed, proposed to substitute speculation for 
this method ; that is now, however, universally admitted 
to be wrong. But a conflict begins so soon as the ques- 
tion is proposed, whether the laws of nature established 
by science are the limits of knowledge. This is the 
same as the inquiry, whether there is other than scien- 
tific knowledge. It seems almost absurd to ask the 
question ; but some so exalt science that they not only 
refuse to join Du Bois-Reymond and others in inscrib- 
ing Ignorabimus on their banner, but every other attain- 
ment so dwindles in comparison with science, that they 
call it knowledge only by courtesy. A scholar eminent 
in one department may get into a narrow rut, and be 
unable to see over its edges any thing worthy of notice. 
Compared with the omnipotence of science, one may 
hear philology, literature, history, and logic, to say 
nothing of metaphysics, theology, aesthetics, and ethics, 
spoken of with a degree of contempt. 

The cause of science will not be retarded, but pro- 
moted, by distinguishing between those who have really 
caught its spirit, and such as are scientists only in name. 
If the latter speak disparagingly of other pursuits in 
order to magnify their own importance, they can work 
mischief only if regarded as speaking in the name of 
science. The question, whether there is any thing be- 
yond the limits of strict science, is answered by scien- 



106 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tists themselves in their efforts to get beyond. The 
limits of science are evidently not the limit of thought, 
and the mind cannot rest when it has reached them. 
Scientific men construct cosmologies, and frequently 
adopt materialistic or idealistic theories of the universe, 
which are wholly extra-scientific. It may even happen, 
that speculation is zealously denounced in the interest 
of exact science, but this only serves to increase the 
astonishment at finding so many winged speculations in 
works of scientists. The imagination plays a much 
more prominent part in constructing theories termed 
scientific than is generally supposed. Herbart held that 
imagination is essential to all discoveries, and that there 
is as much of it in original thought in science as in 
poetry. " It is very doubtful," he says, " whether New- 
ton or Shakspeare possessed the greater imagination." 
Surely our age need not abuse Kepler for his fancies, 
nor pity Newton if he believed in alchemy.* The reli- 
ability of what the mind imagines possible is to be deter- 
mined by direct questions to nature, to be answered by 
means of tentative experiment. The mere mental 
combinations and theories of scientists must of course 
be subjected, as far as possible, to scientific tests ; but 
their very existence, to say nothing of their abundance 
and utility, proves that the mind cannot be compressed 
within the limits of exact science. 10 

The confidence" with which we speak of natural sci- 
ence is justified so long as we remember that it confines 
itself to phenomena, and that its observations are neces- 
sarily limited. We enter the domain of mystery as soon 
as we inquire into the essence of things, the nature of 
forces and causes, and the totality of natural phenom- 
ena. Both the progress of science and the division 

* Jevous, 505. 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 107 

of labor have increased the difficulty of generalizations 
comprehending the total results of scientific inquiry. 11 
While specialization, so marked a feature of our age, 
greatly promotes the advance of the separate sciences, 
it also has serious disadvantages. The rigid specialist 
cannot get a comprehensive view of science even, still 
less of knowledge in general ; he is also in danger of 
becoming unjust to other branches, and of losing appre- 
ciation for every thing but his specialty. The undue 
exaltation of one department of thought destroys the 
unity of knowledge, and the organism of all the sci- 
ences. He who is supreme in a specialty may go far 
astray when he makes it the standard of all intellectual 
achievements, the criterion of all truth, the basis of all 
generalizations, and the law for the interpretation of 
the universe. Mere specialization, in exact proportion 
to its perfection, makes knowledge fragmentary. For 
systematic mental development, and for a complete and 
comprehensive view of tilings, the mind must go beyond 
these specializations. This is a demand of the special- 
ties themselves. Sometimes the limits of their spheres 
are in dispute ; who can settle it without rising above 
the limitations of each ? Divisions are matters of men- 
tal convenience, and analysis is but a preparation for 
synthesis. But how can we form a correct synthesis of 
all the sciences and their results ? In going beyond his 
specialty, the specialist ceases to be a specialist ; and it 
is no disparagement to his eminence in a particular 
sphere to say that the exclusive training for and in his 
specialty has probably unfitted him for the totally dif- 
ferent problems which lie beyond. These problems are, 
in many cases, the deepest, and involve the highest 
interests. Shall they be ignored? Shall they be left 
to the fancy? Or shall man be specially prepared to 



108 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

grapple with them ? The mind demands their solution, 
or, at least, the most earnest effort, with the best means, 
to solve them. If natural science could do the work, 
no one would hesitate to consign to it these problems ; 
but, lying far beyond the test of physical facts, science 
cannot even attempt to solve them without becoming 
philosophy. 

The unity of nature is an axiom of science, and the 
basis of all induction. But is this axiom given by 
isolated facts, or by the special sciences ? No one ques- 
tions that there must be unity in the final results of all 
the sciences ; but can a specialty teach us any thing 
respecting the results of all investigation ? There are 
principles wnich are common to all thought, which de- 
termine the character of all valid research, are the cri- 
teria of all truth, and lie at the basis of all the sciences ; 
now it is self-evident that what is common to all the 
sciences, and constitutes the essence of science itself, 
cannot be a specialty of any particular science. If any 
one claimed it as a monopoly, the others would imme- 
diately rebel. No natural science regards itself called 
upon to make these principles a specialty ; each one, as 
a rule, simply takes them for granted, and works on 
them. Such, for instance, are the principles of knowl- 
edge. Every science rests on these, and all its investi- 
gations and constructions must be determined by them; 
yet it might never, get to nature itself if it had first to 
answer the numerous questions pertaining to the theory 
of knowledge. All that can be expected of a specialist 
is that he master these principles ; and the failure to do 
so is often fraught with serious consequences in scien- 
tific investigations. 12 All inferences should be logical ; 
but the specialist cannot be expected to prepare a logic 
on the basis of his specialty, and then make that logic 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 109 

the basis of reasoning in the specialty. Then there are 
axioms, as in mathematics, which are taken for granted, 
and yet the question of their validity involves the per- 
plexing problems connected with the nature of what 
are called necessary truths. So, too, there are such 
notions as space, time, motion, change, substance and 
accidence, being, cause, and many others, which are 
commonly used as if perfectly clear, and yet they are 
full of mystery.* They may, indeed, be so habitually 
taken for granted that they hardly seem to involve 
unsolved problems, and habit may lead one to regard 
his assumptions as demonstrations. But the critical 
mind, which does not run in a narrow groove, and is 
not enslaved by dogmatism, sees that they involve the 
deepest problems of the human intellect ; and it also 
knows that every solution opens new fields of inquiry. 
With all the brilliant discoveries of science, the sphere 
of mystery has been enlarged and darkened. The 
problems which arise out of the depths of science and 
cannot be solved by it are philosophical, and must be 
answered, if at all, by philosophy. 

The study of the principles, organism, and final con- 
sequences of science, has led scientists themselves to 
connect philosophical speculations with their specialties. 
In Descartes and Leibnitz, philosophy and science were 
intimately connected. Kant passed from mathematics 
and physics to metaphysics and ethics. Lotze and 
Harms went from medical studies to philosophy. Hart- 

* How are we to think matter ? Is it the unchangeable basis of phe- 
nomena, or is it also changeable ? If it is itself changeable, is there any- 
thing in the universe that is not subject to change? If matter is re- 
garded as an unchangeable substance, how can we account for the man- 
ifold phenomena of the world ? To dismiss these subjects as irrelevant, 
means that the mind's inquiries must be checked whenever they go 
below the surface. 



110 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILOSOPUY. 

mann claims to base his speculations on the results of 
natural science, according to the most approved scien- 
tific method. Professor Wundt declares it was the 
natural sciences which, " almost without my knowledge 
and desire, led me toward philosophy ; " and also states 
that now the sciences which lately seemed farthest 
removed from philosophy have not been least affected 
by it.* Helmholtz and others on the Continent adopt 
fundamental principles of Kant's philosophy. In Eng- 
land, Locke, as developed by Hume and Mill, is the 
leading authority among scientists. These philosophers, 
not the sciences, are the source of the prevailing sensa- 
tionalism and empiricism. In the doctrine of causation ; 
in the hesitation to regard the uniformity of nature as 
established bejTuid question ; in the substitution of 
heredity, association, and experience, for the necessity 
of reason ; in the suspicion with which thought, rising 
above the impressions through the senses, is viewed, 
we see the philosophy of Hume. The argument some- 
times met with, that a miracle is possible because the 
uniformity of nature is no necessity of reason, is simply 
using Hume against Hume. And the view of Darwin 
and the Darwinians, that the power to form abstractions 
does not distinguish man from animals, is nothing but 
Berkeley's argument against abstract ideas, adopted and 
made current by Hume. Indeed, scientists usually place 
themselves on some- philosophical basis, on which they 
construct their theories ; and the conflicts among sci- 
entists are usually philosophical, not scientific. Just 

* " Nicht am wenigsten sind aber diejenigen Wissenschaften von der 
Philosophie beriihrt worden, die ihr vor nicht langer Zeit vielleicht am 
fernsten gestanden, diejenigen, die mich selbst — ieh darf wohl sagen 
fast ohne rnein Wissen und Wollen — der Philosophie entgegengefuhrt 
haben, die Naturwisseiischaften." — Avfgo.be der Philosophie in der Geyen- 
toarty 5. 



— 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. Ill 

because it is so absolute, and always appeals to facts, and 
to demonstrations based directly on them, science cannot 
be disputed. It does not dispute, it demonstrates. 

We are consequently justified in affirming that sci- 
ence, in proportion as it is deep, will recognize the 
necessity of philosophy. The isolated thoughts or laws 
furnished by the experimental sciences, instead of sat- 
isfying the mind, impel it to form a union of the 
fragments, and to draw from them the ultimate conse- 
quences. It asks, What is the result of all the sciences? 
Into what ocean do they pour their contents ? Starting 
with the given data and their laws, what may be in- 
ferred respecting the first and final causes? In these 
queries are condensed some of the most important prob- 
lems which experimental science suggests, but which 
lie beyond its sphere, and in the domain of philosophy. 
The mind continually strives to trace relations, to bring- 
remote objects together, and to unite the separated. 
In this it is controlled by an impulse which may be 
rudely checked, but which cannot be satisfied until 
that ultimate unity is discovered whose existence is a 
postulate of reason. 13 

Much of the opposition of scientists to philosophy is 
due to the spirit of positivism, which lauds experience, 
but fails to see that the laws drawn therefrom involve 
abstractions whose processes are subjected to philosophi- 
cal, not scientific tests. Comte would ruthlessly banish 
thought from the highest regions, and confine it to phe- 
nomena. His system denies the rights of the mind 
itself. Its author and some of his disciples (especially 
Littre*) imagined that their positivism was allied to the 
Kantian criticism ; but it is evident that they totally 
failed to catch the spirit of the critical philosophy, 
particularly of its earnest efforts to reach the limits of 



112 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

thought, and to conserve the basis of morality. Posi- 
tivism is not merely unhistorical, but also uncritical. 
Without taking the trouble to examine thoroughly the 
mental powers, it determines arbitrarily the limits of 
thought ; and in this essential element its method 
of procedure is the very opposite of the critical philoso- 
phy. Positivism is dogmatism exalted to absolutism. 14 

Positivism is not, however, the only source of antag- 
onism between science and philosophy. Various philo- 
sophical systems have been seriously at fault, and have 
aroused opposition. In Germany the schism occurred 
during the first decades of this century, when the influ- 
ence of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel determined the 
prevalent character of philosophic thought. The spec- 
ulative tendencies were carried to such an extreme that 
experiment was regarded beneath the dignity of philos- 
ophers and scientists, who were expected to unravel all 
mysteries a priori, and to spin the laws of nature, as 
well as of mind, out of their own brains. For u phi- 
losophy " Fichte attempted to substitute the term Wis- 
senschaftslehre (the doctrine of science), which was 
intended to give the laws of science. In the work with 
this title he claims that the volume takes no account 
of experience, and that its doctrines would be true even 
if there were no experience. The same tone was 
adopted by Schelling and Hegel. While experience 
was spoken of disparagingly, speculation was made 
supreme and regarded as containing all the treasures of 
wisdom. But during the a priori frenzy (1790-1840) * 

* A description of the beginning of this frenzy is given in my Life 
of Immanuel Kant, chap. 11. 

I am well aware that all of Hegel's disciples are not prepared to 
admit that their master went to the extreme in speculation. There are 
many points which are left obscure by Hegel himself, and the fierce 
disputes in his school have only served to add to the confusion. Some 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 113 

the natural sciences made rapid progress, and completely 
emancipated themselves from the influence of specula- 
tive philosophy. A great re-action came. The specu- 
lative systems had prevailed in State and Church and 
literature ; but before the middle of the present century 
a different spirit became dominant. The a priori expla- 
nations of nature were laughed at ; the speculations of 
philosophers were viewed as air-castles ; and science, 
based on the most pains-taking collection of facts and 
the severest induction, became supreme. It seemed as 
if an impassable gulf had been fixed between experi- 
mental science and philosophy. With their extrava- 
gance the really solid and grand achievements of the 
speculative s} r stems were also rejected. Science became 
haughty and exclusive. Experimentalists looked with 
as much contempt on speculators as these had expressed 
for the former ; and shallow empirics revealed their wis- 
dom by an ignorant sneer at profound philosophers. 
Science claimed the entire domain of the real, while the 
realm of visions was assigned to philosophy. This 
development since Kant's Kritik appeared enables us 
to understand why in Germany philosophy and natural 
science are more sharply distinguished than in other 
lands. Naturphilosophie is not used like " natural phi- 
losophy " in England and America to designate physics, 
but speculations respecting nature ; hence it belongs to 
philosophy, not to science. 

Respecting the beginning of that conflict which 

of his disciples claim that on the value of experiment, on the relation 
of experience to reason, on the significance of the particular or indi- 
vidual and the general, and of the concrete and the abstract, Hegel 
had been misunderstood. This may be true ; but in that case both the 
disciples and the master are to blame for contradictory statements, and 
for the use of terms which seem to teach one thing when they mean 
something different. 



114 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

drove philosophy and science into hostile camps, it will 
be interesting to hear so eminent a scientist as Helm- 
holtz.* " Certainly, at the end of last century, when 
the Kantian philosophy reigned supreme, such a schism 
had never been proclaimed ; on the contrary, Kant's 
philosophy rested on exactly the same general ground 
as the physical sciences, as is evident from his own 
scientific works, especially from his Cosmogony." Of 
Hegel's efforts to construct natural philosophy a priori, 
he says, " His system of nature seemed, at least to nat- 
ural philosophers, absolutely crazy. Of all the distin- 
guished scientific men who were his contemporaries, not 
one was found to stand up for his ideas. Accordingly, 
Hegel himself, convinced of the importance of winning 
for his philosophy in the field of physical science that 
recognition which had been so freely accorded to it 
elsewhere, launched out, with unusual vehemence and 
acrimony, against the natural philosophers, and espe- 
cially against Sir Isaac Newton, as the first and greatest 
representative of physical investigation. The philoso- 
phers accused the scientific men of narrowness ; the sci- 
entific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. 
And so it came about that men of science began to lay 
some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influ- 
ences from their work ; while some of them, including 
men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to con- 
demn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but 
as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, 
not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hege- 
lian system to subordinate to itself all other studies 
rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims 
of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of 
cognition, and the definition of the functions of the 
intellect." 15 * 7-8. 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 115 

This feud has by no means been confined to Ger- 
many, though it was most bitter there. The various 
phases of the conflict need not be considered here ; but 
the schism itself must be taken into account in order to 
understand the relation now existing between scientists 
and philosophers. It is not a conflict between philos- 
ophy and science, which would imply that they are 
incompatible and that the one or the other must there- 
fore be destroyed ; but between historic systems, which 
are imperfect and liable to change. There is scarcely a 
doubt that in the controversy philosophers have been 
the greatest gainers, perhaps because they were most to 
blame originally and had most to learn. Not only have 
they abandoned their a priori constructions respecting 
natural phenomena, but many of them have also become 
earnest students of science, so as to connect their phil- 
osophical speculations as intimately as possible with the 
results of exact research. Naturally they attend rather 
to laws and principles than to the details of science, 
though these have also received much attention. To 
remove the charge of vagueness and uncertainty, they 
have attempted to give philosophy as much of the sci- 
entific basis and method as is consistent with its charac- 
acter and aims. If a philosopher now placed himself on 
the Naturphilosophie of Schelling or Hegel, he would in 
his own fraternity be laughed at for his pains. The 
conflict has made philosophy more modest, more criti- 
cal, more solid, and consequently more reliable. 

There are also scientists who have been gainers from 
the conflict. The masters in science recognize their 
limitations, admit the significance of the theoretical 
element, encourage the study of the cognitive faculties 
and of logic, while carefully excluding metaphysics from 
science. The cry, "Return to Kant," came largely 



116 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

from scientists, who felt the need of supplementing 
science with a critical philosophy. Such a prejudice 
has, however, been excited against philosophy, that 
many students of science have ignored even the study 
of logic ; and their works also prove that they do not 
distinguish clearly between sensation, experience, and 
reason. 

Herbart's words, uttered at the beginning of this cen- 
tury, sound like a prophecy : u It cannot be otherwise 
than that the neglect of philosophy should result in a 
frivolous or perverted treatment of the fundamental 
principles of all the 801611068/' So common has this 
treatment become in certain quarters, that earnest voices 
are heard among scientists, to say nothing of philoso- 
phers and others, favoring more thorough discipline in 
philosophical studies. Even the materialist, Dr. Louis 
Biichner, holds that the riddles of life, if to be solved 
at all, require philosophy. He declares that no special 
science can give this solution; the only hope is in the 
results of all, developed according to logical principles.* 
Professor Haeckel f also complains of " the lack of phil- 
osophical culture, which characterizes most of the physi- 
cists of the day." He claims that many of the errors 
of scientists are due to their neglect of philosophy, and 
to that " crude empiricism " which they laud as u exact 
science." u The numerous errors of the speculative 
natural philosophers in the first third of this century 
have brought all philosophy into such disrepute among 
exact scientists, that they cherish the strange illusion 
that they can construct the edifice of natural science 
from facts without a philosophical connection of the same ; 
from mere observation without understanding. Only by 

* Frankfurter Zeitung, 1871, No. 283. 
t Natiirliche Schopfungsyeschichte. 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 117 

means of the most thorough permeation of philosophy 
and empiricism can the indestructible edifice of true 
monistic science arise." While Helmholtz throws the 
weight of his influence in favor of the study of the cog- 
nitive and logical elements of philosophy, his colleague, 
Du Bois-Reymond, does not hesitate to make the charge, 
that among scientists there is a lamentable lack of phil- 
osophical training and dialectic acumen. In his " Seven 
Riddles of the World," he said that the manner in which 
his address on " The Limits of Natural Science " had 
been received proves that " the national philosophic 
culture, of which we are accustomed to boast, does not 
appear in a favorable light." So completely " has philoso- 
phy been shoved aside, that even where natural science 
itself has in many points reached the stage of philoso- 
phizing, there often appears a great lack of preliminary 
conceptions, and ignorance of what has really been 
accomplished." It seems strange that scientists should 
have found it necessary to defend logical studies and 
deep thinking in science, but that has been the case. 
Opposing the empirics, who want to make science super- 
ficial, Liebig said, " In natural science all investigation is 
deductive or a priori ; experiment is only for use by the 
process of thought, just as arithmetical calculation ; 
thought must precede it in all cases if it is to have any 
significance. An empirical investigation of nature, in 
the usual sense, does not exist."* Fechner recognizes 
the need of metaphysics ; and declares that while the 
scientist stops with the atoms, these by no means satisfy 
the mind, which strives to go beyond them. After a 
war between natural science and philosophy, we now 
see them " gradually coming to themselves and making 
peace with each other, which promises to be the more 

* Phllosophische Monatshefte, vol. xi., quoted by Barutsclieck. 



118 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

lasting, since the very problems which claim the atten- 
tion of modern science are of such a character that their 
solution is possible only on condition of co-operation 
between natural science and philosophy." * 

The antagonism between philosophy and science is 
evidently drawing to a close. Both parties have erred ; 
their approach now is on the basis of truth, of mutual 
need, and mutual help. Professor Huxley holds that 
" the reconciliation of physics and metaphysics lies in 
the acknowledgment of faults upon both sides ; in the 
confession by physics that all the phenomena of nature 
are, in their ultimate analysis, known to us as facts of 
consciousness ; in the admission by metaphysics, that 
the facts of consciousness are practically interpretable 
only by the methods and formulas of physics ; and, 
finally, in the observance by both metaphysical and 
physical thinkers of Descartes' maxim, — assent to no 
proposition the matter of winch is not so clear and 
distinct that it cannot be doubted/'' f In his Logik, 
Ueberweg says that "the so-called empirical sciences 
would have to abandon their scientific character, if they 
wanted to reject all thoughts transcending direct expe- 
rience." % In 1873, the Academy of Sciences in Berlin 
admitted to membership two philosophers, Professors 
Zeller and Harms. The address of welcome contained 
these sentences: "If the signs of the times do not 

* Die Grundprincipien der Schilling schen Naturphilosophie, by Dr. R. 
Koeber. See also Wundt's Einfluss der Philosophie auf die Natuncissen- 
schaften, and Aufgabe der Philosophie in der Gegenwart. 

t Lay Sermons, Descartes 'Discourse on Method. The only difficulty 
is in the third condition. If all the phenomena of nature are, " in their 
ultimate analysis, known to us as facts of consciousness," how can the 
facts of consciousness be practically interpretable by the methods and 
formulae of physics ? This makes consciousness interpretable by 
consciousness. 

J At the close. 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 119 

deceive, the reconciliation of philosophy and the natural 
sciences is gradually approaching. . . . The most impor- 
tant discoveries in natural science shed their light over 
connected phenomena of extensive spheres, and they 
of themselves impel to seek a comprehension of the uni- 
versal. Ingenious representatives of the natural sciences 
approach philosophy, and admit that the mission and 
method of both are not irreconcilably hostile. What- 
ever is gained permanently by philosophy in historical 
and scientific tendencies, will revive the consciousness 
that all the sciences are one." 

Objections to philosophy are still common ; they are 
not, however, directed so much against philosophy per 
se, as against certain historic systems and methods. To 
lay their faults to the charge of philosophy itself, is as 
rational as to blame science for the methods of mere 
empirics. Certain philosophical systems have been vis- 
ionary; but we are advocating sober, critical philoso- 
phy, not wild speculation. The charge that philosophy 
is not exact, may mean that its objects cannot be 
weighed and measured. But this is the fault, if fault 
at all, of the objects, not of philosophy. Does any one 
blame science for determining only proximately the dis- 
tance of a fixed star, or, perhaps, resorting to guesses 
on the subject? Ideas cannot be put into scales, or 
determined by inches ; there are no pints or pounds for 
truth and morality. But this is no argument against 
either philosophy or the existence and value of its 
objects.* These may be real, though not tangible ; and 
because so purely intellectual, it is difficult to define 

* "The study of logical and mathematical forms has convinced me 
that even space itself is no requisite condition of conceivable existence. 
Every thing, we are told by materialists, must be here or there, nearer 
or farther, before or after. I deny this, and point to logical relations as 
my proof." — Jevoxs, 768. 



120 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

them, and communicate the conception of them to other 
minds. 

The objection that philosophical systems have often 
changed is no argument against philosophy itself. The 
charge that it has accomplished nothing is based on 
ignorance of its own progress, and of its great service 
in developing science, and promoting all departments 
of intellect. Philosophy is fundamental ; and its value 
is not diminished because the foundation itself was hid 
from most men, while the superstructure it bore was 
evident to all. 

Many of the objections to philosophy may as cogently 
be urged against science. That, too, has problems of 
long standing, which are apparently no nearer solution 
than when first proposed. Can it explain the origin of 
life, or sensation, or consciousness, or the connection 
of mind and body? Can it in sound, say in music, 
sharply separate the physical, the physiological, and the 
psychical elements ? But questions like these are end- 
less ; and if they do not arise, it may be because in 
science men so often operate with symbols which are 
taken for explanations, but in reality explain nothing. 
Science, like philosophy, the deeper it goes, the more 
fully it realizes that it exposes problems rather than 
solves them. It should also be remembered that sci- 
ence itself thrusts upon philosophy the deepest prob- 
lems ; and if these are unsolvable, it proves that science 
itself must remain a torso. 

The defmiteness and exactness of science also have 
their limitations. Has it been determined where plants 
end, and animals begin ? Has the limit of species, or 
even their exact nature, been fixed ? Is there any thing 
definite respecting the use of such important terms 
as atoms, matter, force? What is the bond of union 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 121 

between chemistry and physics ? What is ether ? What 
are the connecting links between gravity, light, heat, 
and electricity? * But it is useless to multiply instances. 
Surely it is no argument against natural science, that 
its deepest problems have thus far remained unsolved ; 
but this makes it the more unaccountable that such an 
objection should seriously be urged against philosophy. 

The lack of agreement among philosophers has been 
used against philosophy; but how is it with scientists? 
Within the last decades the most bitter controversies 
have been those of the latter. " Physical science itself, 
as it becomes general, grows to be contested. . . . The 
larger conceptions and principles of physical inquiry 
are so notoriously under dispute at the present day, 
that it is almost trivial to mention the fact." 16 Science 
invites to deep research just because so much remains 
to be done. " We have but to open a scientific book, 
and read a page or two, and we shall come to some 
recorded phenomenon of which no explanation can yet 
be given." f Is it surprising, then, that philosophy has 
unsolved problems ? The same author sa} r s, " It ought 
to be added, that, wonderful as is the extent of physi- 
cal phenomena open to our investigation, intellectual 
phenomena are yet vastly more extensive." 

Absolute as science is in its proper sphere, it is, as 

* Wundt (Aufgabe) says that, within the memory of the present gen- 
eration, gravity, light, heat, and electricity were each subjected to a 
special method of explanation, and each in reality required a particular 
theory of matter. Accordingly in different departments of science 
different theories of matter prevailed ! 

t Jevons, 754. Du Bois-Reymond gives the following as the seven 
riddles of science, some of which he regards as beyond all hope of 
solution: 1. The nature of matter and force. 2. The origin of motion. 
3. The origin of life. 4. The apparent design in nature. 5. The origin 
of sensation. 6. The origin of rational thought and of language, which 
is intimately connected with it. 7. The freedom of the will. 



122 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

we have seen, severely limited to that sphere ; and the 
masters in science continually warn against transcend- 
ing these limits, and treating philosophy as if lying 
within the domain of science. The two departments 
do not conflict. Instead of dictating them, philosophy 
accepts and uses the facts and laws scientifically estab- 
lished, making them factors in its inferences. Neither 
does science encroach on philosophy ; but gratefully 
accepting its fundamental principles, science rejoices 
if it takes up for solution the weightiest problems. All 
the sciences press toward a unity attainable only with 
the help of philosophy. To check philosophy proper 
is to check thought itself. 

If in its search for ultimate principles philosophy 
takes up, for criticism, thoughts with which scientists 
continually operate without making them subjects of 
special reflection, that is no interference. Philosophers 
who habitually deal with mental phenomena and ab- 
stract terms are, in all probability, best prepared to 
investigate them. Some of these terms have already 
been indicated; as, substance, cause, being, time, 
space, motion, matter, force. Philosophers may render 
important service by elucidating the concepts for which 
they are supposed to stand ; they can at least deter- 
mine whether the concept is consistent with itself, or 
contains contradictions. Thinkers recognize the obscu- 
rity of these terms, though ordinary investigators are 
apt to imagine that they have a definite knowledge 
of the concepts, or the reality which they represent. 
Investigators, as they go deeper and become conscious 
of the fact that they use symbols for reality, learn 
modesty. Balfour Stewart says, " It thus appears that 
we know little or nothing about the shape or size of 
molecules, or about the forces which actuate them; 



and, moreover, the very largest masses of the universe 
share with the very smallest this property of being 
beyond the direct scrutiny of the human senses, — the 
one set because they are so far away, and the other 
because they are so small." * Therefore we are obliged 
either to dismiss these subjects, or else to resort to 
speculation. Since the deepest inquiries of science 
always impel to theoretical investigations, all that it 
can ask is that philosophy base its speculations on 
reliable data, and conduct them according to the most 
rigid logic. 

Healthy speculation, or the thorough elaboration of 
concepts and their consequences, is essential to science. 
The scientific method is possible only because there are 
concepts and principles on which it rests, which them- 
selves are not within the limits or under the necessity 
of (empirical) scientific demonstration. And the scien- 
tist does not hesitate to use notions which he cannot 
test scientifically. What use could he make of atoms 
and the theories founded on them, if he were limited 
to his senses and the test of facts ? An atom may 
be thought, but it cannot be perceived. " The limits 
placed upon our senses, with respect to space and time, 
equally preclude the possibility of our ever becoming 
directly acquainted with these exceedingly minute 
bodies, which are, nevertheless, the raw materials of 
which the whole universe is built." f Another eminent 
scientist says, " An atom in itself can no more become 
an object of our investigation than a differential." $ 

* The Conservation of Energy (Appleton), 6. 

t Balfour Stewart, 9. 

X J. R. Mayer. See Correlation and Conservation of Forces, by W. 
R. Grove (Appleton), 347. Tait says that the question of atoms is one 
whose " solution seems to recede from our grasp as fast, at least, as we 
attempt to approach it," 284. 



124 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The most various properties have been attributed to 
them, and even their materiality has been questioned. 
Yet, in spite of this, there are those who, in the name 
of science, make atomism the explanation of mental as 
well as of natural phenomena. Philosophers do not 
question the right to use the notions of atoms and 
matter, but they insist that these are only symbols 
for an unknown something. So physicists speak of 
force as the cause of phenomena. Faraday says, " What 
I mean by the word 4 force,' is the cause of a physical 
action ; the source or sources of all possible changes 
amongst the particles or materials of the universe." 
Mayer says, " Force is something which is expended in 
producing motion; and this something which is ex- 
pended is to be looked upon as a cause equivalent 
to the effect, namely, to the motion produced." * Tait 
denies that force is a thing at all. " It is not to be 
regarded as a thing, any more than the bank rate of 
interest is to be looked upon as a sum of money. . . . 
Force is the rate at which an agent does work per unit of 
length.^ f Force, then, is cause, something, rate, — all 
concepts that involve philosophical inquiries. Hume 
was any thing but a scientist, yet his contribution to 
thought consists chiefly in his discussion of causation. 
And many scientists take their notion of cause from 
Hume's philosophy. 

Thus one need but take the concepts which all 
scientists must use, in order to see the absurdity of 
attempting to banish philosophy. Science and philos- 
ophy have many notions in common, which can never 
be the direct product of experience, and can be tested 
only by critical thinking. All that lies behind bare 
and isolated phenomena is a mental product. No 

* Grove, 379, 335. t 357, 358. 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 125 

observation can discover substance, cause, or power; 
and those who admit nothing but observation and its 
direct results must, like Hume, deny their existence 
in the external world. They are concepts, not per- 
cepts. If philosophy is rejected because it deals with 
such concepts, then science must also be rejected, for 
its fundamental notions are of exactly the same charac- 
ter. If philosophy does not speculate, then scientists 
must do it. And it is remarkable how philosophers 
and scientists may come to the same conclusions, in- 
dependently of each other, and often by different 
methods.* 

The more fully the relation of philosophy and sci- 
ence is considered, the deeper the conviction becomes 
that they require each other. Both are necessary for 
an intelligent consideration of the world-problem, and 
for all rational attempts to solve it ; both are parts of 
the same great system of knowledge. We may reject, 
as too indefinite, the definition of Herbert Spencer : 
"Philosophy is completely unified knowledge ; " f never- 
theless, there is truth in it, since no knowledge, no 
science, can be completed or unified without philosophy. 

Besides the notions held in common by philosophy 
and science, there are many in which scientists are 
interested, which nevertheless belong chiefly or wholly 
to philosophy. Among these are the problems of 

* Schopenhauer reduces all force to will, not only the force in man, 
but also in nature. A. R. Wallace (Contributions to the Theory of Natu- 
ral Selection) holds a similar view. He says it seems probable that all 
force is will-force. Matter, he holds, is force, and nothing but force. 
Matter in the popular sense does not exist, and cannot be philosophi- 
cally conceived. Zollner has placed the views of Schopenhauer and 
Wallace in parallel columns, thus making their similarity the more 
apparent. 

t First Principles, 539. If knowledge is unified in its ultimate prin- 
ciples, it becomes philosophy. 



126 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

monism, dualism, pluralism, materialism, idealism, pan- 
theism, theism, the nature of freedom, the immortality 
of the soul. Many other questions must remain unan- 
swered, or be left to philosophers, or to them and 
scientists conjointly. Science and philosophy must 
co-operate. Each must find an inspiration, a correc- 
tive, a help, and, in a measure, a limitation, in the 
other. Antagonism means the destruction of self in 
proportion as the antagonist is destroyed. Their free 
and harmonious co-operation, while each remains per- 
fectly independent, is the only ground of hope for the 
best results both in science and philosophy. 

It is surely a strange phenomenon, that the mind can 
so lose itself in the contemplation of the objects of 
nature as to forget itself, its processes, and its own 
laws, which alone make a knowledge of nature possi- 
ble. Is it not a species of infatuation or frenzy ? Not 
a few seem even to forget that natural science has sig- 
nificance only for the mind, not for nature, the object 
of investigation. Unless some human interest is to be 
promoted, it is difficult to understand why bugs should 
be so diligently studied and classified. It can hardly 
be claimed that any blessing is to accrue to them, or 
that nature is thereby to be exalted. But if some 
interest of humanity, is to be subserved, and if all 
study of inferior objects is somehow to promote the 
welfare of the highest of all, why not then regard also 
the study of humanity, of mind itself, as of the utmost 
importance, and all other knowledge as valuable in 
proportion as it furthers a knowledge of self, and is 
promotive of human interests? 

There are already evidences of a decided re-action 
against the tendency which would make the mind a 
mere tool to work with in the quarries of nature, — a 



PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 127 

tool which can neither understand itself nor the purpose 
of its work. Enough has been said to show that it is 
not the real scientists who are guilty of thus inestimably 
degrading the mind. The re-action is simply the rebel- 
lion of the intellect against the attempted degradation ; 
and the leaders in science are also leaders in the re- 
action. Unfortunate would it be for human progress, if 
the systematic ignoring of what concerns humanity most 
on the part of empirics, should lead to a depreciation of 
real science. Nature need not be less studied ; but the 
mind, too, has claims, and will see to it that they are 
not ignored. " Unmistakably the centre of gravity in 
scientific inquiries is gradually being shifted. The nat- 
ural sciences have passed their most flourishing period, 
the mental sciences are approaching theirs." * How far 
the prophecy of the eminent thinker who gives expres- 
sion to this thought shall be fulfilled, must be left to the 
future. But we cannot suppress the wish that there 
may be before us not less of natural science, but more 
philosophy, and more general attention to mental phe- 
nomena. A healthy intellectual period cannot bury or 
hide the mind under its possessions, but will appreciate 
those possessions as the wealth of the mind; and all 
attainments will be esteemed in proportion to their real 
dignity and to their relation to the highest interests. 
Unless indications deceive, the progress of thought 
among the Greeks wilL be repeated in our day, namely, 
from matter to mind, and from nature to humanity. 

* Wundt, Lof/ik, II. 516, 517: " Doch unverkennbar verschiebt sich all- 
lnahlieh tier Schwerpunkt der wissenschaftlichen Forschungen. Die 
Naturwissenschaften haben ibre Bliitbe hinter sich, die Geisteswissen- 
schaften geben ihr entgegen. Die Einfliisse des Naturalismus auf die 
letzteren, die noch iiberall in gescbicbtspbilosopbiscben Systemen, in 
sociologischen mid naturrechtlichen Tbeorien zu spiiren sind, werden 
damit von selbst verschwinden. 



128 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

May we not also expect, that, as Aristotle followed 
Plato, so now rigid, rational philosophizing, uniting in- 
duction and deduction, will follow an unbridled specu- 
lation in philosophy ? 

REFLECTIONS. 

Various senses in which " Science " is used. Its true 
sense. Scientific method. Limits of Science. Rela- 
tion of Hypotheses and Theories to Science. Relation 
of Philosophy to Science. Hostility between them. 
Historic reasons for the antagonism. Tendencies to- 
ward Philosophy in Science. Philosophical elements 
in scientific works. " Law " as used in Natural Science. 
Does it refer to force? Does it explain the cause of 
phenomena? Can Science get behind phenomena? 
Does it determine quality, or only quantity ? What is 
meant by " natural " ? Empiricism and the work of Sci- 
ence. Relation of Philosophy to the basis of Science. 
What problems does Science give Philosophy ? Science 
and the limits of knowledge. The scientific method, and 
mental and historical phenomena. Objections to Phi- 
losophy applicable to Science. Co-operation of Philoso- 
phy and Science. Condition for this co-operation. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 129 



CHAPTER IV. 

PHILOSOPHY AND EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

Psychology, the doctrine of the soul, treats of the 
mental activities, seeking to analyze and interpret them, 
so as to discover their laws, and to give a complete sys- 
tem of the operations of the mind. A general view of 
cognition may be obtained by regarding the mind as 
subject, and all its knowledge as object. If, now, we 
take up for consideration the mind as the subject to 
which all knowledge is object, we can ask, What is that 
mind ? and what does it do ? The first question per- 
tains to essence, namely, the substance or nature of the 
mind, and belongs to metaphysics. The second, pertain- 
ing to the mind's activities, gives the sphere of psy- 
chology. When we turn from the subject to the object, 
we find that the latter includes all that comes before 
the mind ; it therefore includes the whole domain of 
knowledge. 

In psychology the mind, as activity, is both subject 
and object. It reflects on itself, takes up for investiga- 
tion its own operations, and seeks to understand its 
method of dealing with the various objects engaging its 
attention. When we demand of the mind that it make 
itself the object of inquiry, it at first seems to be equal 
to asking the eye to behold itself. But this is not the 
case. We distinguish between the mind and its opera- 
tions, and ask that the subject consider those operations 



130 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

as objects of knowledge. Returning to the analogy of 
the eye, we find that it is simply required to give an 
account of what it sees. How the mind actually pro- 
ceeds when it beholds its own activities and other objects 
of inquiry, is a problem as insolvable as that of the 
modus operandi of the eye in obtaining vision. That we 
can watch our mental operations, is established as a fact, 
as fully as that of seeing with the eye ; and it is the 
given fact for which an explanation is sought. Psy- 
chology therefore deals with facts. Not with facts in 
general, however, but only with such as are a manifes- 
tation and revelation of its own processes. 

When psychology is defined as mental science, or sci- 
ence of the mind, it must be explained in what sense the 
term "science" is used. "Mind" also requires expla- 
nation, in order to determine whether psychology con- 
siders it metaphysically or phenomenally, or, perhaps, 
in both senses. Besides, the term must not be taken in 
the limited sense of intellect, but in that wider one, 
including all the inner operations. It stands for soul, 
and embraces all the psychic processes, whether intel- 
lectual, emotional, or volitional. It is the more im- 
portant to emphasize the breadth of the term " mind," 
because there is a tendency to discuss most fully the 
cognitive faculties, which are constantly employed in 
describing the psychic processes ; but in the careful 
study of feeling and volition, and in determining their 
relation to each other and to the intellect, much of the 
future progress of psychology may be expected. All 
ambiguity will be avoided by defining psychology as 
the system of the soul's operations. It is a psychic 
biology, aiming to explain the origin and movement of 
the soul's life as revealed in its activities. 

It is easy to form a general conception of this disci- 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 131 

pline ; but its extent, the complication of its phenomena, 
and its interweaving with other disciplines, make its 
exact limitation difficult. Many works on psychology 
furnish proof of this. As dealing solely with the mind, 
it may seem to comprehend whatever we know, — all 
knowledge being a possession of the mind, and a prod- 
uct of mental processes. This is as true of natural 
science as of the doctrine of the soul itself. There are 
for us no facts but those of consciousness ; and if we 
know aught, it is because we are conscious of it as pro- 
duced according to the principles of knowledge. To 
regard psychology, therefore, as including all data of 
consciousness, makes it comprehend whatever exists for 
the intellect. In that case it would be so comprehen- 
sive as to be the only possible study. But conscious- 
ness with its contents is not the subject-matter of this 
discipline ; its peculiarity consists in the manner of 
viewing these contents. Psychology does not consider 
what they are in themselves, but onl} r so far as related 
to the soul, and as revealing its activities. The con- 
tents of consciousness are objects contemplated solely 
for the sake of seeing in them the subject. If I am 
conscious of light, I can abstract the fact of conscious- 
ness, and consider the light itself, inquiring, What con- 
stitutes it ? With what velocity does it move ? How 
does it affect plants, animals, and inorganic matter? 
These and similar questions are not ps} r chological, but 
belong to natural science. I, however, enter the domain 
of psychology when the consciousness itself, not the 
light, is the object of inquiry ; as when I ask, How did 
I become conscious of the light? What is meant by 
the fact that I am conscious of it ? How does this fact 
affect my thoughts, feelings, and volitions? In psy- 
chology we therefore abstract from the contents of 



132 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

consciousness the psychic elements, and make them the 
objects of inquiry. Thus all processes of the soul, from 
the most elementary to the most complicated, are in- 
cluded in the study, as sensation, experience, thinking, 
the affections, the aesthetic impressions, and the action 
of the will. We might call it a natural history of the 
mind. While logic seeks the laws necessary to discover 
the truth, psychology inquires into the actual processes 
of the mind. The former is, therefore, normative ; the 
latter, historical and descriptive. 

From this definition of psychology it is easy to deter- 
mine its relation to the other departments of knowledge. 
In all of them the knowing subject is concerned ; they 
consequently have a psychological basis. When I con- 
sider the conservation of energy, I want to learn its 
nature and working ; but the very words " I " and 
" consider " have a psychological bearing. We cannot, 
in fact, utter a sentence without implying psychology. 
This shows the fundamental character of the discipline ; 
it lies at the basis of every thing that is for us, because 
we can know of it only through the mind, the object of 
psychology. If we adopt the language of Fichte, and 
hold that there is nothing but the Ego and the non-Ego, 
we at once see that we can view all things only from 
our standpoint, and as related to us. We can behold no 
object except in the light of our soul ; or we can say 
that the soul is the eye which sees all objects according 
to its own structure. Now, what the study of the eye 
is in optics, that is the study of psychology to all other 
objects of learning. 

It is, however, not definite enough to define psychology 
as the doctrine of the soul. That soul, as we have seen, 
may be considered according to its essence, the ques- 
tions involved being such as these : What is its nature ? 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 133 

Is it simple, or compound? Is it material? Or, we can 
confine our attention to the operations of the soul, 
inquiring, How does it act ? The inquiry into the 
operations of the soul is now commonly regarded as 
the business of psychology. 

The total separation of the two ways of viewing the 
soul is the result of development. In the Socratic school 
psychology was treated as a part of plrysics ; afterwards 
it was connected with metaphysics. Even when treated 
as a separate subject, it at first contained the whole doc- 
trine of the soul, the metaphysical elements receiving 
special prominence. Christian Wolff was the first to 
divide psychology into empirical and rational. To the 
former he assigned the task of describing the inner 
(psychic) processes and arranging them systematically, 
while the rational made the nature of the soul its 
starting-point for the explanation of the psychological 
phenomena. The empirical was accordingly to make 
the facts of consciousness its basis, while the rational 
was theoretical. His own example, however, illustrated 
the difficulty of keeping the two wholly distinct. 

In the division of psychology into empirical and 
rational, Wolff still has followers, while some have 
united both, and still others recognize only the empirical. 
The searching criticism to which Kant subjected the 
mind led him to reject rational psychology as impossible. 
Herbart, who of all German writers gave the strongest 
impulse to psychological studies, wanted in psychology 
a description of the mental phenomena as learned by 
observation, also metaphysics for the explanation of 
their origin, and mathematics so far as quantitative ele- 
ments enter into the operations of the mind. But his 
contemporary Ben eke, who also did excellent service in 
promoting psychology, rejected both metaphysics and 



134 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

mathematics from the study. He held that it should 
be purely experimental, and adopt the method of the 
natural sciences, beginning with experience, and ration- 
ally developing the results thus obtained.* 

In England there has been a strong tendency to 
absorb the whole of philosophy in psychology. This 
movement was begun by Locke, completed by Hume, 
and imitated by their followers. In his " Treatise of 
Human Nature," Hume discusses some of the pro- 
foundest problems of philosophy, such as the nature of 
abstract or general ideas, being and non-being, substance, 
time, space, force, causality, and the like. In the Intro- 
duction he says correctly, " that all the sciences have 
a relation, greater or less, to human nature ; and that, 
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, 
they still return back by one passage or another." How 
comprehensive he makes the system of human nature, 
is evident from the following : " There is no question 
of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the 
science of man ; and there is none, which can be decided 
with any certainty, before we become acquainted with 
that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the 
principles of human nature, we in effect propose a com- 
pleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost 
entirely new, and the only one upon which they can 
stand with any security." If Hume's statement, that 
" the principles of human nature " give " a compleat 
system of the sciences," is taken literally, it results in 
an idealism as perfect as that of Fichte. In that case 
psychology includes philosophy, all science, and in fact 
all knowledge. He does not distinguish between the 
principles of human nature as the subjective condition 

* Hence the title of his work : Lehrbuch der Psijchologie als Natur- 
wissenschaft, 1845. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 135 

of the sciences, and the sciences themselves: he con- 
founds the soil with its products. 

By reducing philosophy to psychology, Hume oblit- 
erates the distinction between what is and what ought 
to be, makes the mind a mere observer where it is called 
to be a critic, and a passive recorder of phenomena 
where it is called to be positive energy and a lawgiver. 
Empiricism is thus made a law, when it only furnishes 
materials for laws. Besides the other defects of his 
psychology, he makes sensation and association the 
norms of all thought, and in his philosophy of expe- 
rience fails, with Locke, to do justice to the mental 
factor in experience. The dread of innate ideas leads 
him to reject what is innate in all mental processes; 
namely, the subjective conditions for receiving and 
elaborating impressions from the external world. In 
reducing logic to psychology, he fails to discover the 
very laws of thought, which he continually uses in order 
to destroy the validity of thought as soon as it rises 
above empiricism. His dogmatic scepticism is con- 
tained in the first sentence of his Treatise, a sentence 
not proved, but a pure supposition. The importance of 
psychology, in its proper place, cannot be over-estimated ; 
but out of its sphere it becomes the means of the most 
serious perversions. 17 

While Locke and Hume make psychology essentially 
philosophy, the systems which consider it as both 
rational and empirical must also assign it, or at least its 
rational elements, to philosophy. That it was originally 
taken up and developed by philosophy, just as physics, 
is not surprising ; but when in the process of develop- 
ment it becomes independent as an empirical subject, 
with an aim distinct from that of philosophy, it of 
course cannot retain its original place any more than 



136 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

physics. Present tendencies are intent on withdrawing 
it from the metaphysical and rational to the empirical, 
and thus to sever its connection with philosophy. 

In his aim to describe, explain, and systematize the 
phenomena of mind, the psychologist is an historian. 
No more than a writer of human or natural history, can 
he describe all that occurs in his special department ; 
but he selects what is most valuable and characteristic. 
This does not mean that only such phenomena are 
chosen as can be fitted into what is known of the 
organism of the mind ; for frequently the exceptional 
is valuable for progress, in that it gives important prob- 
lems for solution. Mysterious phenomena worthy of 
scientific investigation are unfortunately left largely to 
charlatans. That many supposed marvels are based on 
trickery, is no evidence that this is the case with all. 
So-called spiritualism, second sight, and numerous 
strange phenomena well authenticated, lie wholly be- 
yond our present powers of explanation ; but that does 
not prove their mystery impenetrable. We no longer 
believe in witchcraft ; yet under that name many things 
occurred which are astounding revelations of mental 
affections, and are of great interest to the student of 
mind.* The true psychologist does not turn away 
haughtily from things beyond his ken and such as can- 
not be made to fit into his theories, nor does he sneer 
at what seems to savor of jugglery ; but he regards the 
unusual and the marvellous as likely to contain revela- 
tions of value. While formerly mysterious phenomena 
absorbed too much attention, they are evidently too 
much neglected now. The fact that superstition gives 
interpretations which the psychologist cannot accept, is 

* Many illustrations of this may be found in Horst's Zauber Biblio- 
thek. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY, 137 

a reason for seeking the correct explanation. Both the 
facts and their meaning must be determined according 
to the principles of the scientific method. The student 
of psychology, while regarding as most important what 
is most common and evidently within reach of the 
interpreting mind, will learn in proportion as he enters 
the depths that there are mysteries of absorbing inter- 
est and worthy of efforts at solution. Particularly is it 
essential to guard against hasty conclusions as to the 
limits of the mind's operations, — conclusions calculated 
to check inquiry and^ thus to hinder progress. Physi- 
ognomy, phrenology, and so-called mind-reading (usually 
a misnomer for determining mere locality according to 
indications given to the mind through the body), and 
similar misnamed sciences or phenomena, deserve study, 
even if for no other purpose than to overthrow the 
errors they promote. Not that certain .mental phenom- 
ena are mysterious is a reproach to psychology, for 
they may involve insuperable difficulties ; but if it 
ignores them it is seriously at fault. Even the expo- 
sure and exact limitation of problems may be of great 
service. The confessed ignorance of psychologists may 
contain more wisdom than many of their elucidations. 
Nevertheless, psychology would become unhealthy if it 
made the abnormal and the mysterious the substance 
of its inquiries. 

In psychology, as in natural science, the discovery, 
description, interpretation, and classification of mental 
facts, are preparatory to the discovery of their causes 
and the determination of their laws. The student of 
mind aims to learn what is, how it is, and why it is, and 
seeks to reduce his discoveries to a completely rounded 
system, an organism in which facts are members, laws 
are joints, and the soul's energy is the life. 



138 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Beginners in philosophy have usually studied psy- 
chology, and it is here taken for granted that they are 
acquainted with its general scope. Many students, 
however, testify that the study has served rather to 
arouse their minds, and impel their thoughts in a par- 
ticular direction, than to give them sharply defined 
concepts of the nature, aim, objects, and relations of 
psychology. They consequently find it difficult to 
determine its exact relation to philosophy. 18 

While thus distinguishing between subject and object, 
between the mental processes and their products, and 
between psychology and philosophy, do we not force 
psychology into the same category as the natural sci- 
ences? When this is done by the materialistic and 
positivistic schools, they are only consistent with their 
principles. Nor can there be objection to classing psy- 
chology with natural science, if science means simply 
systematized knowledge and if " natural " is used in dis- 
tinction only from the supernatural ; but it is differ- 
ent when the aim is to wipe out the distinction between 
matter and mind. Most of those, however, who speak 
of psychology as a natural science, refer merely to the 
method of treatment.* To this there can be no objec- 
tion. All they mean is that it must be based wholly 
on experience ; that it is " the science of mind worked 
out in the way of the natural sciences." f 

This is not the place to enter into the dispute between 
spiritualists and materialists, whether the science of mind 
can ever be reduced to a natural science as a part of 
physics, or of physics and chemistry ; nevertheless, the 
student should be warned against hasty conclusions, 

* This is the case with Beneke, J. H. Fichte, Waitz, Wundt, and 
others. 

t Mind, 1883. 4. By the editor. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 139 

and reminded that (empirical) psychology has nothing 
to do with the question. The monistic tendency is apt 
to conclude hastily in favor of whatever system may at 
the time be in the ascendancy. When idealism pre- 
vails, it is made the explanation of all things ; and 
when materialism becomes predominant, every thing 
must submit to be classed under matter. Instead of 
fathoming the meaning of the terms " matter " and 
" spirit," they are used, with all their indefiniteness and 
obscurity, as if perfectly understood, — matter as the 
only reality, spirit as the mere negation of matter. 
Even " substance," with which Spinoza and his suc- 
cessors operated so confidently, is becoming shadowy 
in our day ; and a philosophy deeper and more serious 
than that of Hume may question whether the mind can 
conceive of the abiding reality underlying all phe- 
nomena, which it is intended to represent. 

Since psychology aims to describe the processes of the 
soul, it must be evident that these should first of all be 
considered ; and that, if any inference is to be drawn, 
it should be done after they have been fully described, 
not before. To begin the study with a theory of the 
nature of the soul, particularly when that is so much 
in dispute as in our day, is to begin with an unproved 
hypothesis and with a prejudice. We must begin with 
facts, operations, exactly as in nature: from what it 
does and can do, we must try to discover what the soul 
is ; but to make a theory of the essence of the soul the 
principle for the explanation of its operations, is both 
unphilosophical and unscientific. No more in mind 
than in nature have we a knowledge of the substance 
otherwise than from its operations. In no other way is 
a manifestation of their character possible, unless it 
were given by direct revelation from some other source 



140 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

than the mind and nature. What can a manifestation 
of mind or nature mean, other than an operation of 
mind or nature ? We need but make clear to our minds 
what we mean by a manifestation, and that without a 
manifestation of a thing we can have no knowledge of 
it, in order to learn that only from their operations can 
we judge of the essence of objects. Indeed, an exam- 
ination of the terms we apply to objects will convince 
us that, as a rule, these terms, so far as they have an 
intelligible sense, only express what these objects can 
do. We may imagine that we know the essence or 
substance, when in truth we know only the powers 
revealed in the operations ; but these are sufficient for 
an intelligent apprehension of mental and material 
processes. 

Long before our minds are trained to critical intro- 
spection or to reflection, we become familiar with words 
in common use. The meanings attached to them un- 
consciously, or at least uncritically, are apt to remain 
after we have become more critical. Many terms are, 
in fact, used with no definite sense. This is particularly 
the case with such as are supposed to stand for funda- 
mental concepts, and for principles which lie far beyond 
observation. Words thus become symbols of ignorance 
and emptiness, rather than of knowledge and real con- 
tent. The use of some such terms may be necessary 
as an indication of- the object sought; but the object 
still sought must not be treated as if already found. 
Thus the terms " mind " and " matter " may properly 
be used to designate the object of psychological or 
natural inquiry ; but if used metaphysically, as if they 
explained the essence, they deceive us. 

While careful to avoid empty phrases, and especially 
to reject them from the foundation on which we build, 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 141 

we must rigorously insist on investigating every thing 
according to its own laws. In this respect both ideal- 
ism, and materialism have erred, and past experience 
has taught that all reasoning per saltnm, from one sphere 
into another, is apt to lead to confusion and error. 
Analogical reasoning must be closely watched, the more 
so because it is often insidious, and asserts as final what 
has not even been established as probable. In respect 
to mental operations, analogical reasoning is frequently 
applied. There are laws which are applicable to limited 
spheres only, and their application to a different sphere 
is a perversion. When the mind is familiar with a cer- 
tain sphere, it is liable to form the habit of applying 
the laws of that sphere to subjects with which it is less 
familiar; perhaps it even makes their application uni- 
versal. Materialism and idealism frequently depend 
much less on facts or correct reasoning than on mental 
habits, so that their strength is in association rather 
than reason. 

Physics and chemistry cannot explain life, much less 
the mind. Trendelenburg thought he had discovered 
in motion something common to matter and mind ; but, 
aside from other difficulties in his explanation, he uses 
motion as applied to material and mental phenomena 
in different senses. At best there is only analogy, not 
identity ; motion applied to the action of the mind is 
used figuratively. 

The most eminent scientists agree with philosophers 
that, however intimate the relation of matter and mind, 
it is impossible to explain the operations of the latter 
by the known laws of the former. Respecting the sub- 
stance or essence of mind, we are in the presence of 
a mystery thus far inscrutable. This is, indeed, not 
peculiar to mind ; matter, as we have seen, is equally 



142 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

mysterious. Neither spiritualism, nor idealism, nor 
Spinoza's "substance," nor Professor Bain's "double- 
faced unity," helps us out of the difficulty, or throws 
any light into the darkness. If matter really does 
account for mental phenomena, it must certainly have 
something never yet discovered in what is called matter. 
Those who speak confidently of mind as material, evi- 
dently use terms without considering their sense. Lotze 
declares that " it is nothing but an empty popular phrase 
to claim that the doctrine of the life of the soul is to 
be transformed to a natural science, — a phrase which 
either has no meaning, or else signifies that an attempt 
is made to hear with the eyes, and see with the ears." * 
Yet the " inveterate habit of confounding the psychi- 
cal and the physical " has become quite common, and 
is justly pronounced "the bane of modern psychology." f 
While popular scientists frequently confound the two, 
the profound are usually more careful ; though even 
they are sometimes betrayed into transferring the laws 
with which they are familiar, into regions where they 
are less at home. Men like Helmholtz, Virchow, Du 
Bois-Reymond, *Tait, Huxley, are too cautious to endow 
matter with properties never yet discovered in it. If 
all of them, Helmholtz and Tait excepted, at times use 
expressions with a materialistic flavor, they are careful 
at other times to correct them, and to admit their igno- 
rance of the mental substance. Wundt says, " I, too, re- 
gard it improbable that purely psychological doctrines, 
whether facts or theories, can ever be deduced from 
physiological statements." % Professor Tyndall makes 
the following admission : " The passage from the physics 

* Medicinische Psychologie, 32. 

t James Ward, Mind, 1883. 481. 

t Vierteljahrsschrift fiir wiss. Philosophic, 1879. 357. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 143 

of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness 
is unthinkable. . . . Were our minds and senses so 
expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable 
us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain ; 
were we capable of following all their motions, all their 
groupings, all their electrical discharges, if there be 
such ; and were we intimately acquainted with the cor- 
responding states of thought and feeling, — we should 
probably be as far as ever from the solution of the prob- 
lem : How are these physical processes connected with 
the facts of consciousness? The chasm between the 
two classes of phenomena would still remain intel- 
lectually impassable." 19 

In the use of such adjectives as "mechanical" and 
"vital," we are also in danger of taking imaginary for 
real knowledge. They indicate certain methods of opera- 
tion, but nothing respecting the essence of their sources. 
What a substance must be in order to work mechani- 
cally, is no more intelligible than the origin of vital, 
mental, and spiritual phenomena. The laws of the 
mechanical processes can be determined with more ex- 
actness than the psychological ; but we deceive ourselves 
if we imagine that we understand what is inorganic and 
mechanical better than the organic and mental. Those 
who think that the mental processes are made clearer 
by calling them mechanical, need but attempt an ex- 
planation of the latter term in order to learn that, in 
essence, it is not a whit more intelligible than the other. 

The despair of finding the real essence of mind has 
been the most powerful motive for banishing metaphysic 
from psychology. But has it really been banished? 
Every step in psychological inquiry confronts us with 
metaphysical problems ; and however decidedly they 
may be pronounced irrelevant, they are usually either 



144 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

actually discussed, or underlie the discussions. Hume 
professes to be purely empirical ; but surely his empiri- 
cism never discovered that "what we call a mind is 
nothing but a heap or collection of different percep- 
tions," or, that a " connected mass of perceptions . . . 
constitute a thinking being," as he says in his Treatise. 
Even the declaration, made by some modern writers, 
that the mind is to be viewed, not as substance, but as 
action, is metaphysical. If the natural sciences may 
postulate matter, there is no reason why psychology 
rna^j not postulate mind as a peculiar entity.* It must, 
however, be treated as a mere postulate, and the sup- 
posed essence must not dominate the entire investiga- 
tion, as if its nature were established. 

Aside from the nature of the soul, how shall we view 
its activity? Is the soul distinct from the activity, or 
is it nothing but the action ? If it goes out wholly in 
action, what is the basis for future activity? These 
inquiries lead beyond empirical to rational psychology, 
but it is almost impossible to ignore them ; and in psy- 
chology, as in every other department, the deepest 
problems lead to philosophy. The metaphysical factors 
which enter into intellectual activity, whether external 
and internal, or wholly mental, seem to find but a poor 
analogy in the action of hydrogen and oxygen when 
uniting to constitute water. It is more correct to say 
that they become, than that they form, water. A better 
analogy is apparently found in two bodies, which, by 
affecting each other, excite electricity, the bodies them- 
selves remaining distinct from their product. The con- 
ception of mind, as cause, does not remove the difficulty 
in the relation of the soul to its activity. Aside from 
the other difficulties in the conception of cause, can any 
* Discussed more fully in the chapter on Metaphysics. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 145 

thing be called a cause unless it goes out wholly into 
the effect? Probably the best view of mind is that 
of force and energy, or (since the technical sense of 
"force" in natural science might be objectionable) of 
power and energy, the latter being merely the former 
excited to activity.* Mind must not be made the syno- 
nyme of consciousness ; it also exists during sleep. Con- 
sciousness is but one of its modes of activity, much of 
its most important working falling below consciousness. 
Our unconscious mental activity lies at the basis and 
accompanies much of that which is conscious. There 
are degrees of wakefulness ; and when most fully awake, 
and when its attention is most strained, the mind may 
be conscious of processes which at other times are hid. 
The unconscious mental activity is no doubt as rigidly 
subject to law as is the conscious. Connected with our 
emotions and volitions, as well as with our intellectual 
operations, there are unconscious and, therefore, myste- 
rious processes. As our unconscious activity influences 
the conscious, so it seems that the unconscious may be 
influenced by the conscious, as by discipline, volition, 
the formation of habits, and by fixing the attention on 
certain thoughts or objects. It may be that certain 
activities are conscious at the time but not remembered, 
and consequently are held to be unconscious. Thus, 
our childhood is a blank to us now, not because we had 
no consciousness then, but because we do not remem- 
ber what then affected us.f It is an interesting query : 
If an impression is forgotten, and then remembered 
again, what becomes of it during the period of forget- 

* For a discussion of the soul as substance and as action, see Wundt, 
Logik, II. 502. 

f Are not various occurrences during sleep to be explained in the 
same way? We are conscious of them at the time, but forget them; 
that is. we do not remember the consciousness. 



146 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

fulness? There can be no question that the form and 
the intensity of consciousness have much influence on the 
memory. 

Even when viewed as purely empirical, treating only 
of the activity of the mind, psychology is beset with 
difficulties. Those who want to place it in point of 
experiment on a level with the natural sciences must 
not forget that it does not admit of the same exactness. 
The psychologist does not have the mind so completely 
under control as the physicist or chemist the objects he 
investigates ; besides, he cannot use the same instru- 
ments to measure and weigh. His object is even more 
complicated and difficult than that of the biologist. 
From the very nature of the case, there is no hope of 
ever making psychology as exact and definite as the 
natural sciences. 

The terminology also offers difficulties. Words are 
used vaguely ; the same term is frequently employed 
for different operations, and different ones for the same 
activity. Then there is great diversity in the manner in 
which thought, feeling, and volition follow one another, 
in many cases putting invariable rules out of the ques- 
tion. So much depends on individual peculiarities, on 
training and surroundings, that an endless variety is 
presented to the student of psychology. If he confines 
his study to his own mind and to those immediately 
about him, he will be narrow. Exclusive attention to 
his own people, or a special predilection for them, is 
the source of the all but universally prevalent national 
prejudice. Even by taking into account the enlight- 
ened nations of a particular period, a comprehensive 
view of man cannot be obtained. In order to over- 
come narrowness and prejudice, a scholar must study all 
nations, at all periods, and under all circumstances. 20 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 147 

From this it is evident that the field whence psy- 
chology draws its materials is exceedingly large. In - 
order fully to understand the mental operations, it must 
observe them in all the departments entered by the 
mind. The psychologist is naturally directed first of 
all to his own mental processes. These are capable 
of the most direct and most perfect study, though intro- 
spection is at first extremely difficult. There is another 
difficulty in the fact that the very effort to observe 
the mental operations is apt to modify them. Most 
of our experiences can be studied only in the form of 
reminiscences ; when the experiences occur we are not 
usually in a mood to study them. Those psychologists 
err, however, who affirm that we cannot observe what 
is directly before the mind, but only what has become 
an object of memory. They forget that what memory 
contains is always a presentation of what is actually 
present, whatever its relation to the past may be. 

Next to the study of self comes the observation of 
others. That of children is especially valuable, their 
processes being most simple. In the case of older per- 
sons many things complicate the process of observation. 
In watching them, allowance must be made for the 
necessary imperfections in observation, and also for 
the possibility of a disparity between the inner state 
and its outward manifestations. In the latter respect 
the emotions and volitions present peculiar difficulties. 

Valuable materials may also be gathered from biog- 
raphy, history, travels, linguistics, sociology, ethnology, 
and from all subjects that treat of man either individu- 
ally or socially. Asylums and courts of justice furnish 
important subjects for study. The impulse given by 
Darwin has led to the careful study of comparative 
psychology — an important field if fact and fiction are 



148 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

distinguished, if analogical reasoning is kept in check, 
and if human mental phenomena are not made to inter- 
pret the action of brutes, in order, in turn, to use the 
brutes to interpret man. There is, in fact, not a subject 
of human interest from which the psychologist may not 
learn important lessons. But it must not be forgotten 
that the systematized general thoughts, mirrored in the 
individual facts, constitute psychology. 

So extensive is the field that, after a general survey, 
the student may find it advisable to make a specialty of 
some particular department. Not only is there need 
of specialists, but there is also great encouragement for 
them. There can be no thorough treatment of the 
whole unless the various parts have been mastered. 
The exhaustive work within narrow limits, whether 
confined to a particular class of phenomena or persons, 
must not be isolated, but made tributary to the whole. 
There is not a department in which the need of this 
special work is not felt. Even in England, where so 
much attention has been given to psychology, and 
whose philosophers are mainly psychologists, there is 
a marked lack of specialists.* The same is true of 
America, and indeed of all countries. There are, it is 
true, tendencies to specialization now, but chiefly in the 
relation of mind to body. 

The distrust with which speculation is viewed has 
served both to make the empirical method predominant 
in psychology, and to make psychology itself a favorite 
study. Not only does it receive an unusual amount of 
attention in Germany, England, and America, but also 
in France and Scandinavia, so that new and excellent 
works on psychology abound. Psychological experi- 

* " For all the name it has made in the world, English psychology 
has never heen remarkahle for its elaboration in detail." — Mind, 1883,2. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY, 149 

merits have also become common, chiefly through the 
influence of those conducted in the University of Leip- 
zig; but their sphere is necessarily limited. While 
there has of late been much progress in psychologic 
research, even the most thorough works * make the 
impression that respecting some of the most important 
functions of the mind only a faint beginning at inter- 
pretation has been made. Even respecting the sphere, 
the method, and the relations of psychology, there is so 
much uncertainty, that the beginner is apt to be greatly 
puzzled as to fundamental concepts of the study. Since 
psychology is the necessary basis of philosophy, its own 
imperfections will seriously affect the latter. 

It would require a work on psychology itself to give 
a full account of what is still required for the develop- 
ment of the discipline ; but hints on the subject may 
serve as a warning against most common errors, and 
indicate what is most needed to insure future progress. 

The beginning of conscious life is involved in mys- 
tery ; perhaps it dates back to existence in the womb.f 
In the observation of infants the subject is complicated 
by the fact that it is impossible to determine exactly 
what is conscious and what merely reflex activity. 

The view has become general, that "we are only con- 
scious as we are conscious of change," or, as Bain says, 
"We do not know any one thing of itself, but only 
the difference between it and another thing." Think- 
ing is comparison ; and consciousness consists, mainly at 
least, in the discrimination of objects. But if there is 

* As that of Volkmann in German, and of Sully in English. 

t On the conscious activity of infants at various periods after birth, 
see Kussmaul : Untersuclmngen veber das Seelenleben ties neuyebornen 
Menschen. Hoeffding thinks it possible that the unborn child has a 
sensation of touch and motion : Psychologie, translated into German by 
Bendixen, 4. 



150 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF rillLOSOPIir. 

no consciousness without discrimination, then the gen- 
esis of consciousness becomes impossible. With what 
other conscious act shall the first one be compared, and 
from what shall it be discriminated? It seems to be 
more correct to say that a determination of the what of 
consciousness requires comparison with other objects, 
but that the fact of the mere consciousness of an 
indefinite something, of a dark, undiscriminated impres- 
sion, does not require such comparison. The first con- 
scious act must therefore be indistinct, an unexplained 
presence; and because so indistinct and uncompared 
and unrelated, it is not remembered. 

More important than speculations on the genesis of 
consciousness is the resolution of abstract terms domi- 
nating psychology into the concrete realities for which 
they are supposed to stand. It is astonishing what 
influence these abstractions have acquired in psychol- 
ogy, where the concrete is supposed to rule. Among 
these terms, " consciousness " itself is one of the most 
important. It is commonly used as if a kind of faculty 
underlying all the rest, something like a flat surface on 
which objects stand, or which reflects them like a mir- 
ror. There is in the mind no real object answering to 
the term ; but there are conscious objects or states of 
which we are aware, and " consciousness " is simply an 
abstraction from these objects. By dropping all the 
objects before the mind (all the real content), and 
retaining solely the fact that we were aware of their 
presence, we get the abstract notion of consciousness. 
By treating it as a concrete reality, the term does not 
merely become inexplicable, but also leads to confusion 
and error. 

The .same kind of abstraction is found in thought, 
feeling, volition, and numerous other instances. Just 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 151 

as there are conscious acts, but no reality which corre- 
sponds with consciousness except in these acts, so there 
is no thought in the abstract, but there are individual 
thoughts. But another process of abstraction is here 
found. Not only is the general term " thought " treated 
as if something concrete, distinct from definite, individ- 
ual mental acts, but it is also regarded as if it could be 
abstracted from the mind itself and could exist inde- 
pendent of that mind. Thus we speak of thought in 
books, in institutions, in nature, forgetting that outside 
of mental operations there can be only symbols of 
thought, while thought itself is found only in the mind 
possessing it. Thought can never be separated from 
mind, as if it could have an independent existence. 
Thoughts, feelings, and volitions are always definite, 
concrete, with particular contents ; they are not some- 
thing merely on the mind, but they are acts, states, 
manifestations of that mind, and absolutely inseparable 
from it. Thoughts cannot even be communicated ; 
only sjmibols can be given, and thus other minds can 
be led to construct the same or similar thoughts. 
Instead of imparting thought, or reduplicating it as if 
by some photographic process, every thought is formed 
or elaborated by the mind that possesses it, so that, 
whatever its suggestive symbol may have been, the 
thought itself is a creation of the mind whose state 
it is. 

While it is impossible to banish abstractions, and 
substitute for them the concrete, Ave should be careful 
to use abstract terms for what they really are, and not 
hypostatize them as if they had a substantial existence 
of their own. Thus we cannot do without the term 
"mental process;" yet it is a mere abstraction, being 
wholly empty and unmeaning, unless there is some 



152 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

content in the mind with which some process is con- 
nected. We speak about such processes as if directly 
exposed to view : yet we never observe a process itself, 
or become conscious of it, but are aware only of cer- 
tain objects with which processes are performed. In 
that abstract term " process " we embody the thought 
that something goes on in the mind: but take away that 
concrete something, and nothing will go on ; that is, 
there is no process, no going on, unless there is some 
particular content passing through stages of develop- 
ment. 

While warning the student against taking mere 
generalizations for the concrete, it is scarcely less 
important to urge him to estimate aright the anatomi- 
cal process to which the mind is so often subjected. 
That it is a unity, a living organism, with members, 
but without fragments, is not sufficiently considered. 
Why not have a synthetic as well as an analytic 
psychology? 

A law of vast importance, but heretofore overlooked 
by psychologists, is that found in the process of forming 
mental states, which become the condition and criteria 
of all mental activity. According to this law, sensations 
become perceptions, and percepts concepts. Thus I 
receive certain impressions through the eye, and at 
once say "tree," immediately and unconsciously pass- 
ing from the impression to the concept. So we develop 
ourselves into certain states which become permanent; 
and it is these states that are affected by impressions, 
and it is these states that act. Thus our states are an 
embodiment of our total past experience, a summary of 
what we have thought, felt, and willed. Not all the 
individual impressions received are before the mind, 
but their effect is there. The law that prevails is this : 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 153 

There is in the development of the mind itself a general- 
izing process, just as there is in thought. Thus as a 
general term includes under it all objects having the 
marks of that term, so the mind itself passes through 
a generalizing process ; and every stage of mental 
development is the product of all the stages through 
which the mind has passed, and contains in itself the 
elements of all those stages. Our perceptions, our 
judgments, our affections, always depend on the state 
attained. Hence the differences in these respects at 
different periods. What we think, feel, and do is 
always a product and reflection of the state we are 
in. For all our intellectual operations, for aesthetics 
and religion, the law is of greatest significance. A man 
always does what he is at the time. 

There are many other points in pyschology which 
deserve especial care on the part of the student; but 
the above are of a more general character, and better 
adapted to this volume than the details in psychologic 
study which should receive particular attention. They 
may also give a hint of what yet remains to be done in 
psychology. 

In the development of psychology itself, there has 
been a process of specialization, so that it has been 
differentiated from subjects with which it was formerly 
identified. This is not only true of its former inclu- 
sion in physics and metaphysics, but also of its relation 
to physiology, logic, ethics, and aesthetics. Instead of 
being amalgamated with allied subjects, they are now 
grouped around it so as to form a circle of disciplines 
by themselves. Being still in the process of this devel- 
opment, we cannot determine the final results of the 
various efforts at classification ; and the very terms 
used for different subjects are continually undergoing 



154 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

changes. Psycho -physics (physiological psychology, 
mental physiology, aestho-physiology) treats of the 
relation of the mental to the physical or physiological 
processes. There is no agreement as to how much of 
this relation belongs to psychology, or whether any 
of it falls within the domain of psychological inquiry. 
It is admitted that the action of the body, particularly 
of the nerves, has great influence on the mental states. 
There is a preponderating tendency to consign the 
whole subject of the relation of the mind to body, to 
psycho-physics as a separate discipline. Highly impor- 
tant as anatomy, physiology, and especially neurology, 
are for the psychologist, they are preparatory studies, 
and his special department begins Avith phenomena 
distinctly mental. No motion, however essential to 
sensation, can explain the fact of sensation or of the 
conscious state. We do not doubt that there is more 
than parallelism between the physiological and the 
mental ; but we can no more explain how the former 
becomes psychical than we can explain how a volition 
produces physical motion. Besides psycho-physics, we 
have comparative psychology, treating of man's relation 
to brutes ; also pathological psychology or psychiatry, 
discussing the effect of diseases on the mind. Anthro- 
pology has at times been treated as a science of man ; 
but it has also discussed the relation of the soul to 
the body, and has been viewed as a history of human 
nature. While physicians pay special attention to the 
relation of physical to mental disorders, lawyers and 
ethical writers discuss the relation of the physical state 
to morals, especially the relation of diseases and insan- 
ity to crime. Sociology, and in fact all studies con- 
nected with human nature, are intimately related to 
psychology. The applications of psychology are numer- 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 155 

ous. A good beginning has been made in biblical 
psychology (Delitzsch, Beck), and also in the psychol- 
ogy of different peoples ( Voelkerpsychologie, Lazarus 
and Steinthal). So there may be a psychology of reli- 
gion, of humor, of various classes of persons, and of 
different professions. By specialization the subject can 
be indefinitely enlarged. 

Psychology thus finds its proper place between the 
natural sciences and philosophy ; forming, as it were, 
the connecting link between the two. On the one 
hand, it is intimately connected with physiology and 
the whole department of biology, while, on the other, 
it leads directly to the various philosophical disciplines. 
Owing to its intimate relation to other subjects, psy- 
chologists have found it difficult to confine themselves 
to the discussion of mental phenomena and their laws. 
Some drop psychology too much into physiology, while 
others exalt it too much into the domain of philosophy. 

Viewed here in its relation to philosophy, this is not the 
place to consider the practical value of psychology ; yet 
it should be remembered, that, just as the psychic pro- 
cesses construct philosophy, so they are also the means 
for the practical application of its speculations. In 
this respect its relation to ethics is peculiarly intimate. 
Psychology gives a knowledge of conditions for master- 
ing self and others ; and he who understands the asso- 
ciation and sequence of the thoughts, affections, and 
volitions, and the relation of thought and desire to the 
will, has essential conditions of power. Comprehending 
humanity, this discipline embodies more wisdom than 
the Greek maxim, "Know thyself." For pedagogics, 
or the application of the theory of knowledge, of ethics 
and aesthetics, to mental training, psychology is of the 
first significance. In order successfully to instruct and 



156 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

train others, the teacher must understand the mind and 
its functions. It is not accidental that Herbart's school 
developed psychology and pedagogics conjointly. The 
lwo naturally go together. A healthy psychology would 
banish some of the prevalent views of education. 

But psychology must not be expected to do all the 
mind requires ; it cannot take the place of philosophy.* 
The tendency to confound the two spheres makes this 
warning doubly necessary. In describing what transpires 
in the mind, and in reducing this to laws and system, 
psychology does not give the philosophy of the intellect, 
of the emotions, or of the volitions. In order to discover 
the norms of thought, of emotion, and of volition, we 
must ascend from the phenomenal to the rational, from 
psychology to philosophy. But for every study it is 
fundamental, making us acquainted with the soil from 
and in which every subject must grow. 

Every serious study may be a preparation for philos- 
ophy ; but psychology is peculiarly its propaedeutics. 
In the exact description of the origin and nature of 
the facts of consciousness, in its careful observation 
of the mental processes, and in its thorough analyses, psy- 
chology not merely gives philosophy its practical basis 
and legitimate sphere, but also promotes the introduc- 
tion of scientific exactness into philosophical inquiries. 
From what actually occurs in thought, feeling, and voli-^ 
tion, we want to rise. intellectually to what ought to be, 
just as, volitionally, we want to proceed from the ideal 

* Numerous efforts have been made to apply psychology to educa- 
tion. But unless psychology is made philosophy, or at least includes 
it, the ideal of education is not even made the aim in these efforts. 
Psychology is not the law of mental development: this prerogative 
belongs to philosophy, with its norms, ideals, and principles. But a 
knowledge of psychology is a condition for their application in peda- 
gogics, — the discipline for the psychological application of philosophy, 
for the sake of mental development. 



PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 157 

as the law for the real. However the exclusive advo- 
cates of either may protest, the problem to be solved 
is the union of the empirical and the rational, of psy- 
chology and philosophy, — a union which, however, 
fully recognizes their differences. 

It is evident that among scholars, the philosopher, 
most of all, needs psychology. Unless he can distin- 
guish clearly between the different objects and degrees, 
and the various processes of consciousness, he will be 
in constant danger of uniting what should be separated, 
and vice versa. Psychology is the door to philosophy. 

Enough has been said to indicate that this must not 
be understood to mean that ps}^chology is to be the law 
for philosophy. Even if the process of sensation could 
be perfectly described, with the causes, the conditions, 
the manifestations, and the inter-action of thought, to- 
gether with the relation of thought, feeling, and voli- 
tion to one another, that would not determine what the 
mind ought to be and do, any more than the manners 
of an age give us ethics. We must look to the theory 
of knowledge for the norms of thought. And even in 
psychology, both in its construction and study, we find 
a constant application of this theory necessary. To 
view empiricism as the sole guide in psychological in- 
quiry, is a serious mistake. It is not sufficient even in 
considering the simplest elements of knowledge, because 
so much is implied in them which can never become an 
object of observation. Thus, the relation of mind and 
body ; the mental and physical factors in the process of 
sensation ; the conceptions of the Ego, of the mind, the 
soul, and consciousness ; the distinction between im- 
pressions and the comparisons, abstractions, develop- 
ment, and conclusions, of which they are the occasion, 
— require, for a full understanding, much that is never 



158 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

given directly in experience. Indeed, much that is 
considered in psychology requires the highest powers 
of the mind, and the deepest processes of thought. He 
who treats the mental process as a mere beholding of 
what is directly reflected from consciousness, cannot 
form a psychology worthy of the name. What is thus 
beheld is but the material to be interpreted by thinking. 
Psychology is not termed empirical because it is formed 
by an empirical process, but because it is the description 
and scientific interpretation of such a process. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Define Psychology. Difference between Empirical 
and Rational Psychology. Relation of the former to 
Natural Science. Scientific method in Psychology. Re- 
lation of Empirical Psychology to Philosophy. Viewing 
Mind as Subject and Object, wherein does Psychology 
differ from other disciplines? Psychology as Propae- 
deutic to Philosophy. Relation of Psychology to the 
Theory of Knowledge. To Psycho-physics ; Psychia- 
try ; Anthropology ; Biology ; Physiology ; Sociology ; 
Pedagogics. Distinction between the Soul and its 
activity. Mind and Matter. Mental and mechanical 
processes. Empirical Psychology and Metaphysics. 
Psychology and Philosophy in England. The Psycho- 
logical and the Rational Process. Sources of Psy- 
chology. Difficulties and Importance of the Study of 
Psychology. 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 159 



CHAPTER V. 

DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

As the mind is one, so also is there unity in its 
possessions. Every element of knowledge is indissolu- 
bly connected with every other, either immediately or 
through other elements. We cannot imagine a thought 
as isolated. If it were, how could we ever attain, 
understand, or remember it? Every concept necessa- 
rily forms part of the intellectual cosmos, from which 
nothing can be taken without disturbing the symmetry 
of the whole, while the addition of a single foreign 
element would mar its beauty. Fragmentary as our 
attainments seem, they are really parts of a perfect 
system, and need only be properly developed in order 
that the mind may permeate the entire universe of 
thought. We may, indeed, become so absorbed by a 
single member of the intellectual organism as not to 
observe other members, much less the complete system ; 
but our limited view does not affect the vital union of 
the members forming the organism. 

Amid the infinite variety, we are in danger of losing 
sight of the underlying unity, and of treating as frag- 
ments what are in reality organs. While admitting 
the advantages of specialization, we have also seen its 
dangers ; and these admonish us to consider that, how- 
ever extensive the particular field we cultivate, it is not 
the world, but is connected with all the other fields 



160 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

which constitute that world. " In view of the separa- 
tion affected by the pursuit of specialties, and of the 
depreciation of departments foreign to the specialist, so 
often connected with specialties, it seems to me to be one 
of the most important of philosophical duties to cherish 
the conviction of the relationship of the sciences, and 
to maintain that all the scientific interests have an 
equal right to existence. " * If, then, we distinguish 
the various parts of knowledge, it is not our aim to 
separate them, but we want to make each more distinct, 
and to indicate its exact place in the system. Divisions 
consequently give the intellect an advantage in under- 
standing and elaborating a subject. They distinguish 
and abstract, without parting. Just as a definition is 
both an affirmation and a negation, — affirming what 
an object is, and denying that it is something else, — 
so divisions are both analytic and synthetic, analyzing 
a subject, and forming the subject. We divide to 
unite. 

Owing to the universal character of its principles, 
philosophy is best adapted to promote the conviction 
of the unity of thought, though with our limitations 
we may not be able to indicate all the connecting links. 
In seeking the divisions of philosophy we do not want 
to lose sight of the fact that it is, ideally at least, a 
system, and that all distinctions have significance only 
because they are coherent parts of a grand unity. 

In dividing philosophy, therefore, we do not dissect 
it so as to leave only dead parts of a dead system, but 
we distinguish the various members which form the 
living intellectual organism. Just as an organ is com- 
plete only when attached to the body, so a division is 
not perfect in its isolation, but in its connection with 

* Wundt, Logik, II., Preface. 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 161 

the whole system. Between the divisions there are 
interlacings and numerous communications. Some of 
the connections seem to belong equally to the divided 
parts, and in their discussion no division can claim a 
monopoly of them. With distinctions in the same 
system rather than with mathematical separations as 
characteristic of philosophical divisions, we are not 
surprised to find that the different parts of philosophy 
lead to each other, and tend to coalesce so as really to 
form that unity which they are ideally. 

The intimacy of the relation makes the distinction of 
the parts the more difficult, and also explains the variety 
found in the division of philosophy. As in anatomy 
we can take any part of a finger, and consider it by 
itself, or in relation to the other parts, or can take the 
finger, and consider its relation to the hand or to the 
arm or to the whole body ; so in philosophy we can 
make endless divisions, and for each some reason can be 
advanced. But in the midst of this variety we do not 
doubt that some are superior to others. Our search is 
not merely for a division, but for the best. 

We have found that the ultimate principles are the 
objects of philosophy. In its system it must conse- 
quently include all these principles. Until these have 
been discovered, neither the s} r stem nor the divisions can 
be perfected. So long as philosophy itself is an inquiry, 
an object of search, we may have to form our divisions 
with a view to the discovery of the principles, and can- 
not make them as perfect as when the system itself is 
completed. 

In the various philosophical systems the divisions 
have been determined by the views of philosophy, the 
influence of preceding systems, the character of the 
age, or the desire to give prominence to particular parts. 



162 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

With so many different grounds for divisions, it is not 
surprising that there has been no uniformity. 

The particular object to which the first philosophers 
devoted attention was to them the whole of philosophy. 
We have seen that their physics was not the same in 
character and aim as ours. " The ancients were wholly 
ignorant of the investigation of nature in our sense, 
based on experience ; we find thern occupied only with 
philosophical speculations respecting the universe in 
general, its origin and its primitive substance." * To 
them the domain of philosophy consisted of theories 
respecting nature. They had made considerable prog- 
ress in metaphysical speculations about the cosmos when 
attention was directed to the thinking subject, and the- 
ories of knowledge were discussed, and when dialectics 
and ethics were added to philosophy. Thus, instead of 
taking philosophy and analyzing it in order to find its 
divisions, the genesis of philosophy added one subject 
after another, and these formed the various parts. 
Plato seems to have been the first who had a compre- 
hensive view of the proper domain of jDhilosophy, and 
Aristotle the first who attempted completely to system- 
atize knowledge. 

By one of his pupils, Plato's philosophy was divided 
into ethics, physics, and dialectics. The last contains 
his most characteristic views, namely, the doctrine of 
the idea. His ethics includes politics ; his physics, 
the discussion of the soul, or psychology. Th3 subject 
of aesthetics is not separately treated ; but discussions 
of the beautiful are found in different books, particu- 
larly in connection with the doctrine of ideas. In his 
dialectics the discussions are essentially metaphysical 

* Dr. J. Miiller : Grundriss der Physik und Meteorologie, 13th ed., 
Introd. 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 163 

and logical. It is, however, impossible to make a sharp 
division of Plato's works according to subjects. He is 
imaginative, speculative, brilliant, and suggestive, rather 
than analytical and systematic, being a union of the 
poet and the philosopher. 

Aristotle was a logician and systematizer, being in 
this respect the opposite of his teacher. But his efforts 
to systematize knowledge had significance rather for 
certain disciplines than for philosophy as a whole. For 
the present stage of development, his division of philos- 
ophy into theoretical, constructive, and practical, is of 
no special importance. The first includes physics, math- 
ematics, and metaphysics ; the second discusses the 
laws of art; the third treats of ethics and politics. 
Logic was regarded as introductory to the study of 
philosophy.* 

The division into theoretical and practical philosophy, 
prevalent since Aristotle, is not based on inherent dis- 
tinctions. Besides, this division is misleading. All 
philosophy is theoretical; even in ethics it gives the 
theory or principles of conduct, and in aesthetics the 
theory of art. That division also encourages the false 
notion, already prevalent, that the theoretical is not 
practical, whereas it may be intensely practical and the 

* The condition of Aristotle's works is such that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine the exact nature of his division. The perplex- 
ity is partly owing to the fact that he seems to have had no fixed 
principle of division, and in different works he proposes different ones. 
In the Topics he speaks of philosophical problems as ethical, physical, 
and logical; while in the Metaphysics he divides as indicated above. 
He does not, however, always regard philosophy as the genus under 
which the various philosophical disciplines come as species. Frequently 
the view is found in his works, that there are different philosophies. 
This is implied when he speaks of metaphysics as the " First Philoso- 
phy," and when in his Ethics he speaks of another or a different phi- 
losophy. Zeller divides Aristotle's works into those devoted to logical, 
metaphysical, physical, ethical, and aesthetic inquiries. 



164 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

basis of all conduct. It is a thoughtless popular preju- 
dice, that the superficial and immediately apparent is 
practical, while the deep and thorough is not, — a view 
which philosophy is to combat, not to promote. 

There has been much philosophizing which was not 
completed by forming a system. Among the Greeks 
this was true particularly of Socrates ; among the mod- 
erns, of Leibnitz. Their thoughts were, however, full 
of inspiration, gave impulses and germs for future sys- 
tems, and became influential in giving direction to the 
course of philosophic thinking. As Aristotle systema- 
tized knowledge in the Socratic school, so Wolff in that 
of Leibnitz. Even Kant left no complete system ; 
nevertheless, his works have been the inspiration of the 
entire process of philosophical development in Germany 
for a whole century, and have deeply affected thinking 
in other countries. In point of comprehensiveness and 
grandeur of aim, the system of Hegel, developed out 
of Schelling's system of identity, must be placed in the 
first rank. With an introduction (Pliaenomenologie des 
G-eistes) intended to prepare the mind for the highest 
speculation, the system itself, consisting of logic and 
metaphysics (not two, but one subject), natural philoso- 
phy, and the philosophy of the spirit, aims at nothing 
less than the unfolding of absolute knowledge. The 
dispute as to the merits of this system and its division 
is not ended. It is not surprising that in this vast 
repository of profound thought there should be much 
to inspire the highest admiration, and also much to 
meet decided opposition from those occupying a differ- 
ent stand-point. That the system and its divisions are 
not final, is generally admitted in Germany even by 
those who are warm admirers of Hegel. The author 
himself at different times made different divisions. 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 165 

The various divisions of philosophy thus far preva- 
lent no more determine the true division, than the vari- 
ous systems determine the definition of philosophy. 
Not all philosophers have aimed at a logical division 
of the whole subject. When we consider the limits of 
knowledge, and the tendency to make some specialty 
supreme and absorb the attention, we cannot be sur- 
prised if but few philosophers are able to treat the whole 
of philosophy systematically and with equal ability. In 
the entire course of philosophic thought, men like Kant 
and Hegel have not been numerous ; and in our day, 
partly owing to their labors, the demands made on 
philosophy are greater than in their time. 

At present there are writers who include but one 
subject in philosophy, as metaphysics, psychology, or 
the theory of knowledge. There are others who are 
more true to the history of philosophy, and yet either 
fail to exhaust the subject, or else include too much. 
No one questions the right of philosophizing without 
regard to definite system, or the right of taking any 
one department and treating it separately, without 
regard to the rest; indeed, the latter course is often 
valuable for the sake of giving due prominence to a 
neglected subject. But such procedure does not help 
us to a proper division. 

In the history of philosophy, the systems may be 
treated chronologically, without regard to their inher- 
ent connections ; in that case, the various methods of 
division are considered as they arose or appear in the 
systems. But even where the aim is to give the divis- 
ion inherent in the subject, independent of the histor- 
ical origin and development, a variety of divisions is 
possible, just as in natural science, owing to the dif- 
ferent stand-points from which the subject is viewed. 



166 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

A mere grouping or classification of subjects according 
to external or superficial marks indicates that philoso- 
phy itself has not been penetrated. For the distinction 
of parts there must be an inner reason ; if we connect 
them intimately, there must be inherent oneness, or 
organic union. The divisions must exhaust the sub- 
ject, but must include no more than it does. The prin- 
ciple of division must be the same for all parts. Each 
part must be unique, and none embrace the same class 
of objects as another. 

If the absolute beginning of philosophy could be 
found, and the genesis of its development, we might 
discover the divisions by following the process of the 
unfolding. Hegel claimed to have found this begin- 
ning in the abstract concept of being, and the process of 
both thought and being in the dialectic method. But 
neither the beginning nor the method has been estab- 
lished as final. Some philosophers claim that a concept 
or idea must be the start of philosophy, but there is 
no agreement as to which the seed-thought is. Others 
hold that some fact of consciousness, something given 
as certain, must be the beginning ; but there is no con- 
sensus respecting the experience which deserves the 
preference. Other philosophers deny that there is any 
absolute beginning for philosophy. Certain it is that 
none has been established. The beginner is not in a 
condition to discover or intelligently adopt one, and it 
would defeat the very aim of philosophical instruction 
to take such an absolute starting-point for granted, and 
then let it determine his divisions and entire course in 
philosophy. 

Reluctantly, but necessarily, we abandon the hope of 
giving the student the ideal principle which lies behind 
all others, and is their source, and which need but be 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 167 

analyzed to give the divisions, and developed to give 
the absolute system of philosophy. If we imagine that 
we have found what is still an object of search, we may 
fail both to seek and to discover the desired object, and, 
what is worse, we shall envelope ourselves in an illu- 
sion. Under the circumstances, we can only take the 
definition, and let that determine the division, the aim 
being to discover by synthesis, rather than analysis, the 
component parts. 

We therefore ask, What must those principles be 
which give the ultimate explanations? This question 
can only be answered by finding the different classes of 
objects whose principles are sought. An examination 
of consciousness is thus required in order to discover the 
various groups, including all possible objects of contem- 
plation. The first class, which strikes us on account of 
its prominence, is that included under the notion of the 
real, that which exists. This leads to an inquiry into 
being itself. What is meant by being ? What can we 
learn of its nature, origin, and design ? The inquiry 
into being in general leads to questions of concrete 
being, the nature of various objects, their relations and 
activities. By pursuing this thought, we should em- 
brace in our investigation all real objects of knowledge. 
We, however, exclude from philosophy all that pertains 
to experiment, and is empirical; this leaves for our 
department all purely rational questions respecting 
being. 

We, of course, do not contemplate being as abstracted 
from thought, but as the object of our thought. This 
at once puts us or our own being in relation to other 
being ; and, aside from the inquiry into abstract being, 
we inquire, What relation do we sustain to other 
beings ? 



168 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The first question, What exists ? is thus supplemented 
by another, What is my relation to existence? But 
why make our relation to being specially prominent? 
Why not consider our own relations and activities 
under the general head of being ? Simply because we, 
as inquirers into being, have a special interest in our 
own relation to other objects, and therefore we make 
it a point of special investigation. The two points of 
our philosophy are therefore included under the ques- 
tions of being and of our peculiar relation to objects. 

Our conscious relation to reality cannot well be con- 
sidered as a whole, because this relation itself is of a 
threefold character, depending on our intellectual, emo- 
tional, and volitional activities. This gives us, besides 
the principles of being, those of thought, feeling, and 
volition, as the divisions of philosophy. 

But the same result will be obtained by taking from 
consciousness the four groups which form all the sub- 
jects of rational inquiry ; namely, we find in conscious- 
ness the concepts of being, of thought, of feeling, and 
of volition. Nothing can be conceived which is not 
somehow included under these heads, or under a com- 
bination of them. 

The principles of being belong to metaphysics. Our 
intellectual relations involve the question of cognitions, 
and are included under the theory of knowledge. The 
subject most fully developed under this head is logic. 
Our emotional relations involve the general subject of 
the feelings, and are included under the theory of the 
feelings. This department has received less philosophi- 
cal attention than the other elements of our psychic 
nature, and is consequently less fully developed. The 
emotions connected with the beautiful have received 
most attention under the head of sesthetics. Our voli- 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 169 

tional relations involve the inquiry respecting what 
ought to be done, or the theory of conduct. This is 
the department of ethics or morality. Leaving room 
for the development of subjects under the third and 
fourth heads, — now still incomplete, — we have the 
following division of philosophy : — 

1. Metaphysics. 

2. Theory of knowledge. 

3. ^Esthetics. 

4. Ethics. 

More important than the question, how we get this 
division, is this : Is the division justifiable ? This in- 
volves two others: Does it include all the ultimate 
principles ? Can it be still further reduced ? 

Philosophy deals with the real, not with the vision- 
ary or imaginary. Now, as intimated, besides being, 
thought, feeling, and action, we cannot think of any 
other objects of inquiry. To beings with different or 
more powers than ours, there might be other subjects 
for investigation, just as the man with sight has a 
sphere of inquiry which the blind cannot enter. But 
we can form no conception of beings with powers 
totally different from ours, and therefore cannot con- 
sider relations peculiar to them. Rationally we can 
inquire only into what is, including relation and activ- 
ity ; and then, for the reason indicated, we can consider 
specially our activity and relation as thinking, feeling, 
and willing. The division, consequently, includes all 
principles which can be subjects of inquiry for us. 

The question, Can the division be still further re- 
duced? must be answered in the negative. Nothing 
would be gained by saying that philosophy is divided 
into being and our relation to being, since the latter 
is divided as indicated. 



170 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

It is not intended to substitute, for the old division 
of the mind into numerous faculties, the three powers 
of the understanding, the heart, and the will. That 
the mind has modes of action which can be distin- 
guished in thought, however they may be united in 
their source, is evident. There are serious objections 
to the division into separate faculties, lying side by 
side without organic union ; and it is no explanation 
of mental operations, to postulate certain faculties, en- 
dowed with certain powers, and then to regard all the 
activities as but the product or working of these facul- 
ties. In this way the very thing to be explained is 
taken for granted; besides, the unity of mind, the 
mental organism, is destroyed.* In its varied activities 
it is the mind itself that is seen. Nevertheless we 
cannot resolve thought, feeling, and volition into a 
primary activity from which the other two are devel- 
oped, or of which all three are but manifestations or 
branches. Repeated efforts have been made to find 
the seed from which all our mental activities grow; 
but they have not proved successful. Is feeling the 
original psychic state ? Or is there something distinct 
from feeling, thought, and'volition, containing them in 
embryo ? We do not know what this something is ; 
to call it the soul itself, throws no new light on the 
subject. We cannot tell how these three activities 
proceed from the soul. They are in operation long 

* Herbart and Beneke rejected the usual division of the mind into 
faculties as innate distinctions. Such an analysis had a show of knowl- 
edge, hut it was verbal rather than real. In all its activities the same 
mind is seen, hut in different lights; and if the faculties are regarded 
as indicative only of these various activities, they may promote a clearer 
apprehension of the mental operations without destroying the under- 
lying unity. We do not view the faculties as distinct from the soul, but 
as modes of the soul's activities, through which the character of the soul 
reveals itself. 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 171 

before we reflect on them, and we cannot get behind 
these conscious activities to their unconscious origin. 
Many hold that feeling comes first; and there seems 
to be ground for letting it precede thought and volition. 
But by taking any activity as primary, we cannot show 
how the others grow out of it, or just how feeling and 
thought develop into or produce volition. In all psychic 
states, however much the one or the other may predom- 
inate, we cannot absolutely separate feeling, thought, 
and volition, any more than we can make one the germ 
of the other. Their exact relation is, therefore, still 
an unsolved problem. All we can say is, that they are 
products of the same mind, and are so related that they 
affect one another. We, however, separate them ideally 
and consider each by itself. The question of their 
relation really belongs to psychology. Psychology also 
furnishes our division of philosophy, since it is an analy- 
sis of consciousness which gives the objects of rational 
inquiry. 

Philosophy is rational knowledge, namely of princi- 
ples ; or it is principiant knowledge. On first view it 
may therefore seem as if the theory of knowledge, 
instead of being a part of philosophy merely, is the 
whole of it. This view has a number of advocates, and 
is promoted by the prominence given to the theory of 
knowledge or epistemology. This is, however, an error 
based on a lack of proper distinctions, and would more 
likely be avoided if for " theory of knowledge " we 
substituted "theory of knowing." All principles are 
elements of knowledge, but they are not all principles 
explanatory of knowledge. We mean by these princi- 
ples only such as are concerned with knowledge purely 
as knowledge, giving the interpretation of the knowing, 
and not of any particular kind of knowledge. As in 



172 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

psychology the soul's activities are considered, not their 
products as distinguished or abstracted from the soul 
itself (as the object from the subject), so in our search 
for the principles of knowledge we abstract the content 
of thought, and contemplate knowledge as knowledge, 
not as this or that kind of knowledge. As after discuss- 
ing psychology we still find certain contents of the soul 
to consider, namely the notion of being, of thought, of 
feeling, and of volition, as well as other departments 
of knowledge, so after the theory of knowledge (know- 
ing) or the principles of thinking, we still have the 
content of knowledge to consider ; namely, the princi- 
ples of being, feeling, and willing. 

That a certain primacy thus belongs to the theory of 
knowledge, is evident, and it deserves great prominence. 
But even from this point of view we shall have the 
same divisions, though not in the same order. Philoso- 
phy deals purely with rational knowledge (genus) ; 
and in rational knowledge it seeks the principles (spe- 
cies, distinguishing it from other rational pursuits). 
As rational knowledge of principles, philosophy must 
explain knowledge itself, which gives the theory of 
knowing or of knowledge. This is fundamental for all 
intellectual operations. Having found the principles 
of knowledge, we can view all other rational inquiries 
as merely an application of these principles. But why 
are these principles .-applied, in philosophy ? For the 
purpose of finding the principles of being, feeling, and 
acting. 

I cannot see how complete principiant knowledge can 
omit any of these, or can include more. They exhaust 
our inquiries into ultimate principles, and each division 
has a clearly marked field of its own. Other divisions 
extant presuppose a different idea of philosophy, or do 



DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHt. 173 

not exhaust the subject, or make subdivisions primary. 
Our division intentionally omits the application of phi- 
losophy to other objects, as law, language, religion, etc., 
— applications which are endless, and do not belong to 
philosophy proper. Under the four divisions all appli- 
cations of philosophy may be classified, each being 
placed under one or more of them. Thus there is no 
inquiry which does not involve an application of the 
principles of knowledge. Law, politics, and sociology 
are largely ethical, and may be viewed as coming under 
social ethics, or as an application of ethical principles 
to society. 

The theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, deserve 
especial attention in an introductory work ; the former 
on account of its fundamental character, the latter 
because its inherent difficulties are so great. But aes- 
thetics and ethics are also worthy of careful considera- 
tion. Their spheres are more easily comprehended than 
those of the other two subjects, and their discussion 
lies more within the range of ordinary thinking ; their 
ultimate principles are, however, beset with difficulties. 

For the reasons given, the different departments of 
philosophy will be discussed in the following order : — 

First, The Theory of Knowledge (Noetics).* 

Second, Metaphysics. 

Third, ^Esthetics. 

Fourth, Ethics. 

* In Germany this theory is called Erkenntnisslehre, ErTcenntniss- 
theorie, Wissenslehre, Wissenstheorie, and sometimes Noetik. The word 
" epistemology " has gained limited currency in English for the same 
subject. Since, however, we already use " noetic " as an adjective, the 
same word or "noetics," analogous to "metaphysics," "aesthetics," 
and " ethics," might be used to designate the theory of knowledge. 



174 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



REFLECTIONS. 

Why divide Knowledge if it is a unit? Principles 
determining the Division. Can the analysis of any one 
principle give the Divisions of Philosophy ? The Divis- 
ion. The reason for this Division. Does it exhaust 
the subject? Criticism of other Divisions. Why not 
consider the Philosophy of Religion and Naturphiloso- 
phie as also separate Divisions ? Does Philosophy be- 
come psychological by going to consciousness for its 
objects ? Where can Philosophy find its objects if not 
in consciousness? Difference between an empirical ob- 
ject, and an object of consciousness. How does an 
empirical become a rational object ? Reason for dis- 
cussing the Theory of Knowledge first. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 175 



CHAPTER VI. 

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (NOETICS). 

The infinite variety of being, thought, feeling, and 
volition, comprehended in philosophical contemplation, 
forms a unit in that all is considered only so far as 
rational, and as leading to or included in the ultimate 
principles. The intellectual threads, on which every 
thing is strung in philosophy, are rational and princi- 
piant, and objects are philosophically significant in pro- 
portion as related to these threads. The philosophic 
element, in the multiplicity of concepts, forms the bond 
of unity; and that element is the object of search in 
the effort to pass from the desire for wisdom to wisdom 
itself. In philosophy, therefore, we do not seek knowl- 
edge in general, but the knowing element in all that is 
known. The aim to attain full and the highest intel- 
lectual consciousness leads philosophy beyond the con- 
sideration of a knowledge of particular things, to the 
consideration of knowledge itself, making that the 
object of rational and principiant inquiry. 

The problem of knowing, or of knowledge, is funda- 
mental. The mind which recognizes the responsibility 
of giving to itself a full account of itself, knows that it 
must consider the nature and conditions of knowledge, 
before it can rationally discuss the various objects of 
knowledge. An object of knowledge is meaningless, 
unless the knowledge, of which it is the object, is under- 



176 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PniLOSOPUY. 

stood. Our cognitions are a purely intellectual rela- 
tion between the subject and the object ; and this 
relation, being the fundamental conception of knowl- 
edge, is the light in which all objects known must be 
beheld. Not the soul (psychology), not the objects 
to which it is related (reality, beauty, morality), form 
the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge. This 
subject-matter is nothing else than the correct thought- 
relation between the knower and the known, neither of 
which is considered alone, nor even at all, except so 
far as they are necessary to bring out the idea of all 
pure knowledge. The principles involved are those 
which pertain to knowing as knowing ; therefore they 
are general, and apply equally to all departments of 
thought. The question, What must a mental product 
be in order to be knowledge ? excludes from a content 
of consciousness every thing that is peculiar, except 
what constitutes the peculiarity of all knowledge. Be- 
tween the knower and the known we want to discover 
the knowing. For all intellections, the problem is con- 
sequently fundamental ; and if we regard psychology 
as the preface to philosophy, the theory of knowledge 
is its introductory chapter. 

In the haste to acquire objects of knowledge, this 
introductory chapter is frequently skipped. More intent 
on possessing than on giving an account to itself of the 
character of its possessions, and the processes involved 
in their acquisition, the mind overlooks the deepest 
problems of the nature and criteria of knowledge. 
Under these circumstances it is not strange that the 
intellect fails to get the full mastery of itself and its 
acquirements ; and with all its boasted wealth, it does 
not so much possess as it is possessed. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 177 

THE NEED OF SUCH A THEORY. 

This theory becomes a mental necessity so soon as 
the mind reflects on itself, and demands proof of the 
validity of its processes, and of the reliability of their 
results. Whenever we rise from the psychological view 
to the critical inquiry into what must be in order that 
our intellectual attainments may be true, we enter the 
sphere of philosophy, and begin to construct a theory of 
knowledge. The reason in the mind insists on rational 
standards, and requires thought to justify itself. The 
philosophic spirit cannot rest in consciousness or even 
self-consciousness, but only in truth-consciousness. 

Under the objects of knowledge lies the question, 
What is knowledge ? The answer to this gives rise to 
other questions : Is knowledge possible ? If so, under 
what conditions? To what extent? How can it be 
tested ? Only those who have taken the answers for 
granted can fail to see the difficulties and fundamental 
character of these problems. None but the thoughtless, 
who have never made clear to themselves the meaning 
and foundation of knowing, will regard an inquiry into 
the possibility of knowledge useless. This possibility 
has repeatedly been denied, and all supposed knowl- 
edge has been pronounced mere opinion. This scepti- 
ticism was by no means confined to the ancient Greeks. 
In modern times it has been quite common, particularly 
in certain departments of thought. This is evident 
from the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and Comte, and 
also from agnosticism. This scepticism is not confined 
to theology and philosophy, but extends also to science. 
Ferrari, an Italian philosopher who died in 1877, even 
denied the possibility of science, holding that " Logic 
and Nature are contradictory in themselves and be- 



178 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tween themselves, and thought, which would dominate 
facts by applying itself to their real elements, is of 
necessity involved in error." * Even Descartes' Cogito 
ergo sum is not final; and that eminent thinker was 
unable to find any other proof that our minds do not 
deceive us when they present clear and distinct concep- 
tions, than the fact that God is truthful, and conse- 
quently will not permit our minds to deceive us. But 
we reason in a circle if the proof of God's existence 
depends on our reason, and then the validity of reason 
is made to depend on the existence of God. Our age 
has not merely inherited the scepticism of previous 
ages, but it has also overturned the dogmatism of the 
past, has undermined arguments formerly supposed to 
be irrefutable, and has thus deepened and broadened 
doubt and suspicion. 

Whoever understands the deeper undercurrents of 
the age must appreciate the need of subjecting the 
problems involved in cognition to the most thorough 
examination ; and even a superficial view shows the 
importance of critically determining the grounds of 
certainty. These grounds will be valued in proportion 
to the love of truth. The honest doubter, and the 
anxious searcher for an immovable basis of knowledge, 
know the difficulty of attaining certainty respecting 
many of the most important subjects. On the same 
points, conflicting views prevail among those who have 
equal facilities for understanding them.f Marked dif- 

* Mind, 1878. Barzellotti on Philosophy in Italy. 

t Every discussion makes the need of reliable grounds of certainty 
evident. The origin of Locke's celebrated work is an instructive ex- 
ample. In " The Epistle to the Reader " he says, " Were it fit to trouble 
thee with the history of this essay, I should tell thee that five or six 
friends, meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very 
remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficul- 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 179 

ferences prevail respecting the inferences to be drawn 
from the same scientific experiments ; and with all their 
exactness and thoroughness, scientists are by no means 
agreed respecting the principles and results of science. 
One need but hear witnesses of the same occurrence 
testify under oath, to learn how hard it is to determine 
simple questions of fact ; and even when the facts are 
admitted, different and perhaps opposite inferences are 
drawn from them. When we pass from facts to com- 
plicated systems of thought, the difficulties are multi- 
plied. In religion the conflicting views are innumerable, 
and all must have some basis, valid or invalid. One 
will affirm the doctrine of the Trinity as stoutly as 
another denies it ; and an Athanasius may be as ready 
as Servetus to die for what he regards as certain. In 
philosophy the theories respecting the first principles 
vary greatly, and thus the foundation is laid for diver- 
gences throughout the entire domain of thought. The 
theory of knowledge teems with unsolved problems per- 
taining to the nature, the origin, the conditions, the 
limits, the relations, and the value of knowledge. 

So important has this theory become, that it threat- 
ens, for the present, to absorb all philosophical inquiry. 
Since it involves the questions on which all knowledge 
depends, their fundamental character requires that they 
be settled before others pertaining to cognition can be 
determined. In America, Great Britain, France, and 
Italy, the conflicts between empiricism and rationalism, 

ties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, 
without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which per- 
plexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and 
that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was 
necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our under- 
standings were or were not fitted to deal with." The attempt to solve 
this problem resulted in the Essay on Human Understanding. 



180 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

materialism and idealism, theism and atheism, make the 
significance of the theory evident. In Germany, philo- 
sophical journals and books are full of the subject, and 
the best thinkers devote their best efforts to the solution 
of the problems involved.* 

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LOGIC. 

One of the principal difficulties in noetics consists 
in determining the place of logic. The old lifeless 
skeletons which formerly constituted this discipline do 
not meet present demands ; and the numerous recent 
works on logic in America, England, and Germany, 
seek to give the study more life and greater practical 
value. But unanimity respecting the nature, sphere, 
and method of logic has not yet been attained. Some 
hold with Kant that the laws of thought are its sub- 
ject-matter ; others make it a discussion of the princi- 
ples of induction, so that it becomes more directly the 
propaedeutic of the sciences ; and others want it to 
include the whole theory of knowledge. This is the 
case with Ueberweg, who defines it as " the science 
of the normative laws of human knowledge." His 
" Logic " discusses perception, space, and time, and the 
relation of perception to reality, as well as the usual 
topics of formal logic. Ulrici opposed Ueberweg's 
method, and advocated logic as the basis of the theory 
of knowledge, giving the norms of thought, while the 
theory determines the nature and possibility of knowl- 
edge. Sigwart regards logic as the doctrine of the art 

* " Speculative philosophy has in modern times changed in charac- 
ter from a theory of being into a theory of knowing." Mind, 1883, 21, 
by the editor. " The theory of knowledge, besides being separately 
treated, is included in all the newest expositions of logic, dominated 
as these no longer are by the old formalistic conceptions." — Wundt, 
Philosophy in Germany. Mind, 1877. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 181 

of thinking, its aim being to establish reliable and 
general rules for thought. Instead of including the 
entire theory of knowledge, he wants logic to deter- 
mine the correct method of thinking (methodology). 
Among the most important of recent German works is 
that of Wundt, whose title indicates its aim : " Logic : 
An Inquiry into the Principles of Knowledge and of the 
Methods of Scientific Investigation." The first large 
volume is devoted to the theory of knowledge, the 
second to the method of the sciences. Of the great 
mass of learned material, comparatively a small propor- 
tion belongs to what was formerly discussed in works 
on logic. These are but a few samples of the variety 
of opinions on the subject. 

Logic, as giving the forms of correct thinking, can no 
longer be isolated, but must be brought into organic 
union with the other elements of knowing. This, how- 
ever, does not require that it include the whole process 
of obtaining knowledge, perception for instance, or that 
it consider the material as well as the forms of thought. 
The norms of thinking are sufficiently important for 
separate treatment, and they constitute the peculiar 
province of logic. Logic is thus part of the theory of 
knowledge, and properly comes under the head of ori- 
gin of knowledge, namely so far as that origin depends 
on correct thinking. This place secures its immediate 
connection with all the members in the organism of 
knowledge. That it cannot exhaust the whole subject 
of knowing, is evident, though it performs a most im- 
portant part. Thinking is a method of knowing; in 
order that the method may result in truth, it requires 
the right beginning or a proper object. But if logic is 
to begin with sensation, and to determine the correct- 
ness of perception and the right apprehension of its 



182 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

object, — in other words, if all that precedes the act 
of thinking is also to be considered, — then logic must 
include a large domain of psychology. By making logic 
the synonyme of the theory of knowledge, it must also 
determine the relation of thought to reality. 21 The 
form of thought must have some kind of content ; how 
is that obtained ? What is its validity when obtained ? 
These questions include much more than belongs to the 
historically limited sphere of logic. There is no need 
of changing this sphere. The laws of thought, or dis- 
cursive thinking, can still be regarded as the domain of 
logic, which the larger theory of knowledge includes as 
one of its parts.* 

The comprehensiveness of the theory of knowledge 
makes divisions necessary even for a general view of 
its multitude of important subjects. There being no 
generally accepted division, one will here be made 
which seems best calculated to give the student a clear 
conception of the subject, and to prepare him for its 
study. The divisions and their discussions in a pre- 
paratory work must, however, be viewed as a mere 
preface to the depth and breadth of this profound and 
extensive theme. Each of the three heads under which 
we consider the general subject seems inexhaustible. 

1. What is knowledge ? 

2. How is it obtained ? 

3. How is it completed ? 

* Volkelt (Phil. Monatsh., 1881. 540): "It is my conviction that the 
theory of knowledge should not he absorbed by logic, but that, on 
the other hand, logic should be reduced to a part of this theory. This 
theory is the more general, more comprehensive, science. In the course 
of its investigations it unavoidably comes in contact with logical think- 
ing, and must test it according to its objective worth. This task cannot 
be performed without considering the most general forms and laws of 
thought, which are usually discussed in logic." 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 183 

1. WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 

The problem for solution is the exact meaning of 
the expression, " I know." From the object known we 
abstract for examination the knowing. The first glance 
shows that knowledge is not co-extensive with the con- 
tents of consciousness. In distinction from the emo- 
tions and volitions, it is intellectual. But there are also 
intellectual elements in imaginations, opinions, and be- 
liefs ; yet we do not include these in knowledge. With 
whatever tenacity held by the mind possessing them, 
they are not authoritative for other minds. They are 
recognized as having something peculiar, individual, 
perhaps arbitrary, but not what is necessary and uni- 
versal. Knowledge, on the other hand, is universal, and 
has objective as well as subjective authority. If dis- 
covered by one mind, it can also become a possession of 
others, and the grounds on which it rests must be valid 
for every intellect understanding them. It does not, 
like so many of our mental products, depend on peculi- 
arities of mind or training or experience, but on an in- 
herent necessity. Our inclinations and will may effect 
its recognition, not its reality. It is absolute and final ; 
it dominates the intellect like a tyrant, and yet the 
intellect itself is that tyrant. 

The intellect does not create knowledge, but produces 
it according to necessary laws. Just because it beholds 
itself in this product, the mind cannot alter the knowl- 
edge without changing itself. Intellect culminates in 
knowledge, and recognizes it as an imperative. Knowl- 
edge is power, but it is power which is absolute re- 
straint. The mind is helpless in view of it, and there 
is no freedom except in absolute submission. 

Knowledge is truth apprehended, or truth become 



184 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

conscious. We ascribe objective reality to truth; it 
exists even if we do not know it, and it remains un- 
changed by our denial and rejection. We cannot make, 
but may discover it ; and cognition is the process for 
making the objective subjective. Whether we regard 
the truth as consciously existing in any mind, as God's, 
or not, we know that our mental attitude toward it has 
no more effect on it than our recognition of the exter- 
nal world affects its course. The truth is thus a realm 
of its own, complete, perfect, absolute. By entering 
this realm, our intellect appropriates its possessions and 
is enriched, but the realm itself is not impoverished. 
Knowledge is an individualization of truth, a mental 
realization of an ideal existence. 

We can define knowing as a perception of truth, — 
a perception based on grounds evident and certain. A 
man may dream the truth, or have a presentiment of it, 
but that is not knowledge. Truth may be possessed 
without being known as truth, while much that is 
thought to be known is really a deception. Standards 
vary; where many claim to know, the more critical 
discover only prejudice or opinion. What a man re- 
gards at one time as absolutely known, he may later 
reject as false, or as beyond the limits of the knowable. 

If such mistakes and self-deceptions are to be avoided, 
knowledge must be sharply defined, and its criteria 
given. We speak of the absoluteness of reason, but 
forget that in this sense reason is an abstraction, and 
that our minds are fallible, still wrestling with the prob- 
lem, how to attain the ideal reason. The same mind 
that knows must also have the criteria of knowing. It 
must determine for itself the standard of truth. But 
this standard is not true, unless a universal standard for 
all intellect. If peculiar, it is false. With itself, its 



TIIEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 185 

criteria, the mind should therefore be mercilessly criti- 
cal in determining what to accept as knowledge. The 
vast majority are satisfied with mere opinion, take it for 
knowledge, and inquire no further; hence the impor- 
tance of shaking these opinions by doubt, so that the 
mind may become conscious of itself, and pass to knowl- 
edge. But even after the mind has become conscious 
of itself, and is willing to rest only in what is reliable 
and can stand the severest test, it is extremely difficult 
to determine the limits of the knowable. Particularly 
hard is it so to draw the line between faith and knowl- 
edge that they can in all cases be clearly distinguished. 
Both have degrees, and at times they seem to merge 
into each other. Faith may be based on knowledge, 
and must be if reliable; but can knowledge ever be 
based on faith ? If only that is known which is abso- 
lutely demonstrated, then nothing is known. Some- 
thing must ultimately be regarded as so certain that it 
needs no demonstration, otherwise all reasoning is in a 
circle. If every thing must be demonstrated, on what 
does all demonstration finally rest ? With what can we 
begin ? For instance, can we prove that our faculties 
do not deceive us ? If any one attempts this, he must 
do it with the very faculties he is testing ; that is, he 
must take for granted that the faculties, whose reliabil- 
ity he is testing, are reliable. Call it a belief, an as- 
sumption, a postulate, a self-evident truth, or what you 
will, something must at last be taken as so certain, 
that it needs no proof; and that must be made the 
ultimate basis of knowledge, and the starting-point of 
reasoning. 

Nor do we ordinarily limit knowledge to such abso- 
lute demonstrations. When we test such generally 
accepted laws as causation, gravitation, the indestruc- 



186 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tibility of matter, the conservation of energy, we base 
their universality on some unclemonstrable postulate. 
The direct observation of the working of any law is 
necessarily limited, yet we do not hesitate to declare it 
universal. Nothing is regarded as more certain than 
the demonstrations of mathematics; yet they all rest 
on self-evident truths, which are axioms just because 
undemonstrable, though certain. 

Knowledge presents four questions for consideration. 
What is its object (subject-matter) ? What is our con- 
ception of that object? How is the conception related 
to the object ? What is the degree of certainty respecting 
that relation ? 

Let us suppose the object to be a man. If my con- 
ception of him is correct, I have the truth, but I may 
not have knowledge. That conception, while perfectly 
true, may be a mere opinion ; I may only believe that 
he has a certain character. What I opine may be true ; 
what I hold as certain may be false. The difference 
between knowledge and opinion need not be in their 
object, since that may be the same in both ; but there 
mii£t always be a difference in the grounds on which 
they rest. A correct opinion only becomes knowledge 
when I know (not merely opine) that between my con- 
ception and the object conceived there is harmony. 
This psychological element of certainty is, therefore, 
essential to knowledge. 

The truth in a mind may consequently be far more 
extensive than its knowledge. The former is simply 
the agreement of a percept or concept with its object ; 
the latter, however, implies that this agreement is 
known. The difference between a true faith and 
knowledge consists in the fact that in the one case the 
truth is believed, in the other it is known ; but both 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 187 

have the truth. A concept, opinion, or belief may be 
true or false. Knowledge is always true. 

Knowledge, then, is a conscious possession of truth : 
a possession whose grounds are recognized as being in 
harmony with reason, and, therefore, irrefutable ; or, 
knowledge is the legitimately and certainly recognized 
{conscious) agreement of a percept or concept with its 
object. Thus if we have a subject and predicate, knowl- 
edge consists in the established certainty of the har- 
mony between the two ; or, if we have a perception of 
something real, knowledge will consist in the established 
certainty that there is harmony between the mental 
presentation and the thing for which it stands. 

Percepts and concepts exist only in consciousness, 
and always are, in themselves, what they appear to be. 
It is not in beholding them that mistakes occur, but 
only in passing judgment on what they stand for. I 
commit no error in imagining a fictitious character ; 
bnc I deviate from the truth as soon as I ascribe ex- 
ternal reality to the fiction. I abide in the truth so 
long as I take my concepts for what they really are. A 
mind fully conscious of itself and of the nature of its 
possessions cannot err. Viewed in this light, we can 
define knowledge as perfected consciousness. 

Taken in the widest sense, knowledge embraces all 
that is known, irrespective of its character. Hence it 
includes fiction, and numerous other things, which are 
of little or no significance to the scholar. The only 
knowledge worthy of philosophical investigation is val- 
uable and real. Whatever its idealism, philosophy aims 
to become absolutely realistic ; it therefore rejects every 
concept regarded as the intellectual counterpart of some 
reality, when, in truth, it is but a mental fiction. Not 
only does the mind create such fictions, and then pro- 



188 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

nounce them realities, but it also takes words for con- 
cepts, and objectifies its own concepts, as if external 
existences. We speak of accidents, for instance, as if 
they occurred in nature ; but reflection teaches us that 
they only represent our way of viewing certain occur- 
rences. Chance and accident vanish when their causes 
are understood. Perhaps these words are used only 
to indicate that something occurred without intention 
on our part. From this it is evident how essential to 
knowledge is the correct interpretation of our concepts. 

Where reason is made the supreme arbiter, there is 
no danger of excluding ideals from knowledge. As 
objects of search, or as the goal to be striven after, they 
are the highest reality. The true man is an ideal ; but 
he is the only real man, all others being imperfect 
copies. When, therefore, we speak of the real as the 
object of knowledge, it is taken in the twofold sense as 
embracing what exists, and also what ought to be. It 
includes whatever is true. Not only nature and mind, 
but also their source, relations, activities, and products, 
are its objects. In mathematics we have objects of 
knowledge, even if there be no objective (extra-mental) 
reality to correspond with its figures and demonstra- 
tions. All that is real to the mind, and has significance 
for it, is an object of knowledge ; otherwise, sesthetics 
and ethics could never be objects of rational inquiry. 

When we say that knowledge aims at an exhaustive 
understanding of the real, what is meant? We under- 
stand a thing when we know its nature, its origin, its 
relation to other things, and its purpose. A little re- 
flection shows that nothing can be fully understood 
unless every thing else is known. Aristotle says in his 
Ethics that the philosopher must follow things in the 
order of their orgin, and declares that the beginning is 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 189 

half of the whole, — a proverb whose application to 
knowledge is evident. But in order to comprehend 
fully the origin of a thing, we must follow its near and 
remote causes through all the processes by means of 
which it has been developed, going from effect to cause, 
until we reach the first cause. So, in order to compre- 
hend the relations of an object, its connection with the 
whole universe must be traced, since every thing is 
somehow involved in these relations. The purpose or 
design of a thing is fully understood only when all its 
connections, from the nearest to the remotest, are con- 
sidered. It is thus seen that the thorough study of any 
one thing leads to inquiries which involve the whole 
universe of being, and that to know one thing perfectly 
means to know all absolutely. A deep and broad con- 
ception of knowledge reveals our own attainments as 
extremely limited. 

This intimate relation of all objects, so that they 
constitute a universe in which nothing is isolated, 
greatly complicates knowledge. It is impossible to 
know all individual objects, nor is it profitable to spend 
one's strength in acquiring unconnected details. From 
the philosophic point of view, the comprehension of 
details under laws and principles is far more valuable. 
That individual objects must also be studied, is a lesson 
which science is constantly teaching. And every science 
has its (material) logic to determine what shall be 
regarded as scientific knowledge in its special depart- 
ment. So there are laws of historic, literary, and lin- 
guistic criticism, to determine what the conditions of 
knowledge in their respective departments are. But 
the facts in nature and mind thus learned become 
means for induction and generalization. The intellect 
itself impels us to pass from facts to laws, which are 



190 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the foci concentrating all the rays of knowledge. 
Thinking condenses knowledge into its essence. 

While all knowledge, even that of the most insignifi- 
cant details, is truth known as such by the mind, the 
variety in its objects is infinite. Only by classification 
can we gain the intellectual mastery over the innumer- 
able objects. Systematized knowledge is most available, 
and in forming its attainments into system the mind 
both develops and economizes strength. The best 
methods of classification, as we have seen, are deter- 
mined by inherent characteristics, not by incidental or 
external marks. The nature of their union, and the 
amount which objects have in common, determine the 
intimacy of their relation, and the order of their 
classification. 

It is a general rule, that, the more objects have in 
common, the smaller the class to which they belong, 
and vice versa. The same thought may be expressed in 
another way: A concept is rich in content, in propor- 
tion as it is small in extent ; and the poorer in content, 
the greater in extent. Intensively and extensively, con- 
cepts are thus in inverse proportion. In the concepts 
tree and organism, we find that the latter includes the 
former, and all that can be predicated of the nature of 
an organism is true of the tree ; but the concept tree 
also contains much more than the more general concept 
organism. In content the concept tree is much the 
richer, but the concept organism embraces many more 
individuals than tree. A tree is an organism only so 
far as it has elements common to all organisms. The 
last sentence implies that the concept organism is 
poorer in content than tree, but richer in the number 
of objects embraced. 

However, then, we may classify an individual, it 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 191 

always contains more than the class-name indicates. 
This is merely saying that the concrete is richer than 
the abstract. The object before me is a tree, but it is 
something more ; it is an oak, a white oak, a particular 
one, with a certain form and size, with a certain num- 
ber of leaves and quantity of fruit, and with numerous 
other peculiarities. When we assert that an object 
belongs to a particular class, we only indicate that it 
has the marks (notae) common to all the objects of that 
class. Knowledge of this kind is general, abstract. 
When I say, " This is a man," I indicate nothing that 
is peculiar so as to distinguish him from mankind in 
general. He may be any man. Yet our general notions 
are indispensable for reasoning and for all thinking ; we 
cannot even give a definition without them. 

The most general (the most abstract and the empti- 
est) of all notions, that of being, includes extensively 
all that exists, but indicates nothing respecting exist- 
ence except that it is. Can we predicate any thing else 
of all being, except the empty fact of existence? Is 
there any quality or property which belongs to all 
things that are? Perhaps the very thought of being 
implies something else. If this is so, and if we could 
discover this something else, we should gain new knowl- 
edge applicable to the whole universe of being. By 
increasing the intensive content of a general term, we 
increase our knowledge of all objects included under 
that term. 

The general concept, of course, has significance only 
because there are concrete objects which it includes. 
The concept man is useless unless there are men. Are 
the universals purely mental, or do they represent real 
existences? Aside from the conception there is noth- 
ing that can be called absolutely tree, man, or moun- 



192 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tain ; but there are trees, men, and mountains. A still 
more vital question is this: Have we really general 
concepts, or have we instead only general terms to 
which no concept corresponds? Berkeley and Hume 
contended that what we call general or abstract ideas 
or notions are pure fictions. An abstract idea they 
declared an impossibility. By viewing a number of 
similar things, say triangles, they held that we apply 
the same term to all, but that to this general term noth- 
ing in our mind corresponds. The term "triangle " does 
not stand for a general notion, but it stands for each 
particular triangle. We consequently have general 
terms, but no notions. An inference has been drawn 
from this view, especially by Hume, in favor of empiri- 
cism and sensationalism, to the rejection of the higher 
and more abstract activities of the mind. 

Emphatically, however, as they reject all general 
notions, Berkeley and Hume themselves give evidence 
to prove that they are more than mere words. Thus 
they institute comparisons between objects, and abstract 
that wherein they agree from that wherein they differ. 
What is the result of this process? The general con- 
cept which is designated by the general term. From 
a number of triangles I abstract that wherein they 
agree. They all have three sides, so drawn as to en- 
close space, and to form three angles; but the peculiari- 
ties of these triangles — the length of the sides, the 
size of the angles, the amount of space included — are 
not considered. The result of this process of abstrac- 
tion is, that what all the triangles have in common is 
obtained. The general term " triangle " does not indi- 
cate the peculiarities of any particular triangle, but only 
what every figure must have in order to be a triangle, 
whatever else it may have. A general notion is conse- 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 193 

quently real, and is the product of a most important 
mental operation. We go a step farther, and declare 
that the general notion is not merely a mental reality, 
but, so far as it is a notion of things, something real 
corresponds to it. There is no universal in nature ; 
but we make the mistake of looking for some particular 
object which corresponds with the general notion, when 
it does not stand for a particular object at all. It stands 
for what is found in all objects of that class, but which 
cannot be exclusively concentrated in any one thing. 
That which constitutes a mountain is found in all moun- 
tains ; what makes a figure a triangle must be in every 
triangle. 

The difficulty with Berkeley, Hume, and their fol- 
lowers, on this subject, is, that they do not distinguish 
between perception and conception. Hume distinctly 
rejects all that cannot be perceived ; it is either a fiction 
of the mind, or a word without meaning. Now, we can 
perceive only the concrete ; but by mentally elaborating 
our percepts (by thinking), we form general notions. 
We cannot perceive them as we do objects of sense, 
but we conceive them ; we do not make an individual 
presentation to the mind of what is general, but we 
think it. What Hume wants to behold as an "im- 
pression " or " image " of a thing, the mind wants to 
contemplate as the intellectual counterpart of reality. 

We study particulars to get a knowledge of all like 
particulars, and we generalize to individualize. Knowl- 
edge in any comprehensive sense is obtained by pro- 
cesses of generalization and individuation. Cognition 
must attend to details, but general notions are equally 
indispensable to knowledge. 

The question, how far knowledge extends, may also 
be considered both extensively and intensively. It 



194 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PniLOSOPUY. 

would be presumptuous to claim that our cognition is 
co-extensive with being. The unconscious processes of 
our own minds lie wholly beyond the sphere of our 
knowledge ; and there may be entire regions, wholly 
different from those known, which we cannot enter, and 
of whose very existence we cannot even form a concep- 
tion. With other or different senses and intellectual 
powers, regions might be revealed which must now re- 
main hidden. The limit of knowledge is one of the most 
interesting and most difficult problems in the theory of 
knowledge. 

The extent of knowledge intensively considered re- 
fers to the limits of thought respecting the objects 
within the sphere of cognition. How far does our 
knowledge of things extend? The uncritical imagine 
that through their senses they come into direct commu- 
nication with things, and learn to know them immedi- 
ately ; but, in reality, we know directly only what is in 
our consciousness. Mentally we never come in contact 
with things themselves. They reveal themselves to us 
through their qualities or forces ; they are manifested 
to us through the percepts we form of them. It is not 
exact enough to say that we know a thing from what 
it does, for it may do much of which we can know 
nothing; but from what a thing does to us (how it 
affects us), we infer what it is. We thus distinguish 
between phenomena and things themselves. According 
to Kant, we can know only the phenomenal ; the thing 
per se (" das Ding an szcA"), we cannot know. That 
things can only be known according to what they are 
to us, is self-evident. It is but saying that things can 
be to us intellectually only what they are to us intel- 
lectually. The existence of a substance underlying the 
qualities which appear to us is an inference, the cor- 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 195 

rectness of which is much disputed at present. To our 
minds a thing is always what it does, or is able to do. 
Matter is to us simply the sum of its known forces. 
If we are not satisfied with this view, we must make 
it the dark something in which the forces inhere, and 
from which they proceed ; its further definition is still 
a problem. To define the soul as immaterial is, as we 
have seen, purely negative, showing what it is not, but 
giving nothing positive. Directly we know only its 
activity ; all else is inference. Even the problem of 
its immortality is a question of conscious activity. By 
a critical examination of cognitions, we become con- 
scious of our limitations ; and growth in the knowledge 
of self is largely a growth in the consciousness of our 
ignorance. 

The relation of knowledge to reality has been in- 
volved in much perplexity. We do not doubt that 
things exist, whether we have any knowledge of them 
or not. Our thinking does not affect the existence of 
any thing except the thought itself. Nor is the thought 
of an object identical with the object. What, then, is 
their relation to each other ? Have we in our cogni- 
tions a possession of reality, or of its copy? Or is 
thought, perhaps, independent of external existence, 
being wholly a mental creation ? So far as these ques- 
tions belong to an introductory work, they can best be 
considered under the next head. 

2. ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 

This subject might be relegated to psychology if 
the process of the acquisition of knowledge could be 
watched and exactly described. It is, however, per- 
formed unconsciously (at least without being remem- 
bered) long before it becomes an object of attention 



196 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PUILOSOPIIY. 

and reflection. We can still watch certain processes in 
the formation of knowledge afterwards, and the ques- 
tion of the origin of knowledge involves important 
psychological elements ; but psychology cannot solve 
the problem unless we are prepared so to enlarge its 
sphere as to include the critical inquiries of Kant, as 
well as the sceptical but dogmatic processes of Hume. 

Since the time of Descartes, there has been much 
dispute as to whether there are innate ideas. The 
advocates of the doctrine regard as innate the ideas 
called universal and necessary. It is not meant that 
they are universal in the sense that every human being 
has them, but that they are necessarily developed in 
every mind attaining a certain stage of culture. The 
dispute about innate ideas has in large part been 
fruitless, because the terms were not sharply definedc 
Descartes himself did not state the doctrine clearly* 
Locke, in his attack on innate ideas, showed that chil- 
dren, idiots, and savages do not possess them, and 
therefore concluded that they cannot be innate. He 
proved that these ideas are not born with us, but that 
experience is necessary for their presence in conscious- 
ness ; that is, he clearly established what probably no 
philosopher ever questioned, namely that at birth the 
mind has no ready-made notions lying about in con- 
sciousness. His attack, however, made it necessary to 
define more carefully what is designated by the ideas 
pronounced innate. In answer to Locke, Leibnitz 
admitted as true that to the intellect nothing is innate, 
except the intellect itself.* He saw that the real question, 
namely, whether there are not certain principles inher- 
ent in the mind which determine what is necessary, was 

* "Nihil est in intellect!!, quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intel- 
lectus." 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 197 

not touched by Locke's arguments. He held that of 
course there are no complete notions at birth, but that 
the mind has certain tendencies or aptitudes, which, 
with proper development, give necessary truth. These 
innate aptitudes he uses as the synonyme of "innate 
ideas." The meaning is that certain notions are impli- 
cite, not explicite, in the mind at birth. Whether this 
is true, is the real question at issue. 

In this sense Locke himself would no doubt have 
accepted the doctrine of innate ideas. His view of 
reflection, besides sensation, as a source of knowledge, 
really implies it.* But, as the expression is ambiguous, 
and has often been misunderstood, it is better to avoid 
the words "innate ideas," and substitute for them 
inherent mental aptitudes or laws. 

Kant rejected innate ideas, in the literal sense, as dis- 
tinctly as Locke did, but taught that there are certain 
innate conditions of knowledge, certain mental forms, 
which are the mind's contributions to percepts and con- 
cepts. f He held that all knowledge bee/ins with experi- 
ence, but that all is not the product of experience ; this is 
the first thought of the Krltik. He taught that in per- 



* That the mind acts according to innate laws, is not merely implied 
throughout Locke's Essay, but also in his First Letter to the Bishop of 
Worcester. 

t In writing against Eberhard, Kant says: " The Kritik absolutely 
admits no ideas ( Vorstelhtngen) which are created or born with us; all 
without exception, whether belonging to perception or to conception, 
the Kritik views as acquired." Respecting a joriori conceptions, he, 
however, adds, " But there must surely be a ground in the subject 
which makes it possible for the ideas to arise in a particular way and 
not otherwise, as well as possible to apply them to objects not yet 
given; and this ground at least must be innate." He declares as innate 
"the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought." Drobish 
(" Zeits fur exacte Phil." 1862. 6) in quoting these passages says, " Thus 
Kant, also, does not regard his a priori forms as innate ideas, but as 
acquired." 



198 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ception the mind furnishes time and space, which are 
purely internal, as the mental forms into which all the 
materials or contents furnished through the senses must 
be put. For the concepts the understanding furnishes 
certain categories, such as quantity, quality, relation, 
and mode. These categories, however, do not appear 
in the mind at birth. Sensation is necessary to arouse 
the mind to activity ; but when thus aroused, it fur- 
nishes these various forms of knowledge spontaneously. 
"No one would have the concept of cause if by means of 
experience he had not perceived causes. No one would 
have the idea of virtue if he always lived among those 
who are nothing but thieves." Hegel also regarded 
innate ideas as only impllclte in the mind at birth : they 
are there in the form of capacity.* Lotze held the same 
view, declaring that the meaning of innate ideas is 
" that the mind is so constituted, that, when manifold 
impressions are made on it, its own nature " leads it to 
what are called necessary truths. f Harms advocated 
the same doctrine. $ " Innate to the mind are neither 
emotions, nor knowledge, nor strivings ; but it is innate 
to it to feel, to know, to strive ; and in feeling, know- 
ing, and striving, it is subject to a law which must be 
there if we recognize it, and cannot be merely a product 
and habit of knowing. It is innate to the eye to per- 
ceive every impression as color ; it cannot perceive 
tones. It is innate to the feeling to perceive every 
emotion as an agreeable or disagreeable state. But 
neither feelings nor percepts are innate. Just as little 
are concepts innate ; but it is innate to us to know 

* " Nur als an sic.h und in der Weise der Anlage im Menschea 
vorhanden." — Ency. I. 13G. 
f Nonl und Slid, 1882, 340. 
$ Abhandlungen der system. Philosophie, 137. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 199 

objects. It is no more a habit of consciousness to 
know objects, than a stone has learned by habit to fall. 
The laws of knowledge operate in knowing before they 
themselves are recognized." 

From the time of Leibnitz to the present, German 
philosophy has been dominated by the thought — most 
fully developed by Kant — that certain mental elements 
which are innate determine the character of our think- 
ing. Even the realism of Germany * which has lately 
asserted itself is no exception to this rule. The one- 
sided attention to this innate element has led to idealism, 
just as its neglect in other lands has led to sensational- 
ism and materialism. 

Repeated efforts have been made by mysticism to 
account for our highest notions by viewing them as 
revelations. The mind is supposed somehow to be in 
immediate communion with God, so that a knowledge 
of Him is obtained directly (not through means). Mys- 
ticism, though often intimately connected with philos- 
ophy, is not a part thereof, but a problem for solution. 

But even if the mystic's view of the direct communion 
of the mind with God is rejected, there may be what is 
termed intuitive knowledge, such, namely, which is not 
dependent on logical demonstration. Some notions are 
so self-evident that the mind at once, without any 
media, sees their truth. It is a kind of intellectual be- 
holding or contemplation of truth. That the mind has 
this vision, as it may be called, is beyond dispute ; the 
only question can be respecting the reason why the 
mind immediately perceives truth in this way. 22 

The hint given, while speaking of psychology, respect- 
ing the state we form in the process of development, 
may be of service to us in interpreting what we call 

* As that of J. von Kirchinann. 



200 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

intuitive ideas. As a sensation is at once interpreted 
into a percept, so certain concepts are at once pro- 
nounced true. The recognition of their truth requires 
no conscious effort on our part ; it is immediate. The 
states in which we have these intuitions are the result 
of culture, and the processes of this culture can un- 
doubtedly be determined. That the beholding is by a 
state which is not innate, but the product of develop- 
ment, does not affect the value of the intuitions. They 
may be based on innate conditions in the very nature of 
our being, so that the ground of their necessity is in our 
constitution. It would be proper, then, to speak of 
certain ideas' as necessary, and therefore universal. 

We do not mistake, then, in pronouncing as a reality 
the immediate beholding of certain ideas as true ; but 
we mistake in supposing that this vision is a direct 
state of nature rather than a result of development. 
And we also mistake in supposing that such immediate 
beholding pertains only to what are commonly called 
intuitions. They are but the operation of a very com- 
mon law of our being, — a law working in the formation 
of all habits, and in all judgments, in which the mind 
overleaps certain links in the process of reasoning. The 
mind, after itself passing through certain processes of 
generalization, generalizes unconsciously. The steps 
originally conscious in forming a judgment are after- 
wards omitted. The first and last link of the chain are 
seen, and, without examining the rest, the mind knows 
that they are all in their place. 

The various efforts somehow to get a knowledge of 
objects directly or otherwise than through sensation, 
have been opposed by those who held that the mind is 
wholly passive, or at least wholly dependent on exter- 
nal objects for what it knows. The advocates of empiri- 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 201 

cism have been no more careful in the use of terms 
than those who taught the doctrine of innate ideas. 
Whoever regards the mind as originally both empty 
and passive, and always under the dominion of impres- 
sions from the external world, must make sensation the 
source and explanation of all cognition. 

Locke's well-known figure of the mind as "white 
paper," is frequently quoted as evidence that he re- 
garded the mind as passive. " Let us, then, suppose 
the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of charac- 
ters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished? " * 
Locke, however, does not use this comparison to prove 
the mind inactive, but merely to show that at birth it 
has no ideas. When he says that it is like "white 
paper," he only means to say what he adds, that it is 
" void of all characters, without any ideas ; " but the 
inference so often drawn, that paper may be written on, 
but cannot write on itself, is drawn by others, not by 
Locke. That he does not regard the mind as passive, is 
evident from the same section, when he says, " Our 
observation, employed either about external sensible 
objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, 
perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which 
supplies our understandings with all the materials of 
thinking." To the question, Whence has the mind " all 
the materials of reason and knowledge ? " he anwers, 
"From experience; in that all our knowledge is 
founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself." 
But this experience, he holds, consists of sensation and 
reflection ; the external and internal factors co-operate. 
After speaking of sensation, he says of reflection, " The 
other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the 
understanding with ideas, is the perception of the oper- 

* Book II. 1, 2. 



202 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ations of our own minds within us, as it is employed 
about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when 
the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the 
understanding with another set of ideas which could 
not be had from things without ; and such are percep- 
tion, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, 
willing, and all the different actings of our own minds ; 
which we, being conscious of, and observing in our- 
selves, do from these receive into our understandings as 
distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. 
This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself." * 

The hints given by Locke respecting reflection 
were not fully developed by him. He says it might 
with propriety be called "internal sense," thereby indi- 
cating that he regards its function mainly as that of 
an observer of the inner operations, and not as a power 
that works over the impressions received. Even in his 
view of reflection he does not rise above the psycholo- 
gical to the rational activity of the mind. But some of 
his followers neglected the hints he gave concerning the 
mind's activity, and made the outer sense the only 
source of knowledge. In France, Condillac taught that 
the mind is passive ; through the senses the world 
writes its figures, or photographs its images, on the soul, 
which may view them, but has no active part in their 
production. But even if the soul were passive in receiv- 
ing impressions through the senses, it surely cannot be 
so, as Condillac supposed, in working them over in 
thinking. 

Materialists go still farther than Condillac, who did 

not hold that the soul is material. Epicurus regarded 

the soul as not different from the body, and held that the 

images in the mind are produced by the constant emis- 

* Book II. l, 4. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 203 

sion of fine particles from the surfaces of bodies. Thus 
material copies were thought to pass from things into 
the mind.* Modern materialists regard thought as 
merely a physiological function of the brain. Buech- 
ner teaches that the soul itself is nothing but a special 
endowment of the vital force, conditioned by the pecul- 
iar construction of the material of the brain. He says 
(Kraft u. Staff") i " The same power which digests by 
means of the stomach, thinks by means of the brain." 
Some materialists speak of thought as a phosphores- 
cence of the brain ; but this figure throws no real light 
on the mental processes. All such illustrations take 
it for granted that we know body better than mind, 
when the fact is " that we know more of mind than we 
do of body ; that the immaterial world is a firmer reality 
than the material." f 

Respecting the origin of knowledge, conflicting views 
are thus found to prevail. An idealism, which views all 
cognition and its objects as a direct product of the soul, 
has found advocates, as well as sensationalism and 
materialism, which regard the external world or matter 
as the only source of all that is known. We shall be 
fortunate if amid this confusion we can give hints to the 
beginner to direct him to the way in which the solu- 
tion of the problem may be found. 

It is universally admitted that knowledge begins with 
experience ; by examining this, therefore, we may learn 
something respecting the origin of knowledge, and the 
factors it contains. Much as experience is discussed, it 
is too often treated as if its exact nature were already 
determined, and needed no further inquiry. The man- 
ner in which the subject is frequently discussed makes 

* Lange, Gesehichte des Mater ialismus, first ed. 29. 
t Huxley, Science and Culture. 



204 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the impression that even Locke has not been carefully 
studied ; and in some instances his standpoint is treated 
as if Berkeley, Hume, and Kant had written in vain. 
The most evident things are reiterated, while the points 
needing elucidation are overlooked. 

In the sense now generally adopted, experience does 
not primarily express the act of testing or trying, nor 
any other act except the observation of what is in con- 
sciousness. In the broadest sense we experience what- 
ever we are conscious of. We may hesitate to say that 
we experience a thought or an idea ; but it is certain 
that we do not have an idea or a thought unless the 
fact that we have it is a matter of experience. It is 
true that it is more common to use the term " experi- 
ence " with reference to sensations and feelings ; and in 
proportion as intellectual activity enters into sensation, 
the less apt we are to apply the term " experience " to it. 
We experience the pain caused by a burn ; but in the 
beauties we see, and in the music we hear, the intellect 
is more active, and we do not speak of these as experi- 
ence in the same sense as of pain or pleasure. We ex- 
perience trials, but think thoughts and do deeds. When 
we thus speak of thought and deeds, it is, however, the 
active mental element (the producing factor) to which 
attention is called, not to the fact of our conscious- 
ness of that activity. What we thus distinguish from 
experience is our own intellectual activity, and it is 
thus seen that the term is used for a state in which we 
are affected rather than active. When our attention is 
directed absorbingly to intellectual or volitional efforts, 
we experience little ; but when we yield ourselves more 
to the spontaneous processes of our minds, to the imrae- 
diateness of our feelings, we experience in a peculiar 
sense. Experience thus pertains to the psychological 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 205 

rather than the rational processes. There is more of it 
in the busy scenes of life than in mathematical demon- 
strations. And by systems of experience, so termed in 
philosophy, we mean those which have much immedi- 
ateness, spontaneousness, depending much on direct 
sensation and observation, not so much on the mental 
elaboration of the material thus gained. An experien- 
tialist is afraid to speculate, for fear of losing the bless- 
ings of experience. No one thinks of calling Hegel's 
system a philosophy of experience ; but Locke, Hume, 
and their followers have produced systems which may 
be so called with much greater propriety. Sensational- 
ists stoutly oppose the intuitional ists, overlooking the 
fact that in point of immediateness (absence of discur- 
sive and inferential thought) they are really one. Sen- 
sationalism affirms for the outer what intuitionalism 
claims for the inner sense ; and there seems to be no 
good reason for crediting the testimony of the one, and 
rejecting that of the other. If extremes, they may serve 
each other as correctives. 

Experience is, as we have seen, an infallible guide so 
far as a knowledge of what is in consciousness is con- 
cerned ; it is in its explanation that errors arise. It is 
itself purely subjective, and indicates nothing as to the 
origin of its objects. They may come from within, or 
from without, or from both. To appeal to experience, 
therefore, as the source of all cognition, does not prove 
that source to be either external or internal. Whether 
consciously or unconsciously, " experience " is, unfortu- 
nately, often used as synonymous with "sensation." 
When men claim to have settled the origin of knowl- 
edge by declaring that it comes through experience, 
they have in reality indicated only one of its media, 
not its origin. Many, besides confounding experience 



206 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILOSOPIIY. 

and sensation, also confound mere impressions on the 
senses with knowledge. By ignoring what Locke called 
the "internal sense" or ''reflection," the sensationalist 
may imagine that he has succeeded in putting all his 
mental operations outside of his mind and into things. 

Let us begin with percepts (sight, sound, etc.), and 
see whether they receive their character wholly from 
external objects. In order that there may be percep- 
tion, it is not enough that the organs of sense be af- 
fected. If this takes place during sleep, or while the 
attention is absorbed by something else, there is no per- 
ception. This is only found where the mind receives, 
or re-acts against, the impressions made on the organs. 
In every perception of external objects we postulate 
three factors, namely an external object, the tactual 
impression on the senses, and. the activity of the per- 
ceiving mind. 

Our percepts are not copies of what transpires in the 
external world, which, consequently, cannot be the only 
factor in their production. The man who is color-blind 
sees objects in a light different from that of the man 
who is not. Sound is also conditioned by the character 
of the ear; and it is similar with reference to all sensa- 
tions. But the third factor, the perceiving mind, must 
also be taken into account. We see light, and hear 
sounds, and yet the external factor consists of vibra- 
tions of ether or air. " It can at once be proved that 
no kind and no degree of similarity exists between the 
quality of a sensation and the quality of the agent in- 
ducing it, and portrayed by it. . . . Our sensations are, 
as regards their quality, only signs of external objects, 
and in no sense images of any degree of resemblance." * 

* Helmholtz, Popular Lectures, 390, 391. In another place he states 
that our sensations are only symbols of the objects of the external 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 207 

Thus, even in the most elementary experience, we must 
take account of other factors than the external world. 
We make mistakes respecting sensation, and afterwards 
correct them ; these mistakes and corrections are men- 
tal acts. In our perceptions the judgment is active, 
though perhaps unconsciously. 

If now we take sensations as elements of all knowl- 
edge, we have, from the very beginning, to deal with 
a mental factor which sensationalism is apt to ignore. 
When two objects, the external world and the mind, 
co-operate, the result must be regarded as»the product 
of both factors. The motion resulting from the impact 
of two moving bodies can be determined only by con- 
sidering both bodies and their motions. This is simply 
an illustration of the law of all activity, whether mate- 
rial or mental : whenever objects affect each other, the 
result is the product of both. 

In knowledge itself there is absolutely no factor ex- 
ternal to the mind. That the impression on the organs 
of sense is a condition for a knowledge of external ob- 
jects, is true; but it is only a condition, and cannot 
properly be called a factor of knowledge itself. Aside 
from this, all that pertains to knowledge is purely the 
product of mental activity, or of the intellectual elabo- 
ration of what is given in sensation. Were the mind 
passive, or had it nothing but consciousness, so as to 
reflect objects as from a mirror, it would be impossible 
to do any thing with a sensation except to view it. 
The sensation even would be present to the mind only 
so long as the impression itself continued; its longer 

world, which correspond with these somewhat as written letters and 
the sounds correspond with what they represent. They, indeed, give 
us information respecting the peculiarities of the external world; but 
not better than we can give a blind man information of color by means 
of verbal description. 



208 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

retention or reproduction would require memory. But 
even with memory, it would be impossible to change 
the original form ; and, aside from isolated impressions, 
all knowledge would be out of the question. A sensa- 
tion cannot develop itself, and cannot attach itself to 
other sensations ; it is nothing at all by itself, but only 
something for the mind that has it. To ascribe to it 
the power of developing itself, makes it an independent 
substance. Whoever speaks of the energy of sensations 
to develop, compare, analyze, or unite themselves, need 
but know what the statement means, in order to see its 
absurdity. A mathematical problem can as easily solve 
itself, or separate points connect themselves to form a 
line. 

From the mind itself, as well as from the external 
world, the understanding gets materials of knowledge. 
Our emotions and volitions and thoughts are products 
of the soul, and are as truly a revelation of reality as 
are our presentations of external objects. The wildest 
nation that ever entered the human mind has as real 
a cause as the deepest truth, or the clearest perception. 
A notion is not wild or false because uncaused, but be- 
cause it itself, or its cause, is misunderstood. The appre- 
hension of the cause of any mental phenomenon always 
gives real knowledge. Frequently the material obtained 
by watching the mental operations is far more valuable 
than that whose source is external, since it gives reve- 
lations of self. 

But whether the occasion of it is inner or outer, expe- 
rience itself is always purely mental. It never occurs 
outside of the mind, nor can we ever have a perception 
of any thing not in the mind. Whoever has seriously 
reflected on the subject must see that nothing can be 
more absurd than the statement that we have an expe- 






THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 209 

rience of the outer world. How can the mind get out- 
side of itself and inside of that which is outside of itself? 
All that we can experience respecting the outer world 
is in the form of mental impressions, whose source or 
occasion is in that world. 

Those who try to reduce the mental activity in the 
formation of knowledge to a minimum may claim that 
the mind can do nothing but develop its sensations, and 
that this is meant by the statement that all knowledge 
is the product of experience. These persons, however, 
usually forget that there are perceptions from within, 
as well as from the outer world, and that the whole 
process of developing the sensations and perceptions is 
subjective ; it is done wholly by the mind. In this 
process the mind does not proceed arbitrarily, but 
according to laws. But these laws are its own. Of 
its perceptions it can make only what, under the cir- 
cumstances, its laws demand. The percept is a tool of 
the mind. The mechanic uses the saw as he pleases, 
but he cannot use it as a gun ; in its use he is limited 
by the nature of the implement. The union of differ- 
ent percepts, the formation of concepts by abstracting 
elements common to the percepts, and all the processes 
of reasoning and thinking, are purely mental, and are 
determined by the object of thought and the laws of 
mind. Even in the case of the experientialist, the 
external factor, though absolutely necessary, dwindles 
to a minimum in his investigations. 

The purely mental element in these processes is not 
observed, because it usually works spontaneously and 
unconsciously, and because the attention is not directed 
to it, but solely to the object under consideration. Just 
because the intellect is not foreign to us, we do not 
readily observe its operations. They are means to 



210 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

which we have become accustomed, and we lose sight 
of them while intent only on the end they are to accom- 
plish. It is altogether different with the impressions 
received through the senses: we take them up con- 
sciously, in order to work them over. Only by a special 
effort of reflection can we learn the significance of the 
processes usually performed unconsciously. 

Besides ignoring what is taught respecting the mind 
by its own operations, the cardinal error of sensational- 
ism is based on the fact that it fixes the attention only 
on the beginning or condition of our knowledge of 
external objects ; but the fact that all we know, what- 
ever its external conditions may be, depends on the laws 
of the mind, is overlooked. The nature of the mind 
ultimately determines its own processes under given 
conditions, so that we cannot otherwise perceive, expe- 
rience, or think, than according to the principles im- 
planted within us, or according to the constitution of 
our being. The laws of thought that dominate our 
intellectual life are our own nature. Their working is 
involuntary, at least ordinarily, and they can be learned 
only by watching their operations ; but when once dis- 
covered, they are final for us. We may explain and 
illustrate these laws, and give the principles involved 
in them, and indicate the sphere of their operations; 
but we cannot go farther in our explanation of them, 
than the statement that we are so constituted that we 
cannot do otherwise. Whoever questions the validity 
of his mental laws, thereby invalidates his own objec- 
tions. It is more irrational to question the validity of 
our mental laws than to question the validity of a law 
of nature ; for the validity of a law of nature depends, 
for us, on the validity of our mental laws, by means 
of which the laws of nature are established. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 211 

Observation furnishes nothing but isolated facts. 
How, then, do we get general laws, — those of nature, 
for instance ? An apple hangs on a tree ; I cut off the 
stem, and the apple falls to the ground ; I connect the 
change of location with the cutting of the stem, calling 
the latter the cause of the change. Were this repeated 
a million times, and always with the same result, it 
would not teach me that every change must have a 
cause, but only that, as far as I have observed, every 
change has a cause. Observation gives us only facts, 
but never the necessary and universal.* Whence, then, 
the general law that every change must have a cause? 
Should we not substitute for it: Every observed change 
had a cause ? 

We experience the fact that we have the law, but no 
amount of experience can give the law. Hume makes 
the law of causation the product of a mere habit of 
mind. We learn it, he claims, by observing that changes 
have (what we call) causes, or we accustom ourselves 
to assume a cause for every change. To this habit he 
naturally denies the claim of establishing any necessity 
or universality. Only in mathematics, dealing not with 
reality but with the relations of ideas, does he recognize 
absolute laws. 

It is a fatal objection to this theory of habit, that it 
does not account for the law it proposes to explain. 
By observing the same act often repeated, and always 
with the same result, I may form the habit of expect- 
ing that result under the same circumstances ; but this 
expectation is not at all the thing whose explanation is 
demanded. What is to be explained is the fact, that 

* " Necessity and strict universality are, therefore, sure signs of 
knowledge a priori, and they are inseparably connected." — Kant, 
Kritik, Introduction. 



212 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

we have the notion that every change must have a cause. 
This necessity is purely mental. I can change a mere 
habit by setting a must against or over it ; but I cannot 
alter the law that? every change must have a ca,use. 
But even if Hume's position is admitted, it confirms 
the fact that we cannot get behind or beyond the laws 
of the mind, for the theory of habit in the end amounts 
to this: It is the law of mind to form the habit of 
regarding every change as having a cause. And the 
recent efforts to explain certain or all general notions 
as hereditary amount to the same thing ; namely, that 
it is a law of mind, in the process of development, to 
transmit, by inheritance, general notions. Thus stated, 
the doctrine is that of innate ideas in a literal sense, 
and is liable to the same objections. The meaning in- 
tended is, however, that a mental predisposition to form 
certain general notions is inherited. But, supposing 
that this is really hereditary, are the tests of the heredi- 
tary also hereditary ? Are the rational criteria of truth 
inherited ? Only so long as we move in the sphere of 
psychology, can heredity have any significance in inter- 
preting mental phenomena. The grounds of truth and 
the principles of knowledge, to be found only by pro- 
found investigation, cannot be hereditary; no more than 
hard-earned money is inherited. The fact is, that no 
rational theory whatever can be framed whose ultimate 
basis is not some law inherent in the mind itself. As 
soon as we pass from the descriptive and historical to 
the rational, we are wholly dependent on the unaltera- 
ble laws of thought. These laws are, consequently, the 
ultimate appeal in all questions pertaining to knowledge. 
We are now prepared to inquire into the validity of 
thought which rises above mere observation. We have 
seen that all knowledge, however elementary in charac- 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 213 

ter, and whatever its primary conditions (or source), 
depends ultimately on our mental laws. Now, if the 
normal action of the mind can be trusted in observa- 
tion, why not in other respects? The same mind forms 
the percepts and the concepts ; and there is no reason 
to regard its normal action a whit more reliable in 
one case than in the other. We distinguish between 
ordinary and scientific observation, the latter being 
reliable because made according to critical methods 
whose validity the mind has established; while the 
former does not comply with rational demands, and is 
consequently liable to mistakes. The same is true of 
all mental activity ; if exact, critical, normal, it must 
be reliable. And the burning question in the theory 
of knowledge is not, What can be known by means of 
observation and experiment ? but this, What are the 
laws of mind, or the norms of thought ? 

Not merely is all thinking determined by these laws, 
but it is also a revelation of them. We may direct 
attention so exclusively to the objects before the mind 
as to disregard the mental activity, or we can make the 
latter the subject of study. In considering the law of 
gravitation, we naturally inquire into its operations 
throughout the universe ; but we can also inquire into 
the activity of the mind in the formation of the law 
itself. The scientist sees nature through the law, while 
the mental philosopher sees the mind in the same law. 

Ail these considerations lead us to change the ques- 
tion, Is there a purely mental element in knowledge? 
so as to read, Is there any knowledge without a purely 
mental element? This must be answered in the nega- 
tive. But this is different from the question, Is there 
any knowledge whose source is purely mental? What- 
ever may originally arouse the mind to activity, all that 



214 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

we know of the mind itself is learned only from its 
operations. But the mind can create no knowledge of 
real objects. All that we can know of reality must be 
given either directly through the senses or through the 
operations of the mind, or it must be an inference from 
something thus known to exist. Hume saw correctly 
that we infer from the existence of an object known, 
the existence of another unknown object, on the prin- 
ciple of causality. 

But even if the mind can work only if some material 
is given it from within or without, what it makes of 
this material, or infers from it, is the product of its own 
activity. While it cannot construct a real world of 
objective existence, it does construct an ideal world 
which to it is real; besides that which is, the mind 
recognizes what ought to be. From habit we may at 
first form the notion of what is becoming ; but when its 
activity is properly aroused, the mind subjects it to a 
higher, an absolute ought. This imperative the under- 
standing does not find in any thing given directly in 
consciousness, but in it the mind objectifies itself. This, 
of course, does not exclude the fact that the mind has 
been trained by experience ; but experience gives no 
ideals. In forming them, the mind is wholly a law unto 
itself. In its ideals, it mirrors itself. 

It has already been stated that our mental laws, 
unless made the subject of special reflection, work un- 
consciously. Thus our universal notions usually come, 
we know not how. Necessity and universality are the 
product of the mind ; that they are inferred from facts 
given by observation, does not interfere with their 
mental character. A particular fact or truth is nothing 
but that particular fact or truth, and in itself implies 
nothing except that and what it is. All that is implied, 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 215 

or inferred, is put into it solely by the mind. But in 
every particular fact the mind sees a necessary and uni- 
versal truth. Whatever occurs once must always occur 
again under the same conditions. The single occur- 
rence is given by observation, the "always" and "must" 
are added by the mind. 

In order to discover the origin of the notions called 
universal, necessary, self-evident, intuitional, we must 
notice the process of their formation. This process is 
determined according to our mental constitution, or a 
law inherent in our being, and, aside from this, nothing 
is innate. The process itself only takes place after the 
mind has been aroused to activity, and has attained a 
certain stage of progress. 

Much of the embarrassment of philosophers, from 
Hume to Mill, would have been avoided if the law 
active in the formation of our universal notions had 
been discovered; if instead of resting with custom, 
habit, association, as final, these themselves had been 
properly explained. The law of mind which produces 
our general ideas is final for us, and with its discovery 
our inquiries must end. What this law is, we can of 
course learn only from its operation. 

We have seen that notions called necessary and uni- 
versal are the product of states formed in the process 
of development, being generalizations of the mind's 
own generalization. Let us now see whether we can 
discover the law according to which what is pronounced 
necessary and universal is formed. 

Logicians usually regard it as a fundamental law of 
mind that A is A ; even with the sign of equality 
(A = A) it is thus interpreted. Now, that A is A, is 
undoubtedly true ; but it is empty tautology which 
neither in itself nor in its application has any signifi- 



216 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

cance. But the formula that A equals A, gives a law 
of the mental operations very fruitful in its application. 
In this formula, A is not the same A in both cases, but 
the one is exactly like the other, and we interpret it to 
mean : Every A is equal to every other A. Thus let 
A = stone, then, according to the formula, every stone 
is equal to every other stone ; a statement which at 
first seems absurd, but which, properly understood, is 
literally true. Every stone, as stone (without reference 
to kind, quality, size, or other peculiarities, but simply 
as stone), is really equal to every other stone con- 
sidered merely as stone. Let A == power, or cause, or 
any thing else, and it will be found that the formula is 
always applicable. Power is always power, and as 
power it equals all power as power. A, wherever found, 
as A, always equals every other A. 

A mental standard is a criterion for the mind only if 
this law is correct. It in fact lies at the basis of every 
comparison and of every judgment. Just because it is so 
universal in its application, it is important to formulate 
this fundamental law distinctly. It is but an applica- 
tion of this law, when we affirm that what occurs at one 
time will always occur when the same conditions are 
given.* If fire burns to-day but not- to-morrow, then 
fire is not the same to-day and to-morrow ; that is, fire 
is not fire, or A is not equal to A. If at one time an 
unsupported object falls to the ground, a like object 
under exactly the same circumstances will always do so. 
A single event contains all the laws involved in all 
equal events, just as completely as all the events con- 
tain those laws, though it may require many experi- 

* Time and space, whether regarded as purely suhjective, or as "both 
subjective and objective, have no influence on occurrences; it is only 
what is in time and space that can have such an influence. 






THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 217 

ments to discover with scientific exactness the nature 
of the event, and of the laws involved. 

The same fundamental law applies to the qualities of 
things, and is active in all systematizing and classifica- 
tion. If life is that mark of a single object which con- 
stitutes it an organism, then it is necessary to constitute 
any other object an organism. If a single change needs 
a cause, then every change needs one. 

From this law we readily learn the origin of the 
truths held to be necessary and universal. The mind 
finds them implicite in particulars, and from these infers 
them. Experience is necessary for their discovery, but 
it does not give them ; they are conclusions of the mind, 
and in it they have an a priori basis. 

All analysis and synthesis are performed according to 
the law given. In all its processes the judgment acts 
on the supposition that things are alike or unlike ; its 
function is that of comparison, to determine whether an 
object or a notion is like or unlike A. Since the mental 
standards determine our judgments, we can see why 
our knowledge is not limited by observation. The 
general laws and axioms, according to which we judge 
the material furnished by observation, are a mental 
necessity, behind which we cannot go. All assertions 
to the contrary are somehow contradictory. To limit 
the law that every event must have a cause, by experi- 
ence, is to destroy the law itself; it is a law only be- 
cause it is not limited. J. S. Mill limits the law to 
experience, and supposes a case which is really incon- 
ceivable. " I am convinced that any one accustomed 
to abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his 
faculties for the purpose, will, when his imagination has 
once learnt to entertain the notion, find no difficulty in 
conceiving that in some one, for instance, of the many 



218 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides 
the universe, events may succeed one another at ran- 
dom, without any fixed law ; nor can any thing in our ex- 
perience, or in our mental nature, constitute a sufficient, 
or indeed any, reason for believing that this is nowhere 
the case. The grounds, therefore, which warrant us in 
rejecting such a supposition with respect to any of the 
phenomena of which we have experience, must be 
sought elsewhere than in any supposed necessity of our 
intellectual faculties." * We may observe events with- 
out inquiring into their causes; but we cannot really 
think or conceive them as succeeding one another at 
random, without any fixed law. In order to do this, 
we should have to think A as not equal to A ; that is, 
we should have to conceive events, somewhere beyond 
observation, as not events. Even if an event conld 
happen without law, the mind could not conceive it as 
thus happening ; it can only think according to law, and 
its law for conceiving events is according to the law of 
causality. If anywhere a change needs no cause, then it 
nowhere needs one ; if it has one, it is purely accidental. 
Unconsciously, but with absolute reliability, the mind 
draws conclusions according to its inherent laws. When 
we become conscious of these laws, and make them the 
object of reflection, we can do nothing but accept their 
validity. All our reasoning cannot alter them, for rea- 
soning is itself but an exercise of these laws. If the 

* Logic, II. 95. Mill is entirely consistent with the principles adopted 
from Hume, when a few pages later he says, " The uniformity in the 
succession of events, otherwise called the law of causation, must he 
received not as a law of the universe, hut of that portion of it only 
which is within the range of our means of sure observation, with a rea- 
sonable degree of extension to adjacent cases. To extend it further, is 
to make a supposition without evidence, and to which, in the absence 
of any ground from experience for estimating its degree of probability, 
it would be idle to attempt to assign any." 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 219 

mind intuitively sees the truth of an axiom, that is final. 
The only possible question could be whether it is really 
an intuition. If a single real intuition could be over- 
thrown, it would invalidate the reliability of all mental 
processes. Whether, therefore, necessary and universal 
notions are called inferences, axioms, intuitions, or any 
thing else, they have their basis and absolute authority 
in a mental necessity. 

In answer to the question, What is the origin of 
knowledge ? we therefore answer, It is neither wholly 
from within nor wholly from without, but both the 
external and internal factors co-operate in its formation. 
Knowledge is mental, and the external can never be 
more than merely the occasion of it ; but there is no 
knowledge of which the last analysis does not somehow 
include, or lead to, both factors, though they are by no 
means always equally prominent. 

The hints given on the origin of knowledge have pre- 
pared us for the question, What is the relation of knowl- 
edge to the real world ? Whatever views may be held 
respecting the nature of that world, no one doubts that 
besides the thinking mind there must be other real ob- 
jects. Every effort, however, to demonstrate the exist- 
ence of a world external to us must fail, because we 
never can get out of or beyond our subjective state.* 
The usual argument to prove its existence is that we 
become conscious of certain rjhenomena without any 
effort on our part. They must consequent!}' have their 

* It is generally admitted that the existence of external reality can- 
not be proved. "The reality of what is objective to us can never be 
severed from its subjective basis; therefore it can never be a matter of 
absolute certainty, but at best only very probable." — Volkelt, Phil. 
Monatsh., 1881, 534. Mill, Lor/ic, I. 9, states that at present " it is univer- 
sally allowed that the existence of matter or of spirit, of space or of 
time, is in its nature unsusceptible of being proved; and that whatever 
is known of them is known by immediate intuition." 



220 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

source in something else than ourselves. With eyes 
and ears open we cannot help seeing objects and hear- 
ing sounds. In ourselves we can discover no activity 
which accounts for the appearance of these perceptions, 
and we have no control over them ; they are apparently 
forced upon us. It is, therefore, concluded that their 
cause must be in something else than ourselves. 

This reasoning is, however, based on the supposition 
that we are conscious of all our activity, whose products 
are manifest in consciousness. But this is not the case. 
There must be in us, as we have seen, a sphere of great 
activity lying wholly beyond consciousness; a sphere 
whose existence must be postulated in order to account 
for much that appears in consciousness. Many thoughts 
arise unconsciously whose origin must be in ourselves. 
Thus we try to recall a name, but fail after long effort ; 
we dismiss the matter, and it comes without effort. 
We think of one thing, and a thought altogether dif- 
ferent enters the mind. Behind our conscious processes 
there must be others of which we are unconscious ; and 
it may be that our unconscious activity is much greater 
than the conscious. It is consequently impossible to 
prove that something must have entered the mind from 
without, because we are not aware of having produced 
it. But the fact that we cannot demonstrate the exist- 
ence of an external world does not weaken the convic- 
tion that it is a reality. Idealism cannot be refuted ; 
neither, on the other hand, can it demonstrate the non- 
existence of the world. Aside from absolute demon- 
stration, there is the strongest ground for accepting its 
existence. Indeed, we are tempted to declare the de- 
monstration impossible, just because the existence is 
self-evident. 

Postulating, then, that there are objects external to 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 221 

us, what is our intellectual relation to them? The 
things themselves do not enter the mind, nor can the 
mind enter the things. We receive impressions from 
them through the senses ; but it has already been shown 
that these impressions are not duplicates, or even photo- 
graphs, of the things themselves. We have no way of 
comparing our impressions with their sources, except by 
means of impressions. Our minds never deal directly 
with the objects, but only with the effects which they 
produce. Our intellect cannot come in contact with 
things ; directly we deal solely with phenomena, and 
our world (that of which we are conscious) is purely 
phenomenal. This conclusion has been regarded as 
derogatory to the validity of knowledge, and the most 
persistent efforts have been made to overthrow it ; but 
reflection only proves that no other result is possible. 
We can know things only as they are related to the in- 
tellect. This relation is one of knowing, not of being. 
From the very nature of the case, things can be to our 
intellects only what they appear to us. Even if the 
mind could somehow come in direct contact with them, 
things could be known only from their relation to us 
as knowing, or as they appear to the mind. Objects 
manifest themselves to us by means of qualities or 
forces ; but these are qualities of the things themselves. 
Hence we can know things only through the relation of 
their qualities to our intellects. 

This conclusion does not in the least depreciate the 
value of knowledge. Our knowledge is real as knowl- 
edge ; it is not, however, any thing real outside of the 
mind, nor does it profess to be. Do what we will, our 
intellect can no more project its percepts outside of our 
minds, than we can stand on our shoulders. We have 
a real knowledge of real things, but of things as they 



222 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

manifest themselves by means of their properties to our 
minds through the senses. In the intellect, we have 
not things themselves, but a knowledge of them ; not 
objective reality, but a conception of it. In knowledge, 
therefore, we have symbols of things, intellectual views, 
or mental representations of them ; and, as such, their 
validity is beyond question. 

Much of the discussion respecting the relativity of 
knowledge leads to confusion, because the meaning of 
this relativity is not fathomed. We can speak of knowl- 
edge as the product of a relation, — as that of a subject 
to its object, of the ego to the non-ego ; but knowledge 
as knowledge is never relative. It is knowledge only 
because it is absolute for all mind. If, however, the 
meaning is that the objects of knowledge can be con- 
ceived only as related, then there is no room for dis- 
cussion, for the statement is self-evident. Things that 
belong to the same universe are necessarily related; 
how else could they constitute one universe? In con- 
ceiving objects as related, we consequently conceive 
them as they are. The absolute, in the sense of some- 
thing unrelated, is a pure abstraction; but even as 
such, it is a contradiction in itself. As soon as you 
think the absolute, you think it as related to the intel- 
lect, and thus it ceases to be unrelated. The absolute 
has become a bugbear in philosophy by treating it as 
unrelated, whereas,- in that sense, the absolute is incon- 
ceivable. To affirm that we do not know things abso- 
lutely in the sense of exhaustively, is, perhaps, too 
evident to require serious discussion. 

The affirmation, then, that we know things, means, 
of course, that we know them as they appear to us 
intellectually. If by thing per se we mean a thing as 
it is in itself, but not to us, it necessarily lies beyond 






THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 223 

our power of apprehension. If we conceive it at all, 
we necessarily conceive it as it is to us, or appears to 
us, not what it is independent of this relation to us. 
Whatever I conceive must be related to rny intellect ; 
if, now, I should conceive it as not thus related, I should 
conceive it, not as it is, but as it is not. The whole 
discussion of the thing per se, begun by Kant, is an 
attempt to discuss things as if there were no intellect ; 
an attempt to apprehend things with the mind as if 
there were no mind. Kant puts things per se (noumena) 
and phenomena, or things as they appear, in opposition, 
just as if they excluded each other. If for thing per se 
we put the essence of a thing, which is really meant, 
it becomes evident that the phenomena need not be 
wholly foreign to the thing itself, but may be a reliable 
manifestation of it. That things are to us only what 
they appear, is no evidence that they do not, in some 
measure, appear to us as they are. 

That our knowledge of things is not synonymous 
with the being of things, can only disappoint when the 
nature and aim of knowledge are misunderstood. In 
knowledge I do not seek real existence, but an intel- 
lectual apprehension of it ; I do not want things, but I 
want to understand them. There can be no confusion 
unless we confound being with a knowledge of being. 

These reflections make it seem strange that the theory 
of knowledge should ever have been regarded as the 
discipline which considers the relation of knowledge to 
things. The latest German work on this theory says, 
" The general aim of the theory of knowledge pertains 
to the solution of the problem, whether and to what 
extent objective knowledge is possible ; " * and the large 

* Volkelt: Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grundlegung der 
Erkenntnistheorie, 1886; 545. 



224 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

volume is devoted to the question of the objective value 
of subjective knowledge. This view of the subject has 
become quite common. But why call it theory of 
knowledge if its subject-matter is not knowledge itself, 
but the relation of knowledge to things ? It considers 
the relation of intellect to things, which is a relation of 
knowledge ; and its sphere is the whole department 
of knowing, whether that be subjective or objective, or 
both. In the complete and thorough discussion of the 
entire domain of knowledge, the objective value of 
subjective percepts and concepts is included, but it does 
not exhaust the subject. 

It has already been intimated that we cannot compare 
things as known with things as not known (or other 
than as known) ; all we can do is to compare one con- 
cept of external reality with other concepts of the same, 
— a process by means of which we never get away from 
our conceptions. If I could somehow compare a con- 
cept with external reality, I should have for comparison 
a concept which has ceased to be a concept, and has 
become the reality external to it. That the intellect 
moves only in the sphere of the intellectual, should 
never be a question for the intellect. 

Since all knowledge depends ultimately on the laws 
of thought, the main thing is correct thinking. This is 
the province of logic. 

LOGIC. 

Logic, as one of the conditions for the attainment of 
knowledge, is naturally placed under the general head : 
Origin of Knowledge. Here the term is used in the 
sense of pure or formal logic, not material or applied. 
Its aim is to give the laws of thought (normative laws 
of pure thought), without taking into account the 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 225 

objects of thought. It seeks to answer the question, 
How must we think in order to attain the truth? 
What must the sequence of thought be in order that 
truth may be the result? It thus deals simply and 
purely with the thought-conditions of knowledge,— 
conditions which apply equally to all content.* 

It is not definite enough to say that logic is the 
science of "the necessary laws of thought." For, if 
the laws sought are necessary, how can we do other- 
wise than think according to them ? If necessary, they 
must operate whether we know them or not. Yet, 
properly understood, it is correct to say that logic treats 
of the necessary laws of thought. 

Thought is not lawless or arbitrary ; it is a rigid, per- 
fect system, of which mathematics is but an illustration ; 
it is an organism, in which part fits into part, and part 
follows part, with perfect regularity and consistency. 
As in the solution of a mathematical problem a single 
mistake vitiates the entire process which follows, and 
makes the result false, so it is with all our mental pro- 
cesses ; one mistake vitiates the whole. It is common 
to say that logic aims to prevent these mistakes by giv- 
ing the laws of correct thinking, and the criteria by 
which all thought must be tested. This will do if we 
understand what is meant by correct thinking ; it evi- 
dently means the proper sequence of thought. All real 
thinking is correct ; if there are mistakes, it is because 
there is a lack of thought. He who says 2-\- 2 =5, does 

* Pure or formal logic thus differs from applied logic, which treats 
of the laws of thought in relation to the material or content of thought. 
Pure logic gives formal truth, applied gives material truth; the former 
shows under what conditions thought harmonizes with itself, the latter 
gives the laws which show the relation of thought to its content. By- 
limiting logic to the laws of thought, we also distinguish it from Hegel's 
view according to which the principles of thought are also those of 
being. 



226 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

not think 2+2, but 2+3. So lie who says: Most men 
die a natural death, therefore Socrates died a natural 
death, does not think at all. Errors, then, do not spring 
from thinking, but from the failure to think ; it is by 
thinking that we discover errors, which are the product 
of thoughtlessness somewhere. If thinking can err, 
where is the corrective of thinking? We often use 
words instead of thoughts, and thus make mistakes ; 
but by thinking through a subject, and by putting 
thoughts into the words, we correct the errors. Logic, 
then, simply gives the laws of all thought, and these it 
learns from thought itself ; it gives the laws according 
to which men must think in order to get the truth, but 
these are at the same time the laws which all men follow 
who really think. 

Viewed in this light, logic gives the deepest philos- 
ophy of the mind. In its thought, the intellect mani- 
fests itself, and in the laws of thought we have the laws 
of the intellect. Those who see in pure logic only rules 
for attaining a knowledge of other objects — not of the 
mind itself — do not know what a revelation they miss. 
Thus in the study of what is called formal logic, real 
knowledge is gained, namely of the mind. In consider- 
ing the forms of thought, these forms themselves are 
the material of knowledge. 

Logic deals with concepts, and with them exclusively. 
With language it deals only so far as it embodies 
thought ; and with things it deals only through their 
concepts. 23 Language is viewed in logic purely as a 
symbol of thought. 

The basis of all reasoning must be absolutely reliable 
and universally applicable, namely axioms. The pri- 
mary law is that of identity, or rather equality (being 
in reality two laws), namely that A equals A. Its 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 227 

converse is the law of contradiction. A is not equal 
to non-A. From the law of equality we also get that 
of excluded middle: Every thing equals either A or 
non-A. 

These three laws contain the principles of all com- 
parison ; namely, that a thing is like or unlike the 
standard, a third supposition being excluded. All 
processes of syllogistic reasoning are comparisons or 
determinations of likeness and unlikeness. 

Abstraction also depends on the same laws : it is 
comparison for the sake of discovering and abstracting 
what is common to different objects. B, C, D, differ ; 
but B = #, 5, <?, d ; C = a, ?, /, g ; D = a, A, z, k ; that 
is, they all agree in that they have a. We can express 
the thought thus : B does not equal A except in so far 
as it is the same as A. It is this A, or this element of 
sameness or equality, which we want to find in abstrac- 
tion. In this way the marks of things, which consti- 
tute them classes, or arrange them under the same 
concepts, are found. When we search for what is com- 
mon to things, we call the process abstraction ; when 
we search for what is common to events, we call the 
process induction.* Deduction is the reverse, and may 
be viewed as a concretion of the abstract. 

For science, as well as philosophy, logic is fundamen- 
tal, and has been regarded so since the days of Aristotle. f 
It is so essential because it disciplines the mind for 
every department of thought, and gives the normative 
laws of all thinking. Within the last fifty years great 
efforts have been made, both in Germany and England, 
to develop logic beyond the bare skeleton which came 

* Taine, History of English Literature, on Stuart Mill, says, " All 
the methods of induction, therefore, are methods of abstraction." 
t Cicero calls it Ars omnium artium maxima. 



228 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

down through the middle ages from Aristotle.* But 
the much already done shows how much yet remains 
to be done. 

Since logic is usually treated more fully in our insti- 
tutions of learning than any other department of phi- 
losophy, it is not necessary to enter into details here. 
It is, however, important to note that the correct 
sequence of thought is by no means a guaranty that 
truth will be the result. Only on the right basis, or 
with truth as the starting-point, will correct thinking 
end in truth. And it will generally be found, that, when 
men disagree, their logic is less at variance than the 
premises from which their reasoning starts. Before 
entering upon an argument, the disputants should first 
determine whether each does not start with a postulate 
different from that of the other. The assumptions are 
often of far greater significance than the proofs. 

In the tendency to specialism, there is a twofold dan- 
ger ; namely, of choosing a basis for reasoning without 
a sufficiently broad induction, and of applying the re- 
sults of our reasoning to spheres that really lie outside 
of this application. In the one case our argument is 
too narrow, in the other too broad. In determining the 
basis from which reasoning starts, all that really per- 
tains to it should be taken into account. By putting 
into that basis more than belongs to it, we get results 
that are not warranted. Thus some draw from their 
notion of a substance inferences of the greatest impor- 
tance without ever considering what the substance really 

* In Germany numerous works on logic have appeared. Hegel gave 
a new impulse to the study by his work on the subject. Among the 
more recent books are those of Ulrici, Lotze, Ueberweg, Sigwart, 
"Wundt, Schuppe, Bergmann. In England Whately revived an interest 
in logic; and works on that subject have been published by Hamilton, 
Mansel, Mill, De Morgan, Whewell, Boole, Veun, Jevons, and others. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 229 

is, and not aware that what they infer from the sub- 
stance is only that with which their own imagination 
has endowed it. Hence the object of reasoning should 
first of all be thoroughly mastered. Then the conclu- 
sions should be rigorously confined to the objects to 
which they have been found actually to apply. Rea- 
soning that pertains to quantity does not explain quality. 
What applies to material processes has significance only 
for all that is known to be material. Physiological 
demonstrations can determine psychological questions 
only if it has been proved that physiology is psychology, 
or that they have a sphere in common. Just because 
it has become so customary to determine what is true 
in one sphere by what has been established in another, 
the student should train his mind severely to limit his 
conclusions to the objects and spheres for which they 
have been established. 

Three rules, then, are essential for the attainment of 
logical truth : master the object of thought so as to 
know its content ; reason correctly respecting that which 
is known of the subject; limit the conclusion to that 
respecting which it has been established. 

3. COMPLETION OF KNOWLEDGE. 

Not merely truth, but truth in greatest perfection, is 
the aim of intellect. That restless impulse to know, 
which the Germans call Wissensdrang, or JVissenstrieb, 
may be the inspiration of but few ; among these, how- 
ever, are all philosophic thinkers. Nothing short of 
the deepest thought in the most perfectly developed 
stage and in the best form can satisfy the aspiring 
mind. 

Hints on the development of knowledge itself (not 
merely of an individual's attainments) are found in 



230 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PTIILOSOPIIY. 

works on logic, psychology, and pedagogics ; but the 
subject is usually treated in a fragmentary manner. 
Its importance justifies separate treatment, in order to 
secure for it more thorough and more systematic dis- 
cussion. The philosopher and educator find that it 
teems with weighty problems ; and the student, who 
wants to become a thinker as well as a learner, and 
who desires to increase knowledge as well as to master 
what is already known, will seek principles so to guide 
him in his researches as to develop the best results from 
the thoughts already attained. 

The very idea of developing something new from 
what is known, implies that the new is somehow con- 
nected with the old, or lies in it as in embryo. The 
present rests on the past, and the future lies in the 
present, and there are threads which lead from the one 
to the other. So when we speak of the completion of 
knowledge, we want to find the threads which lead 
from the known to the unknown. Thought is a seed 
with a certain degree of development at a particular 
time ; and future progress consists in the development 
of what is still undeveloped in the seed, or but imper- 
fectly developed in the plant. 

The completion of thought, therefore, implies abso- 
lute dependence on the seed, but independence of the 
development already attained, in the sense of not being 
limited by it. Independent, original thought, guided 
by the energy in the living seed, is the condition for 
passing to what is new and yet old ; for developing, as 
Hegel would say, the energy of the flower into the 
fruit which it virtually contains. 

For the increase of knowledge in any department it 
is, therefore, essential to learn what stage of develop- 
ment has been attained, otherwise there is danger of 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 231 

wasting time in searching for what is already found. 
A true philosophy does not undervalue history, but 
assigns to it the proper place in intellectual training. 
Historical study may not develop intellectual strength 
as greatly as philosophy and science ; bat only when 
one has learned what others have done in his specialty 
can he understand what yet remains to be done, or 
work successfully to do what is still needed. In the 
historical knowledge, seized by a philosophical mind, 
there may be important hints and impulses for new 
development. New problems may be suggested, the 
failures of other thinkers will serve as warnings against 
wrong methods, and all that has already been accom- 
plished should be the starting-point for accomplishing 
what is yet to be done. Even if it gives only this 
starting-point, the historical knowledge is valuable, 
since it may save from tedious wanderings over beaten 
tracks. The methods of others may be fit for a help or 
guide, but not for a tether. The student must avoid 
ruts ; and with a safe compass, he must not fear to 
launch out into the deep. A pupil may find a teacher's 
method invaluable for disciplinary purposes ; but he 
cannot hope to add any thing new to the stock of 
knowledge by only repeating experiments performed 
much better by some one else. The young mathema- 
tician might learn much by repeating Newton's elab- 
orate and intricate calculations, but he would not be 
likely to add any thing to mathematical science by the 
process. 

There is scarcely any danger that philosophy will 
repeat the mistake of under-estimating observation and 
experiment ; but, from what has been said, it is evident 
that there is clanger of expecting from these themselves 
what can be wrested from them only by the energy of 



232 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

thought. Whatever may transpire outside of the mind, 
and however necessary for knowledge it may be, intel- 
lectual progress depends on the amount of thought put 
into the results of observation and experiment. While 
this is true in science, the need of great mental energy 
in regions not so immediately connected with observa- 
tion is still more apparent. 

As no one can master or develop all subjects, the 
student, after securing a liberal education, is obliged 
to limit himself; he must choose something as a specialty 
if he wants to become an authority in any thing. The 
choice of the proper subject for special study is of the 
first importance, and is by no means wholly determined 
by the profession or general calling chosen. In order 
that the choice may be rational, the student must not 
merely take into account his ability, circumstances, and 
opportunities, but also the importance and fruitfulness 
of the subject. Inquiries may be of subordinate value 
and not worth the time spent on them, or they may be 
resultless because the subject itself is fruitless. Espe- 
cially in philosophy, on which so much effort has been 
spent in fruitless inquiries, is it important to select for 
profound study important and fruitful problems. 

Usually the progress of knowledge is regarded as a 
growth in the comprehension of the causes of things. 
Science is largely an inquiry into immediate causes, as 
philosophy is an inquiry into ultimate principles, which 
must include the first and final causes. All deeper 
thought seeks the explanation of what occurs, by deter- 
mining its origin (the genetic method). Here it is not 
necessary to emphasize the investigation of causes, since 
its importance is generally admitted ; it will be more 
helpful to take up neglected elements. 

Frequently causes lie wholly beyond our reach, or an 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 233 

inquiry into cause may be irrelevant. Thus, to inquire 
into the cause of being is the same as inquiring into the 
being which existed before being. But in dealing with 
objects there are numerous other problems than those 
which pertain to cause, — problems which are concerned 
with a full understanding of the thing itself. We can 
ask what it is, how it compares with other objects, where 
it is, and what it can do ; that is, instead of inquiring 
how a thing became what it is, we concentrate our 
investigations on the nature of the thing itself. 

In philosophical inquiries we deal with ideas and 
concepts, which are remote from concrete objects. The 
region of pure thinking is peculiarly difficult, thought 
itself being the sole guide and corrective of thought. 
Unless here the mind is fully master of its concepts, it 
is liable to take the flights of fancy for the process of 
reason. Instead of taking the psychological standpoint, 
and merely observing the movement of objects in the 
mind, philosophy checks this movement in order to 
enter the objects themselves, to think them exhaustively, 
so as to leave nothing in them or pertaining to them 
obscure. We thus pass, as it were, from physics to 
chemistry ; from mere relations and conditions and 
movements, to the nature of objects. Take, for in- 
stance, the notion of substance. In common parlance 
the word is used as if perfectly understood, but critical 
reflection shows that there are depths in it which the 
mind has not fathomed. We thus operate with the 
word as a mere symbol, while the thought itself is lost. 
The meaning of the term " substance " should be probed 
until no further inquiries respecting it are possible, or 
until the limit of thought has been reached. The more 
comprehensive and abstract a term, the greater the 
temptation to use it vaguely ; and this vagueness neces- 



234 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sarily extends to all objects included under the term. 
Common among such vague terms are " being," " cause," 
"matter," "spirit," "consciousness," "person." The 
pronoun " I " is a rich subject for reflection. Does it 
include all that is meant by soul or spirit ? Does it in- 
clude the body ? Is it the representative of the whole 
man, or only of the conscious self? If it stands for the 
personality, what is the exact meaning of that personal- 
ity ? Does the " I " stand for a substance, or is it only 
an aggregate of the various states of consciousness? 

By thus taking up subjects, and giving to itself a full 
account of them, the mind soon discovers that it is in 
the habit of operating familiarly with concepts which 
are full of mystery ; that it is prone to inquire into the 
causes of things before understanding the things them- 
selves ; that it takes symbols for things and concepts ; 
and that in many, perhaps by far the most, of our men- 
tal operations, we are only half awake. It is only by 
deep and persistent reflection that we become sufficiently 
conscious of ourselves to see that our intellectual life is 
largely a dream, — a dream in which we dream that we 
are awake. In being aroused to full consciousness, the 
mind makes real progress, attaining a state which will 
influence all its future operations. The result is not 
merely a clearing of the understanding, but also a de- 
velopment of our knowledge. Even if no new objects 
are discovered, the old ones are made more distinct, and 
whatever is in them is unfolded. But this very process 
may also lead to something else ; namely, to the discov- 
ery of germs rich in the promise of new developments. 

This method of taking a subject and holding it stead- 
ily before the mind to let the light of the intellect illu- 
mine every part of it, is wholly different from what is 
called discursive thought. We do not proceed from 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 235 

one thing to another, but abide by one subject. Our 
thought moves, but around and through and in the 
same object. Subject and predicate are not taken apart 
and viewed separately, as sometimes seems to be the 
case,; but the subject is seen in its predicates, so that 
the mind, in considering them, consciously abides by the 
subject. It does not enter on a process of syllogis- 
tic reasoning to infer something else from the subject. 
It indeed wants to make new discoveries, but those 
which are to be found in the subject itself, not outside 
of it. In comparison with the discursive, we can call 
this the penetrative and exhaustive method of thought. 

Let A be the object of this penetrative energy of 
thought. Instead of making A simply a link in a 
chain, so that I pass from it to B, thence to C, etc., I 
make A the focus on which all possible light is steadily 
concentrated. I want to know just what A is and con- 
tains. I may already know that it contains the predi- 
cates a, ft, c, c?, but these do not exhaust it. There is 
an unknown x which I want to discover, and for that 
reason I confine all my investigations to A. If I proceed 
from the known to the unknown, it is from the known 
to the unknown in the subject itself. In this process 
thought, however, does not confine itself permanently 
to one point. Hegel's dialectic process has at least 
demonstrated this: that to think any subject exhaus- 
tively, necessarily leads beyond the subject to something 
else. Individual thoughts may, like islands of the sea, 
not be connected superficially, but at their base. 

This penetrative method, a characteristic of all philo- 
sophical thinking, is so much insisted on here because its 
neglect is so common, and its attainment so difficult. 
Our modern life, with its endless distractions, and its 
absorption by details, with much reading and little 



236 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

thinking, tends to make thoughts the waves which 
play on the surface, while the deep remains unfathomed. 
Thus the habit is formed of using subjects and predi- 
cates without thoroughly understanding them. That 
men, even scholars, constantly use concepts which they 
cannot define, is one of the worst and. most common 
vices of modern thought. 

In order to pass from the subject itself to something 
else, we must distinguish between what it contains, and 
what the mind infers from it. The oil painting before 
me is nothing but canvas with certain colors. Analyze 
the picture as I will, I find nothing but these. But 
how much more than these the mind infers from the 
picture ! It was painted, it did not grow ; it is the 
product of an artist ; he had a definite end in view, 
embodied in the picture his ideal, and had skill in 
execution. And these conclusions are just as reliable 
as the fact that the painting consists of canvas and 
colors. But every inference I draw respecting the 
artist depends on a correct apprehension of the picture. 
If it is a chromo, or a copy, or a poor picture, I make 
serious blunders in my inferences by reasoning on the 
supposition that it is a Raphael. 

The same is true of all objects : they contain some- 
thing, but may suggest more ; and what they suggest 
depends on what they contain. After exhausting the 
real contents, we proceed to what is implied by them. 
I want to learn from an object what it is, and what it 
can teach me respecting other objects and the whole 
universe. If what I infer from an object is really 
implied by it (is really a necessity of thinking), then 
it is as reliable knowledge as any other. In this way, 
and not merely from observation, we get new subjects 
for reflection. Why we draw these inferences, is one 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 237 

of the important problems of philosophy ; how to draw 
them correctly, is a question for logic. Because some- 
thing is, therefore we infer that something else must 
be. This is, and therefore that must be, really involve 
all that can be known. And the development of knowl- 
edge requires the mastering of the concepts of what is 
known to be, and then the following to their utmost 
limits the inferences legitimately drawn therefrom. 

From this it is evident that real objects of knowledge 
are not merely obtained through the senses, and by 
watching our inner operations, but that they may also 
be learned from correct inferences. In science this has 
been proved by inferring the existence of objects, and 
then afterwards confirming the inference by direct dis- 
covery of the objects. 

Besides this exhaustive method in treating separate 
concepts, progress may also be expected by connecting 
thoughts, and thus forming new combinations, and 
making these combinations the source of new infer- 
ences. New combinations of thoughts are new discov- 
eries, and may furnish new germs for future progress. 
Is not all inference in reality but a relating process? 
Analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, are 
but processes by means of which implied relations are 
made explicit. All thinking is but explication of an 
implication. 

If knowledge is to be completed, it is evidently not 
enough that separate concepts be mastered, that several 
of them be combined, and that the implied be made 
explicit by means of inferences. Disconnected thoughts, 
lying around loose in fragments, do not constitute 
knowledge in an exalted sense any more than stones 
scattered about constitute a building. In order to be 
completed, knowledge must be put into a systematic 



238 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

form. It is only in a system that a thought occupies 
its proper place in relation to other thoughts, and 
attains the highest perfection of which it is capable. 

In order that there may be system, a subject must 
be clearly defined, so as to determine its relation to the 
subjects immediately above and below it. After its 
place in the universe of knowledge has been determined 
by the definition and necessary explanations, the sub- 
ject must be separated into parts, according to the 
logical principles of division ; that is, the divisions 
must include the whole subject, but in such a way that 
they do not include one another.* Various methods 
of division are possible ; and the one adopted must be 
determined by the nature of the subject, the stage of 
development attained, and the aims of the author. 
The divisions may be chronological or geographical; 
they may be determined by external marks, or by 
internal characteristics. The last is the most perfect, 
since it arranges knowledge according to its inherent 
relations and real connections. In every case the same 
principle of division should be followed throughout. 
If, for instance, a subject Avere to be divided partly 
historically, partly geographically, partly according to 
its inherent character, there would be confusion in- 
stead of system, overlapping instead of division. 

Under the main ones come the subdivisions, which 
must also follow the same principles. A subject can 
be divided and subdivided almost endlessly. The ana- 
lytic process may be carried to such an extent that 
the result is a lifeless skeleton. The scholasticism of the 
middle ages was fond of nice and curious distinctions, 
which became a kind of mania; but by this process 
alone, however valuable for the study of a subject, 

* See the chapter on the Division of Philosophy. 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 239 

living systems, intellectual organisms, are not produced. 
All separation is for the sake of forming the parts into 
an articulated union, and every true system is a syn- 
thesis of correlated parts. As nothing exists except 
in relations, we cannot think a thing correctly if we 
conceive it in isolation. There is no individual except 
as part of the whole ; really and fully to comprehend a 
thing means, as we have seen, that the universe, of 
which it is a part, must be comprehended. But the 
synthetic work is usually far more difficult than the 
analytic. Many can take apart a watch, who cannot 
put it together again ; and yet the pieces are valuable 
only because they form the watch. The dissection of 
the dead body is so important because it enables to 
understand the living body as an organism. And in 
mind as well as body we do not want pieces of a ruin, 
but a perfect system. 

It is an imperfect view of a system, to regard it as a 
mere form which does not affect the truth itself. As 
the arm is something very different on the body from 
what it is when severed, so a thought is not the same 
when seen by itself as when viewed in its proper con- 
nections and relations. In the system, thought is given 
in its completeness or totality, with all its interfacings. 
All questions pertaining to relation, cause, and pur- 
pose, have relevancy only to thought in an articulated 
system. 

The idea of system presupposes the connection of 
thought so as to form a unity. But how can this unity 
be established or rather discovered? By finding the 
principles involved in a subject we get that wherein all 
pertaining to it is united. A system consists in the 
arrangement of all a subject involves under its princi- 
ples according to their organic relations. Some idea is 



240 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the animating spirit of every true system, giving it life 
and determining the various organs of the system. 

From this it is evident that system is not merely of 
aesthetic value, nor merely an expedient for remember- 
ing and using and communicating knowledge : it is 
necessary for the completion of thought itself. The 
mind demands it. Much supposed to be well under- 
stood is found to be in a crude state as soon as an effort 
is made to put it into its proper place and articulations 
in a system. Then it is found that a truth unsystema- 
tized is only half truth ; it is completed truth when its 
exact relation to other truth is determined. Thus the 
very effort to systematize thought leads to its deeper 
study and more perfect development. But it also 
makes the mind conscious of its limitations. All our 
systems are imperfect. Many of our thoughts, espe- 
cially the highest, we cannot yet put into a system. 
Even the effort to harmonize them is baffled. In their 
isolation we do not see that they are in conflict, but 
it becomes evident so soon as we attempt to articulate 
them. Most painfully do we become conscious of limi- 
tation in our efforts to complete all knowledge in unity 
under its ultimate principles. This is the ideal of 
philosophy in its search for those final explanations 
which are the conditions of all systems. Only when 
completed can the theory of knowledge determine abso- 
lutely the limits af human thought. 

[REFLECTIONS. 

Define Knowledge. Its Origin. Its external and in- 
ternal factors. Relation to Imagination, Opinion, 
Faith. Subjective views and objective Knowledge. 
Not Certainty, but its grounds are the Criteria of 
Knowledge. Reasons for believing in an external 



THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 241 

world. Kant's Ding an sich. The unconscious basis of 
conscious operations. Logic. Formal and applied. 
Logic as a revelation of the nature of Mind. What is 
meant by Norms of Thought? Can real Thinking err? 
Laws of Thought discovered by Logic, as mental Pro- 
cesses by Psychology. What is abstract thought ? Does 
reasoning lead to the discovery of objects of existence ? 
Explain Causation. Hume's view. Basis of universal 
and necessary Truth. Law of Identity, and Law of 
Equality. Doctrine of Innate Ideas. Views of Leib- 
nitz and Kant on the subject. Relation of Thought 
to Objects. Harmony of Idealism and Realism. Can 
we identify the Laws of Thought and Being (Hegel) ? 
Place of the Theory of Knowledge in Philosophy. 
Brilliant and penetrative Thought. Exhausting a Sub- 
ject, and discursive Thinking. What is System ? How 
formed ? Its effect on Thought. Conditions for devel- 
oping and increasing Knowledge. Limits of Thought. 
Their relation to the Limits of the Real. Significance 
of the Theory of Knowledge for the times. Is Reason- 
ing more than comparison ? Basis of Reasoning. 
Kant's analytic and synthetic Judgments. On what 
grounds do we infer the unknown from the known ? 



242 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER VII. 

METAPHYSICS. 

By generalizing the various objects of profitable 
thought, we can comprehend all of them under the real, 
the possible, and the desirable. The first includes all that 
actually is, the last embraces the ideals to be sought, 
and the second gives the sphere in which their realiza- 
tion may be expected. As the severe method of philos- 
ophy eliminates from its inquiries whatever is fanciful, 
it finds in the three groups all that can claim its atten- 
tion. The realm of thought itself consists largely in 
the determination of what is possible. Many of the 
problems of the real can be answered only in terms of 
logical possibility by our intellects. The third division, 
the desirable, does not directly concern the theory of 
knowledge, which deals primarily with what the intel- 
lect regards as necessary or possible ; but in that divis- 
ion are included aesthetics and ethics, which deal with 
ideals and their realization. The problem of the first 
division leads us into the darkest and most difficult 
region of thought, namely metaphysics. 

This much-abused term represents the highest aim of 
philosophy, and the ultimate limit of intellectual aspira- 
tion. The word itself originated in the title given by 
one of his pupils to certain works of Aristotle. These 
treated of the ultimate principles of being in general, 
and constituted what Aristotle himself called " Wis- 



METAPHYSICS. 243 

dom," or "First Philosophy," or "Theology." The 
fourteen books under the title of " Metaphysics " were 
placed after his works on Physics ; and this circum- 
stance is generally supposed to have determined the 
title, its sense being that these books should follow 
those on Physics. It may, however, be that the title 
was intended to indicate the nature of the contents, 
namely such as lie beyond physics.* 

It is only of secondary importance what the original 
import of the words of which " metaphysics " is com- 
pounded may have been, or what sense was attached to 
the compound itself by him who first used it to desig- 
nate a particular subject. Aristotle himself did not 
designate any part of his philosophy by this term, nor is 
it certain that all the books placed under this, title are 
by him. The general contents of these books may, 
however, be a valuable aid in understanding the 
original meaning of the term ; but what his pupils or 
successors called metaphysics, can no more be a law 
for the sense of the term at present, than " physics," 
as employed by the ancients, can determine its use by 
scientists now. But the aim of Aristotle in his First 
Philosophy indicates the aim of metaphysic in all ages, 
being the thread running through all metaphysical 
systems. 

In this First Philosophy, Aristotle aimed to discover 
the general principles of being, in distinction from the 
special sciences, which are devoted to particular depart- 
ments of being.f He sought to explain what lies 

* Ta nera T<i <t>vaiKa. The preposition may mean either after or beyond 
(trans). 

t " For Aristotle, metaphysic is the science which has to do with 
heing as such, "being in general, as distinguished from the special 
sciences which deal with special forms of being." — Ency. Brit.: Meta- 
physics. 



244 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

behind all phenomena, and is their source. The main 
points discussed were substance, form, cause, and de- 
sign, which he regarded as involving the problems con- 
nected with the essence of being. And at all times the 
questions connected with being, with reality, in distinc- 
tion from the phenomenal, and from our conceptions, 
have occupied the attention of metaphysicians.* 

While metaphysic has from the first dealt with being 
or the absolutely real, it could of course treat this only 
intellectually or as an object of knowledge. All ques- 
tions involved might be resolved into this one, What 
can be known respecting the ultimate nature of reality ? 
The principles of being are sought, the explanation of 
it, an intellectual apprehension of what is. Thus meta- 
physic of course involves the problems of knowledge, 
especially that of the limits of the human faculties. 
Does the powe* of thought extend to reality, or is it 
limited to phenomena? It is not surprising that in 
Hume, Kant, and others, the question of metaphysics led 
to an inquiry into the limits of knowledge. But in 
order to get a clear conception of metaphysic itself we 
must distinguish it from the means necessary for mas- 
tering it. Certain mental conditions are necessary for 
discovering the laws of nature, yet we distinguish be- 
tween these laws and those conditions. The same is 
true in metaphysic. Its knowledge is the highest, and 
requires the greatest mental efforts ; but it is the result 
of these efforts which is to be viewed as metaphysic. 
By keeping this in mind we shall avoid the mistake, 
which is common, of confounding this subject with the 



* "On the one hand, we see Plato and Aristotle striving to seize, 
absolute existence, and, on the other, to apprehend it as the cause of the 
apparent reality. This is also undoubtedly the main purpose of meta- 
physics." — Flugel in Zeitschriftfur exakte Philosophic. 1875, 15. 



METAPHYSICS. 245 

theory of knowledge. This theory is related to meta- 
physic, as the rules of science to the science formed by 
their application. 

Before the theory of knowledge had become a special 
and prominent department of philosophy, it was natural 
that questions concerning the power of thought should 
be discussed in connection with metaphysical inquiries. 
Even now the metaphysician may find it necessary to 
discuss such questions, and indicate the conditions for 
attaining a solution of the ultimate problems ; just as 
the scientist, even after the principles of science are 
separately treated, may find it necessary to discuss those 
principles as he applies them. But for the metaphysi- 
cian the main purpose is the solution of metaphysical 
problems, and not to lose himself in the investigation of 
the means ; though that solution can only be found by 
using the proper means, they exist for the sake of the 
end they are to attain. Kant's Kritik is an inquiry 
whether metaphysic is possible ; and since he concludes 
that it is not, it is absurd to speak of that work as itself 
a system of metaphysics. 

Questions respecting the powers of the human under- 
standing belong to the theory of knowledge ; yet every 
subject can take from this theory whatever it may need 
for its own development. But it leads to confusion to 
make metaphysic partly an inquiry into the limits of 
the understanding, and partly an explanation of abso- 
lute being, two distinct subjects being mixed in this 
way. We shall, therefore, distinguish metaphysic, or 
the principles of being, — attempting to explain the 
essence of what is, and giving the ground of what ap- 
pears, — from the theory of knowledge, or from the 
rules necessary for attaining these principles. 

Where the naive view prevails that phenomena are 



246 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the things per se, or that by means of sensation Ave get 
at the very heart of being, there will, of course, be no 
deeper metaphysical inquiries. If common-sense is the 
criterion of all knowledge, we need but interrogate it 
in order to learn all that can be known about being. 
Or, if our knowledge of being is regarded as intuitive, 
we need but behold our intuitions to get our metaphys- 
ics. So far as sensationalism has prevailed in England, 
France, and other countries, the metaphysical problems 
have not even been apprehended. If all the gold lies 
loose on the surface, no one will be so foolish as to 
quarry the hard rock to find it. If common-sense and 
intuitionalism contain all the treasures of wisdom, the 
philosophical problems lose their difficulty. In Scot- 
land, where special stress has been laid on these two 
sources of knowledge, they have been regarded as fur- 
nishing the final solutions of metaphysics. Indeed, in 
that country metaphysic has largely been identified with 
an inquiry into the first principles of human knowledge. 
Thus Stewart speaks of metaphysic as applicable to all 
inquiries which aim " to trace the various branches of 
human knowledge to their first principles in the consti- 
tution of the human mind." President M'Cosh, in his 
" Logic " says, u The science which treats of the intui- 
tive operations of the mind is called metaphysics ; the 
science which considers the discursive acts is logic." 
Accordingly his work on "The Intuitions of the Mind" 
is a system of metaphysics. This makes metaphysic 
part of the theory of knowledge, that part namely 
which pertains to intuitions.* But are not questions 

* In the article " Metaphysics " in Ency. Brit., the suhject is defined 
as that "which deals with the conditions of all knowing and "being." 
In the article of Dr. M'Cosh, already quoted, he says of the principles 
of the intuitions, " A system or systematized arrangement of such 
principles constitutes metaphysics or mental philosophy. . . . All pro- 



METAPHYSICS. 247 

respecting " the intuitive operations of the mind " psy- 
chological and noetic rather than metaphysical ? It is 
well known that scepticism has shaken the confidence 
in these intuitive operations, so that inquiries respect- 
ing them are of great importance. But such inquiries, 
like those of Locke, Hume, and Kant, concern the nature 
and the limits of human understanding. If it is once 
established by the theory of knowledge that there are 
such intuitive operations, and that they give a knowl- 
edge of being, then this knowledge, the result of these 
operations, will be metaphysics; and then all the in- 
quiries into these intuitive operations will be the propae- 
deutic of metaphysics, but not the system itself. 

We must hold fast the idea that metaphysic pertains 
to being, its principles, its ultimate explanation, its 
essence. Ueberweg pronounces it " the science of prin- 
ciples in general, so far as they are common to all 
being." * According to Lotze, " metaphysic is the sci- 
ence of the real, not of the merely thinkable. Reality 
is that by means of which an existing object is distin- 
guished from the non-existing, a transpiring event from 
the non-transpiring, an existing from a non-existing 
relation." f One of the latest works on metaphysics 
also regards the nature of being as the object of meta- 
physical inquiry, and declares that it is the province of 
metaphysic "to explain the notion of being and the 
method of its attainment." J 

Hegel, by identifying the principles of knowing with 



fessed metaphysical principles are attempted generalizations of our 
intuitive perceptions and judgments." (593-595.) 

* " Die Wissenschaft von den Principien im Allgemeinen, sofern sie 
allem Seienden gemeinsam sind." — Logik, 5 edit., 9. 

t Grundziige der Metaphysik, 8. 

X Teiclimiiller: Die loirkliche und die scheinbare Welt. Neue Grundlage 



248 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

those of being, made the laws of thought also the laws 
of reality. The process of thought is the process of 
the absolute or of being in the highest sense. His 
pantheism is a panlogism. Where thought and being 
are thus identified, it is necessary that one system, 
metaphysics, should include both. But the confidence 
in the discovery of this identity has been lost, and it is 
now held to be safer to view thought as an explanation 
of being than to imagine that the essence of being is 
already given in thought itself. The present condition 
of philosophy demands the separate investigation of the 
principles of knowledge, and then the application of 
these principles to the explanation of being. 

When metaphysic is declared to deal with the " con- 
ditions " of being, the meaning can only be the condi- 
tions for the existence of particular objects. Let any 
one inquire, for instance, Why is there being rather 
than nothing ? and he will soon find himself in a region 
in which thought is lost. Besides, that being which 
has conditions is not the ultimate object of metaphysi- 
cal investigation: it seeks, above all, a knowledge of 
that being which is unconditioned. 

The term " being " is the most abstract that can be 
conceived. It includes all that is, and yet indicates 
nothing peculiar to any kind of existence. So broad 
in extension as to embrace every thing, it is so empty 
of content (intensively) that Hegel identified it with 
nothing. There is no pure being in existence, except 
in thought ; that is, there is nothing of which it can be 
said that it is being and nothing else. Instead of empty 
being, which is absolutely nothing but the thought of 
mere existence, all that is real is something particular. 
The thought of " being " is so great an abstraction that 
the mind at first finds difficulty in grasping it. Instead 



METAPHYSICS. 249 

of defining metaphysic as dealing with being or the 
notion of being, we can say that it treats of reality, of 
real existence. By the real we understand that which 
is not merely thought, but which exists, whether we 
think it or not. 

Professor Harms says : " Metaphysic treats of the 
being of that which is thought, as it is outside of 
thought Qpraeter notionem) ; logic, however, treats of the 
being of that which is thought, as it is in thought. 
As the latter is, however, only a thought, while the 
former is called a reality, the one treats of being, the 
other of thought. Both conceptions are fundamental 
for knowledge, for there is no knowledge in which 
there is no thought and being. The conception of 
being applies to the known outside of thought, and 
that of thought applies to that known in thought." 
It is not, however, taken for granted by philosophy 
that the real in this sense is self-evident ; some of the 
deepest problems of philosophy are involved in the 
notion of the real. Our consciousness informs us that 
thought itself is real in the sense that it exists for us; 
but is the object of thought any thing real ? Does any 
thing outside of the mind correspond with my thought 
of an object? The import of this question will be 
clear to every one who apprehends the fact that we 
have an immediate knowledge only of what is before 
consciousness. 

We can define metaphysics as the philosophy of the 
real, involving as it does all that is necessary to explain 
reality. 24 Its aim being to explain the real, the charge 
that it is visionary can have significance only when it 
becomes false to itself. Its subjects are not arbitrarily 
chosen ; their basis is found in consciousness, and in all 
deeper inquiries they are forced on the mind. One 



250 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

cannot think at all without coming to metaphysical 
problems. Experience itself needs metaphysics as much 
as a tree does roots. Behind the infinite variety mir- 
rored in consciousness, the being and nature of mind 
furnish deep metaphysical problems. Behind phenomena 
there must be something that is not phenomenal, but 
the ground of all phenomena ; this ground metaphysic 
seeks. At the basis of the changeable there must be 
something that is unchangeable ; the qualities suggest 
a substance, and the apparent the real. Metaphysic 
wants to discover and explain the eternal, the immu- 
table, the uncaused cause, the substance. Every con- 
sciousness assumes something as real; all experience 
presupposes it; every science takes its existence for 
granted ; all thought ultimately seeks it ; the ordinary 
thinking claims to have it ; the metaphysician wants to 
make sure that it is intellectually in his possession. 
Experience is full of contradictions, which the mind 
cannot tolerate ; in the ultimate source of all there can 
be no contradiction, for in that case it would be self- 
destructive. Hence the ultimate unity and harmony 
are sought. Something appears, then vanishes ; but it 
can only appear if something else is that makes it ap- 
pear. There can be no light unless there is something 
that shines. Now, what is this that t*, and makes 
something else appear, but does not itself appear? Is 
it matter ? Is it .spirit ? • Is it Plato's idea ? Is it 
Spinoza's substance, to or on which thought and ex- 
tension are but attributes or modes? Is it the monad 
of Leibnitz, or the Realien of Herbart ? 

From this it is evident what the leading problems of 
metaphysics are. In the ordinary consciousness, and 
by the sciences, are given certain notions which are 
supposed to be ultimate. These are taken up by the 






METAPHYSICS. 251 

metaphysician, and subjected to the most rigorous test, 
in order to determine their validity. His aim is always 
to find what is, in distinction from that which becomes. 
Such terms as " matter " and " spirit " are critically in- 
vestigated, to learn just what they present to the mind. 
When their exact sense is found, all sorts of questions 
still remain to be answered. If matter is ultimate, how 
does what we call spirit originate from it ? If spirit is 
ultimate, how does it produce matter ? May there not 
be something behind both matter and spirit, neither the 
one nor the other, and yet the cause of both? Perhaps 
both can somehow be united, so that they are in reality 
one, though to us they seem wholly dissimilar. Besides 
the question of the nature of original being, there are 
many others. Is this original being a unit, a duality, 
or a plurality ? Thus the questions of monism, of 
dualism, and of pluralism are involved. Is the original 
reality but one in nature and also a unit in itself, the 
only one of its kind, as the God of theism ? Or is it 
one in essence, but with many samples of the same, as 
the atoms of Democritus? But the various conceptions 
of original being are only the beginning of metaphysi- 
cal inquiry, — a beginning which is yet endless. Were 
the nature of the original known, other questions would 
immediately arise. How is it related to the derived? 
Is the process one of creation, or of evolution ? It is 
thus seen that the problems are those of theism and 
atheism, of pantheism, materialism, and idealism. In 
order to understand the real, we must know how it is 
connected so as to form a universe in which nothing 
is isolated ; this involves the question of the relation of 
things. In considering the difference between what is 
and what becomes, we come to the questions of cause 
and effect. These introduce some of the deepest prob- 



252 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

lems discussed by Hume and Kant. We distinguish 
between qualities, and the substances in which they 
inhere. Is the substance distinct from its forces or 
powers ? Are, perhaps, the transpiring events them- 
selves the only realities, while force and substance are 
mere mental creations ? Is the form distinct from the 
substance ? Of what is called external reality we have 
no conception except as existing in space ; and of all 
that is external and internal we have no conception 
except in time. What, then, are space and time? But 
there are still other problems which lie at the heart of 
all reality. Is there design in the universe, or is the 
cosmos wholly purposeless ? What rules ? Reason, 
fate, or chance ? 

These and the numerous problems connected with 
them give the contents of metaphysics. It is evident 
from them that all the inquiries pertain to being, and 
that the ultimate aim always is to get the explanation 
of reality. The old division, Avhether adopted or not, 
gives a clear idea of the subjects of metaphysics ; namely, 
ontology, cosmology, rational psychology, and rational 
theology. Ontology considers the principles of all being, 
whatever is common to all that is.* It asks what being 
is. What must an object be in order that being may be 
predicated of it? What is the distinction between being 
and reality? The relation of being to becoming (Sein 
und Werden) also belongs to this division, thus introdu- 
cing the subject of cause and effect. The notions of 
substance and quality, of quantity and relation, are also 
involved. The other three divisions take up the three 
highest classes of being, or the realities contained in the 
abstract notion of being. f Cosmology treats of the ma- 

* It has been called Scientia entis in genere. 
t " Scientia entis in specie." 



METAPHYSICS. 253 

terial universe, and discusses matter, its connections and 
relations, together with space, time, design, and the 
other general problems involved in the existence of the 
cosmos. Rational psychology (also called speculative 
or metaphysical psychology) discusses the essence (na- 
ture) of the soul, whether material or spiritual, whether 
a unit or an aggregation, a simple or a compound sub- 
stance ; whether free and immortal. Rational theology 
is similar to what has been called natural theology* and 
treats of God so far as an object of pure reason. It dis- 
cusses the question of his existence, testing the various 
proofs which have been adduced ; also his nature, attri- 
butes, and relation to the world.* 

If there is one subject which, more than any other, 
arouses the deepest interest, and strains the mind to the 
utmost, it is metaphysics. If in it speculation and ab- 
straction culminate, it also absorbs and concentrates 
enthusiasm. One need but apprehend the nature of its 
problems in order to appreciate the deep devotion and 
intense application of the profoundest philosophers to 
metaphysical studies. Metaphysic seeks the first thought 
of reality in order that it may derive all others from that 
original, and discover the last thought; it searches for 
the basis (the presupposition) of all experience and all 
science ; it attempts to solve the problems of the world, 
of man, and of God ; it seeks the beginning of all begin- 
nings. 

The mind which understands the meaning of meta- 
physic, and yet treats the subject frivolously, must be 
essentially profane. " The anti-metaphysical twaddle of 

* Lotze, who holds that metaphysic aims to discover the laws of the 
connection "between the separate elements of reality, divides the subject 
into three parts ; namely, ontology, cosmology, and phenomenology, 
or rational psychology. Rational theology, also a part of the old meta- 
physic, is treated separately, under the head of Philosophy of Religion. 



254 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

many persons reveals great levity and gross ignorance 
respecting the most weighty problems." * The intellect 
cannot accept as final the words of M. Renan : " God, 
providence, immortality, are so many good words, per- 
haps a little lumbering, which philosophy will interpret 
in senses more and more refined, but which it will never 
replace to advantage. Under one form or another God 
will always be the summary of our supernatural needs, 
the category of the ideal.''' This writer gives a significant 
insight into his own mind, rather than into metaphysics, 
when he says, " Metapbysic is nothing but a most ele- 
vated and noble manner of conceiving and grouping 
things ; it is to every thinker whatever pleases him." f 

It is a work of supererogation to plead for the contin- 
uance of metaphysics. Some kind or other will exist 
as long as the human mind ; the only question is, what 
kind? It is a mental necessity, and if the intellect 
cannot get a rational metaphysic, it will, perhaps un- 
consciously, adopt one based on mere opinion. Kant 
despaired of the final solution of the highest problems 
by the speculative reason, but he understood human 
nature too well to question the continuance of meta- 
physics. He said, " In all persons, as soon as their rea- 
son rose to speculation, there has always been some kind 
of metaphysics, and there always will be." A shallow 
empiricism attempts to flee from metaphysic as if it were 
a ghost ; it, however, invents its own, but of the crudest 
sort. "Its metaphysic consists in this, that it returns 
to the metaphysical prejudices of the common conscious- 
ness, which it enriches with some contradictions intro- 
duced by science." J Its superficial character alone 

* Schilling: Zeitsohriftfur exacte Philosophie, 1863. 
t Kibot: Mind, 1877, 381. 
t Wundt: Eiiifluss, 24. 



METAPHYSICS. 255 

makes it questionable whether it is worthy of being 
called metaphysics. Positivism relegates the subject to 
the antiquated vagaries of the past, but it has a sort of 
metaphysic made to order for its own private use. " It 
requires little subtlety to read metaphysics between the 
lines of the positive philosophy. The difference lies be- 
tween the metaphysic which recognizes itself as such, 
and that which does not ; between the metaphysic which, 
because it understands the distinctive nature of its prob- 
lem, does not seek the solution of it from the sciences 
which themselves form the problem to be solved, and 
that which, unaware of its own office, though unable to 
discard it, interpolates itself into the sciences and then 
extracts from them, under the guise of a scientific theory 
of mental phenomena, what are, after all, but the first 
thoughts of metaphysic clothing themselves in a new set 
of mechanical or physiological metaphors." * Even in 
England, where an abhorrence of metaphysics is often 
expressed, it cannot be banished from natural science 
and psycholog}^, to say nothing of philosophy-! 

The most serious opposition, based largely on Kant's 
Kritik, regards a speculative metaphysical system im- 
possible. The failure of the ruling systems at the 

* T. H. Green: Contemp. Rev., vol. 31, 26. 

t Vigorous thinkers in England, not dominated by sensationalism, 
are making an earnest effort to promote a deeper study of metaphysical 
questions. Philosophers affected by the movement begun by Kant, as 
well as by that which Locke inaugurated, keenly feel the neglect or 
superficial treatment of the profoundest problems. The late Mr. Green 
declared that Englishmen have not taken the first step to solve the 
metaphysical problem left by Hume; that, in fact, in England the prob- 
lem had not even been put in " its true and distinctive form." Respect- 
ing the claim of English writers to substitute psychology for metaphysics, 
Mr. Green said, " It is not really, nor can be, the case that our psychology 
has cleared itself of metaphysics, but that, being metaphysical still, it 
is so with the metaphysics of a pre-Kantian, or even of a pre-Berkeleian, 
age." 



256 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

beginning of this century has promoted this view ; 
but their failure must not be identified with that of 
philosophy. Kant's Kritik is not final ; it is the begin- 
ning, not the completion, of the critical method. Every 
theory of the limits of the human understanding is 
liable to be negatived by that understanding itself, and 
the intellect is likely to take its own achievements as 
the limit of its powers. Metaphysic is one of the ideals 
of philosophy, even the greatest. All the highest aims 
are ideals, but that is no valid reason for abandoning 
their pursuit. In dealing with the most difficult of all 
problems, it is not surprising that the intellect has wan- 
dered much in its search for the right road. Idas it 
been otherwise in any other department ? The critical 
philosopher is not so presumptuous as to claim that he 
has the explanation of the universe ; but, strange as it 
may seem, those who most vigorously denounce meta- 
physics, presumptuously claim to have solved the mys- 
tery. There is an impudent materialism which is too 
conceited to recognize itself as metaphysic reduced to 
a guess and an assumption. Paulsen says, "Aside 
from frivolous materialists, who find some sense in the 
statement that perception is motion, there is to-day 
probably not a metaphysician who believes that he has 
the key to unlock the mysteries of the world." 

In the various systems of metaphysics, we see how 
the world-problem has been mirrored in different minds, 
and how they have attempted its solution. Around 
this problem has been concentrated the deepest think- 
ing of the ages. Although we cannot yet think the. 
universe, this does not imply that the inquiry into 
its ultimate explanation has not taught valuable lessons. 
We may not be able to explain the nature of electricity, 
and yet the very effort to find the explanation may 



METAPHYSICS. 257 

teach many important truths. He who has read in the 
history of philosophy only the failure of metaphysics 
to solve its problems, may have had his eyes open, but 
his mind must have been closed. The problem has 
been made clearer ; its depth and difficulties have 
been revealed ; popular fallacies have been exposed ; 
cherished methods of handling the problem have 
been proved false ; conditions for the solution have been 
made plainer ; the search for the highest intellectual 
attainments has led the mind into the sublimest regions 
of thought ; and deep lessons, and numerous valuable 
discoveries and truths, lie all along the path of meta- 
physical inquiry. What one finds in the history of 
metaphysics depends somewhat on the ability of the 
seeker. 

We are living in an era when metaphysic is viewed 
with suspicion, and when its supposed solutions are 
received with scepticism. There is no reason for regret- 
ting this. Metaphysic needs thorough purging. The 
time has come when dreams and visions and poetic 
inspirations must cease to be viewed as the intellectual 
counterpart of reality. Metaphysic has been too hasty 
in its conclusions, has leaped over the necessary condi- 
tions, has assumed what should have been demon- 
strated, and has attempted to rear its structure without 
properly laying the foundation. It is fortunate that 
the day is past when it was blindly praised, and when 
its wildest conclusions were accepted uncritically, — 
fortunate, because now its vagueness must cease, it 
must pass from promises to real solutions, and it must 
prove its premises instead of constructing mythologies. 
What it has lost in appearance, it will gain in sub- 
stance and solidity. Metaphysic, through the very criti- 
cism to which it has been subjected, has been made 



258 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

conscious of itself. The recognition and removal of 
its diseases are the conditions of health. It tried to 
soar instead of treading on solid ground. It has now 
learned to creep, in order to be safe. There cannot 
be too much healthy criticism and caution respecting 
the profoundest inquiries. There is, it is true, no en- 
couragement for pretenders, or the frivolous, to enter 
the deep, dark mine in which metaphysicians labor, but 
the loss will not be appreciable ; those called to that 
sphere will feel an irresistible impulse to enter and 
quarry. 

So far is metaphysic from opposing inquiries into the 
limits of the human mind, that it has actually given 
birth to them. It wants to work wholly in the domain 
of the possible and the real. To be metaphysical in the 
true sense, does not, then, imply an abandonment of 
reality, but rather absorption in its contemplation. It 
is in the effort to pass from the phenomenal to the real, 
that the mind is most of all led to consider the ques- 
tion of its limitations, which is seen most strikingly in 
the case of Kant. Locke was more a psychologist than 
a metaphysician. Berkeley and Hume aimed to become 
metaphysicians while remaining psychologists. Kant, 
by far the most metaphysical of all, penetrated farthest 
in considering the limits of the reason. His whole 
investigation of the reason shows that metaphysic, in- 
stead of fearing criticism, demands it. But while it 
wants to determine the real limits of the mind, it opposes 
all efforts to fix them arbitrarily. Nothing is more 
deadening to intellect, or more destructive of progress, 
than the thoughtless dismissal of the most serious prob- 
lems, with the unproved dictum, — " unsolvable ! " In 
many cases the possibility of a solution can only be 
made evident by its discovery, as in the case of the law 



METAPHYSICS. 259 

of gravitation, the power of steam, and the electric 
telegraph. 

Our age, critical, sceptical, and destructive, is more 
intent on studying the history of philosophy than on 
the production of great metaphysical systems. Under 
these circumstances the course of the beginner cannot 
be doubtful. Although a learner, all his learning 
should be a discipline in thinking. His criticism should 
be relentless but sound, and destructive for the sake 
of becoming constructive. Digging is not laying the 
foundation, and yet it is rational only when under- 
taken for the sake of the foundation and the super- 
structure. As the deepest of all studies, metaphysic is 
worthy of the profoundest efforts. No question of the 
limits of our faculties should be permitted to interfere 
with the boldest grappling with the hardest problems. 
It is presumptuous to fix hastily those limits, particularly 
in an age in which all efforts to settle the matter have 
signally failed ; and however highly we may esteem 
noetic inquiries, it is foolish to claim that thought shall 
suspend its operations until its limits have been deter- 
mined. Whether the problems are solved or not, the 
mind is exalted by seriously considering them, and is 
disciplined by penetrating as far as possible toward a 
solution. If the philosopher's stone is not found, 
chemistry may be evolved in the search. 

Since the student must have some kind of meta- 
physic, the question is, whether it shall be rational or 
superficial. " No one who has been aroused to reflec- 
tion can dispense with the aid of metaphysics ; no 
period in the history of culture has been able to with- 
draw from co-operation in the effort to solve the great 
riddle of existence ; and even modern natural science, 
which would like to reject metaphysics, has its own 



260 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

metaphysic in materialism, although an extremely poor 
and wretched kind." * The very impulse which leads 
the thinker to seek unity, order, reason, in the universe, 
is metaphysical. Anaxagoras already thought there 
must be a Mind which orders the universe, and ac- 
counts for the wisdom and power manifested; and 
surely the progress, since his day, has not made the 
mind less desirous of searching for its own similitude. 
Why the restless impulse to seek the final solution of 
the problem of being? Kant, although despairing of 
the solution, deeply felt the significance of this ques- 
tion. The mind most fully conscious of itself is in its 
element only when it seeks what is deepest. To the 
philosophic thinker the cosmos, the soul, and God will 
always present numerous unsolved problems, — goads 
to inquiry; solutions found will give birth to newer 
and greater problems. Growth in knowledge deepens 
and darkens mysteries, but it also solves mysteries. 

Probably at first the result of metaphysical inquiries 
will be of a negative character, proving supposed solu- 
tions false. Everywhere the student finds that solutions 
are claimed to have been made in regions where these 
solutions are now declared impossible. It is no easy 
task to test these solutions, — to clear the mind of the 
fictions which are taken for reality. It may be discov- 

* E. von Hartmann (Phil. Monatsh. vii.). He thinks the view that 
the great problem of being is unsolvable, rests solely on the fact that 
heretofore it has not been solved; bnt this does not prove that it cannot 
be solved, and is no reason for ceasing the efforts at solution. But he 
holds it to be still more silly to regard the problem as so easy that any 
journeyman can solve it, or any specialist, with no particular training 
for the general problem. He adds: " The standpoint of modern investi- 
gators of nature is not seldom the strangest and most contradictory 
hash of materialistic metaphysic, of dogmatic denial of the possibility 
of metaphysics in general, and of subjective pride of intellect, which 
pronounces the metaphysical problems children's toys." 



METAPHYSICS. 261 

ered that even scientists sometimes work by the light 
of Aladdin's lamp. When mind is lost in matter, it is 
its first task to find itself again, or all is lost. 

The true metaphysician does not aim at that beyond 
his reach, but to go as far as possible and grasp all within 
reach. Only so far as it can move securely does meta- 
physic want to go. And he who goes safely thus far will 
find enough to do without attempting the impossible. 

Of fundamental importance for the beginner is the 
question, On what basis and by what means shall the 
structure of metaphysics be reared? The master mason 
must learn from the mistakes of former builders. There 
must be no arbitrary principles, no assumed basis, no 
fanciful method. Metaphysic must begin with what is 
given, which exists, and has some good reason for its 
existence. It begins with the facts of consciousness 
and the results of science, and makes them the basis of 
its inquiries.* It does not operate with these facts and 
results in a method peculiar to itself, but simply accord- 
ing to the laws of thought. It asks, With the given 
facts of consciousness and the results of science, what 
has reason to say respecting them? What inferences 
must reason draw from them? All science operates 
with the same laws of thought, and thus attests their 
validity ; are they then less valid in their fullest devel- 
opment and highest application ? 

* Schopenhauer declares that metaphysic is based on experience, 
and is its interpretation. He accordingly calls it the science of expe- 
rience (Erfahntngswissenschaft), "not, however, the individual experi- 
ences, hut the total, the general sum of all experience, is its object 
and its source." Another says that " metaphysic can, in the end, seek 
nothing else than what the experimental sciences also seek: namely, 
to know the connection of all experience." Siebeck, in Viertelj. fur 
iciss. Philosophic, 1878. He claims that the mistake has been that it 
attempted to find from a part of experience the principle lying beyond 
the whole. 175. 



262 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The problem which metaphysic presents is therefore 
simply this : With the knowledge that exists, what do 
the laws of thought teach us respecting being in gene- 
ral, and respecting the world, the soul, and God ? This 
statement of the problem gives the specific character 
of metaphysical inquiry. In the experimental sciences 
the attention is directed solely to the thing experimented 
with ; in metaphysics, however, the question is not 
what the thing requires, but what the laws of thought 
demand. The scientist is absorbed by the thing in hand, 
and asks, What is it ? the metaphysician is not limited in 
his inquiries by that in hand, but by that which pos- 
sesses it, which contemplates and thinks it. Surely it 
must be possible to determine what reason demands, 
what it can demonstrate, what it must postulate, and 
why it must postulate. If the mind makes mistakes in 
its conclusions, it has the test of the conclusions and 
the means of correction in itself. And when reason 
reaches its limit, it will as. surely stop as life does at 
death. 

There is growth in metaphysics. Depending on the 
attainments in science and in general knowledge, and 
on the application of the laws of thought to them, it will 
grow as there is development in these respects. It 
will gradually unfold its problems, and in their solution 
will be seen a reflection of the knowledge, the views, 
and the thinking of the age. Every period completes 
itself in its metaphysics. 

It is sometimes charged against metaphysics, that into 
it enter other than purely intellectual elements — such 
as religious, moral, and aesthetic interests. So far as 
these dim the intellectual vision, they are disturbing 
forces, and must be removed; but they never act as 
such when metaphysic is true to itself. That it takes 









METAPHYSICS. 263 

them into account, is in its favor, since it proves its 
completeness. Whatever may be said of external 
nature, it is evident that every account of man which 
regards only his physical and intellectual condition is 
sadly incomplete, and that all theories which ignore his 
moral, religious, and assthetic interests, are partial. 
The latter need explanation as much as the physical and 
the purely intellectual, and a system which ignores them 
cannot be final. 

Man is not a mere calculating machine ; he is a 
mathematician, but also something besides. There are 
legitimate spheres of thought where demonstrations 
are out of the question. The scientist, as well as the 
philosopher, forges chains of logic without being able 
to find the hooks on which to hang the first and the last 
links. No more in metaphysics than in science can we 
do without the law of probability. But the probability 
must be recognized as such, and not be made an axiom. 
The mind may have to resor-t to postulates whose valid- 
ity is unquestioned ; they may be a mental necessity, 
and if they are, that is final. Such postulates even the 
rigorous Kant admitted, and he placed them beyond the 
reach of all sceptical attacks. The difference between 
the man who admits and the man who rejects postulates 
is that the one knows himself, while the other does not. 

Hypotheses are not science, but scientists cannot do 
without them ; neither are they metaphysic, but it needs 
their help. Not in forming them are metaphysicians to 
blame, but in forming them without sufficient reason, 
or in failing to test them, or in pronouncing them final 
principles. In forming hypotheses, metaphysic may err, 
thus proving that it is human and on exactly the same 
footing as all other pursuits. Science too, as we have 
seen, has its long wanderings without positive results, 



264 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

and its way to truth often lies through error. It has 
been said of Kepler's laws, that they " were an outcome 
of a lifetime of speculation, for the most part vain and 
groundless." No less an authority than Faraday de- 
clares : " The world little knows how many of the 
thoughts and theories which have passed through the 
mind of a scientific investigator have been crushed in 
silence and secrecy by his own severe criticism and ad- 
verse examination ; that in the most successful instances 
not a tenth of the suggestions, the hopes, the wishes, 
the preliminary conclusions, have been realized." 

In considering psychology, we found the problems 
connected with the essence of the mind beset with diffi- 
culties. Even if their solution were possible, this would 
not be the place to enter on a full discussion of them. 
The reality of mind is, however, of such vital impor- 
tance as to be worthy of attention, even in an intro- 
ductory work. Besides removing false impressions, we 
must aim to get a reliable and firm working basis. 

We have seen that the intellect deals purely with 
mental products in proportion as it rises above the 
immediate impressions of sense. The sensations cannot 
even reflect or see themselves, much less can they form 
comparisons, contrasts, combinations, and inferences. 
These require mind. There are only units in nature ; 
but we can bring them into relations, and can think 
large numbers. As far as we can discover, a stone in 
Africa and a tree in America do not affect each other ; 
but how numerous the relations of quality and quantity 
which the mind can determine respecting them ! The 
vast realm of thought, in distinction from sensation, is 
a purely intellectual sphere. Not that the mind here 
is creative, but it is determinative : it does* not make 
something that is not, but it discovers what is. Its 



METAPHYSICS. 265 

discoveries are not, however, confined to what we call 
matter : the most of them, in fact, have no direct rela- 
tion to what is known as such, but have significance 
only for mind. We can call the one external, the other 
internal, reality ; and, if there is any difference in the 
degree of validity, it is in favor of mind rather than of 
matter. 

By distinguishing between the impressions made by 
external objects, and what thinking makes of them, we 
postulate the existence of both the mental and the 
physical world. All that we term concept, idea, logical 
norms, and indeed the whole realm of the rational and 
of philosophy, transcends the material. We judge of 
nature itself according to the laws of our minds, and 
subject to this test even the direct impressions received 
from the outer world. The first hints from matter 
already contain a mental element ; and in science, phi- 
losophy, and art, the mind, in the use of the conditions 
from the world of sense, is purely a law unto itself. 

The deeper this line of thought is pursued, the more 
are we forced to admit the existence of mind as distinct 
from matter. The world of intellect is a reality, — a 
world utterly without significance and explanation if 
there is only what is known to be physical. The differ- 
ence between the two is not a question of reality, but 
solely of the kind of reality. To deny that reality 
which is the only source of all knowledge of the real, 
lands us in the abyss of nothing. It must also be con- 
sidered, that our own mental acts are the only objects 
of reflection of which we are immediately conscious. 

We are thus warranted in asserting that the exist- 
ence of mind is of all things the most certain. By no 
processes of observation or thinking can we account for 
the origin of mind from matter. As far as we can now 



266 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

see, such an origin is wholly inconceivable. The last 
results of physiology, as well as of psychology, recog- 
nize mind as sui generis ; and we are obliged to postu- 
late it to account for our intellectual operations, just as 
much as we are obliged to postulate matter in accounting 
for physical processes. 

We may call the mind a substance, if we mean by it 
only that it is the reality which stands under, and is the 
source of, our mental activity ; but the term has been 
employed in such various senses and so obscurely, that 
its use may add new confusion, instead of serving as 
a real explanation. Less objectionable is the term 
"entity" indicating a real existence, the source and 
centre of activity, without attempting to indicate its 
essence. Mind, then, we affirm, is an entity distinct 
from other objects, with a peculiar activity, and moving 
in a world of its own. While thus obliged to distin- 
guish it from matter, we do not claim that it is foreign 
to the external reality. They are not identical, but 
correlated, forming one universe, just as soul and body 
one person. Partly they form a parallelism or a corre- 
spondence ; partly each may have a sphere peculiar to 
itself. The difference between the two is not suffi- 
ciently marked by ascribing to the one consciousness, 
and denying it to the other. The character of the 
thought in consciousness must also be taken into ac- 
count. The mental world is not a negation of the 
material, nor, on the other hand, does it find in that 
its limits. Thought moves in a sphere which encloses, 
but also transcends, the outer world. 

By basing our inferences strictly on the facts of mind, 
we shall be true to the scientific method, and at the 
same time have a solid basis for philosophy. Of mind, 
just as of matter, we know only what it does ; and from 



METAPHYSICS. 267 

this, we infer what it is. Rebel as we may against the 
conclusion, to our intellects a thing is simply what it 
can do. It is by interpreting action that we get what 
we term substance, which is always an impenetrable 
mystery, unless we mean by it merely the power to 
account for certain activities. Mind as entity — as not 
a mere relation, not a mere quality of something else, 
not mere action without an actor — gives us the funda- 
mental conception needed. 

All the possible metaphysical conceptions respecting 
mind and matter may be classified as follows : — 

1. They are different manifestations of the same sub- 
stance. The ground of their unity is behind both, — in 
their common source. Pantheism. 

2. The one is the product .of the other. Theism, 
Idealism, Materialism. 

3. They are in no way united, but only correlated. 
Dualism. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Origin of the Name Metaph} T sics. Aristotle's "First 
Philosophy." Define Metaphysics. Different senses in 
which used. Difficulties of the subject. Indicate its 
exact sphere, and the character of its objects. Define 
Ontology. Cosmology. Rational Psychology. Rational 
Theology. Possibility of Metaphysics. Necessity. 
Metaphysics of Materialism. Metaphysics and Theory 
of Knowledge. Method of Metaphysics. Possible 
Metaphysical Theories. Criticism of each. Hypothe- 
ses in Metaphysics. Distinction between Being and 
Action. Does Action imply Being as its Source? 
Conception of Substance. Mind as Entity. 



268 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PUILOSOPUY. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

AESTHETICS. 

Reason in the form of feeling may be more difficult 
to discover than in thought and conduct, but we do 
not believe it to be less real. Its existence there is 
admitted whenever we speak of feeling as reasonable 
or unreasonable, — terms which indicate its quality as 
well as its source. We may say that in emotion reason 
is latent, unconscious, not sufficiently evolved to recog- 
nize itself; and that the problem for it is how to find 
and express itself as reason. The solution of this prob- 
lem would give a complete theory of the emotions, a 
system of the rational principles involved, so great 
a desideratum in philosophy. That without their expla- 
nation a philosophical system is incomplete, becomes 
evident on considering how large a part of our psychic 
nature, not included in thought and volition, the feel- 
ings constitute. 

Compared with the other mental states the emotional 
has received least, attention, both in psychology and 
philosophy. The full importance of the subject is evi- 
dently not appreciated. An emotion does not obtrude 
itself on the intellect, but rests in itself, and tends to 
absorb in itself as emotion the whole soul. Knowledge 
and conduct require effort, and demand or solicit reflec- 
tion ; but feeling is supposed to take care of itself, 
being regarded as a state little subject to direction or 



AESTHETICS. 2G9 

control. This neglect is the more strange in view of the 
fact that so many regard feeling as the soul's primitive 
activity, giving birth to all the other psychic operations. 
But even if without this fundamental significance, the 
feelings exert a powerful influence on the other mental 
states, play a prominent part in morals, and constitute 
the happiness or misery of life. Nor are they so wholly 
beyond our control as some imagine : all our volitions 
and efforts at culture help to form a permanent state, 
which becomes the source of our emotions as well as of 
our other mental operations. 

The difficulties connected with the nature, cause, and 
relations of the feelings threaten to baffle all efforts to 
obtain a rational explanation. The feelings can neither 
describe themselves, nor does their course terminate in 
their rational equivalents. The direct testimony of 
consciousness merely states that they are, and that they 
have a certain quality and quantity (intensity). All 
attempts at explanation lead away from them into the 
region of the intellect. By concentrating the attention 
on them for the purpose of determining their character, 
the feelings themselves are modified; and every attempt 
to bring them under the focus of the intellect interferes 
with their immediateness and purity, checks their spon- 
taneity, and introduces a foreign element. Just because 
feeling is immediate to consciousness, the intermediate 
or producing processes being hid, it is so difficult to 
give its philosophy. Only by a direct appeal to con- 
sciousness can we learn what it is ; but even the psy- 
chology of the feelings is attended with peculiar difficulty. 
All explanations must be given in intellectual formulas; 
but it is no easy matter to find their intellectual equiva- 
lents, if it can be said that they have any. They are 
too volatile to be confined to the rigidity of concepts. 



270 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

They are not thoughts, and yet we want to express 
them in thought. But we can no more transfer them 
from one sphere of the soul into another than we can 
make our intellectual apprehensions a direct counter- 
part of external reality. The feelings we think, by 
passing into thought cease to be feelings. Every defini- 
tion is consequently imperfect, and comes far short of 
what we experience in the feeling itself. We can give 
descriptions of our emotional states ; but these indicate 
how we felt, not what the feeling in itself was. 

For the deepest and most fruitful study of this sub- 
ject the student is necessarily referred to his own ex- 
perience. The psj^chological view thus obtained will, 
however, leave much unexplained. We want a full 
intellectual apprehension, a complete rational interpre- 
tation, of our emotional nature, which is only possible 
by the farthest removal of feeling from its immediate- 
ness ; it demands that the emotional be made rational. 
In our feelings, more than in any other exercise, we are 
passive, being subjected to their dominion ; by taking 
them into the domain of the intellect we make them 
subject to ourselves, and master them. 

The very passivity of the emotional state (implied by 
the etymology of such words as "pathos," "passion," and 
the German Leidenschaft) interferes with the intellectual 
elaboration of the feelings ; and it is not surprising that 
those who indulge.- this state most are least intent on 
its explanation. On the other hand, the study of phi- 
losophy, with its constant exercise of reason, and with 
its effort to exalt every thing into the domain of the 
rational, tends to neglect and suppress the emotions. 
It is evident that the mind's passivity will be limited in 
proportion as its voluntary activity is increased. Not 
seldom philosophers fail to appreciate the significance 



ESTHETICS. 271 

of the feelings, because they cannot forge them into 
logical chains. The critical philosophy is too cold and 
stern to give them their deserved prominence, even in 
the domain of morals. The system formed around the 
categorical imperative is largely a skeleton, which lacks 
the warmth and beauty of life. Hegel, still more than 
Kant, depreciated the feelings, and sometimes spoke of 
them contemptuously. But whatever claims a system 
of philosophy may have to rationality and intellectual 
absoluteness, serious defects will adhere to it so long as 
the emotions do not receive their proper place and 
deserved treatment. 

In dividing philosophy into the principles of being, 
of knowing, of feeling, and of acting, we naturally ex- 
pect under the third head a complete theory of the feel- 
ings. But instead of an exhaustive discussion of this 
theory, only one department in its wide domain has 
been taken out of psj-chology, and made the subject of 
special philosophical inquiry ; namely, esthetics.* This 
term, commonly used in Germany for the theory of the 
beautiful, is employed in various senses by English 
writers. " ^Esthetics is the term now employed to des- 
ignate the theory of the fine arts, — the science of the 
beautiful with its allied conceptions and emotions. 

* ato-^rjo-i? signifies perception by means of the external senses. It 
was used by Baurngarteu {^zthetica, 1730) to designate that discipline 
which investigates the nature and use of the knowledge obtained 
through the senses. Under the knowledge thus obtained is that of the 
beautiful. But Baumgarten, the founder of aesthetics, neither indicates 
the exact relation of the sensualistic and intellectual elements in 
beauty, nor does he gire a complete theory of the beautiful. In his 
Eritik of Pure Reason, Kant uses the term "aesthetics" in its etymologi- 
cal sense, and applies it to sensation in general. The first part of that 
work he calls "Transcendental ^Esthetics," which he defines as " an a 
priori science of the principles of sensation;" and he discusses, under 
this head, space and time as the conditions of sensation. Iu his Kritik 
of the Judgment, Kant uses it for the theory of the beautiful. 



272 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The province of the science is not, however, very defi- 
nitely fixed; and there is still some ambiguity about the 
meaning of the term, arising from its etymology and 
various use." * The subject is popular, and has received 
considerable attention in various languages ; many 
writers, however, give reflections on art and the stand- 
ards of taste, rather than a rational inquiry into the 
nature of the beautiful. Through the influence of 
Kaut (Kritik der Urtheilskraft') and Hegel (Aesthetik)) 
a large number of German works have appeared which 
discuss the subject from a philosophical standpoint.! 

The sphere of aesthetics is too limited if defined as 
" the theory of the fine arts." The aim in such cases 
is to make beauty the essence of the discussion ; but 
then the beautiful in general should be considered, 
whether found in mind, in nature, or in art. Valuable 
and even indispensable as a propaedeutic to art, the 
essential element of aesthetics as a part of philosophy 
will be lost by limiting it to art. It has a general sub- 
ject, as well as special departments ; and, aside from its 
practical application, it has a rational value. Even if 
there were no art, we can well conceive that the mind 
would take an interest in the speculative questions con- 
nected with taste. ^Esthetics, even if limited to an in- 
quiry into the principles of beauty, or to the search for 
the reason in beauty, is a philosophical discipline. But 
the effort to make it merely a theory of the fine arts 

* Ency. Brit.: ^Esthetics. 

f Among the numerous German works on aesthetics since Hegel, are 
those of Weisse, Vischer, Carriere, Koestlin, Krause, Schasler, and Von 
Hartmann. Vischer's work, in three volumes, is the most complete dis- 
cussion of the subject in the whole range of literature. The history of 
aesthetics has been written by Zimmerinann and also by Lotze. On 
special departments of the subject, the German literature is also exten- 
sive and valuable. Of the older writers, Winckelmann, Lessing, and 
Schiller deserve special mention. 



ESTHETICS. 273 

indicates the triumph of empiricism, and proves that 
the rational is appreciated only as a preface to the tech- 
nical and artistic. If appreciated at all, beauty must 
be esteemed for its own sake ; but this means that it 
must be prized wherever found. 

In claiming that aesthetics is a rational discipline, 
which discusses ultimate problems, Ave do not want to 
ignore its psychological basis. Much remains to be 
done by psychology in order to determine the distinc- 
tion between beauty and allied emotions and concepts. 
A complete scale of animal and human feelings, which 
lead up to the beautiful, would be valuable. Instead 
of antagonism, the most intimate co-operative relation 
should be maintained between the rational or philo- 
sophical and the psychological factors. 

In order to introduce the student into aesthetics as 
usually treated, it will here be considered as the phi- 
losophy of the beautiful. Beauty is thus made the 
subject-matter. Other subjects are also discussed by 
writers on aesthetics ; but these subjects are loosely 
grouped around beauty, not so connected with it as to 
form a distinct organism. At the close of the chapter, 
it will be shown that the sphere of aesthetics should 
be enlarged, so as to form a rational system of beauty 
and of allied objects. The aim of aesthetics will then 
be to discover the peculiar marks of all objects termed 
aesthetic, and to bring them into organic connection. 

By examining the various works on aesthetics, we are 
struck with the difficulties connected with the question, 
What is beauty ? Every one has an answer in his con- 
sciousness in the form of an impression, but not in terms 
of rational interpretation, which is the very aim of 
aesthetics. Familiar as all seem with the beautiful, its 
mystery becomes apparent so soon as we attempt to 



274 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

define the term. The result always teaches that the 
impression itself is far more distinct and vivid than 
any interpretation we can give of it. After all that 
has been written on the subject, one need but examine 
the current definitions of beauty in order to learn how 
little has been accomplished for the attainment of defi- 
niteness. Much of the confusion arises from the fact 
that the term is applied to entirely different spheres. 
Thus we speak of beauty as purely subjective, namely, 
as an emotion, but also as in external objects. We are 
apt to transfer our aesthetic emotions, as well as the 
impressions on the senses, to the objects occasioning 
them. But by naming these objects we do not define 
beauty itself. Nor can the definition be found by in- 
dicating the characteristic marks of objects pronounced 
beautiful, such as grace, or an assemblage of graces, har- 
mony, symmetry, proportion, the adaptation of means 
to end, and unity amid variety. 

This vagueness characterized the discussion of the 
subject of beauty from the very beginning.* Although 
a favorite theme with Plato, he fails to distinguish it 
sharply from the true, the righteous, the good, and the 
wise ; and different views of it are given in different 
books. In " Phasdros," Socrates speaks eloquently of 
beauty ; but a better discussion of the subject is found 
in the " Symposium, " in the discourse of Diotema, re- 
lated by Socrates. . But instead of an analysis of beauty, 
we find here rather a description of the lover's ecstasy 
in beholding the beautiful. Plato describes beauty here 
as the eternal, unchangeable, divine idea, or beauty per 

t In Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. 4, p. 199, Conrad Hermann 
states that the history of aesthetics among the ancients must consider 
chiefly the views of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of the 
Neo-Platonists. He regards Pythagoras as the first who entered upon 
philosophical inquiries into the beautiful. 



ESTHETICS. 275 

se, not as embodied in any tiling else. Plotinus in his 
essay " On the Beautiful " follows his master Plato in 
exalting the ideal far above all its visible manifestations. 
The subject received little attention during the scholas- 
ticism of the Middle Ages ; and in comparison with the 
themes that usually engrossed the attention of thinkers, 
it was probably not thought worthy of serious inquiry. 
Locke does not discuss beauty ; Hume mentions it in a 
few places, but confounds it with the agreeable. The 
result of English inquiries is indicated in the article on 
^Esthetics in the " Encyclopaedia Britannica : " " What 
strikes one most, perhaps, in these discussions, is the 
vagueness due to the great diversity of conception as to 
the extent of the beautiful in the number of objects it 
may be supposed to denote. . . . There is certainly a 
great want of definiteness as to the legitimate scope of 
aesthetic theory." * 

We pronounce objects beautiful because they excite 
in us the emotion of beauty. But, whatever its occasion, 
beauty itself exists only for and in the mind. It is as 
purely ours as sight and hearing ; and all definitions 
must deal with it primarily as a mental state or as an 
emotion. That for its existence, at least for its origin, 
the notion of the beautiful depends on something exter- 
nal to us, must be admitted as freely as in the case of 

* For a theory of art among the ancients, see Eduarcl Mueller: Ge- 
schir-hte der Thcorie der Kunst bei den Alten, 2 vols. A brilliant rather 
than a profound discussion of the beautiful is given by Cousin in his 
Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. The latest German 
works on aesthetics are by E. Von Hartmann: Die deutscke ^Esthetik 
seit Kant, and Die Philosophie des Schoenen, In Preussi&che Jahrbuecher, 
August and September, 1887, A. Doering has two excellent articles on 
the history of aesthetics. The discussion of the subject of aesthetics is 
usually so unsatisfactory that it is difficult 'to recommend any particular 
book to the student. A brief history of Theories of the Beautiful is 
given by Bain in Mental and Moral Science, 301. For the English liter- 
ature on the subject the student is referred to iEsthetics in Ency. Brit. 



276 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

vision ; but it can never be conceived as any thing exist- 
ing independent of mind. A metaphysical consideration 
of the subject would undoubtedly conclude that the emo- 
tion itself has its basis in the harmony of the inner and 
the outer being, so that it is a product of their harmo- 
nious action and re-action. 

We speak of beauty as an emotion, a characteristic 
which distinguishes aesthetics from the sphere of logic, 
as well as from that of ethics. When we speak of our- 
selves as aesthetical, we do not refer to our purely intel- 
lectual activities ; it indicates a state which no amount 
of mere theoretical contemplation and no mere volition 
can express. 

^Esthetics can be placed under the general head of 
values. In this point of view it considers the subjective 
significance of a certain class of emotions and of the 
objects which excite them. By this method of classifi- 
cation we should have to include under values aesthetics 
and ethics, both beauty and right having worth for our 
feelings. The prominence given by Herbart and Lotze 
to this view of the subject makes us feel more deeply 
the need of a general theory of the feelings, and particu- 
larly their consideration in the light of values. Such 
a theory would indicate the relation of both aesthetics 
and ethics to our emotional nature. But even if such 
a theory were completed, it would not include both sub- 
jects under emotions in the same sense or degree, since 
in ethics the feeling is not the essence, as in sesthetics, 
but conduct or the will is the controlling factor. 

In thus giving aesthetics a peculiar relation to the 
emotions, we, of course, do not so isolate it as to make 
it independent of our other mental operations ; we 
only indicate its general psychological sphere. In the 
division of the emotions into those of pleasure and 



ESTHETICS. 211 

displeasure, beauty is included under the former. Amid 
the prevailing indefiniteness, it is, however, frequently 
confounded with the agreeable, without indicating its 
peculiar pleasurable elements. The sharp analysis of 
the emotions, — an analysis psychological in character, 
and yet essential as a basis for philosophical treatment, 
— which determines the exact quality of beauty, is too 
much neglected. Many things please, and are pro- 
nounced agreeable or interesting, which we do not term 
beautiful. A companion may have all these qualities 
without any claim to beauty. Pleasurable impressions 
may be received through any sense, but only from the 
higher do we receive impressions of beauty. When 
Burke speaks of this impression as obtained also through 
low r er senses, he confounds the beautiful and the pleas- 
urable. 

The emotion of the beautiful is not to be classed with 
animal passion, though this emotion may become so 
strong that we can speak of a passion for the beautiful. 
This emotion cannot, however, be put on the ordinary 
level of mere gratification. There is in beauty an intel- 
lectual element which exalts it far above mere sen- 
tiency ; and we can call it an intellectual emotion or a 
sentiment, in which there is a union of intellectual and. 
emotional factors. 

^Esthetic pleasure springs directly from the beholding 
of the beautiful object. The beauty strikes us at once, 
though continued and absorbing contemplation may be 
necessary for its full appreciation. The immediate, in- 
tuitive element makes its effect akin to inspiration, and 
gives beauty the character of a percept rather than of 
a concept. If the soul is absorbed by mere reflection 
on beauty, without permitting a re-action of the feelings, 
the impression itself is weakened, or perhaps wholly 



278 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILO SOPHY. 

obliterated. Neither the possession of an object, nor 
reflection on its use, increases its beauty : this being in- 
dependent of all extraneous circumstances.* Tt is also 
different in character from the ethical, which involves 
duty, implies choice, and cannot be appreciated unless 
it is regarded as involving freedom. Beauty is sponta- 
neous ; it is simply beautiful, and nothing more. Thus, 
in contemplating the highest works of art, we do not 
lose ourselves in considering their purpose : to do so 
would substitute reflection for the impression. On the 
other hand, the emotion must not be disturbed by the 
conviction that the purpose of the artist was not accom- 
plished. The art must be such that all reflection, con- 
sciously or unconsciously, heightens the impression. 
Our consciousness is so limited that it carries on but 
one main process at a time, to which all else becomes 
tributary. The more absorbing and intense an emo- 
tion, the less room for reflection. 

The reason why beauty pleases may be as difficult as 
the question why certain things are agreeable to the 
palate. Taste, whether used figuratively or literally, 
is hard to explain. When we affirm that beauty pleases 
for its own sake, we mean that its value to the mind 
consists in its direct contemplation, not in the fact 
that it gratifies an appetite or any animal craving, nor 
because it involves an imperative. But by thus giving 
it the immediateness of intuition, we only indicate the 
more clearly that it must have its basis in the soul 
itself. The capacity, at least, must be innate ; which, 
of course, does not imply that the taste is not suscepti- 
ble of cultivation, or that it must, in every respect, be 
the same in all persons. Its ground is innate, as much 

* In his Kritik of the .hidr/ment, Kant particularly emphasizes the 
fact, that the mere contemplation of an ohject produces the impression. 



ESTHETICS. 279 

so as the power to think and choose, so that we can say 
that the conditions of the beautiful are found in 'all 
men. The same is true of reason, though considerable 
mental development is required before its exercise by 
the child. The taste for the beautiful, like reason, is, 
in a certain sense, the same in all men, and 3-et may be 
differently developed and exercised. Just because it is 
innate, — say as ability, or instinct, or as a germ, — and 
so far the same in all, we can give laws for the appre- 
ciation of the beautiful, and rules of taste and criti- 
cism ; and just because so much of the individual 
appreciation depends on the degree of culture, the stage 
of civilization, the training and the surroundings, — all 
variable elements, — we find that there are different 
views of beauty. In all such cases we must distin- 
guish between the rational or essential element, which 
is necessary and universal, and the accidental, which is 
local and temporal. Persons may be in such a state as 
not to be able to appreciate the beautiful, but that does 
not prove that there is no beauty. At different times 
there have been different standards of right : that, how- 
ever, does not prove that there is no absolute standard, 
but only that the standard adopted ma}^ be false. The 
same is true respecting beauty. With the same sur- 
roundings and the same degree of culture, there will 
also be agreement respecting the essentials of beauty, 
thus giving its laws objective reality, and making 
aesthetics possible. 

In vindicating for the beautiful the same eternal 
basis as for the true and the good, we cannot ignore the 
fact that the opinions respecting aesthetics differ greatly. 
This is partly owing to the fact that the subject, the 
newest department of philosophy, is but imperfectly 
developed; partly to inherent difficulties. Persons may 



280 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

imagine that they differ respecting the beautiful, when 
they judge only respecting the agreeable, which depends 
so largely on subjective conditions. While beauty 
always pleases, we do not always discern between the 
beauty and other characteristics which please. In the 
same individual the taste may vary at different times. 
We are continually cultivating our souls, but are by no 
means fully conscious of the process or its results ; 
perhaps the most marked effect of the development is 
on the unconscious basis and background of our con- 
scious activity. We may, therefore, know what pleases 
us, though unable to give the reason for the pleasure. 
Indeed, the pleasure itself is apt to be so engrossing as 
to leave no inclination to enter upon reflections respect- 
ing its nature ; and we usually pronounce an object 
pleasing or beautiful, without even attempting an 
analysis of its pleasing or beautiful qualities. 

Modern German writers, especially in Hegel's school, 
have made much of the union of the idea with its sen- 
sible symbol as the essential element of beauty. Thus 
in art, an object is regarded as beautiful in proportion 
as it embodies and realizes an idea or ideal. 25 That cer- 
tain ideals consciously or unconsciously form our stand- 
ards of taste, is no doubt true. These standards or 
norms may change with our culture ; but we cannot 
arbitrarily determine them, they must have their basis 
in necessary laws. They are always in the mind, and 
active there, though we may not be aware of their exist- 
ence. The fancy is continually cultivated, and uncon- 
sciously determines the manifestations of taste as they 
appear in consciousness. There are no doubt numerous 
operations below consciousness whose influence is made 
manifest in impressions of pleasure and displeasure. 
The fancy darkly throws its spell over an object, and 



ESTHETICS. 281 

heightens its beauty, we know not how. The object 
itself may be viewed in the light of a symbol, and is, 
perhaps, seen rather in what it suggests than really is. 
It thus becomes the occasion for fancy to exercise its 
creative power, and to put into the object its own ideal 
forms. Those who lack fancy, prosaic natures living 
wholly in matters of fact, of course fail to appreciate 
the most exquisite beauty. Those subtile elements 
which are indescribable, but appeal directly, instinc- 
tively as it were, to the soul, and form the essence of 
beauty, escape their notice. There are many who cannot 
appreciate the beauty of Raphael's Madonnas, because 
they do not see the ideas veiled in or shining through 
them : they see the pictures, but not what they repre- 
sent. 

This intellectual element in beauty, exercised con- 
sciously or unconsciously, raises it far above the im- 
pressions which come through the lower senses. More 
intellect enters into the appreciation of a beautiful 
landscape than into the pleasures of a meal, though we 
may be as little conscious of thought in the one as in 
the other. Beauty comes without effort, and suggests 
none : it simply presents beauty, and that intuitively. 
In contemplating it the soul has the standard of beauty 
in itself; indeed, it may be said to see with this stand- 
ard, and to apprehend immediately the agreement or dis- 
agreement of an object with this norm. In all aesthetic 
appreciation an intellectual perception of harmony is 
mirrored in the emotion of the beautiful. While in the 
domain of logic, as well as of ethics, the soul labors, 
being impelled by the necessity of truth or the ought 
of duty, in aesthetics it is free, controlled only by its 
own impulses. This freedom is play for the spirit, the 
paradise of the most delightful spontaneity. This is 



282 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the domain in which genius revels and creates, because 
it cannot do otherwise. Just because it is play, the 
contemplation of beauty is not the business of life, but 
its relaxation and recreation. It is accessory to life, 
rather than its substance ; and he who makes it his 
mission to behold only beauty, cannot hope to drift into 
the higher realms of truth and duty. Indeed, the con- 
templation of nothing but beauty, at last wearies and 
enervates. That its admiration is not devotion to the 
good, and that the substitution of aesthetics for ethics 
as the rule of life is not an exaltation of character, is 
proved by numerous examples of genius, — artists, musi- 
cians, and poets. We must distinguish between the 
adornment of life, and that life itself which is to be 
adorned. It is with beauty pursued for its own sake as 
life's highest calling, as with pleasure: it cannot satisfy. 
As the sole object sought in marriage, beauty soon loses 
its charm ; or, rather, other considerations interfere with 
its appreciation. The speech whose essence is its adorn- 
ment soon wearies, and is pronounced insipid. We pity 
the man who cannot leave his diamonds for fear they 
might be stolen, — pity him even if a duke. But in its 
proper place, aesthetics exalts the soul above life's vulgar 
associations, to the contemplation of its own ideals, and 
receives inspiration even from ethics. If our ideas are 
expressed at all, they ought to be expressed in the most 
perfect form. 

But is beauty when ascribed to objects mere form ? 
Is it never the substance, but merely something acces- 
sory? The question involves the extremely difficult 
concepts of substance and form, and of their relation. 
When we speak of a soul, a character, or an idea, as 
beautiful, the language implies that beauty is more 
than a form. Aside from the more purely intellectual 



ESTHETICS. 283 

objects of beauty (ideas, poetry), we are, however, jus- 
tified in attributing the beautiful to the form ; but this 
form must always be conceived as the form of some- 
thing, so that it is never any thing of itself. In this 
sense we can speak of form as constituting beauty in 
painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. Is it not 
likewise the case with beauty in nature? The same 
face may be beautiful in repose, and ugly when dis- 
torted ; in which case there is evidently no change of 
substance except in its form. It is the harmonious 
arrangement of colors or of sounds which we pronounce 
beautiful. The highest truth may be expressed in an 
abstract form, which can lay no claim to beauty, and 
the deed prompted by the noblest impulse may be done 
awkwardly ; but when something in itself worthy is 
expressed or embodied in the manner most in harmony 
with the object, and most pleasing to the spirit, so that 
this recognizes its own ideals in the form, we have 
beauty. Besides the love of truth and goodness, an 
appeal is thus made to the imagination. 

The general term " form " is a mere abstraction, while 
the realm of beauty is in the concrete. In every beau- 
tiful object the form is definite, as well as the form of 
some substance : it is always a particular form. We 
must therefore regard beauty as form, not as separated 
from the substance, but as that substance itself in a 
certain stage of perfection. And those substances 
which are capable of the most perfect form are the ones 
susceptible of greatest beauty. 

Just as we cannot separate quality from the thing in 
which it inheres, so it is with form and . substance. 
Indeed, we can say that beauty is a certain quality in 
objects ; and the term " quality " expresses the general 
nature of beauty better than the term " form," particu- 



284 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

laxly when we speak of beauty in ideas, in poetry, and 
generally in intellectual elements. 

We thus find the sensible and the rational, the sub- 
stance and the form, harmoniously blended in the beau- 
tiful. Idealists are apt to see the aesthetic element too 
exclusively in the idea, while empiricists and sensualists 
see it too exclusively in the external forms which excite 
the emotion. The latter is seen especially in English 
writers on the subject. Empiricists are also apt to de- 
grade it to the level of sense impressions, and to over- 
look the associated intellectual elements. Instead of 
this one-sided view, whether too exclusively idea or 
sense, we have in the contemplation of the beautiful a 
union and concentration of all the powers, but in an 
unrestrained manner. In the most beautiful objects 
the soul sees itself at its best. Beauty interprets the 
soul's mysterious longings and aspirations. The person- 
ality finds itself in the beautiful, and puts itself into it. 
The soul is interpreted in the form, and recognizes it as 
its appropriate body. In beauty there is something 
peculiarly human and soulful ; it is the mirror of the 
spirit's ideals. 

In the preceding, reference has been made repeatedly 
to beauty in objects. This will not be misunderstood 
if it is remembered that the meaning is, that there is 
something in them which excites the emotion of beauty. 
Things are not beautiful in the sense in which they 
have forces or are extended. The forces work, whether 
seen or not ; but there is no beauty where there is no 
contemplating mind. It is not a force ; it is not in 
objects any more than there is thought in them. But 
objects may be the occasion of that emotion, and we 
want to learn what it is that excites the emotion. 

To determine what is called beauty in objects, consti- 



AESTHETICS. 285 

tutes the aim of aesthetic criticism, and is an exercise of 
the judgment. There may be taste without criticism, 
because that taste acts unconsciously, immediately, be- 
ing itself unaware, as a rule, of its principles of action. 
In criticism we seek the laws which determine its 
activity ; we want to make the taste conscious of itself. 

Beauty in objects is divided into the beautiful in 
nature and in art. The beautiful objects are numerous 
and widely different, the essential elements of beauty 
being the unity in the infinite variety. However abso- 
lute the aesthetic norms may be, their application in 
criticism depends very materially on our subjective 
state, as is evident from our different judgments at 
different times respecting the same object. There may 
be disturbing influences which interfere materially with 
the purity of the judgment. However beautiful an ob- 
ject seen alone, when very common it may fail to excite 
any emotion. The surrounding of things, or their set- 
ting, has much influence on their effect : a fact the more 
easily understood when it is remembered that beauty is 
essentially an order, arrangement, form, not the sub- 
stance by itself. A beautiful woman among many plain 
ones makes a deeper impression than among a thousand 
equally beautiful. She is as beautiful in herself in one 
case as in the other ; but the frame or setting differs, 
in one instance the power of contrast being absent. 
It is always necessary to distinguish between beauty 
in objects, and the psychological conditions for its 
appreciation. 

An ideal, when embodied either in nature or in a work 
of art, is the concrete form of an abstract idea : it is an 
individual object in which the general idea is realized. 
The ideal woman is a specimen of the idea of woman- 
hood, and the soul finds every thing beautiful in which 



236 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

it discovers the ideal of its idea of perfection. Hence 
Hegel defines beauty as " the sensible manifestation of the. 
idea." * Not the marble, as marble, is beautiful, but 
the marble with a certain form, so that the suggestion is 
not that of marble, but of some mental idea. But as 
the mind must at times be aroused in order to discover the 
thoughts hidden in nature, so it may have to be awak- 
ened to full consciousness in order to discover the ideals 
veiled in objects of beauty. When some other faculty 
is predominantly active, the fancy may not be able to 
throw its spell over an object, or to follow the sugges- 
tions hinted at. The spirit must freely lose itself in the 
contemplation of beauty if the aesthetic emotion is to 
prevail. There are in music no charms unless the soul's 
dream of harmony, of unity, and of sweetness is realized 
in the sounds : a scientific analysis of the notes destroys 
the beauty. Even if we adopt Wagner's theory that all 
thoughts can be expressed in sound, we must admit that 
we are neither able to find sounds for all concepts, nor 
to interpret the meaning of all sounds. Music appeals 
to the emotions, and it is impossible to interpret it as if 
every sound had a definite sense. It may be full of 
ideas, but they are in the form of emotions : it is thought 
struggling through sound and entangled in feeling. For 
the appreciation of music, the mood of the spirit is, 
consequently, of special significance. The charm of a 
symphony may consist chiefly in what of memory, or 
aspiration, or prophecy the imagination interprets into 
it. Night, stillness, moonlight, water, the historic asso- 
ciations of a place, the poetry or romance thrown over 
a scene, have much to do with the effect of a melody. 
As Kant observes, the nightingale heard in the dark 
forest makes a different impression from the perfectly 
* " Das sinnliche Scheincn der Idee." 



ESTHETICS. 287 

imitated sounds when the fact of the imitation is known. 
The same is true of beauty in visible objects : its effect 
is due to our own ideas and associations. Symmetry 
and harmony, the agreeable blending of colors, the unity 
in variety, are of themselves not enough to constitute 
beauty : they must somehow excite the fancy, and allure 
the soul to attach its ideals to them. The object must 
not overwhelm the imagination, but give it opportunity 
for free and full play. If it overwhelms or stuns, the 
emotion is that of the sublime. This includes all that 
suggests the incomprehensible and the infinite. Hence 
the awe it excites. In the stormy ocean, in the vast 
expanse of the starry heavens, and in the high moun- 
tain, there is more than the mind can grasp. But while 
the mind is overwhelmed by sublimity, and is lost in the 
very effort to find itself, it is at home in beauty, and 
finds itself in the contemplation. The realm of the 
beautiful lies between the neat and the sublime. 

The fact that our first aesthetic impressions are some- 
times reversed, particularly respecting persons, is no 
argument against the immediateness of beauty. The 
change may not be a reversal of opinion respecting the 
same elements, but is, perhaps, owing to the discovery 
of something hidden before. Thus the charm in the 
expression of sentiment and in the varied play of fea- 
tures may be discovered only on nearer acquaintance. 
Grace of motion and poetic beauty of mind transcend 
the attraction of mere regularity or symmetry of fea- 
tures, or may amply compensate for their absence. 

While the contemplation of beauty opens to us the 
whole domain of nature as well as of art, its production, 
of course, limits us wholly to the consideration of the 
latter. Is art an imitation of nature ? Does it surpass 
nature? These are old questions, and will probably 



288 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

cause discussion in the future as in the past ; but they 
are really irrelevant, for as they stand they can be 
answered both affirmatively and negatively. However 
much the mind may depend on nature for the means of 
culture, its norms of beauty must be found in its own 
ideals. In producing these ideals, the external or natu- 
ral element is a factor, and it would be erroneous to 
pronounce them otherwise than potentially innate. If 
art aims, in some instances, at a perfect imitation of 
nature, that does not circumscribe its limits: it may 
also produce what can nowhere be found in nature, 
putting in one object an assemblage of graces or excel- 
lences which are not found in such perfection in any 
real object. Here comes the distinction between the 
ideal and the real. The mind has its own standard of 
beauty. Suggestions, hints, and various aids may be 
given by external nature ; but these can never do more 
than develop a power already in the mind. The highest 
art is not imitative, but the product of genius, which 
is a law unto itself. In a certain sense, all true art is 
natural. The laws of nature are simply the laws of 
our own minds ; hence the creations of the mind that 
follow its own laws are in harmony with the laws of 
nature. The unnatural in art is objectionable, because 
it violates the laws of mind. But art, while natural in 
the sense of being in harmony with natural and mental 
laws, is not limited to the objects of nature, but pro- 
duces ideals not found in nature, and yet doing no 
violence to it. These ideals fulfil what is given in 
nature only in the form of types and prophecies. The 
ideal man is not found in reality, but he is not un- 
natural; indeed, we do not hesitate to pronounce him 
the only true man. In its relation to nature, art is the 
ideal perfection of hints discovered therein. We thus 



ESTHETICS. 289 

vindicate for art a sphere for creative energy. Its 
greatest productions transcend nature, just as mind 
does. This is true of the great works of art, from the 
masterpieces of Greek genius down to Thorwaldsen. 
Nature must be reflected in the highest creations, other- 
wise they are abortions ; but the mind must be their 
soul, otherwise they are not creations. In art the mind 
rises in a peculiar sense into its own element ; and in 
its harmony with nature, which is nevertheless a con- 
trast, it can be original. It is as vain to hunt for 
Guido's Aurora in nature as to search for Milton's 
descriptions in history. So exalted is the true artist 
that we never think of classing him with the mechani- 
cal imitator or the slavish copyist. His art expresses 
nature, but it is his nature. 

The term " fine arts " does not really express what 
is intended to be designated. The term " useful arts " 
shows the aim of the objects included; and when we 
contrast fine arts therewith, we expect the adjective to 
be the counterpart of " useful." Why may not the use- 
ful arts also be fine? It would be no improvement to 
substitute "beautiful" for "fine," since in the arts 
thereby designated there is much that can be termed 
neither beautiful nor fine. They would be more fully 
designated by calling them represeMtative arts ; their aim 
being to represent some object or ideal, and their value 
consisting in this representative element. Or they 
might be called contemplative arts, to indicate their 
purpose as intended solely for contemplation. 

In all the arts called fine, there may be many things 
which increase the interest without heightening the 
beauty. Sometimes the accessories to beauty, or the 
associated considerations, are very prominent, and at 
times something else than beautj^ is the chief aim of the 



290 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

artist. Thus the value of a picture may consist in the 
truthfulness with which it represents an object or his- 
torical scene. While the Laocoon was evidently in- 
tended not to offend the taste, mere beauty was certainly 
not its main object. It is probably an effort to put a 
description into marble, and the artist wanted to make 
it as true as possible to the description, or to the idea 
to be represented. One need but study the best gal- 
leries to learn how small a proportion of the art makes 
beauty its sole aim ; very frequently it is only accessory 
to some other aim of the artist. The Greeks were 
especially successful in making their art the embodi- 
ment of particular ideas. In their statues of the gods, 
as Jupiter, Mercury, Minerva, Venus, some special 
characteristic is to be represented. The exact represen- 
tation of that idea is the aim ; but this is to be done as 
perfectly as possible, and it is in this perfection that the 
beauty is to be found. The beautiful is intended to 
bring out the truth, or the idea, in the best manner. 
In many works of art, beauty is, therefore, merely 
incidental, not the first aim. Where the direct aim, it 
must of course appear as the representation of a con- 
cept which is in itself pleasing. If Satan is represented 
as beautiful, it must be at the expense of truth. Much 
of Michael Angelo's Last Judgment is so full of horror 
as to suppress the emotion of the beautiful. 

Some regard the characteristic, the peculiar, and the 
individual as the essential element of beauty in art. 
Artists have peculiarities, and the works of a master or 
even of a school may be recognized by certain charac- 
teristics of style. Generally it is easy to pick out the 
works of Titian, Rembrandt, and Rubens in a gallery. 
However broad and varied an artist's range of subjects, 
in all of them the characteristic marks of his mind and 



AESTHETICS. 291 

skill must appear : he cannot deny himself in his works. 
Perhaps his most marked peculiarity is a mere manner-' 
ism. Its originality may make it interesting, or there 
may be other qualities which commend it ; but in itself, - 
as a mere mannerism, it is a defect. This becomes 
evident so soon as it is imitated ; and it is most likely 
to be imitated just because it is individual and striking. 
Hegel, in distinction from what is peculiar, emphasized 
the rational and universal in art. He viewed objects as 
defective in proportion as they are peculiar, but perfect 
in proportion as they are universal. That is not beauty 
which pleases me only, but which commends itself as 
beautiful to all capable of its appreciation. The more 
art accordingly rises above the individual and peculiar 
— above mannerism especially — into the rational and 
universal, the more perfect it becomes, because the 
more ideal. But while this is true, there need be no 
irreconcilable conflict between the characteristic and the 
universal. That which is not a characteristic (manner- 
ism) of an artist, but a peculiarity or characteristic of 
the object represented, becomes a source of beauty in 
proportion as it is brought out properly. An ideal has 
characteristic elements which distinguish it from all 
other ideals; and it cannot be represented correctly 
without those elements. If female beauty is to be 
painted, that which distinguishes it from all other 
beauty must be brought out ; the elaborate details of 
dress become offensive if they hide the loveliness of the 
face, or receive more attention than the characteristics 
of female beauty. If the frame is more beautiful than 
the picture, the artist's aim is defeated. A discord is 
in itself always disagreeable ; but if it serves to bring 
out more fully any characteristic harmony, it has an 
aesthetic value ; it heightens the impression of beauty. 



292 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

This is, it seems to me, the true place of the charac- 
teristic in art : it is an excellence so far as it heightens 
what constitutes the essence of beauty in an object. In 
this sense the characteristic is co-extensive with the 
ideal, and is in reality universal, while mannerism de- 
tracts from the ideal in that it attracts the attention 
from ideals themselves to the peculiarities of the artist. 
Raphael's ideals of beauty have merely psychological or 
historical interest, except so far as they approach the 
universal ideals. When we find that in his pictures of 
the Infant Christ and the Virgin Mary he makes every 
thing tend to present what is most characteristic in the 
beauty of the objects represented, we admire the charac- 
teristic just because it is universal. He makes the 
characteristic of beuaty itself his peculiarity, so as to 
exalt his individual taste to that of the universal con- 
sciousness. That characteristic in art is valuable which 
represents a universal ideal. This is the harmony be- 
tween the characteristic and the universal, — it is a 
universal characteristic. 

These general remarks are only intended as an intro- 
duction to the central thought of aesthetics. Details 
are of course out of the question. Numerous subjects 
grouped around the centre must be omitted ; their treat- 
ment belongs to works on aesthetics. The student will 
soon find, that, much as has been written on this branch 
of philosophy, much more remains to be done. The 
agreeable, the sublime, the tragic, the comical, and re- 
lated subjects, need careful consideration, as well as 
beauty itself. The theme is fruitful and fascinating; 
but its proper treatment requires a union of qualities 
rarely found in one man. It still waits for its master. 

Besides the general work yet to be done in deter- 
mining the nature of beauty and its relations, much also 



ESTHETICS. 293 

remains to be determined respecting the several arts. 
"But comparatively little has been done in a purely 
scientific manner to determine the nature and functions 
of art so as to fix the relations of the different arts to 
simple or natural beauty. . . . There seems even now 
no consensus of opinion as to the precise aims of art, 
how far it has simply to reproduce and constructively 
vary the beauties of nature, or how far to seek modes 
of pleasurable effect wider than those supplied by 
natural objects. A theory of art at all comparable in 
scientific precision to existing theories of morals has yet 
to be constructed. The few attempts to establish a 
basis for art of a non-metaphysical kind are charac- 
terized by great one-sidedness." * There is not even 
agreement as to the division of the representative arts. 
Architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry are 
the main divisions ; but this classification is not com- 
plete.! Shall rhetoric be added ? There may be beauty 
in gardening, in furniture, in dress, in oratory, in style. 
It will not do to dismiss these with the statement that 
in them beauty is not the sole or main object ; neither 
is that always the case in the divisions given above. 
How about theatrical and operatic representations? 
The most complete union of all the arts is found in the 
opera, with its poetry, music, acting, and scenic effects, 

* Ency. Brit. 

t Cousin divides the arts into "two great classes: arts addressed to 
hearing, arts addressed to sight; on the one hand, music and poetry; on 
the other, painting, with engraving, sculpture, architecture, gardening." 
1G7. This division according to the senses addressed seems to he too 
external. Is there no internal relation hetween the arts themselves 
to determine their connection and division? 

Schasler also divides the fine arts into two classes, namely those 
viewed simultaneously and those A'iewed successively. Under the first 
head he places architecture, sculpture, and painting; under the second, 
music, mimicry (pantomine), and poetry. 



294 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

giving opportunity to introduce all the departments of 
art. This variety, with an idea as the bond of union in 
the various elements, adds much to the attractiveness 
of the opera. But, at the same time, the opera is un- 
natural, and this mars its beauty ; it is art that is not 
true, and this makes it artificial. The opera wants to 
represent life, but in life comedies and tragedies are not 
sung, and men do not die with an orchestral accompani- 
ment. The opera is not the perfection of the real, nor 
the ideal fulfilment of any prophecy veiled in life. The 
charm of music in the opera, which gives it the advan- 
tage over the drama, is also, as far as nature is con- 
cerned, its disadvantage. One must often suppress 
reflection if the most touching scenes are not to become 
supremely ludicrous. Art, whose essence is truth, may 
be developed into harmony with nature ; but if its 
essence is or contains a falsehood, it never can harmonize 
with nature or with an ideal. The opera contains the 
elements of destruction in itself; and, to say the least, it 
is very doubtful whether a cultivated taste can perma- 
nently endure any thing so thoroughly artificial. No 
doubt every sentiment and emotion may somehow be 
expressed or interpreted in sound ; but to sing the most 
trivial and the most solemn emotions and descriptions, 
— to sing household affairs, mechanical labor, historic 
scenes, remorse, all that pertains to life and death, to 
self and the worLd, — is ridiculous. It turns tragedy 
into comedy, and life into caricature. And the time 
may yet come when the degree of true culture attained 
by certain ages will be estimated by their enthusiasm 
for the opera. The proper sphere of the opera is in 
romance rather than real life. 

^Esthetics as accessory to life and thought, not their 
essence, is subordinate. As such its value is, however, 



ESTHETICS. 295 

very great. Its mission is to bring to the most pleasing 
perfection something really worthy of supreme excel- 
lence. Art is degraded whenever it represents a debas- 
ing object as pure, beautiful, and attractive. To pursue 
beauty — a pure abstraction — for its own sake, instead 
of something really valuable which deserves to be made 
beautiful, is a perversion of life and its functions, and 
must be placed among the aberrations of the mind. 
To put the fanciful and imaginative in place of the real, 
is a species of insanity. 

The ethical element in aesthetics deserves more at- 
tention, not merely for the sake of ethics, but also of 
aesthetics. Numerous tendencies in art prove this, and 
the claim has actually been made that aesthetics is inde- 
pendent of moral considerations. It has been tacitly 
held, and also publicly proclaimed, that artists are not 
to be judged by the same moral standards as humanity 
at large. Such views are destructive both of aesthetic 
and of moral health. 

But in its proper place aesthetics cannot be too highly 
prized. Thus the soul, life, ethics, religion, worship, 
and all that is noble, may be developed to perfection 
and become beautiful. Not by assigning to beauty 
a fictitious realm by itself, but by putting it into true 
and organic connection with ethics, does it obtain a 
worthy mission. We want to develop to beautiful per- 
fection the substance found in metaphysics, the thought 
found in noetics, and the right discovered in ethics. 



The student will probably find peculiar difficulty in 
determining exactly the nature and sphere of aesthetics. 
In the current literature on the subject he will be struck 
more by the multitude of details than by the precision 



296 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

and definiteness of the discussion. ^Esthetics is still 
in its preparatory stage ; the discussion is tentative, 
materials are gathered, and classifications are made. 
But the time for synthesis into a compact, completely 
rounded, and sharply limited system has not yet come. 

After the preceding general consideration of the 
subject, the student's attention is now directed to two 
points as especially worthy of consideration, both for 
the sake of obtaining clearness, and a basis for future 
progress. These two points are : the determination of 
the exact sphere of the aesthetic emotion, and the ex- 
planation of the conditions of aesthetic appreciation. A 
careful consideration of these points will lead into the 
very heart of the subject, and will concentrate attention 
on what is most essential in aesthetic theory. 

First, then, Wliat is the sphere of the cesthetie emo- 
tions ? 

The very question implies that there is in these emo- 
tions something which constitutes them a peculiar class. 
What now is it that makes them peculiar ? What are 
the characteristic marks of what we term the aesthetical ? 
Evidently we make a mistake if we treat beauty as the 
characteristic mark of the aesthetic. That beauty does 
not exhaust the sphere whose limits we are seeking, is 
tacitly admitted by all writers on aesthetics when they 
draw so many other subjects into the discussion. Thus, 
in considering the representative arts, they cannot con- 
fine attention to beauty, that being but one of many 
elements entering into those arts. ^Esthetics as the 
theory of these arts must necessarily include all per- 
taining to them, while beauty alone leaves much in 
them unexplained. But the sublime, the tragic, the 
comical, are usually treated as also belonging to aes- 
thetics, — surely sufficient proof that there is a large 



AESTHETICS. 297 

class of objects having in common what is called aes- 
thetical, and that of these objects beauty forms but a 
part, not the whole. We must thus try to discover 
what beauty and these allied subjects have in common 
to constitute them aesthetical. 

That aesthetics lies in the domain of the agreeable, is 
universally admitted. Thus, whatever its source may 
be, the aesthetic effect is always pleasing. Even when 
the subject is tragic, it must be so presented as to be 
fascinating. But the peculiarity of the pleasure in 
such cases has not been clearly defined ; and for this 
reason the aesthetic element in agreeable objects has 
often been confounded with the agreeable in general. 
It is of first importance, therefore, to seek the charac- 
teristic mark of the pleasing element in aesthetics. 

We have already seen that whatever is low or merely 
sensual is not aesthetic. The vulgar does not belong to 
the sphere we are seeking. The same is true of all that 
does not rise above the limits of mere sense-impressions 
into the sphere of the intellect. Likewise the impres- 
sions through the lower senses are excluded ; they do 
not furnish material for such intellections as are required 
in aesthetics. Taste, smell, touch, and the organic sen- 
sations are too grossly real, too directly adherent to the 
material, to admit of the spiritualization found in aesthetic 
concepts. Sight and hearing are more intellectual, the 
media through which they are excited are more refined, 
their spheres are more exalted ; and, while less domi- 
neered by gross matter, they are more free for intellect- 
ual play. The very extent of the spheres of these two 
senses suggests a certain degree of freedom ; while the 
others move in a small sphere, and are severely limited. 
The higher senses give immediate play to the intellect, 
while what the other senses present must be dropped 



298 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

before such play is possible. The latter are therefore 
properly called the lower senses, and are the conditions 
for the lower pleasures of life, while the others are higher 
in the intellectual scale, and furnish material for aesthet- 
ics. Whatever is aesthetic must transcend the vulgarly 
or physically agreeable, such as the pleasures of appe- 
tite, and must rise into the sphere of intellectual con- 
templation. The aesthetic emotions consequently imply 
a certain degree of intellectual development, and also 
culture and refinement. The aesthetic element in Plato's 
"Symposium" consists in the intellectual, not in the 
gustatory, feast. 

Having now risen to the agreeable as a mental qual- 
ity, and having taken aesthetics out of the realm of 
vulgar pleasures, it remains to determine its exact place 
among refined gratifications. The question is, What is 
the intellectual character of aesthetic pleasures, or what 
peculiarity in our intellectual operations constitutes the 
charm of aesthetics ? 

All aesthetic pleasures are, of course, subjective, but 
they are not personal ; that is, they do not spring from 
the fact that on me, as an individual, any benefit has 
been conferred. What is purely personal and exclusive, 
pertaining to me only, and of interest only to me, is 
excluded from aesthetics. There is thus nothing selfish 
in it. The joy that springs from an acquisition of for- 
tune or of honor is no more aesthetic than is the taste of 
a savory meal. Neither is a tragedy in real life aesthetic. 
This gives an important hint as to the place of aesthetic 
emotion ; it is not found in any natural affection, nor in 
any real experience. Joy and sorrow occasioned by real 
personal affections are not in the sphere of aesthetics. 

Nor is the purely intellectual element, intent only on 
truth and understanding, the sphere of aesthetics. This 






^ESTHETICS. 299 

excludes mathematics, logic, and science. However 
great the pleasure connected with the discovery of 
truth, the demonstration and judgment of truth do not 
constitute the essence of aesthetics. That these may be 
the occasion of aesthetic emotions, is not questioned, but 
from them these emotions do not spring directly. 

It is thus evident that the real alone does not consti- 
tute the sphere we are considering. It must be some 
particular aspect of the real, or some relation it sustains 
to the intellect, or some notion or suggestion of the real. 
Thus the mere reality of a flower, or the science of that 
flower, or the fact that edible fruit will grow from the 
flower, has no aesthetic significance. For the cow that 
eats it, but not for the artist, the mere reality of the 
flower is the only consideration. That nevertheless 
truth and reality, particularly in the form of ideals, are 
essential to genuine aesthetics, has already been suffi- 
ciently indicated. 

The entire discussion forces us to regard the imagin- 
ation as the sphere of the aesthetic emotion. Not the 
logical inferences from the real and from truth consti- 
tute aesthetics, but what the mind in its free play, accord- 
ing to the laws of possibility, makes of them. The 
combinations and creations in aesthetics must be true 
(according to rational principles) while free. Thus the 
imagination is not wild, not a lawless fancy, and its 
products are not monstrosities, but it works within the 
domain of reason. All its productions, if aesthetic, have, 
however, a relation to our emotional nature ; their appeal 
to the soul is responded to by a feeling of pleasure. 

The imagination deals with the real in a representa- 
tive manner, and this representative element is charac- 
teristic of all aesthetic objects. Not, then, what an object 
is in itself, but what it represents, what it is in point 



300 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of suggestiveness, makes it aesthetic. The mere -fact of 
brilliancy, no more than its carbon, makes the diamond 
an aesthetic object ; that fact may be made simply the 
occasion of scientific inquiry, without an appeal to 
the emotions. So a real sorrow is simply sorrow, but its 
representation or description may be aesthetic. See the 
storm with King Lear ! Suffering itself is painful ; yet 
its description is not only free from actual suffering, but 
may also be very fascinating. So the descriptions of 
pleasure may, by means of representative elements, pro- 
duce aesthetic effects. Thus, in what are termed beauti- 
ful arts, the effect depends on what they suggest, on 
what they represent, and on the manner of the represen- 
tation. In thus transferring the sphere of the aesthetic 
emotions from the real to the representative, we find 
the interpretation of the conspicuous part played in 
aesthetics by symbolism. 

The representative element in art will readily be 
admitted, but its existence in natural objects termed 
beautiful may not be so evident. This may be a reason 
why aesthetics has by some writers been limited to art, 
while the beauty in nature has been excluded. But a 
careful study of the aesthetic effects of natural objects 
will also prove that these effects depend on representa- 
tive elements. Thus no natural object has an aesthetic 
significance if beyond its bare reality it has no sugges- 
tions or inspiration, for the mind. A landscape viewed 
merely as so much nature, or as of certain utility, has 
no aesthetic value. But when, aside from its utility and 
science, nature appeals to the imagination, it may have 
aesthetic effects. A mouse may be one thing to the 
peasant, and something very different to the poet 
Burns ; yet its bare reality may be to either of less 
significance than to a cat. It is thus evident that the 



ESTHETICS. 301 

aesthetic effect depends in every instance on what the 
mind associates with an object, or on what the imagin- 
ation interprets into an object or constructs from it. 
Not the little faded flower is charming, but the withered 
hopes it symbolizes make it so attractive. 

The discussion of the sphere of the aesthetic emotions 
has already led us to the second point, which we must 
now consider more fully; namely, the conditions of 
cesthetic aj^preciation. 

The consideration of this point confirms in a remark- 
able degree the correctness of the indicated sphere of 
the aesthetic emotions. We do not look for aesthetic 
appreciation where the training has been merely utilis- 
tic or scientific ; how, then,- is it obtained ? 

This appreciation is only possible when we rise above 
the naturalistic and realistic standpoint, into the realm 
where the imagination moves amid symbols and repre- 
sentations, and is free to form its own constructions. 
^Esthetic appreciation thus depends on a peculiar kind 
of culture, — a culture in the discernment of the repre- 
sentative element in objects, and also a culture of the 
feelings which respond to this element. All other 
things being equal, the minds richest in suggestiveness 
(minds called by the Germans geistreicli) will be most 
aesthetic. With the richness of suggestion we must not 
confound the depth of emotion ; what a mind lacks in 
variety of suggestiveness may be compensated for by 
depth of emotion. The broken column on a tomb may 
be richer in suggestion to the poet than to the mother 
who erected the monument ; but the one suggestion to 
the mother excites deeper emotions than all the sugges- 
tions of the poet. 

The aesthetic faculty, as it may be called, like all 
other mental powers requires exercise, training, develop- 



302 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PUILOSOPHY. 

ment. The first things that claim attention are such as 
meet physical needs; hence the appetites are so pre- 
dominantly exercised for years, and we cannot speak of 
aesthetic appreciation in the infant. For the develop- 
ment of this appreciation, or taste, the exercise of the 
imagination is the condition. With its earliest intel- 
lectual operations the child enters the sphere of the 
representative. Thus the very name "mamma" is a 
symbol, being representative, as all language is. 

In order to understand the conditions of aesthetic 
appreciation, we must again recur to the formation of 
mental states. We are apt thoughtlessly to regard 
every judgment as independent of our subjective state ; 
we treat it as if invariable and universal : in other 
words, we treat subjective judgments as if they were 
objective. Where judgments are purely mathematical, 
logical, or scientific, we of course place ourselves on the 
objective standpoint ; and we generally make the mis- 
take of regarding all judgments as of the same char- 
acter. This is fruitful of error, particularly in social, 
ethical, aesthetic, and religious matters, and in all cases 
when a purely subjective element enters into the judg- 
ment. There is a large class of subjects which cannot 
be determined according to the strict principles of exact 
science. We might call judgments respecting them 
subjective, determined largely by the estimated value 
of objects to oursejves; although the aim should con- 
stantly be to attain the objective standpoint, which is 
the norm. 

Since so many of our judgments, opinions, and views 
depend on our subjective condition or state, it at once 
becomes* evident that attention to the state is of first 
importance. The very word " taste " refers to the sub- 
jective state, and thus implies that the norms of taste 



AESTHETICS. 303 

are not necessarily found in objective nature or art. 
Let us call this inner condition, on which so much of 
aesthetic appreciation depends, the aesthetic state. How 
is it formed ? 

We have seen that, whatever of our mental processes 
is conscious, the formation of mental states of more or 
less permanence is a process below the horizon of con- 
sciousness. As in the growth of plants and animals, 
so in the development of mental states, we can see 
the results, but not the process itself. The temporarily 
conscious operations of the mind leave a permanent im- 
press on the mind itself: they must be viewed as real 
operations or conditions of that mind, not as mere hap- 
penings on its surface. Every thought, in proportion 
as it is deep, works changes in the mind, and no thought 
leaves us as it finds us. Particularly by repetition are 
ideas and thoughts embodied in our state, assimilating, 
as it were, the mental organism to them, and determin- 
ing the character of its life. All habit is an illustration 
of the fact that there is a tendency in our nature to 
become what we do. 

Under certain processes of culture the representative 
element becomes a permanent and a prominent factor in 
our mental state. Thus certain objects become sym- 
bols, and their real meaning may have less significance 
than the symbolical. But not only does an object lose 
its real in its representative element, but the thing sym- 
bolized is also lost in the symbol. How often is a word 
taken for the concept, and the sign for the thing signi- 
fied ! Idolatry is a striking illustration. Thus we may 
have hieroglyphics, but not their interpretation. The 
power of symbols or of the representative element 
depends on mental association ; and this association de- 
pends on past experience and training, as they have 



304 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

become permanently embodied in the state which they 
have formed. The very fact that they have formed the 
state implies that they are somehow subsumed into that 
state, and continue to live and work in it. Thus on 
our past history the associations and the suggestions 
of our minds depend. Owing to the difference of states 
and of consequent associations, that which causes one 
to weep makes another laugh. 

The process of forming representative elements and 
symbols goes on ceaselessly. While all language is 
based on this process, it is most apparent in that which 
is figurative. One thing is made to stand for or to 
represent another, so that an object may be the symbol 
of an infinite variety of objects. Then the association 
of an object takes the place of the object itself. Thus 
the joy that springs from an object may make that 
object the symbol of joy in general ; as light, a feast, 
a song, or a dance. In this way objects which most 
deeply or most frequently affect us become representa- 
tives of all objects of the same class. 

There is thus a constant cultivation of a state in 
which the representative element is prominent, a state 
which is the condition for sesthetic appreciation. And 
our sesthetic state depends on the difference in the 
mind's symbolism. The moonlight has a different 
effect on one who sees in it only a condition for more 
efficient work at night, from what it has on him to 
whom it has associations of poetry, music, and love. Its 
effect on lovers on the Grand Canal at Venice differs 
from that on the gondolier who earns a few more sous 
than in a dark night. 

In the state formed gradually by culture we have the 
standard of sesthetic appreciation. It may be a prosaic 
or poetic, a commercial or an sesthetic, a scientific or 



ESTHETICS. 305 

an imaginative state ; but whatever the state, it is 
always the condition of aesthetic effects. We judge, 
esteem, appreciate, feel, according to that state which 
conserves in itself the sum total of the impressions made 
on us during the past ; the present factors in influ- 
encing that state must of course not be overlooked. 
Hence the difference in impressions on the same person, 
by the same object, at different times. 

Just because the state itself determines the nature of 
the impressions, we are not conscious of the standard 
according to which the impressions work. In aesthetics 
there is usually an immediate beholding ; the impres- 
sion is received directly, intuitively, as it were, by the 
sum total of the state. The mental process in the im- 
pression is, like all other mental processes, known only 
in its results. The mind's standard in the appreciation 
is the state that mind is in ; or we may say that the 
standards are latent in the mind, being there potentially 
and working there, but not consciously. Thus it re- 
quires a special effort of reflection to determine the 
reason of aesthetic appreciation, the taste being first 
and immediately active as appreciative, and then as 
critical ; it first receives the aesthetic impression, and 
then searches for the cause of that impression. Appre- 
ciation and criticism are therefore not necessarily equally 
strong in the same person. 

The immediateness of the aesthetic beholding or in- 
tuition is proof that the mind is, at the time, not con- 
scious of the standards according to which it acts ; yet 
it is commonly ignored that the mind unconsciously 
acts according to its standards or ideals, just as it 
unconsciously forms them. Even when in vigorous 
exercise, they may elude the efforts of reflection to dis- 
cover them ; and it is not surprising that but few per- 



306 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sons are aware of the standards which determine their 
appreciation. In order to determine all the elements 
which enter into the appreciation of a flower, scene, or 
picture, all the factors embodied in our state through 
the whole course of past development, and now working 
there, would have to be known. No more in a purely 
intellectual than in an aesthetic appreciation is the whole 
past experience involved. We must therefore conclude 
that the ideals formed in the process of development 
and actively working in the mind are its standards of 
appreciation ; but these ideals are embodied in our 
state, or help to constitute it, so that they work in that 
state itself, though unconsciously. 

Since unconscious associations and unconscious ideals 
operate in aesthetic appreciation, we can understand 
why so much remains obscure in the process. We have 
not consciously at command all the factors which enter 
into aesthetic emotion. In art criticism we, however, 
seek to interpret the emotion by analyzing its elements. 
The various processes which the student of art at first 
performs slowly, laboriously, and consciously, at last 
become habitual, easy, and unconscious. Thus even 
the rules of criticism, like those of grammar, work 
directly, and are applied unconsciously. While aesthetic 
appreciation is therefore immediate, the condition for 
its immecliateness and character may be the product of 
years of development. 

There is a striking difference in the effect produced 
by the different arts. This is largely owing to the 
nature of the representative element. Poetry is the 
most definite of the arts, music the most indefinite. 
The preceding views will help us to understand this. 
It has been said that poetry appeals to the feelings 
through thought, but music to thought through feeling. 



ESTHETICS. 307 

Indeed, we may arrange the various arts according to 
the distinctness of their representative elements, — a 
striking confirmation of the theory that the representa- 
tive is the sphere of aesthetics. Poetry is so definite 
because it uses language which expresses ideas in the 
clearest manner. But let one hundred musicians hear 
the same piece of music, and the chances are that no 
two of them will agree exactly as to the thoughts 
intended to be expressed. The explanation is found 
in the symbol used ; namely sound, but not in the 
form of articulate language. Sound, as a symbol, is 
vague, the same tone being capable of different inter- 
pretations. The obscurity of the symbol thus explains 
the fact that the appeal of music to the imagination is 
so indefinite. And yet therein, in part, is its power, 
since it gives so much free scope to the imagination. 

After determining the exact place of aesthetics and 
the conditions for aesthetic appreciation in general, spe- 
cial inquiries can be instituted respecting beauty, the 
chief object of aesthetics. In beauty we have the high- 
est object of aesthetic appreciation, the culmination of 
taste. All that constitutes the aesthetic element in any 
object must also be found in beauty. Thus its sphere 
is found in imagination, in an intellectual symbolism. 
Perhaps the most serious mistake has been made in the 
attempt to treat it as the only aesthetic object, or as 
peculiarly aesthetic, whereas it shares its general charac- 
teristics with other aesthetic objects. But in beauty 
certain aesthetic qualities reach their highest develop- 
ment. Into beauty enter the reason, the spirit ; beauty 
pertains to what is most agreeable to the imagination. 
Perhaps the term " beauty " is used so vaguely, and 
applied to so many merely agreeable objects, just be- 
cause it lacks those striking peculiarities which have 



308 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

been sought in it. Whatever is beautiful has a pecuilar 
excellence ; and, instead of a peculiarity of quality, 
beauty is rather an exalted degree of qualities also 
found in objects not pronounced beautiful. Beauty is 
an cesthetic emotion, excited by a pleasing object which 
appeals to the imagination with a degree of perfection 
approaching the ideal. Beauty, thus, always pleases. 
The medium of the pleasure is the imagination ; and 
it pleases, because it approaches the highest concepts 
of excellence in representation. Thus the blending of 
agreeable sounds in music, the harmonious arrangement 
of colors in painting, the symmetry of form in statuary, 
are beautiful in proportion as they present to the imagi- 
nation representations of pleasing objects in a state of 
perfection approaching or suggesting the mind's ideals. 

Beauty is thus mental : it is an idea, existing in the 
mind. But there are numerous symbols of beauty. 
The idea may be embodied in an object ; that is, cer- 
tain objects may be symbols of the idea, or they may 
represent ideals. 

Since beauty, like sight and sound, whatever its occa- 
sion may be, is always mental, the soul is peculiarly 
drawn to objects in which beauty is represented. The 
soul seems to discover itself in such objects. Beauty, 
so far as spoken of in objects, meets, expresses, and 
interprets the soul's longings, though often indistinctly, 
as in music. And genius in art consists in the power 
to form constructions and creations which appeal with 
an ideal effect to the imagination, and express most 
perfectly the soul's conception of representative 
excellence. 



ESTHETICS. 309 



REFLECTIONS. 



Etymology, Meaning, and History of ^Esthetics. 
Define Feeling. Importance of a theory of the Feel- 
ings. Their Origin. Their relation to Thought and 
Volition. Their Immediateness. Does Feeling deter- 
mine Values? What is Beauty? Relation to the 
Pleasurable. Is Beauty always an idea or ideal em- 
bodied in form? Unconscious mental basis of the 
Beautiful. Beauty in mind and in objects. Freedom 
or play of the soul in contemplating Beauty. Power 
of contrast on the emotion of the Beautiful. Effect of 
reflection on the emotion. Relation of Beauty to Good- 
ness and Truth. Distinction between Beauty and its 
conditions. Is Beauty in the ideal, or in its represen- 
tation? Views of Beauty in empirical and idealistic 
schools. Is it mere form ? What is Genius ? In what 
sense is it a law unto itself? Is it unconscious of its 
law? Define Art. Give its divisions. Aims of the 
so-called Fine Arts. Classify them. Indicate the 
aesthetic element in each. Advantages and disadvan- 
tages of the Opera. ^Esthetic value of the various 
Arts. Aim of ^Esthetic Criticism. Define Taste. Can 
Beauty ever exist as the sole quality or characteristic 
of an object ? If Beauty is perfection of substance (in 
quality or form), can Beauty have a value independent 
of the substance ? Apply this to Poetry, Oratory, 
Style. What value is attributable to Beauty in objects ? 
Application of ^Esthetics to education, religion, and 
other departments. Define the sphere of the ^Esthetic 
Emotions. The significance of the representative ele- 
ment. Symbolism. Conditions of ^Esthetic Apprecia- 
tion. How are mental states formed ? What elements 
are conserved in our states ? 



310 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER IX. 

ETHICS. 

However complete a thought may be in itself, we 
regard it as complete in its relation to our personality 
only when it somehow affects the feelings and the will. 
When knowledge becomes sesthetical and ethical, we 
have seed and flower and fruit. But also in another 
sense we see in ethics the crown of philosophy. Being 
based on a knowledge of thought, of being, and of feel- 
ing, it concentrates the results thus obtained, in order 
to find the principles of morality, and to construct the 
theory of doing. While thus the completion of rational 
thought, it is, on the other hand, also fundamental, 
since ethical principles are involved in the construction 
of logic, metaphysics, and aesthetics. 

As a philosophical discipline, ethics seeks the princi- 
ples of the volitions or of conduct. It is rational and 
theoretical, aiming at the discovery of the principiant 
element in action. It is frequently placed under the 
head of practical philosophy, since it aims to give 
the law for all practice ; yet it is not an art, but the 
philosophy of the art of the true life. There are numer- 
ous phases of life which it does not discuss directly, 
but in no sphere is practice possible whose fundamental 
principles are not found in ethics. It seeks not the 
totality of reason in conduct, but this reason so far as 
it has a moral bearing. Hence, instead of ethics, we 
have the term "morality," or moral philosophy. 



ETHICS. 311 

A clear and distinct apprehension of the idea of 
morality reveals a sphere different from metaphysics, 
noetics, and sesthetics, yet intimately connected with 
them. All it has in common with them is made pecul- 
iar in that it is viewed exclusively in its moral aspect. 
It is the peculiarity of the ethical concept on which 
attention is now to be concentrated. 

Both an intelligence which works necessarily, and a 
law which operates blindly, exclude the ethical idea. 
This idea involves, as a constitutive element, the con- 
ception of an alternative. A being without choice is. 
reduced to the level of natural objects, controlled by 
force, and cannot be moral. The doctrine of fate anni- 
hilates the will, and makes ethics impossible. Equally 
destructive of ethics is the doctrine of chance. If there 
is no unalterable law, then there is no standard to 
which conduct must be conformed in order to be 
moral. Morality cannot be arbitrariness. If each will 
can determine arbitrarily the ethical, then morality is 
not objective : it is not grounded in reason, and cannot 
fix a rule of action. If fatalism retains the name of 
ethics, it reduces the discipline to a natural science, 
while chance reduces it to chaos. 

All morality involves choice between alternatives, 
but not every choice is a moral act. The character of 
the choice is determined by the end in view, and by the 
means for the attainment of that end. The ultimate 
end chosen (design, purpose, aim, motive) always in- 
volves ethics; but the choice of the particular means 
for its attainment is not necessarily moral. If the ulti- 
mate aim is carnal gratification, the choice is manifestly 
immoral ; if right is the aim, the choice is moral. It is 
the ultimate aim, — the object sought as the consumma- 
tion of all choices, — which determines the character of 



312 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the life, casting its light or darkness over the entire 
course. There may be mistakes in the choice of means 
to attain the end, but success or failure may involve 
much that lies beyond our power; and we are not 
responsible for the inevitable, nor for a knowledge 
beyond our reach. Not results beyond our control, but 
solely the ends honestly chosen, and consistently sought, 
determine the moral quality of life. Hence the attri- 
butes generous, miserly, noble, selfish, good, bad, right, 
wrong, may designate the life as a totality, giving the 
ruling motive as the vital force, and determining the 
ethical character of the products. Hence character, 
judged as a totality, and not according to separate acts, 
which may be exceptional, must be measured by the 
end chosen, and by the measure of consistency with 
that end. That life's aim also affects the choice of 
means, and determines the character of the means, is 
evident. Consistency with a good purpose makes bad 
means impossible. But for the realization of certain 
ends various means may appear to be equally effective 
and good. In that case it becomes morally indifferent 
which is chosen. If means are morally equal, the 
choice may depend on other than ethical grounds. By 
following to its utmost consequences all the considera- 
tions which enter into a choice, we should undoubtedly, 
in every instance, come to an ethical principle ; but this 
does not mean that what ultimately involves ethics also 
implies an ethical element in the details of the choice 
of an individual, since the ultimate principles rationally 
involved may lie wholly beyond his reach. Not what 
is ultimate in ethics, but what is ultimate for me, in my 
peculiar circumstances and with my peculiar attain- 
ments, is the standard of my responsibility. Such 
reflections make evident the need of a general theory 



ETIIICS. 813 

of conduct as a preparation for ethics, just as in 
aesthetics we felt the demand for a general theory of 
the emotions. 

Can a being perfectly good, and meeting with no 
opposition, be called moral? Its perfection would be 
much like that of a law of nature ; the difference being 
that the perfect being would work intelligently, with a 
definite end in view. God is moral in the sense that 
He is always perfectly in accord with the moral law, 
not because He has an alternative. We must view 
Him as the source and embodiment of the moral law, 
and His deeds as expressive of the perfection of His 
nature. He is free in that He is not subject to exter- 
nal restraint. His acts are determined by His own 
nature. In Him, therefore, we find freedom and neces- 
sity united. The term " morality " can consequently 
be applied to God in a peculiar sense only ; and to pre- 
vent confusion, it is better to avoid it altogether, and 
substitute for it " holiness." 

The subject-matter of ethics is the good, or that 
which has moral worth. If in the good is found the 
characteristic mark of all that is ethical, it must be 
determined what constitutes the distinctive peculiarity 
of the good, what its criteria are, how it is related to 
truth and aesthetics, wherein consists its distinction 
from the pleasurable and the useful, and how it can be 
attained. Such subjects as man's personality, his rela- 
tion to God, the freedom of the will, the nature of con- 
science and character, the essence of right, virtue, duty, 
responsibility, and the questions connected with motives, 
means, and ends, — all belong to ethics. It thus deals 
with the problems which involve the greatest concerns 
and the deepest interests of life ; and one need but 
appreciate its significance, to understand why so many 



314 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

thinkers have viewed it as the culmination of all 
philosophy. 

We distinguish between philosophical and theological, 
or Christian, ethics. While the latter discusses the 
principles of morality found in and demanded by the 
Christian system, the former investigates those discover- 
able by human reason. In speculative theological ethics 
(especially the work of Richard Rothe), there is a union 
of Christian and philosophical elements. While Chris- 
tian and rational ethics may be treated separately, they 
cannot be permanently divorced. A complete philo- 
sophical ethical system must include the Christian ele- 
ments which are rational ; and a Christian system of 
morality cannot ignore any ethical demands of the 
reason. They cannot both be final unless there is an 
essential agreement between them. If such an agree- 
ment cannot be established, either the Christian or 
the rational system will be regarded as supreme, and the 
other subordinate, or else the one will attempt to super- 
sede the other. If Christian ethics is viewed as a 
purely human product, philosophical ethics will seek to 
give its rational explanation, and will wholly absorb 
it, — all that is in it being valued only so far as it is 
rational ; but if viewed as divine in its origin, its rela- 
tion to philosophical ethics will have to be determined. 
Christian ethics must be rational, not indeed in the 
sense that all its_. principles can be discovered or fully 
explained by limited human reason, but in the sense 
that faith in them must be reasonable. We are con- 
cerned here, however, only with philosophical ethics.* 

* On the relation of Christian to philosophical ethics, see Dorner, 
System of Christian Ethics, 17-28. For the literature on ethics, philo- 
sophical, as well as Christian, see the same work, 28-42. The valuable 
list of English and American works on the subject, 39-42, is by the 
translator, Professor C. M. Mead. 



ETHICS. 315 

While in theological ethics the principles are taken 
from Scripture, philosophical ethics searches for them 
in the light of reason. The objects of its search are 
the good, absolutely and relatively, and the ultimate 
grounds and norms of conduct. Its principles must be 
universal, applying to all moral beings, and including 
in their application both the individual and society. 
The essence of the ethical impulse is the imperative 
ought. While it works immediately, unconscious of the 
ingredients involved, it is really very complicated, and 
includes all that pertains to the moral process. That 
something ought to be, implies that it is not, and also 
that it will not come of itself. The very possibility of 
ethics, therefore, implies incompleteness, imperfection, 
— a recognition of a more perfect state than the existing 
reality, and the need of effort for its realization. We 
do not feel ourselves bound by the things that are, but 
by that which ought to be. The imperfect real is not 
our standard, and cannot give it. The ideal is our law. 
Being in antagonism with the existing reality, this 
law cannot have its origin in the things about us. The 
consciousness of an ought springs from a contemplation 
of the contrast between the real and the ideal. Ethics 
is a forecasting, a projection of the mind beyond what is, 
and a prophecy of better things. We stand on the real, 
but only to rise above it, and to work up to something 
beyond. We must not, however, imagine that the mere 
contemplation of the imperfect and the perfect makes 
morality possible. We must recognize ourselves as 
related to both, as somehow responsible for the relation 
sustained, and as able to promote the ideal by the use 
of the real. Thus the ethical always involves a process, 
an effort, a development. It is possible only in a world 
that is imperfect, and yet has in it the seeds and condi- 



316 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tions of perfection : it involves ideals, the possibility 
of their attainment or of approach thereto, and a con- 
sciousness of responsibility respecting their realization. 
Much as intellect and feeling have to do with ethics, 
the will is the supreme factor. 

From the time of Socrates till the present, an effort 
has been made to discover the principle of morality, or 
the standard of right. The fundamental question has 
been, What is the ultimate appeal, the final law? In 
opposition to the sophists, who made morality, as well 
as truth, something subjective, individual, a matter of 
opinion, Socrates aimed to establish it on a universal 
and eternal basis. Plato finds the moral ideal in God, 
who is the supreme good ; and this is the view preva- 
lent in his school. While the same idea lies at the 
basis of Aristotle's ethics, he discusses, in his book on 
that subject, moral conduct and the particular virtues 
more fully than the fundamental principles. The impor- 
tance of the subject has led to the frequent discussion 
of ethics in recent times. Principles formerly thought 
to have been firmly established are now attacked. 
Different philosophical schools have set up different 
standards of right ; and in this, as in the other depart- 
ments of philosophy, the conflict of different views is 
radical. Respecting details, as well as many general 
rules, there is much unanimity; but respecting the 
ultimate principles, such as the nature, the basis, and 
the criteria of the good, there is great diversity. It 
is in ethics that the fundamental differences of theism 
and atheism, of idealism and materialism, are most 
apparent. While much remains to be done in order 
to determine particular moral laws, the most essential 
thing needed is the discovery of the basis on which the 
whole system of ethics rests. 



ETHICS. 317 

Viewed with respect to this basis, the various ethical 
schools are usually grouped under two heads ; namely, 
the intuitional and the utilitarian. These names, how- 
ever, embrace a great diversity of views. Frequently 
the intuitional and utilitarian principles are represented 
as diametrically opposed ; but sometimes an effort is 
made to unite, or at least to reconcile, them. Too fre- 
quently the fundamental principles adopted are stated 
so indefinitely that their exact nature cannot be deter- 
mined. The terms " intuitionalism " and "utilitarian- 
ism" themselves need more careful definition. As a 
general rule, the intuitional school finds the standard of 
moral conduct inherent in man, as something a priori, 
not learned from experience. If this is taken in the sense 
that the capacity for morality is innate, so that man need 
only be properly developed in order to become ethical, 
it is difficult to see how any objection can be found to 
this position. It puts the innate element in morals on 
exactly the same basis as that in noetics and aesthetics. 
But if the a priori element excludes the a posteriori, so 
that not merely the capacity for morals, but also the 
moral ideas, are made innate, intuitionalism is subject 
to the same objection as the doctrine of innate ideas in 
general. But if it is found that there is a basis for 
morality in the very constitution of our being, ethics 
will be placed on an immovable foundation. Bight will 
have its source and law in the very nature of things, 
and should be done for its own sake ; and then it is an 
end in itself, not merely means for attaining something 
else. It is this absoluteness and ultimateness of right 
which the intuitional school seeks to establish. The 
utilitarian school, on the other hand, denies that there 
is such an inner, inherent standard, but holds that the 
useful determines the right; hence the name "utilita- 



318 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

rianism." The useful has itself been variously con- 
ceived, sometimes being taken in a lower, at others in 
a higher sense ; sometimes as the means of pleasure, or 
happiness, or well-being, or some other real or imagined 
good. Bentham held that it is the aim of morals to 
secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and 
this view has generally prevailed in modern utilitarian 
ethics. 

It is not surprising that the relation of the principles 
of the two schools continually varies. Sometimes these 
principles approach each other, as if a truce was to be 
made ; and then again they are antagonistic. They are 
treated as if they excluded each other, when this is not 
necessarily the case. A utilitarianism may be possible 
which is in perfect harmony with intuitionalism. The 
subjects overlap: they are two circles which intersect 
and thus have a part in common. Both, if they go deep 
enough, must take something as innate ; both must learn 
from experience ; both recognize the useful. Hence, 
in reality, both are intuitional, and both are utilistic. 
According to their usual treatment they, however, 
differ in their intellectual apprehension of the right, 
not respecting what is innate, unless intuitionalism 
means innate ideas, or utilitarianism means that absurd 
empiricism which finds outside of the mind what can 
only be in the mind. There is no reason in intuitional- 
ism itself why it-should not regard right as inherent 
in our nature, and determined by the constitution of 
things, and yet regard the right as the useful. The 
difference is thus less a question of inherence than of 
intellectual development ; though it is evident that the 
intuitional school seeks a metaphysical basis, while 
the utilitarian moves more in the realm of the phenome- 
nal. Yet when traced back to its source, the impulse 



ETHICS. 319 

to do right, whether it be synonymous with the useful 
or not, must necessarily have its basis in the nature of 
our being. Whatever may be its external occasion, the 
ouijlit is always inner, personal. 

As intuitionalism refers primarily only to the psycho- 
logical source of ethics, so utilitarianism refers primarily 
only to means, not the end. Both names are, therefore, 
objectionable as a designation of the entire system of 
morality. A less satisfactory word than " utilitarianism " 
could hardly have been chosen for the ultimate princi- 
ples of morality. The useful is always means, never 
an end. How, then, can the means to an end be the 
end of moral conduct ? Perhaps we cannot conceive 
an ethical system in which the right and useful are not 
in the end perfectly harmonious. But if the useful is 
the law for ethics, we at once ask: Useful for what? 

There are certain precepts which we regard as of 
binding authority. What constitutes them an impera- 
tive command? 

It is here assumed that this authority really exists 
for every normally developed human being. Its non- 
existence would prove a being not moral. If the intel- 
lect may be so perverted that the normal exercise of 
thought becomes impossible, why may not the moral 
nature be so perverted as to fail to discern between 
right and wrong? But the moral perversions of men, 
and the diversity of views respecting the right, are no 
evidence that morality has no basis in the constitution 
of human nature. 

Morality, being something objective, and the same 
for all responsible beings, not mere subjective prefer- 
ence, whim, opinion, or arbitrary determination, it is as 
subject to laws as are our reasoning faculties. The 
deepest inquiry must always conclude that these laws 



320 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

have their basis in the nature of things ; and that, in 
their ultimate consequences, they must tend to produce 
harmony. Laws which govern phenomena cannot them- 
selves be made phenomenal. Were there no moral order 
in the universe, our moral laws would not be harmless 
fiction merely, but an actual perversion. However we 
may define the right, its last interpretation must be 
consonant with our own being and with the design of 
things. This broad and deep view of morality reveals 
it as objectively real and eternal. But we must distin- 
guish between the absolute norm for morality and its 
conscious possession. Just because so deep, it is diffi- 
cult of discovery ; and different views of the standard 
of right arise from different apprehensions of the nature 
and source of things, or because the individual and the 
temporal, instead of the universal and eternal, are made 
the basis of morality.* 

We are not born with a code of morals ready for 
immediate application ; such a code can only be formed 
by training and education and surroundings. As these 
vary greatly, so may the views on particular points of 
conduct, however universal and alike the innate moral 
basis. But why is a moral training at all possible ? 
Because there is moral capacity in man, making him 



* It is the narrow and shallow conception of morality which con- 
stantly leads us to misapprehend its nature. The very terms generally 
used to designate moral conduct and relations need hut he understood 
in their full hreadth and depth in order to get at the essence of morals. 
When we speak of the right, we do not get the full meaning of the term 
unless we take it in all its relations; namely, right in consideration of 
all that exists. We want to do what is due and proper, not merely 
when we consider ourselves only, hut in view of other men also, of the 
universe, and of God. If we cannot take all this into the account in 
moral action or in determining the right, the difficulty is with our intel- 
lect; and our inability to apprehend the broad, eternal basis of the right 
should not lead to a perversion of morality itself. 



ETHICS. 321 

susceptible to moral impressions, and capable of moral 
aspiration and of resisting immoral tendencies. 

While no amount of training or education could 
make a being ethical unless it had an innate moral 
capacity, the peculiar direction of morality in an indi- 
vidual depends largely on the intellectual development. 
The different elements of our nature are so intimately 
related that the state of the one must also affect that 
of the other. The innate element of conscience consists 
not in the apprehension of this or that conception of 
right, for that would imply the existence of innate 
ideas. With increased knowledge, our previous judg- 
ments may be reversed. It is thus seen that they are 
intellectual, dependent on our mental attainments. So 
long as the purely theoretical element in morals is made 
its essence, conscience cannot be regarded as either 
innate or unchangeable. Conscience is an impulse to 
the right. This impulse has its basis or possibility in 
the nature of our being. Without this emotional or 
impulsive element, we might contemplate truth theo- 
retically, without any feeling of personal responsibility 
respecting it. When the intellect has discovered the 
right, conscience impels us to do it. Conscience, viewed 
as merely or mainly a discerner of right, is put on an 
intellectual basis. How inadequate this view, is evi- 
dent from the fact that conscience does not merely 
impel to do the right known, but also impels to seek 
the right and the truth. Thus instead of being an 
intellectual apprehension, conscience is an impulse 
behind all intellectual activity; it is the ethical energy 
in human nature. 

Viewed in this light, conscience reveals a most im- 
portant aspect of our nature. The fact that we are 
not indifferent to right and wrong establishes the truth 



322 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

that we are moral beings, — a truth whose significance 
for our position and relations in the universe is of in- 
estimable value. This truth is the basis of all ethics. 
We may not always be able to determine with absolute 
certainty what is right, but that does not interfere with 
the absoluteness of conscience. The way to the right 
may be lost, but this very possibility implies that it 
exists. So the impulse to seek and to do the right may 
be partly suppressed by lust or other agencies, and thus 
the normal action and development of conscience may 
be hindered. But the absence of certain tendencies 
and impressions, under particular circumstances, does 
not prove that in a normally developed human being 
they would not be present. The arguments against 
the innateness of conscience are largely of this negative 
character, and in reality prove nothing against morality 
as an essential element of human nature. 

While emphasizing healthy moral views as a condi- 
tion of healthy moral conduct, we need not hold with 
Socrates that correct knowledge is the only thing re- 
quired. In a being otherwise perfect, this would 
indeed be the case ; but, as we have seen, there is as 
striking evidence in human nature of emotional and 
volitional as of intellectual perversion. What is appre- 
hended as right by the intellect must be chosen by the 
will before there can be moral conduct. The frequent 
rejection by the will of what is recognized as right, is 
too common to require special mention. The different 
elements of oar nature, involved in moralhrv, greatly 
complicate the subject. While the will is the most 
essential factor in the realization of morality, this will 
depends largely on the proper relation of the intellect 
and the emotions to the right. In morals we have an 
aspect of truth different from that given in logic and 



ETHICS. 323 

aesthetics, an aspect which puts us into peculiar relation 
to it : the relation of responsibility. In morality we are 
made to sustain a personal relation to the truth.* An 
intellectual being without the ability to discern right 
and wrong, and without the feeling of responsibility, 
would wholly miss a certain aspect of truth. The truth 
would be viewed only in its objective relation, not as 
having a personal interest. Such a being would lack 
a peculiar sense, and all that pertains to morality would 
be as foreign to him as color to a blind man. 

That personal relation to the truth which exists in 
morality is the ground of all moral law or of duty. 
Take that away, and it becomes absurd to talk of 
morals. How do we account for the consciousness of 
this relation ? Why can we not rest in the contempla- 
tion of the ideal good, just as we do in that of the ideal 
beauty ? Ethics begins when besides the contemplation 
of the ideal we recognize any degree of responsibility 
for its realization. There is always in morality a cate- 
gorical imperative, though its content may differ from 
that formulated by Kant. What makes this imperative 
ought, always found in morals and never in any thing 
else? We have answered that it has its seat in con- 
science ; but this leads to the question, How did it get 
there? In rational ethics we seek an explanation of that 
impulse which is the basis of morality. 

In harmony with a broad tendency of modern 
thought, conscience has been pronounced a product of 
evolution. How this was possible is not explained sat- 
isfactory, nor is there agreement as to the exact nature 
of the process ; but whatever the differences respecting 

* A relation involving the whole person as a person. Personality- 
involves self-consciousness (the consciousness of self as distinct from all 
other objects) and self-determination. 



324 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

details, evolutionists usually regard conscience and the 
whole of ethics as the product of natural development. 
Some lay the stress on heredity, by means of which cer- 
tain predispositions and tendencies are supposed to be 
explained ; others emphasize the training, the influence 
of the environment, and the association of ideas induced 
by habit. The theory of evolution has certainly di- 
rected attention to important elements heretofore too 
much neglected. The basis with which an individual 
starts (whether the product of heredity or not), the his- 
torical development into whose results he is placed, the 
statutory laws, the customs of the people, the prevalent 
views of morality, and the habits he forms, are all potent 
factors in determining his views of morals and his moral 
conduct. The correct theory of ethics cannot be found 
by ignoring or rejecting these factors, but by fully 
considering them, and critically distinguishing their real 
from their imagined influence. Since what is innate 
and implicitly (potentially) present may be subject to 
evolution so as to be explicitly (really) present, there 
is no reason why intuitionalism and evolution may not 
be harmonized. 

Over-zealous Darwinians (especially materialists like 
Carl Vogt) are apt to create suspicion even respecting 
those elements in the theory which are well-founded. 
Thus, as is so common in such cases, the theory is estab- 
lished before the inductions justify it, and then it is 
used as an absolute law to interpret facts. The efforts 
to evolve morality and religion from brutes depend 
wholly on analogical reasoning ; and it is evident that 
frequently human elements are interpreted into brutes, 
in order to discover in brutes ethical and spiritual germs. 
If the animal could develop itself up to man, or if some- 
thing could be added to it which would make it human. 



ETHICS. 325 

the question would be settled. But this very possibility 
remains to be proved. The process of evolving men 
from brutes is too often accomplished by first making 
men brutes. Here is a region in which hypotheses luxu- 
riate in the name of exact science. Some of the very 
advocates of this theory fail to study man himself as an 
individual, as a part of humanity, and in connection 
with the history of human development. Until the 
specific element of morality is found in matter or in 
the animal, — not merely an imagined something from 
which its evolution may be imagined, — we shall be 
limited to its discussion where certainly found, namely 
in man. The apparent analogies, mere interpretations 
on our part, do not establish a real likeness or sameness. 
Heredity, the laws of association, historical develop- 
ment, the training of the individual and his environ- 
ment, the statutory laws and prevalent views of legal 
right, can at best account only for prevailing moral 
opinions. They never lead beyond the historical and 
psychological contemplation of morality. Let us sup- 
pose, too, that, in accounting for what is, they explain 
the opinions respecting what ought to be, and give an 
impulse to seek what is recognized as right. Now, if 
besides these nothing else were involved in morality, 
the question of its origin might be settled, very largely 
at least, by an appeal to these factors ; the origin of the 
imperative ought would of course not be explained. 
But these are not the only factors. Instead of letting 
all that may have come through inheritance, the laws of 
association, historical development, training and envi- 
ronment, the constitution and laws of a land, the views 
of legal right, or any or all existing views and theories, 
determine the ethical laws, I subject all these to criti- 
cism, interpret them rationally, accept some and reject 



326 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

others, and form a standard of right which is not given 
by all of them combined. There is such a thing as his- 
torical morality, but we distinguish it from the rational 
and philosophical. The latter may even use the historical 
as a help in the formation of its ideals ; but history or 
custom can never determine the character of rational 
ethics. The laborious ethical process starting with the 
historical, the hereditary, and the environment, but ris- 
ing above them under the sole guidance of reason, and 
making all of them subject to its criticisms and laws — 
surely no one will claim that this process is hereditary, 
or associational, or historical, or a product of the envi- 
ronment. The fact is, that purely evolutional morality, 
in ignoring the rational element, is not morality at all ; 
it reduces the moral processes to natural law, and "thus 
robs them of the very thing that makes them moral. 
But rational morality can use all that such evolutionists 
claim, and can give it full weight in determining the 
character of morality. Give evolution something to 
evolve; give education something to educate ; give the 
environment something that is environed ; determine not 
merely what the laws of association do, but why they 
work as they work ; in other words, let reason give an 
adequate philosophical explanation, instead of the par- 
tial psychological and historical ones usually given, and 
all that enters into morality will receive its proper place 
in the system. We only get morality when we interpret 
what is, and what must be, into an ought; and this 
interpretation is only possible if the interpreter is 
rational, personal, and responsible. I can be moral just 
because I can rise above all that I have been made by 
heredity aiicj other influences, toward an ideal which 
springs from my own being, and whose contemplation 
impels me to seek its realization. 26 



ethics. 327 

Whoever admits the distinction between what is and 
what ought to be, virtually admits the supremacy of 
mind in moral questions. It is in morality that the 
autonomy of mind appears in its most perfect form. 
Unless we are a law unto ourselves, whatever may be 
needed to develop us to become such a law, a system of 
ethics is impossible. Man is an ethical being because he 
can be himself in the inexorable nexus of things, and 
can say yes when the environment says no. In ethics 
man lifts himself to the height of his own ideals, and 
rises from things to personality. Morality is not a 
creation out of nothing, but from that which is only in 
mind. We cannot go behind this : our mind is so con- 
stituted that in its normal development the moral 
ideals are produced. This may be called idealism, be- 
cause the ordinary realism cannot produce it or even 
account for it; but it is an idealism which is the 
intensest, and the only true and abiding realism. 

We have already found that the utilitarian and intui- 
tional schools do not necessarily exclude each other. 
Even if the basis of morality is intuitive, that does not 
exclude a utilitarianism which adapts means to a certain 
end, though it opposes the substitution of means for 
end. The end sought by utilitarianism may be pleas- 
ure for the individual or society at large, or it may be 
the preservation of the individual and society, or wel- 
fare, well-being, health, efficiency. In all these cases 
the right (in the sense of means) is determined by the 
useful. Where morality is viewed as part of biology 
or natural history, it will be regarded as somehow the 
product of the effort of conscious life to follow "the line 
of least resistance " or " the line of least pain," and to 
make hunger or physical craving its occasion or source. 

Usually hedonism and eudaemonism reject the ego- 



328 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tistic and favor the altruistic or social view, reco£- 
nizing the happiness or welfare of society at large as 
the great aim of morals. It is admitted, too, that the 
pleasures sought are not the low ones, but the highest. 
Sometimes they are spoken of as rational, and the desire 
to attain them is called a rational desire in distinction 
from the sensuous. The meaning of course is not that 
the libertine and savage, in the pursuit of gross pleas- 
ures, have morality to perfection. This is not even the 
doctrine of Epicureanism, though it is frequently so 
understood. The social and rational are connected as 
intimately as possible with this pleasure. But taken 
even in its most rational sense, can pleasure or happiness 
be regarded as the ultimate end of conduct? 

In examining utilitarian writers, one is struck with 
the difficulty of remaining consistent with their theory. 
It is frequently found that they actually abandon the 
theory, or else make concessions on important points. 
Thus J. S. Mill, a true Benthamite in the theory that 
pleasure is the only good, makes a significant confes- 
sion.* Speaking of a crisis in his mental history, he 
says, " I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that 
happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end 
of life. But I now thought that this end was only to 
be attained by not making it the direct end. Those 
only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed 
on some object other than their own happiness ; on the 
happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, 
even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, 
but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something 
else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments 
of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make 
it a pleasant thing, when they are taken en passant, 

* Autobiography, 142. 



ETHICS. 329 

without being made a principal object. Once make 
them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. 
They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask 
yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. 
The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end 
external to it, as the purpose of life. Let your self- 
consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, ex- 
haust themselves on that ; and if otherwise fortunately 
circumstanced, you will inhale happiness with the air 
you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about 
it, without either forestalling it in imagination, or put- 
ting it to flight by fatal questioning. This theory now 
became the basis of my philosophy of life." Surely a 
strange end that is defeated when made "the direct 
end " ! If enjoyments are to be taken " en passant, 
without being made a principal object," it is hard to 
understand in what sense they are to be made the 
ultimate end or " principal object." 

If happiness is the sole object, then the means for its 
attainment must be right, and there is no difference in 
the moral quality of pleasures ; yet this the advocates 
will not admit. As soon as any moral quality aside from 
the pleasurable itself is admitted, pleasure ceases to 
be the sole object of moral choice. If the happiness of 
others is the final moral law, then if I have the choice 
of making fifty good men or fifty-one bad men supremely 
happy, I ought to confer the happiness on the bad, and 
leave the good in misery. If not, why not ? 

The debauchee makes pleasure the ultimate rule of 
conduct: why condemn him? To say, because his 
pleasures are wrong, is yielding the whole point, and 
making something else than pleasure the rule. At 
best it can only be claimed by the hedonist that the 
debauchee is mistaken as to the means of obtaining 



330 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

pleasure, since by his licentiousness he destroys the very 
capacity for enjoyment, and ruins himself. The state 
of a man may be such that what pleases him works 
destruction ; then he must be put into a state in which 
his pleasure will conduce to his welfare. This means 
that if a man's state is right, his pleasures will be bene- 
ficial. Make yourself what you ought to be, then you 
will do what gives the highest pleasure. No one doubts 
that if he becomes perfect his greatest pleasure will be 
in the perfect, and that this pleasure will be right. 
But here character is made the great aim, being viewed 
as the end to be attained irrespective of the pleasure, 
while pleasure is regarded as but a natural consequence 
of that character. Not what is merely means is sought, 
but the end for which the means are the condition ; not 
what is merely phenomenal, as pleasure, is the aim of 
ethics, but what is substantial and permanent, namely a 
state or character. 

But if character is the ultimate aim for the individ- 
ual, why shall he make any thing else, as happiness or 
welfare, his aim in dealing with his fellow-men? If 
for himself character is the condition of the highest 
well-being, must it not likewise be so for every other 
member of society? Those who admit this may still 
claim that, while character is the great aim, it is sought 
solely for the sake of the happiness it affords. One 
need but state the proposition in this bald way to show 
that no one can really advocate it ; and it may be 
unconditionally affirmed that he who seeks character 
solely for the sake of pleasure, will neither form a 
perfect character nor attain the highest pleasure. 

If pleasure or happiness is the aim, how can I ever 
feel it a duty to sacrifice for the sake of others? It 
may not be to me a pleasure to sacrifice nryself for 



ETHICS. 331 

others ; indeed, if it is a pleasure, it is hard to under- 
stand wherein it is a sacrifice. Hedonism either de- 
stroys all sacrifice for human welfare, or else reduces 
it to the blind instinct or impulse of the brute. To 
regard sacrifice as the result of calculating the amount 
of pleasure to be gained, destroys its nobility. Sacrifice 
is noble when performed for the sake of right and duty, 
and it is regarded noble in proportion to the intensity 
of the suffering. That the joy of doing right more than 
balances the pain of the suffering, may be true, but it 
does this because it is right ; but the right is not done 
for the sake of securing greater pleasure. 

Frequently the appeal is made from pleasure to the 
right. A man finds his joy in the lowest pleasures,* 
and he is urged to forsake them because they are 
wrong. Surely in such cases the appeal is not made 
from one pleasure to another, but to something quali- 
tatively different. If the difference in the pleasure is 
only quantitative, the man living in the grossest pleas- 
ures of vice differs only in degree from the man who 
is virtuous, benevolent, and in every respect morally 
perfect. With pleasure as the standard, misery is the 
only vice. 

In the discussion of utilitarianism, it is common to 
confound things that are wholly distinct, and for this 
reason so much of the discussion is inconclusive. The 
confusion is largely the result of confounding an intel- 
lectual with an emotional element. Thus the appre- 
hension of the right is continually contrasted with the 
desire for happiness, whereas the two may be in perfect 
harmony. The conflict in this case, if there is any at 
all, is between the intellect and the emotions. Instead 
of contrasting the intellectual apprehension of right 

* How can pleasures be low if the pleasurable is the right ? 



332 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

with a desire, we should compare the intellectual appre- 
hension of right with the intellectual apprehension of 
the pleasurable. When this is done, it will at once be 
seen that the two are not synonymous. The apprehen- 
sion of the right, in the broadest sense, takes into 
account all moral relations. Applied by the individual 
to himself, it implies a correct relation to all things. 
If he takes account only of his intellect, or only of 
his feelings, or only of his conduct, his view of the 
relation will be partial ; he must take his whole being 
into account. This relation must include the family, 
humanity, in fact, all things in all their bearings, in 
order to be full and perfect. In all respects the indi- 
vidual wants to be right in his relation to all things. 
The right in this full sense is what is due or becoming, 
what is in harmony with truth, with God, with the 
perfect "ideal. The fact that we cannot take so deep 
and broad a view of things does not interfere with the 
idea and the eternal basis of right itself. This rightness 
of relation, this correctness of myself in view of the 
whole universe of being, involves the right relation of 
my being, and all that proceeds from it ; and thus 
includes character and apprehension and desire and 
conduct, and not feeling merely. 

When now we turn from this broad, all-comprehen- 
sive, rational view of right, to the pleasurable, what is 
the difference? While the former includes the pleas- 
urable so far as right, but only as an element in con- 
nection with rightness of being, thought, and conduct, 
the pleasurable as the aim of morality takes a partial 
view of right, namely only so far as related to the 
feelings, and ignores all the others. For this reason, 
however the pleasurable may be harmonized with right, 
it can never be the complete basis of ethics ; it puts a 



ETHICS. 333 

part for the whole, and thus destroys the possibility of 
a perfect system. Another vice in this method is the 
fact that it makes this part an emotional instead of a 
rational element. 

The deeper we pursue these considerations, the more 
defective hedonism appears. Its advocates cannot be 
consistent, because they put on the throne what is 
subordinate ; they make the conclusion the major prem- 
ise. It is certainly strange that vulgar pleasures and 
the highest approval of conscience should be put into 
the same category as pleasurable. Better substitute for 
pleasure rightness of emotion, and under this include 
all the feelings which spring from a proper relation to 
objects. It thus includes intellectual joys, peace, and 
all true gratification, but rejects false pleasures which 
have their source in a false relation to things. We 
thus distinguish ethical from base pleasures. The stand- 
ard of the former is something objective ; the standard 
of the latter is subjective onl}\ 

This rightness of being and relation, demanded by 
ethics, presupposes that there is a possible harmony 
between the moral being and the universe.* With this 
deep basis of ethics in the nature of things, we shall 
have no difficulty in harmonizing the views which 
make the right and the pleasurable the end of morals. 
We have already seen that the former, as the more 
comprehensive, includes the latter. If there is reason 
in the universe, then the right relation of being must 
result in pleasure to a creature with sensibility. Pleas- 
ure is, in fact, only a harmonious emotional relation. 
Rightness in being and relation implies harmony, satis- 

* To view man only in relation to his environment is belittling, 
unless the whole universe, physical and spiritual, is regarded as that 
environment. 



33-1 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

faction, and all the emotions which can spring from 
the proper influence of one being on another being. 
Where the right, then, in the full comprehensiveness 
of its meaning, is attained, pleasure must be one of the 
results. It is an effect, but not the whole, there being 
other effects also ; it is not a cause or the end. It is a 
good ; but a good which has its source in the supreme 
good, in a character which puts a man in every respect 
into the right relation. When this right relation is 
contemplated rationally, I get the idea of right ; when 
I view it in relation to my emotions, I get the notion 
of pleasure, happiness, welfare ; when I view it in 
relation to conduct, I get the law for moral action. 

When morality is compressed into the sphere of the 
emotions, instead of being viewed as a rational prin- 
ciple, its aim must of course be made happiness or 
pleasure. If the desire refers to a feeling as the object 
sought, it must of course be happiness. All feelings are 
pleasurable or painful ; no one can desire the latter, 
unless he can desire what is not desirable. To speak of 
a desire for pleasure, is really tautology ; we can have 
no other desire as desire. In opposition to all such 
efforts to make morality merely emotional, Kant is right 
in emphasizing the purely rational element in ethics ; 
but he goes too far in wholly rejecting the emotions 
from ethical conduct. A course is not right because I 
desire it, but I ought to desire it because it is right. 

Is feeling the sole motive power of the will ? Many 
claim that this is the case, and it is taken for granted 
by those who affirm that the pleasurable determines the 
right. But in spite of the generally adopted theory 
to the contrary, feeling is not the sole motive power of 
the will. There is no feeling unless it is felt ; and it 
is evident that much of our conduct is not preceded by 






ETHICS. 335 

emotion. So in the purely theoretical contemplation 
of the right, we can decide what it ought to be in 
the abstract, without considering our emotional nature. 
Having decided what it is theoretically, in the abstract, 
it can be chosen as the theory of conduct without con- 
sidering its personal application and without giving an 
occasion for any personal feeling to arise. Not in the 
abstract determination of right, any more than in any 
other abstract question of truth, need my feelings be 
aroused. But in the specific application of the theory, 
when it comes to practical details, personal feeling 
enters into consideration. In determining the right in 
the abstract, we carry on a purely intellectual process. 
And when the right has once been determined, there is 
no reason why it should not be made the law of con- 
duct, without considering feeling, or even against feel- 
ing. We seek the truth because it is the truth, some- 
thing final in itself; we seek the right because it is 
right, also something final. And if feeling or prejudice 
interferes with truth, we reject such interference ; and 
we do so equally respecting the right. So far from let- 
ting our emotions determine conduct, reason demands 
that its own voice is supreme and shall alone be heard. 
A moral judgment is an imperative ; but just because it 
is a judgment, it is not an emotion. The love of duty 
or the pleasure in the doing does not lessen the morality 
in the case ; the moral element is, however, not in the 
love or the pleasure, but in the duty. As in aesthetics, 
so in ethics, we form a state (character), and the norms 
embodied in this state act directly, without waiting for 
an emotion to intervene. In ethical conduct we do 
what we are, not merely what we feel. 

The root of many perversions in ethics is to be found 
in the false theory that feeling is the sole motive power 



336 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of the will. Can we not choose to make reason the 
standard instead of feeling? Undoubtedly. But what 
is the motive in thus choosing reason ? The fact that 
this choice is worthy of my being. I thus prefer worthi- 
ness of being to phenomenal emotion. Only by con- 
founding preference, which may rest on other than 
emotional grounds, with pleasure, does the theory of 
feeling as the sole motive of the will find any basis. 
There may indeed be a choice between different pleas- 
ures, but there may also be a choice between pleasure 
and reason. Even if we view ethics wholly in the light 
of values, we can value the law of reason above the 
impulse of an emotion. We can choose nothing in 
which we do not somehow have a personal concern and 
an interest; but it is a mistake to regard feeling, or 
more specifically the feeling of pleasure, as the only 
human concern. I may even recognize it to be my 
duty to do the very thing my feelings oppose ; if, then, 
conscience can oppose all impulses to pleasure, how can 
pleasure be the impulse of conscience ? By making 
subjective pleasure the standard of ethics, its ideals are 
degraded and destroyed. 

One of the latest German works on ethics * affirms 
that " what is in no sense a good for me, I cannot desire 
solely for the sake of good to others ; but only in case 
it also has for me a perceptible and appreciable value. 
In this sense it must be affirmed that in every human 
volition is necessarily involved not merely eudgemonism, 
or a reference to the feeling of pleasure in general, but 
also egoism, or the reference to the feeling of personal 
pleasure. It is totally impossible for a human being to 
choose an end, and the necessary means for its attain- 
ment, which have no relation to his personal feeling." 

* Vorfragea tier Ethik, von Dr. Ckristoph Sigwart; 886, p. 6. 






ETHICS. 337 

It should readily be admitted that every choice is related 
to our feelings, and the realization or failure will neces- 
sarily effect the feeling; but this is not the point in dis- 
pute. The question is whether feeling is necessarily 
the motive or the aim of the choice ? This presents a 
radical problem, and the character of a system of ethics 
will depend largely on the nature of the solution. 

In ethics we move in the domain of values, and no 
choice is possible unless the object chosen has some 
worth in our estimation. This is implied in the choice 
itself, and is an essential element in all volition. But 
it is a mistake to make the feeling of pleasure the test 
of worth. If an object has worth for me, I of course 
rejoice in its attainment ; but if I choose it because it is 
noble, true, right, it is a perversion to make the joy 
which is merely an incidental result of this choice the 
motive of the choice. I do not choose the true for 
the reason that I prefer it to the false, for that is putting 
truth on a level with mere subjective whims ; but I prefer 
it to the false because it is the truth. In other words, the 
ultimate ground of choice is not the mere fact of prefer- 
ence ; but the fact of truth is the reason for the pref- 
erence, and the ultimate ground of choice. I thus make 
truth the rule for my preference, not my preference the 
rule for the apprehension of truth. In choosing the truth 
as truth, I do not at all consider the effect on my feel- 
ing ; how, then, can feeling be the motive of the choice ? 
By making it the motive, we simply make an effect the 
cause. The very fact that I can choose what is right in 
the abstract, and because it is right, without regard to 
the feeling produced, is conclusive proof that I choose 
for the sake of the right, not for the sake of any pleas- 
ure it may produce. Even in the choice of the right, 
I have satisfaction or pleasure ; but it is not for the 



338 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sake of this pleasure that I make the choice, but for 
the sake of the right, and the pleasure is simply a con- 
comitant of the choice. Let us say that Ave love the 
right, and that we choose it because we love it ; then of 
course the choice of right, as a mere choice, is put on a 
level with the choice of the basest gratification, although 
it may spring from the noblest nature. But why do we 
lave the right ? Not because it produces pleasure in us, 
but because it is in harmony with a righteous character. 
And where reason has become the guide of life, the right 
is loved and chosen for the sake of what it is, not for 
the sake of the emotion it excites. So I affirm that I 
take pleasure in truth ; but does that mean that I value 
truth only for the sake of the pleasure it excites? It 
is thus evident that the real motive in choice, whether 
selfish or altruistic, or purely rational, or whatever it 
may be, depends on the character of the person, and on 
the rule adopted for life. I, of course, cannot prefer a 
thing without preferring it; but that does not mean 
that I prefer a thing because it gratifies, since the ques- 
tion of gratification may not at all have entered into the 
consideration. If I can contemplate an object as it is 
in itself, abstracting wholly from its relation to my feel- 
ing, then I can also abstract from my feelings in choos- 
ing it. Against my feeling I can put an imperative 
ought, and can choose a standard against my feelings. 
In other words, reason, conscience, character, as well as 
the desire for pleasure, can be made the motive of con- 
duct. Epicureanism is possible, but so also is stoicism. 
It is thus evident that a sharp distinction must be 
made between the motive of the choice and the feeling 
which is merely concomitant. The very fact that there 
may be reason in a choice, implies that the rational 
element may predominate over the emotional. 



ethics. 339 

The position here taken disposes of such questions as 
these: Does ethics depend on something inherent in 
the mind and on the relations of the mind, or does it 
consider only results ? Is it grounded in the constitu- 
tion of things, or in considerations of what is yet to 
become? Such inquiries are based on a supposed 
antagonism, where in reality there is none. What 
results, and what ought to become, must somehow be 
in the constitution of things. In the completeness with 
which it contemplates objects, ethics takes into account 
both what is and what ought to be. But in consider- 
ing what ought to be, ethics again takes into account 
the constitution of things. It aims at a state, something 
that abides, not merely to produce a transient emotion. 
Instead of making a feeling the standard of reason, it 
makes reason the standard, and feeling an element in 
the process of realizing its end. By making emotion 
its law, we reduce ethics to the level of aesthetics ; but 
by making it inhere in the constitution of things, and 
seek a state or condition in harmony with the ideal of 
this constitution, we get the true idea of ethics. 

We have now attained a standpoint from which we 
can judge all moral claims. Every aim short of the 
rightness mentioned falls short of the final aim. This, 
of course, does not imply that the aim itself is wrong ; 
it may be right but not final ; it may be embraced in 
that final aim, as an arc in a circle. If it is said that 
the aim is the survival of the fittest, we ask, fittest for 
what? If the survival of the fittest means the fittest 
to live, that is likely to survive without an}^ help. How 
can the fittest to live do otherwise than survive the 
unfit or the less fitted? If the aim is the preservation 
of life, the question arises, why preserve life ? Neither 
is the " efficiency of the social organism " the final aim. 



i 



340 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Efficiency for what? Every aim short of rightness of 
being and relation fails to reach the tap-root of ethics. 
Every deep inquiry pushes down to this rightness ; and 
while the modern horror of metaphysics may seem to 
absolve men from the necessity of finding this tap-root, 
it does not oblige them to deny its existence, and to 
affirm that the roots lying on the surface are the 
deepest. 

Do what we may, we cannot get morality as a natural 
process, but only, as a process of reason. To the must 
in nature, I oppose the ought of reason. So if the pleas- 
urable only is the object of choice, we are forced to 
take our place with Socrates, and say that we need but 
know the right to do it. The ought in this case, as 
much as in the other, becomes a must. I ought, how- 
ever, to do the right even if I cannot see just what 
pleasure will flow from it ; I ought to do it even with- 
out considering the question of pleasure. If the pessi- 
mist sees in suicide, not merely of the individual but 
of humanity, the only hope of relief from misery, why 
not commit suicide? Ought not the parent to strangle 
his child if that is the only way to save it from misery ? 
What right has he to let it live if happiness is the 
reason of the ought? 

The freedom of the will involved in ethics has caused 
much speculative difficulty. Its theoretical explanation 
was regarded by .Kant as impossible, but he held that 
it is a necessary postulate of the practical reason ; and 
he did not hesitate to declare that the primacy belongs 
to the practical, not to the speculative reason. Alter- 
natives are presented to us, as, for instance, the objects 
of reason and of sense, and we choose the one and reject 
the other. So far there is no practical difficulty. True 
or ideal liberty is frequently spoken of as a union of 



ETHICS. 341 

freedom and necessity, namely, the voluntary choice 
of that which is true, right, eternal, or which is for 
reason a necessity. This removes from the freedom of 
the will all mere arbitrariness. If it wants to be truly 
free, it must choose what is objectively true and right. 
The ultimate ground of this freedom is in the spirit ; 
it is free because it has the power of self-determination 
so far as its own conduct is concerned. It can choose 
between an external and an internal law ; it can become 
a slave of things, or can be a law unto itself. This is 
involved in the idea of personality. Our reasoning is 
so involved in the chain of cause and effect, that we 
usually regard all cause as itself only the effect of 
something else. We even regard being as involving 
the idea of cause, when it does nothing of the kind. 
Change involves the idea ; but being is that which is, 
while only that which becomes involves the idea of 
cause. A being that is free does not necessarily create, 
but it chooses. It cannot be part of the mechanism of 
nature, that mechanism which in our day is often so 
exclusively viewed as to be made the standard for 
judging all things. The spirit cannot be mechanical 
and yet have choice. We, indeed, imagine that we 
understand the mechanism of nature, while the choice 
of the spirit is pronounced an unfathomable mystery. 
But we have seen that we understand the one just as 
perfectly as the other, the necessity in nature being 
not a whit more explicable or rational than the choice 
of the spirit. Besides, if the mechanism of nature is 
the law of mind, then not only does all the mystery 
remain, but thought is also involved in contradictions. 
How can this mechanical necessity produce the con- 
viction of freedom, of choice, and all the activity of 
conscience ? Then the belief in freedom, and all other 



342 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

views, true or false, are a necessity. But if necessary, 
they must be true ; in other words, error is truth. Not 
on a mechanical, but only on a rational basis, is a system 
of ethics possible. 

In our subject philosophy verges on religion; moral- 
ity is, in fact, their point of contact and the ground 
which they have in common. While in rational ethics 
we consider man in his relation to the universe, in reli- 
gion we consider his relation to God. But ultimately 
his relation to the universe depends on his relation to 
God, and thus religion and ethics are found to have 
essentially the same basis. In any true sense, a system 
of ethics is impossible on atheistic principles. If, for 
instance, there is no design in the universe, there can 
be no end which I ought to realize. It is absurd to 
claim that man ought to seek certain results, if he is 
not made or intended for any thing. In ethics we have 
the very strongest argument for design. Even utilita- 
rianism need but be probed to the bottom in order to 
discover that it must finally rest on a theistic basis. 
With nothing but matter and invariable laws, it never 
can establish the fact that I ought to sacrifice for the 
good of the greatest number ; all it can do is to claim 
that I must let myself go as the unalterable laws force 
me. Even if I can persuade myself that there is a moral 
order of the universe, or a moral law, whose source is 
not in a personality, I do not see how this involves 
an imperative. Why not let this law or order take 
care of itself? It must be self-evident, that without 
the conception of obligation a system of ethics is not 
possible ; but it is equally clear that to affirm obligation 
without giving its ground is irrational. For the fact of 
the ought, the reason demands the why, in order to learn 
whether the fact is authorized. Just here is the point 



ethics. r >:43 

where various systems fail : they attempt to build ethics 
without laying the foundation. They do not go deep 
enough; they assert responsibility without giving a 
sufficient reason for it ; they construct a system which 
has significance only for personality, but ignore person- 
ality itself, or at least its legitimate inferences ; and 
their whole work is an effort somehow to conjure from 
the must of nature the ought of reason. What wonder 
if in such systems of ethics the essential characteristic 
of ethics is wanting ? However we may try to avoid 
them, there are certain postulates without which a 
moral system is impossible : Personality as the ground 
of obligation and the condition for its apprehension ; 
reason or design in the universe, giving certain ends 
or an end to be realized ; and a future life for meting 
out that justice which is not attained here. If these 
are admitted, it will also be necessary to postulate the 
existence of God, without whom it is impossible to find 
for them a rational basis. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Definition of Ethics. Relation to other departments 
of Philosophy. Rational and theological Ethics. Basis 
of Ethics in human nature. Different Systems of 
Ethics. Their relation to this basis. Relation of Right 
and Happiness. Criticism of Intuitionalism and Utili- 
tarianism. What is Conscience ? How regarded by 
Evolutionism? Objections. What is involved in the 
concepts of Obligation and Responsibility? Define 
Personality. The Useful, or Means as an End. The 
Conception of Freedom demanded by Ethics. Ethics 
of Materialism. Source of Ethical Ideals. What is 
the Good ? God as ethical. Personal and social Ethics. 
Relation of Law, Politics, Sociology, to Ethics. Ethical 



344 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

demands in view of Socialism. Pleasure and Worthi- 
ness. Ethics of Feeling and of Reason. Why seek 
the Happiness of the Greatest Number ? Sacrifice ; 
Benevolence. If Pleasure is the end of Morality, how 
can pleasure ever be wrong ? What is involved in the 
conception of base pleasures? Brute-impulse and Con- 
science. Hope of Immortality as based on Ethics. 
Kant's Argument on Immortality. Heredity, Environ- 
ment, and Rational Ethics. Objective Standard of 
Ethics. Mind freeing itself from things in Ethics. 
Ethics and Design. Is he responsible for any thing 
who is not intended for any thing? Kant's Categor- 
ical Imperative. His Essence of Morality in a Good 
Will. Aristotle's Essence of Morality in the realization 
of the Design of our being. Is a Good Will original 
or acquired? How is Remorse possible? Is a knowl- 
edge of Right and Wrong innate? What is innate? 
The relation of Reason and Feeling to Volition. 
Ethics as the culmination of Philosophy. Freedom of 
the Will. Relation of Morality to Religion. Postu- 
lates of Ethics. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 345 



CHAPTER X. 

THE SPIRIT AND THE METHOD IN THE STUDY 
OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Inquiry among students from the most prominent 
institutions has revealed the surprising fact that they 
were permitted to finish their collegiate course without 
receiving special instruction respecting the aim and 
value of the particular studies, and respecting the 
proper spirit and best method in their pursuit. As a 
consequence, certain branches were studied simply be- 
cause required as conditions of graduation, not because 
their importance for mental development and practical 
application was appreciated. Under these circum- 
stances it is not strange that so many studies are pur- 
sued in a mechanical way, and tend to hinder rather 
than to develop the spirit of the real student. A 
study should be made rational by indicating its nature 
and aim, and by showing how it can be pursued most 
successfully. It is certainly presuming too much to 
suppose that the student understands the purposes of 
studies which are entirely new to him ; and many who 
are eager to learn do not get the full benefit of instruc- 
tion in the classics, mathematics, history, and philosophy, 
because they are left to grope their way in the dark. 
The answer of many students to the question, Were 
you taught the aims of your various studies, and the 
best method of pursuing them ? is, " No ; I was left in 



346 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the dark until I discovered, after years of hard toil, 
what I should have known in the beginning." Not a 
few admit, even after graduation, that they do not 
know how to study. 

Of all studies, philosophy is the most purely rational ; 
and in order that its pursuit may be rational, the 
student should get a clear idea of the nature of philos- 
ophy, of the aim and spirit in the study, and the best 
method for attaining success. If heretofore the chief 
aim has been to determine the nature and purpose of 
philosophy, the attention will now be concentrated on 
the demands made by philosophy on the investigator ; 
in other words, we shall now consider the spirit and 
method in the study of philosophy. 

While this spirit and method are necessarily involved 
in all the preceding discussions, their separate treat- 
ment affords an opportunity for a definite statement of 
what was all along implied, and for giving a summary 
of the conditions essential for the solution of the prob- 
lems presented. While this chapter is therefore in part 
a review of the course already taken, its chief aim is to 
help the student to become an independent philosoph- 
ical inquirer. 

Philosophy is theoretical wisdom, or the idea of wis- 
dom traced to its ultimate principles. The study of 
philosophy requires practical wisdom, which consists 
in the choice of a worthy end, in identifying the spirit 
with that choice and end, so that it becomes an embodi- 
ment of them, and in selecting the best means for the 
attainment of the end. For the student of philosophy, 
practical wisdom therefore requires a clear conception 
of philosophy itself, and a knowledge of the way to its 
attainment, — requirements peculiarly difficult when the 
mere comprehension of the nature of the desired object 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 347 

demands such laborious investigation as philosophy. 
If an object can be discovered only by pursuing the 
way that leads to that object, it is not very logical 
to ask the student to determine definitely the object 
desired, in order that he may find the way to it. This 
forecasting of the mind, this anticipatory and prophetic 
element, which becomes the impulse and guide to reali- 
zation and fulfilment, is among the most important of 
our mental functions. A sketch is thus made by the 
mind which it afterwards fills out ; an ideal is shad- 
owed, and life is absorbed in the effort to make the 
ideal itself clearer and real. Thus we define an object, 
and then we seek the object itself with all its wealth 
of fulness. Were the definition more than a shadow, 
we should not be required to follow its outlines so long 
and laboriously in order to find the substance. But 
how important the shallow of philosophy if it leads to 
the substance which casts it ! 

The object of search is brought nearer and becomes 
more distinct in proportion as progress is made in the 
journey. The mountain outlined against the distant 
horizon gives but a faint idea of the real ascent. Just 
as the domain of science grows clearer, as conquest 
after conquest is made, so the nature and the sphere 
of philosophy can be understood only in the ratio of 
progress in philosophical study. The student must 
expect the greatest difficulties in the beginning ; but 
with the right start, he will find that every forward 
step leads him to greater clearness and to richer pos- 
sessions. The most extensive view can be obtained 
only on the summit ; but every progress in the ascent 
enlarges the view and makes the summit itself more 
distinct. 

Philosophy, then, is presented to the student simply 



348 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

as a problem for solution. He is requested to define 
it sharply, and to ponder the definition until the out- 
lines stand distinctly before his mind. But for the 
contents of philosophy we are obliged to refer him to 
the solution itself. 

The subject-matter of philosophy may be represented 
by concentric circles; the outer one representing being; 
the next, the theory of knowledge ; the third, the theory 
of feeling, or aesthetics ; the fourth and innermost, the 
theory of volition, or ethics. Philosophy does not pro- 
pose to exhaust the contents of these circles, but only 
to give the principles and their rational systems. In 
each case philosophy goes behind the details to find the 
first thought, the beginning, not dependent on other 
thoughts, but itself the condition of all thinking in that 
particular circle. A dark background, impenetrable to 
our reason, may lie behind thaj; basis from which all 
our reasoning must start ; but human philosophy does 
not demand the discovery of what is absolutely first, but 
only what is necessarily the starting-point for human 
thinking. If we are unable to comprehend the whole 
circle of truth, philosophy demands that the mind pass 
to the utmost limit of its capacities, so that it may 
reach what for human reason is ultimate. Philosophy 
is thus a limitation for the sake of a determination of 
the first and last rational thought. Distinct from reli- 
gion, and yet in many respects intimately related to it ; 
sharply separated from the special sciences, yet giving 
the basis and completion of all science ; related to 
psychology as the temple to the vestibule ; related to 
history as the rational to the phenomenal, and to life 
as the theoretical is to the practical, — the ideal philoso- 
phy is peculiar, with its domain clearly marked, and 
yet in living connection with all the other realms of 



SPIBIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 349 

thought. Philosophy can no more exist by itself than 
we can breathe without air; and other departments are 
no more complete without philosophy than is the gene- 
sis of the oak without the acorn as its seed and fruit. 

Philosophy, which is viewed objectively as a system 
of ultimate rational principles, is to be made subjective, 
or the real possession of the mind. In the effort to 
solve this problem, the question respecting the spirit 
required in the study of philosophy is of fundamental 
importance. While the spirit is first considered, we 
are well aware that it cannot be wholly separated 
from the method. Thus dogmatism, scepticism, criti- 
cism, eclecticism, empiricism, and idealism indicate a 
particular method in philosophy, but also a certain 
spirit as the source or accompaniment of the method. 
While the one always accompanies the other, we give 
the preference to the spirit as supreme, and as really the 
determining factor. 

An attractive view of truth regards it as a seed 
planted in the mind as the soil, and growing according 
to its own inherent powers and laws, into the whole 
system of truth. This makes a truth its own spirit 
and method, the mind merely furnishing the nourish- 
ment required for the growth. Then a correct thought 
deep and broad enough need but be discovered and 
planted in order to develop itself into the whole system 
of philosophy. The figure certainly has the merit of 
indicating the absorption of the mind required in the 
development of philosophic systems. But the objection 
to it is that a process is attributed to thought which is 
really performed by the mind itself. No thought grows 
of itself; all the productiveness attributed to it inheres 
in the mind. It is consequently better to change the 
figure, and to regard the truth as an organism which 



350 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

has become independent of the womb, and develops 
itself, and appropriates all that enters into contact with 
it. This organism is the spirit itself as the embodiment 
of a particular truth. The energy of thought is but the 
intellectual energy of the mind itself. Without hyper- 
bole we can say that the truth becomes spirit, and the 
spirit truth. It is no more possible to divorce the spirit 
from its thought, than to separate the sap from the 
living tree. The consideration of the condition of the 
spirit is therefore of primary importance, since its char- 
acter and degree of attainment determine its apprehen- 
sion of truth, beauty, and goodness, and the nature of 
the development formed by the apprehension of them. 

Intellectual development is as truly self-culture as is 
the formation of character ; and it can never be under- 
stood so long as we regard it as a process which takes 
place in us, but of which we are not a part. Of every 
one it must be said, "As he thinketh in his heart, so 
is he." A new thought is a new mental fibre ; it both 
gives us what we had not, and makes us what we were 
not. The mind is not a receptacle into which thought 
is put and held, as something distinct from it; but an 
organism, which in the production of a fresh thought 
puts all its mental attainments into new relations by 
introducing this new element, and also itself attains 
new relations and assumes new attitudes. Whatever 
it may be potentially or ideally, the intellect is really 
only what it thinks ; and in the deepest sense a man 
possesses intellectually only what he thinks. 

Tins view of the organic union of the mind and its 
products — instead of the mechanic one permitting a 
total separation of the two — reveals the essentialness 
of a true spirit in the investigation of truth. In our 
thoughts we have not merely a manifestation of truth 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 351 

or error, but also a revelation of the intellect. It is 
not exact enough to say that in intellectual progress 
there is a constant series of action and re-action, for 
there is in reality only mental action ; but we can say 
that the truth grows in the mind, and the mind grows 
in the truth. 

Since the mind and its products constitute an organ- 
ism, all that has intellectual significance must enter 
this organism and become part of its constitutive ele- 
ments. There are in reality no laws for a mind except 
so far as they are laws of that mind. Rules for a study 
or an art are valuable in proportion as they become 
spirit. Their aim is pedagogical. Coming first as a 
foreign element, they are to domineer over the mind 
until it is trained into harmony with them, and becomes 
an embodiment of them. We learn rules of grammar 
to forget them ; but we so completely grow them into 
ourselves that we naturally speak correctly. The same 
is true of logical, assthetical, and ethical rules ; their 
mission is accomplished when they become life and 
spirit, act spontaneously, and require special reflection 
if we are to become conscious of them. Genius does 
not ignore law ; it is law become personality and spon- 
taneity. Since its rules are so purely personal and sub- 
jective, not foreign and external, genius may be least 
able to explain its operations. 

Rules being for discipline and for training, their sig- 
nificance, particularly in philosophical studies, consists 
less in what they teach than what they make us. The 
spirit itself must be true if its impulses are to be toward 
the truth. In a peculiar sense a man's philosophy 
depends on himself; in the system he produces, the 
philosopher gives expression to himself. Hence Fichte 
said, " The philosophy which one chooses is determined 



352 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

by the character of the man ; for a philosophical system 
is not a dead article, it is animated by the soul of the 
man who has it." In the case of Fichte, as well as of 
Kant, the strong moral elements of the man are seen in 
his philosophy. How can a philosophy be true to the 
man, unless he himself is the soul of the system ? We 
can seek and comprehend only that to which there is 
an analogy in t the mind; and we can product* those 
thoughts only whose seeds are within the soul. These 
considerations make it evident that philosophy, so often 
treated as purely objective and. as a mere abstraction, 
can become real, concrete, only by becoming subjective ; 
and that the subjective state, the character of the spirit, 
will determine the objective character of the philosophy. 
This is only an application of the law that the cause 
must be equal to the effect. 

The influence of thought on volition is universally 
recognized, but the power exerted by the will on the 
thoughts is not fully appreciated. Thinking contains 
an ethical as well as a logical element ; and frequently, 
when mistakes and errors occur, the will rather than 
the intellect requires changing. Pestalozzi's saying 
applies to intellect as well as to life : " If a man resolves 
any thing firmly, he can accomplish more than he be- 
lieves." Jacobi affirms,* that experience and history 
had taught him, "that the action of man is less depend- 
ent on his thinking, than his thoughts depend on his 
conduct." We are not philosophers by nature, nor is 
the usual training calculated to make us philosophical 
thinkers. In order to philosophize, it is necessary to 
infuse the energy of thought with the energy of the will. 
Amid the ordinary interests and tendencies of men, it 
requires a character of peculiar strength to devote the 

* In a letter to Hainann. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 353 

intellect to the problems of philosophy, and to make 
the sacrifices involved in this devotion. The Greeks 
regarded philosophy as in a special sense a free choice, 
as something that must be deliberately willed, and 
purely for its own sake. He who cannot exercise this 
rational choice, and put his whole spirit into it, has not 
grasped the meaning of philosophizing. The necessity 
for philosophy is in the irresistible energy of the free 
mind. So far is it from finding its occasion in the ordi- 
nary pursuits of life, that philosophy may even interfere 
with many of them, regarding them unworthy of the 
effort required. It is not accidental that it does not 
usually appear among a people until their immediate 
necessities are supplied, and industrial and commercial 
interests have ceased to absorb the attention. Philos- 
ophy is not pursued as a bread-and-butter study ; it 
does not lead to wealth, but it gives riches their true 
value as means, while despising them as an end; the 
learned professions do not make it a condition of mem- 
bership ; it is not necessary to make a man popular, but 
rather unfits him for the usual level of popularity. 
" No man of science ever has in view the utility of his 
work," said Liebig; indeed, he is too much absorbed by 
science itself to consider any ulterior aim. The same is 
true of the philosophic spirit. It does not ignore or 
question the utility of its pursuit, but neither does it 
permit this utility to distract its purely rational aim. 
The immediate use of philosophy consists in the satis- 
faction it affords the mind itself, and in that it constantly 
impels the mind to become deeper, higher, and broader. 
If what is vulgarly called "practical" robs the mind cf 
its ideals, or leads to their depreciation, philosophy 
denounces it as a positive degradation of individuals 
and nations. The ideals, as forecastings and prophecies 



354 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of the mind, give freshness, inspiration, and a worthy 
aim to the spirit, and furnish the standard by which the 
practical should be measured. They are real, not as 
actual attainments, but as ends to be sought ; and their 
destruction means the death of the highest mental life. 
Where the ideals die, pessimism flourishes. 

If asked to concentrate into one term all that consti- 
tutes the true spirit of the student of philosophy, I refer 
to the etymology of the word, and answer : the love of 
wisdom. Love is an affection, and cannot be translated 
into thought ; but when wisdom is loved, the affection 
has its source in the conviction of the desirableness of 
wisdom, and the consciousness of its lack. Where con- 
ceit flourishes, there is no room for philosophy. Humil- 
ity grows with depth ; and the profoundest philosopher is 
intellectually the humblest. Intellectual pride may lift 
the empty head, never the full one. Few fathom self 
enough to know how little they know. The true stu- 
dent of philosophy soon learns that mental verdancy 
culminates in conceit, just as the folly of fashion in 
vanity ; and in proportion to the depth attained will he 
appreciate the well-known saying of Newton, " I do not 
know what I may appear to others, but to myself I seem 
to have been only like a boy playing on the seashore, 
and diverting myself in now and then finding a 
smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, 
whilst the great -ocean of truth lay all undiscovered 
before me." Only those who know not of the undis- 
covered ocean are lost in pride over the pebble and the 
shell. 

The work of Socrates consisted largely in leading the 
mind to examine itself with a view of becoming con- 
scious of its needs. The knowledge of one's ignorance he 
regarded as the essence of wisdom. Plato (Symjiosium') 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 355 

puts into his mouth the sentiment that neither the gods 
nor any one already wise either philosophizes or desires 
wisdom, for one longs only for what he has not. Nor 
do the ignorant seek wisdom, because they are satisfied 
with their ignorance. Both the stupid and the conceited 
are thus excluded from philosophy. Plato frequently 
emphasizes knowledge of self as the most important 
object of search. In his Phcedros, Socrates says that he 
has no time to spend on the interpretation of the myth- 
ologies, and states as the reason the fact that he does 
not yet know himself, and so long as he is ignorant of 
self he regards it ridiculous, to investigate other objects. 
Self-knowledge is thus made the object of supreme 
importance. When he comes with Phasdros to a plan- 
tain-tree, on the bank of the Ilissos, Socrates breaks 
out in rapture over the beauty of the scenery, which is 
strange to him. Phaedros is surprised that the scenery 
is not familiar ; but Socrates answers that he is eager 
to learn, but that country and trees teach him nothing, 
while lie can learn from men in the city. Without 
depreciating other knowledge, we must emphasize, with 
Socrates and Plato, the knowledge of self and man in 
general, as a primary condition for the study of phi- 
losophy. 

The love of wisdom gives both the impulse and the 
aim in philosophical inquiries. Wisdom can be found 
only in the truth. All truths are not equally impor- 
tant, but whatever is not true is worse than worthless. 
Philosophy, viewed as a subjective state, is an absorbing 
passion for the highest and the final truth. With the 
purity of this passion no interest must be permitted to 
interfere. However intense the passion itself, the pur- 
suit requires singular calmness and deliberation. The 
mind must concentrate its energies on the subject under 



356 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

consideration, losing itself in that, and following it 
unhesitatingly to its legitimate conclusions. The truth 
alone excepted, no results whatever are to be considered. 
Philosophy wants to get at the heart of things, so as to 
discover their source and interpret their nature ; these 
do not conform to our views and inclinations, but we 
must conform to them. The philosophic spirit is revo- 
lutionary, and yet conservative, being ready to destroy 
itself and all things else if not conformed to the truth, 
and equally ready to sacrifice all to preserve existing 
truth. Not seeking to make the subjective objective, 
but the reverse, it cannot be enamoured with the arbi- 
trary, is not controlled by the accidental, and laughs at 
the transient fashion in opinions. It seeks the eternal, 
and knows that nothing but truth is eternal. The 
power of truth is the thinker's power and hope. The 
reception given to the views of Copernicus made Gali- 
leo hesitate to publish the results of some of his investi- 
gations. But Kepler wrote: "Have confidence and go 
forward, Galileo ! If I see aright, there will be few of 
Europe's more important mathematicians who will dis- 
sent from our view, so great is the power of truth." 
Every student of philosophy must say with Locke : " It 
is truth alone I seek; and that will always be welcome 
to me, when or from whence soever it comes." It is 
not necessary for a man to be a philosopher ; but if he 
wants to be one. in reality, not merely in name, he must 
be true to the truth. 

Schopenhauer declared that it was not in harmony 
with devotion to truth, for a philosopher to accept a 
position as professor of philosophy. He affirmed that 
in the teaching of philosophy in the university £he 
disadvantages were greater than the advantages; and 
he spoke with contempt of the philosophy of the cathe- 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 357 

dra (Kathederpliilosophie) . He thought it unworthy 
of a philosopher to be dependent on the appointing 
powers, and held that the considerations of the state 
and religion might induce him to swerve from the 
truth ; and to accept pay for his instruction made it 
seem as if the teacher was more intent on making the 
truth minister to himself and family than to devote 
himself wholly and disinterestedly to the truth. This 
view may be an extreme ; but it must be admitted that 
an official position as teacher of philosophy has by no 
means always been promotive of an unbiassed and inde- 
pendent relation to the truth. And from Descartes to 
Hartmann, some of the most influential philosophers 
have not been professors, — among them, besides the 
two just named, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 
Leibnitz, and many others, particularly English phi- 
losophers. A discipline whose realm is the highest 
truth can evidently be promoted by those only who 
unreservedly consecrate themselves to the truth, re- 
gardless of emoluments and of opprobrium ; and a 
philosophy that is not free is not worthy of the name. 
But if the philosopher retains his freedom, an appoint- 
ment as teacher of philosophy may be an efficient way 
of promoting the truth. 

For the philosophic thinker, the danger of prejudice 
consists in the fact that its influence is mainly uncon- 
scious, working so insidiously as to make its cause the 
synonyme of truth, and then enlisting all the energies 
in favor of that cause. When once entertained, preju- 
dice never rests until it becomes universal and om- 
nipotent. The persistence of force applies fully to 
the mind. A course deliberately chosen will in time 
control the intellect unconsciously; it forms habits to 
which every thing is made tributary. A single volition 



358 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

may be as a seed which grows through life and assimi- 
lates to itself intellect, heart, and will. However diffi- 
cult it may be to become conscious of the principles 
which control us, they must be known if the pernicious 
power of prejudice is to be destroyed. 

Views transmitted from generation to generation are 
thoughtlessly adopted and, fortified by the blind zeal 
of prejudice, are made norms of thought and action. 
Where heredity, history, and the dominant factors of 
an age, usurp the place of reason, we find men thrust 
into ruts from which they can be forced only with a 
painful wrench. Whoever has seized the idea of phi- 
losophy as reason in the exercise of its universal and 
eternal functions, can hardly understand the possibility 
of making national prejudice a factor in philosophical 
studies.* Endowed with the universality of reason, 
philosophy is superior to the peculiarities of ages, 
nationalities, and schools. It is better to call it super- 
national than international, since its principles repre- 
sent what is above the nations, rather than what is 
interpenetrative and common to them. What difference 
can it make to him who is absorbed solely in the search 

* This prejudice is most senseless in philosophy, yet not uncommon: 
traces of it are, in fact, found in every land. Speaking of the disciples 
of Kosmini and Gioberti, Barzellotti (Philosophy in Italy, Mind, 1878) 
says: " The disciples clung to the words of their masters, and rejected 
all innovation and all impartial study of foreign doctrines. The senti- 
ment and the idea of ' Italianism ' in philosophy, which were certainly 
exaggerated by Giolxerti, but yet when he wrote had some justification, 
became in some of his followers a prejudice and a pretext for narrow- 
ness of mind and ignorance of all modern culture." "The upholders 
of Italian doctrines erred in despising German philosophy, while they 
did not know it; the Hegelians and Kantians erred in wishing to make 
Italians think wholly in the manner of Germans." Professor Maharfy 
says, " In reviewing the theories of past thinkers, the main objects with 
Stewart and his school were to magnify them if they were Scotch, and 
to decry them if they were unorthodox." (Princeton Bev.,l$7S, July, 
225.) Similar instances might be multiplied. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 359 

for truth, whether a system originated in Greece, Ger- 
many, England, Scotland, or America, if only it is true? 
The philosophic spirit scorns every effort to make truth, 
science, philosophy, or religion, questions of nationality, 
just because it seeks what is deep and broad as human- 
ity. While philosophy thus transcends the temporal 
and the local, it does not ignore the abiding and uni- 
versal elements in them, but seeks their interpretation 
and appropriation. A system is necessarily largely 
influenced by the age and national peculiarities, and 
it cannot be true to its author and his surroundings 
unless it has a flavor of both. If the development of 
philosophy is to be promoted among a people, the 
growth and present condition of the nation must be 
considered. The attainments made are the starting- 
point for all future progress, and the soil into which 
all imported seeds of culture must be planted. Every 
system of philosophy is racy. Imported systems must 
consequently be grafted on the tree of knowledge 
already growing ; they must somehow be adapted to 
the national life if they are to be assimilated ; or, the 
national life, if false, must be so changed as to bring 
it into harmony with the truth. But it is not the 
temporal or national peculiarities which give a philo- 
sophical system its rational excellences. Truth is 
cosmopolitan. 

Whatever the ideal of philosophy may be, every 
actual system is, in a measure, the product of past 
systems and of the environment. Even those which 
laid greatest claim to absoluteness are no exception. 
Hegel held that it is the mission of philosophy "to 
seize the present and the real." He regarded the truly 
real as the rational, and said, " It is the task of philoso- 
phy to comprehend that which is; for that which is, 



360 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

is reason. As far as the individual is concerned, he is, 
of course, a son of his age; and philosophy likewise 
is the translation of the age into thought. It is as foolish 
to imagine that any philosophy transcends its present 
world, as that an individual leaps beyond his age." * 
While there is truth in this, every system, to be 
worthy of attention, must be more than a reproduction 
of past systems and of its own age : it must be an inter- 
preter, critic, and prophet. Above all, philosophy must 
not become the imitator of the prevailing fashion. The 
philosopher, seeking to get from his age those elements 
which are eternal, namely, the principles lying behind 
phenomena and controlling them, must maintain his 
independence, and strive to rise above the particular, 
individual, and variable, into the realm of pure and 
universal reason. A philosophic system is the product 
of a free, rational thinker, under the influence of past 
systems and his own age. Especially to philosophers 
does the saying of the historian Ranke apply : " Great 
men do not make their age, but neither are they made 
by it. They are original minds, who independently 
participate in the conflict of ideas, concentrate the 
mightiest of them, those on which the future depends, 
develop them, and are developed by them." 

A philosopher cannot divest himself of his peculiari- 
ties and individuality : how should they affect his phi- 
losophy? No one can deny or transcend his nature, 
but he can cultivate it into the truth. The principal 
point to be decided is, whether the individual should 
be made the test of truth, or whether the universal is 
the law to which all that is individual must conform. 
Individuality is the standpoint of the ego, universality 
that of reason. Philosophy seeks the truth, not my 

* Preface to Philosophie des Rechts. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 361 

truth. History deals largely with opinions, with the 
exceptional and the individual ; philosophy, with what 
is universally the eternally rational. 

Philosophy is destructive of credulity as well as of 
prejudice. Whatever of Kant's system may be rejected 
in the progress of thought, the critical spirit he intro- 
duced will remain. The philosopher takes for granted 
nothing which is subject to demonstration ; and if any 
thing accepted cannot be demonstrated, he must give 
the reason for this inability, and the reason for the 
acceptance. In this respect he is no less rigid than 
the mathematician. Indeed, he is in some respects 
more rigid. While the mathematician assumes axioms, 
the philosopher makes axioms themselves objects of 
rational inquiry. Errors long cultivated are with great- 
est difficulty rooted from the mind, and even after the 
most critical investigation the truth may escape our 
grasp. It is particular^ in adopting a system or prin- 
ciples, that the student should be on his guard.* 

* Whoever would learn with what caution philosophical works 
should he read, need hut examine any thorough criticism of eminent 
authors. The student who is in danger of undue influence from a 
favorite author or teacher would do well to consider that ages of careful 
testing may he required to determine a correct estimate of a system. 
Thinkers are still intent on sifting the systems of Kant and Hegel, and 
even the relative merits of Plato and Aristotle have not been finally 
settled. With all their excellences, H. Spencer's works, as a system 
of philosophy, cannot stand the tests of the criticism of the age in which 
they appeared. On this subject the student will find the articles, hegun 
in the Contemp. Rev., December, 1877, by the late T. H. Green, valuable. 
In the same journal, January, 1878, Jevons gives an instance of the 
difficult}' of discovering the errors of a subtle philosophical writer. 
He states that, according to the traditional requirements of the London 
University, he was obliged to use part of J. S. Mill's works as text- 
books. For twenty years, he says, he made these works a study, and for 
fourteen he used them as text-books. " Some ten years of study passed 
before I began to detect their fundamental unsoundness. During the 
last ten years, the conviction has gradually grown upon my mind that 
Mill's authority is doing immense injury to the cause of philosophy and 



362 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

In the deepest sense the philosopher seeks reality, 
aiming constantly to get at the essence of things. Not 
that he despises phenomena or form, bnt he seeks to 
value them at their worth. The steady aim at intel- 
lectual realities is especially demanded in an age when 
so many delight in visions. Truth has not set its seal 
on the soul which requires rhetoric, poetry, or fictitious 
adornments to make the truth acceptable. It may 
require considerable philosophic depth to distinguish 
between the truth and its trappings, between the sub- 
stance and the style. 

Few things are more intolerable than the scholastic 
boor, who wears his logic on his sleeve, demands a dem- 
onstration for what belongs to natural impulse, and 
who deadens thought, emotion, and inspiration, by tor- 
turing them into the Procrustean bed of his syllogisms. 
Philosophy is not to pervert nature, but to aid it in 
realizing its ideal. The era of Wolff, when men wanted 
every thing in lectures, sermons, books, and conversa- 
tion, to conform to mathematical rules, is past; the 
mechanical and artificial character of his philosophy is 
not adapted to an age of vigorous and healthy thought. 
Rousseau was right : education is a naturalization of 
men, not their transformation into machines. 

It would be a wrong to the student to leave on his 
mind the impression that in the study of philosophy 
any thing can take the place of the severest toil. Men- 
tal power is essential, but not enough ; it must be con- 
verted into energy. The mind must put itself wholly 

good intellectual training in England." He even declares: " I under- 
take to show that there is hardly one of his more important and peculiar 
doctrines which he has not himself amply refuted." Many other 
equally severe charges are made against him. Numerous other 
examples might be given, all of which are warnings, especially to the 
beginner, to be extremely slow and critical in adopting a system. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 363 

into the subject. Whatever genius may do in art, he 
who depends on it in philosophy will fail. All philoso- 
phers have been toilers. The student of philosophy, 
as well as of science, may learn a lesson from the 
patient, steady labors of Newton. Pie would admit no 
difference between himself and others, except in perse- 
verance and vigilance. " When he was asked how he 
made his discoveries, he answered, ' By always thinking 
about them ; ' and at another time he declared that if 
he had done any thing, it was due to nothing but indus- 
try and patient thought : ' I keep the subject of my 
inquiry constantly before me, and wait till the first 
dawning opens gradually, by little and little, into a full 
and clear light.' " * 

It should not be the first aim of the student to learn 
many things, or to adopt or form a system; but to 
think, to think correctly and profoundly. If this is 
well learned, it makes him the master of systems ; and 
if nothing else is gained, it will pay him for the effort 
to penetrate the most abstruse subjects, and to solve 
the most intricate problems. If in other studies the 
attention is directed mainly to the acquisition of knowl- 
edge, in philosophy the aim is depth, — the pursuit of a 
thought to its ultimate source, and the reduction of the 
multiplicity of phenomena to their underlying princi- 
ples ; so that, instead of gathering new materials of 
knowledge, the aim is rather to find the absolute expla- 
nation of what is already found. But by this thorough 
appropriation of what we have, the deepest and best 
new possessions are gained. The delving process 
reveals treasures of wisdom never to be found on the 
surface. Just as in the chemical substances, so in intel- 
lect, much that was thought to be simple is found to 

* Whewell, II. 192. 



3G4 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILOSOPIIY. 

be compound; what was viewed as isolated, is seen 
to be intimately connected with other thoughts and to 
lead to them ; what was pronounced exhausted is, by 
renewed study, made to yield fresh seed-thoughts; 
hidden recesses, new principles, and undiscovered terri- 
tories are thus revealed, and new applications are made 
possible.* The mind, thus disciplined, in the course 
of time forms the habit of looking at things from the 
rational point of view, and the deep, exhaustive study 
of subjects becomes the natural bent of the intellect. 
The spirit endowed with energy of thought, with a 
comprehensive grasp, with a disposition to go to the 
depths, and with the ability to descend through the in- 
finite variety to the fundamental unity, has the elements 
of a philosopher. The one advice to be given to the 
student, and always to be repeated and emphasized, is 
— Think.t 

The requirements are such that, if fully appreciated, 
they may deter many, who are eager to learn, from 
devoting themselves to philosophy. Without comply- 
ing with these hard conditions, much may be learned 
from the reading of philosophic works ; but they must 
be fully complied with if the subject itself is to be 
truly entered and the philosophic spirit cultivated. The 

* Herbart (Einleitxing, 192) says, " Every system which does not 
wholly separate its theoretical from its practical part, has hidden 
sources, which the author himself does not fully understand, hut which 
must be exposed in the course of the examination." 

t Schaarschmidt (Phil. Monatsh. 1877, 5), speaking of what is required 
of him who would become a philosopher, says, " It is the activity of 
the polymcthist, one might almost say of the panmathist, which is 
required as a preliminary. And yet the positive, so-called exact knowl- 
edge is still the least of the requirements; for it is not knowledge which 
constitutes the philosopher, but thinking, concentrated, thorough, 
methodically trained thinking, to which the sum total of scientific at- 
tainment is but a premise with which it starts in its search for the last 
abstractions and highest ideas." 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 365 

numerous efforts to popularize systems may have a 
measure of success, but what is deepest in philosophy 
cannot be made popular. There is no hope of success 
for those who do not think in the best sense, except 
that they may get a smattering of what others have 
thought ; but their minds can more easily be filled from 
other sources than philosophy. The study is not for 
those who want to taste many things and digest noth- 
ing, or who neglect solid food in order to live on 
desserts, a process which promotes mental dyspepsia. 
Those who want to receive their truths as happy intui- 
tions, or imagine themselves philosophers by instinct, 
should be sent to learn a lesson from the instinct of the 
ant and the bee. Philosophy may be dreamt of, but is 
never dreamt. But for the slow, patient plodder, there 
is every encouragement : for that brilliancy, however, 
which wants to scintillate its philosophy, there is none. 
Where independent thought is wedded with a genius 
for toil, the best results may be expected. A man may 
be an orator, a poet, or an artist, who cannot be a phi- 
losopher ; he may be a philosopher, and lack the quali- 
ties which shine before men. Philosophy does not go 
by leaps. Every foot of ground must be conquered and 
earned before it can be possessed ; nothing is inherited, 
nothing comes by lot or chance, nothing is bestowed as 
a gift. The student of philosophy may learn a valua- 
ble lesson from the slowness and accuracy of scientific 
investigation. Herbart said: "Instruction in philos- 
ophy, without exactness, makes only fantasts and fools." 
Enthusiasm may be a help, but it creates no truth ; it is 
valuable if it leads to depth, but an injury if it encour- 
ages flights from solid ground into regions of re very and 
mythology. Philosophy has no oracles, and no miracles 
of speculation. It is the most prosaic prose, whose sole 



366 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILOSOPIir. 

apology for existence is the fact that the mind cannot do 
without it. 

When beheld from the street, the painted windows of 
a cathedral are all blurred; in order to see the figures 
distinctly, and to learn what sacred scenes are repre- 
sented, one must enter the temple, and view them from 
the sanctuary itself. So it is with philosophy: to see 
and appreciate it, the temple itself must be entered. 
Many come to the door, few pass through the vestibule ; 
perhaps the momentary opening of the door gives a faint 
and fleeting impression of the grandeur, and affords a 
hasty glance at significant but uninterpreted symbols. 
However others may hesitate, let the true student enter 
boldly ; it is his sanctuary. For the earnest thinker, 
there is every encouragement to study philosophy. If 
little has as yet been done that can be regarded as final, 
so much the more remains to be accomplished. Her- 
bart's words apply to our day as well as to his own : 
" The truth lies before, not behind us ; and let him who 
seeks it look forward, not backward. In his reflections, 
let him advance as impelled by the problems presented." * 
He will find limitations, but even their discovery is of 
great value ; and within the limits of the mind he will 
find more than enough to enlist his best energies in 
philosophic pursuits. Should it be discovered at last 
that the ultimate problems of being are unsolvable, he 
will find even in metaphysics vast regions which the 
mind can explore and in which new discoveries are pos- 
sible ; while the theories of knowledge, of feeling, and 
of volition are practically inexhaustible. There maybe 
subjects which are not worthy of great energy ; but 
worthy of greater effort than we can exert are those 
problems which underlie all others, involve our deepest 
interests, and constitute the domain of philosophy. 

* Einleitunrj, 212. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 367 

Having considered the Spirit, we now turn to the 
Method in the study of philosophy. 

This method must not be confounded with any sup- 
posed absolute method of philosophy itself, nor with 
the method adopted by a particular system, as eclecti- 
cism, idealism, or the Hegelian dialectic process. It is 
not our purpose here to determine how philosophy 
itself must proceed, but how the mind ought to proceed 
in order to study philosophy. The subjective method 
of study, not the objective method of philosophy, is 
under consideration. 

The pedagogical training for philosophy is one thing, 
the mastering of a philosophical system another, and 
different from both is the formation of the system itself. 
While the first is the chief aim of this volume, it can 
accomplish its purpose only by keeping the other two 
continually in view as the goal of the mental discipline. 
In the process through which the student himself must 
pass, he wants not merely to learn philosophy, but also 
to become a philosopher. Out of his present self and 
his surroundings, he seeks to develop himself to the ideal, 
so that the highest prophecy embodied in his intellectual 
being may be fulfilled. According to Hegel, what the 
mind is implicitly (an sicK), potentially, or in idea, that 
it should strive to become really. The thinker knows 
that reason as attributed to the human mind is an 
abstraction, not a concrete reality. Reason, like phi- 
losophy itself, is in a process of becoming; but it is 
not yet. When the student objectifies philosophy, 
abstracting it as something wholly apart from mind, 
he recognizes it as still requiring a certain process of 
development toward perfection. That process which 
he ascribes to objective philosophy, must be performed 
by his own mind in the study and the development of 



368 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy. This subjective process is long and labo- 
rious, and his habitual methods of intellect may have to 
be changed. Instead of thinking around and about 
things, he must try to enter their heart, so that he may 
get their essence. Not by magic does he pass from the 
surface to the interior; he must slowly drill his way 
into the innermost part, in order there to get a stand- 
point so as to view the whole circumference from the 
centre. Every description of an object from the surface, 
or from a point between the surface and the centre, is 
partial: it misses the centre, and all that lies between 
the point of view and the centre. These descriptions 
may be true so far as they go ; but their mistake begins 
when they proclaim themselves as an exhaustion of the 
subject. Thus there are works on noetics, metaphysics, 
aesthetics, and ethics, which are rich in excellent sugges- 
tions ; but the inquiries move along the shell, and there- 
fore fail to reach the kernel, the seat and source of all life. 
The ultimate philosophic aim is always the idea, — 
the perfect idea, not isolated, but in a completed system. 
In its idea an object is comprehended ; in that, and in that 
only, we see what it is. In its most compressed form 
the idea is a word, as " philosophy," "metaphysics ; " or 
it is a definition. But a word is a mere point, a defini- 
tion is a mere outline ; the developed idea is the whole 
system in its completeness. Thus " philosophy " is a 
word, of which we give a definition, and which stands for 
a perfect sj^stem. This process from the empty to the 
full, from poverty to wealth, from the compressed to 
the expanded, is common to all ideas. We can say that 
the term " philosophy " contains the definition and sys- 
tem; this is true, but they are contained in a latent form, 
and the problem is how to make all the implied content 
a real possession of the mind; just as the word "spirit" 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 369 

contains in mice all that conscious personality involves, 
but just what this really means has been the deepest 
problem of philosophy in all ages. Indeed, there has 
been much discussion whether this spirit exists in all 
possible fulness as conscious personality, or is still toil- 
ing its way up to the real of its ideal. 

From this it is clear what the aim of the student 
of philosophy must be: not to think at objects or of 
them, but to think the objects themselves, that is, to 
apprehend them intellectually. This he does b} r getting 
into the centre, by grasping the idea. But this idea is 
not to be seized merely as a word or definition, but as a 
system with all its wealth of thought. In this way he 
is to master philosophy by comprehending its idea, not 
as a mere point or outline, but in its fullest develop- 
ment and with the richest content. 

This aim of philosophy is again emphasized here 
because its clear apprehension is the condition for secur- 
ing the method that leads to the desired goal. 

The appreciation and rational elaboration of the pro- 
found problems of philosophy require preparatory disci- 
pline as well as mental maturity. The subject naturally 
belongs to the higher classes in college or to a post- 
graduate course. In Germany, the university is re- 
garded as the proper place for its study. All rational 
inquiry, the study of principles, generalizations, abstrac- 
tions, and profound investigation of any kind, may serve 
as a preparation ; but the best discipline for the mind 
properly prepared is philosophy itself. In the prepara- 
tory training, all is valuable in proportion as it teaches 
the pupil to think for himself, to be critical, exact, 
thorough and discriminating, and to distinguish between 
subject and object, and between the object before the 
mind and what it represents. 



370 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The best work in philosophy requires the union of the 
scholar and the thinker. The supreme aim is to philos- 
ophize on the deepest and broadest basis. Malta for the 
sake of multum, is the motto of the philosophic student ; 
and no department of thought, no interest of humanity, 
is to him a matter of indifference. The larger the field 
in which he gathers his materials, and the more compre- 
hensive his view, the more complete will be his gener- 
alizations, and the more reliable his inductions and 
deductions. While going back to the beginning, and 
taking for granted nothing that needs proof, the pro- 
gressive philosophic thinker makes what has already 
been accomplished the starting-point for what remains 
to be done ; in the known he seeks the thread to the 
unknown. While philosophy is not to be studied ex- 
clusively in its history, that history must nevertheless 
be mastered for the sake of penetrating the various sys- 
tems of the past, and understanding the philosophical 
tendencies and needs of the present, thus securing the 
basis on which thinkers must build. In that history 
the weightiest problems of reason are presented, as well 
as the efforts of the greatest minds to solve them. 
The genesis of problems in history corresponds largely 
with that in the mind of the individual ; and the genetic 
stud}^ of philosophic thought not merely develops the 
mind, and both reveals and solves difficulties, but it also 
develops philosophic thought. Memory is valuable as 
an aid in philosophizing, but a hinderance if it becomes 
the substitute. The philosopher is not made by learn- 
ing, but by critically mastering systems ; not by com- 
mitting, but by thinking and perhaps transcending the 
thoughts of other thinkers. 

Original thinking, so strongly emphasized as essential 
for the true study of philosophy, is often but little 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 371 

understood by those expected to engage in it. Perhaps 
they think it implies that even the basis and the con- 
tent of the thought are to be originated. They forget 
that the mind does not create its objects of philosophic 
contemplation out of nothing, and also that reason acts 
according to established and unvarying laws. Not a 
few make fancy the most active agent in what they call 
thinking, regarding it a merit to be able to begin an}^ 
where and end nowhere. Not a few systems would be 
less brilliant, but more substantial, if their fictions were 
banished, and only their rational thought were permitted 
to stand. 

Being subject to the most rigorous laws, original 
thinking rejects every thing that is merely subjective. 
Thinking is not original because peculiar to him who 
performs it, but because he does what all who truly 
think must do in the same way if they take up the 
same course of thought.* The original thinker is one 
who does independently a work which is really as uni- 
versal as mind. If his work lacks that universal char- 
acter (or objectivity), it may have a psychological 
interest as a peculiarity, an eccentricity, or as a mon- 
strosity ; but it has no claim to philosophic thought. 

The thought we pronounce original must be about 
something. Whence this material of thought? We 
have already seen that the mind does not absolutely 
create it; the material must somehow be given to us, 
or be the product of something thus given. In an 
absolute sense, that is, without a posteriori conditions, 

* There is no private property in thought. If a man can originate 
any thing intellectually, which has significance for himself only, and 
which cannot be communicated, he is welcome to hoard it. He has 
found something which everybody else would have thrown away as 
worthless. My feelings may be my own, but my thought must be 
universal if it is to be rational. 



372 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

no -thought is a priori; just as in an absolute sense 
none is a posteriori. The object of original thought 
is either found in consciousness (so full of materials 
before philosophic reflection begins), or is given through 
the senses, or is obtained from the thinking or investi- 
gation or observation of others. The subjects thus 
obtained, or found by reflecting on these materials, 
are elaborated by thought, worked over mentally, so 
that the mind may discover what is in them, or may 
be inferred from them. If the mind adds any foreign 
matter to them, it is not done by original thinking, but 
contrary to all thought. What is original in the sense 
of adding unwarranted elements, should be sedulously 
avoided as the root of error. Real objects, and valid 
thought on these objects, are the conditions of original 
thinking in the true sense. Such thinking is solid, 
fruitful, and abiding; and its value consists in the 
very things which distinguish it from the processes 
which are arbitrary, vague, unsubstantial, and wild. 

It is thus evident that any real subject may be the 
occasion of original thinking. The mind can take it 
up in order to fathom it, so as to discover all it is, 
intellectually considered. Original thought consists in 
all those efforts of thinking which lead to the discovery 
of what was before unknown to the thinker himself, 
though it may have been known to others. A discov- 
ery to the individual may be old in history ; we may 
learn much that is new to us, without producing any 
thing new. 

Ordinarily the mind is left to its spontaneous oper- 
ations, without an effort to give its thought special 
energy or a particular direction, much less to make 
the thinking itself an object of rational inquiry. Phi- 
losophy checks this vagrant course, in order to throw 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 373 

thought back on itself, and oblige it to give a full 
account of itself. Even when the object is not the 
thinking, but the content of thought (the thing thought 
of), the question which philosophy considers is : What 
must I think of this ? Thus in metaphysics, although 
real existence is the object of thought, the question 
to be answered is : What must I think of existence ? 
What do the laws of thought require respecting it? 
If in the experimental sciences (psychology, of course, 
excepted), the mental processes are largely or wholly 
ignored, while the attention is absorbed by the object ; 
in philosophy, whatever the object, the claims of the 
thinking subject are fully recognized. The mind knows 
that the object is its own, and that the treatment to 
which that object is subjected depends wholly on the 
mental laws. 

There is thus good ground for the view that philoso- 
phy is intimately connected with psychology. For all 
the purposes of philosophy, a knowledge of psychology 
is of fundamental importance. Although philosophy is 
not psychological, but rational in its method, — consid- 
ering what must be, not giving descriptions of what 
occurs and an account of the laws uniting phenomena 
into a system, — psychology helps us to find the philo- 
sophical problems. The concepts given in conscious- 
ness, but not fully elaborated by psychological study, 
give the materials with which philosophy begins, as 
well as the divisions of philosophy. What must be 
left by psychology as problems, is taken up by phi- 
losophy for rational solution. All other subjects also 
furnish such problems, but it is by the study of the 
mind itself that we become most fully conscious of 
them. 

After the processes of cognition have been consid- 



374 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

erecl psychologically, we take up for philosophical con- 
templation, first of all, the theory of knowledge. It 
occupies the first place in the study of philosophy 
proper, because on it, as a foundation, the entire super- 
structure rests. Men may, indeed, think correctly with- 
out understanding the laws of thought ; but philosophy 
is only possible when thought is self-conscious. This 
self-consciousness is particularly demanded when the 
prevalent scepticism can only be met by an appeal to 
the criteria of thought. Taking into account the con- 
dition of philosophy and the spirit of the age, it is not 
strange that so many emphasize this theory as the main, 
if not the sole, problem of philosophy. To its solution 
we must look for a firm basis and reliable method. The 
stress placed, since Aristotle's day, on logic as propae- 
deutic to all other studies, must be extended to the 
whole theory of knowledge. The student who prizes 
philosophy as rational knowledge will proceed ration- 
ally only if he, first of all, inquires into the nature, 
the origin, the validity, the method, and the limits of 
this knowledge. 

It is, of course, not meant that no other part of phi- 
losophy should be taken up until all that pertains to 
this theory has been finally settled. In that case we 
should never get beyond the theory. As all the other 
parts of philosophy learn from this theory, so it may 
learn from all of them. Only by developing all depart- 
ments and elements of knowledge, can the theory itself 
be made complete. It is no eiddence of vigorous, 
healthy thinking, to regard knowledge itself impossible 
until the details of the theory are settled, or to spend 
all the time on the theory and miss the knowledge for 
whose sake it exists. 

After the theory of knowledge, it seems most logical 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 375 

to take up metaphysics, both on account of the funda- 
mental character of the thought of being, and because 
this thought is involved in aesthetics and ethics. But 
the inherent difficulty of the subject, and the present 
unsettled state of metaphysical inquiry, may make it 
expedient to leave it to the last. All the other philo- 
sophical studies will then be a preparation for it, and 
the mind will come to it after that thorough discipline 
which is required in order to apprehend its problems. 
This course is the more practicable now, because the 
other departments of philosophy avoid, as much as 
possible, the introduction of metaphysical questions. 
Still the ideal course makes ethics the crown of the 
whole ; but even if placed before metaphysics in the 
course of study, it may be made the goal of all. Its 
study before metaphysics does not determine its place 
in the system, nor does it imply that ethics is to be 
finished then; it can afterwards be made a specialty, and 
all other investigations tributary to its development. 
The whole course of study in college or university is, 
after all, only preparatory for later philosophizing. 
From the seed then planted, the whole life is to 
develop and reap the fruit. 

The scheme then is : Psychology, Theory of Knowl- 
edge, ^Esthetics, Ethics, Metaphysics. The applications 
of philosophy are almost endless, and this is not the 
place to discuss them ; their consideration must be left 
to those who take up the specialties to which they see 
fit to apply philosophy. Thus the jurist will prefer 
the philosophy of law, the statesman the philosophy 
of politics, the linguist the philosophy of language, 
and the theologian the philosophy of religion. Just as 
with the application of philosophy, so with the study 
of its own departments ; one may choose this, another 



376 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

that department, as a specialty, each according to his 
peculiar needs. But for completeness all are neces- 
sary. 

If antiquated subjects live only in history, others 
live both in history and in the present. Among the 
latter we class philosophy. For this reason we cannot 
agree with those who treat it as worthy of study in 
its history, but not according to what it is in itself. 
Only what is finished can be found in perfection in 
history. 

In the study of philosophy, what place shall, then, 
be assigned to its history?* Were there a history of 
philosophy itself, — of the connected and progressive 
development of philosophic thinking, of the growth of 
the organism of rational thought, — not merely of the 
various philosophic systems, it might serve as a most 
valuable introduction to the study of philosophy. 
Even when the history of philosophy means the history 
of the successive systems, as is now the case, there are 
advantages in placing it at the beginning of the course 
as an introduction to philosophy itself. The thoughtful 
student finds this history fascinating, and full of inspira- 
tion ; and the effort to master the various systems is 
a fine discipline for philosophizing. But there are also 
serious disadvantages in putting it first. The student 
is not yet prepared to comprehend the leading problems, 
much less the systems themselves ; for this, the study 
of philosophy proper is the only adequate preparation. 
The mind unprepared for this history is confused by 
the numerous perplexing themes, and lost in the laby- 

* The impulse given by Hegel has led to the production of many- 
valuable histories of philosophy, and the most eminent living writers 
on the subject have come from his school ; as Erdmann of Halle, Zeller 
of Berlin, and Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg. 



SPIRIT AXD METHOD IX THE STUDY. 377 

rinths of speculation.* Instead of clear conceptions, 
a medley of indistinct notions is usually the result. 
Some imagine that in this history they study philosophy 
itself, and perhaps claim to understand philosophy after 
learning a few ideas from different systems. Many 
current views of philosophy have their source in the 
reading of the philosophic thoughts of others, rather 
than in the study of philosophy itself. 

A method to be highly recommended is the simulta- 
neous study of every department of philosophy, both 
according to its essence and in the light of its history. 
In this way the history of philosophy will be studied by 
subjects. Where this is done, there is hope of clearness 
and definiteness, and results both fruitful and lasting 
may be expected. Thus in connection with the study 
of logic its history might be considered, especially the 
views of Aristotle and Kant, and those prevalent during 
this century. Besides the general history of the sub- 
ject, the views of eminent philosophers on particular 
points should be studied when these points are under 
consideration. By this method the history will bring 
the subject itself into clearer light, and the study of the 
subject will promote the understanding of the history. 
Thus the theory of knowledge cannot be properly 
studied unless the views of Locke, Hume, Reid, Kant, 
and others are taken into account. The same is true 
of metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics ; a knowledge of 
their genesis and development essentially promotes their 
comprehension. After the various parts of philosophy 
have thus been studied in connection with their history, 

* Hegel was certainly not inclined to make philosophy easy for stu- 
dents; but he pronounced the history of philosophy, which Herbart and 
Schelling recommended as propedeutics to philosophy, too difficult for 
that purpose. — Philosophische Propaedeutik, XVIII. 



378 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

the student will be prepared for the study of the entire 
history of philosophy, which can then be taken up. To 
master a subject at the same time in the light of its 
history, and rationally, is the true philosophical method; 
and with every branch of philosophy, the essential ele- 
ments of its history should be connected. 

Besides the study of the history of philosophy by 
subjects, as a preparation for its study as a whole, the 
reading of the principal works of eminent philosophers 
is to be commended. Among the ancients, selections 
may be made from Plato (Symposium, Phcedros, Repub- 
lic^) and Aristotle (particularly those on Dialectics and 
Ethics) ; among the moderns, Locke, Spinoza (Ethics), 
Hume (Treatise, first part, or Inquiry), Kant (Prolego- 
mena, Kritik of Pure Reason, and Kritik of Practical 
Reason), Hegel (Philosophy of History, Phenomenology, 
and Logic), and Lotze are worthy of special mention 
for this purpose. If only a few works can be read, let 
them be taken from Plato, Aristotle, Locke, and Kant, 
with selections from philosophers in the present century. 

Hardly less important than its history is the study of 
the present status of philosophic thought. In it will 
be found many of the conditions and demands with 
which the philosopher must reckon. The exact status 
of philosophy is, however, an exceedingly difficult prob- 
lem, particularly at a time when there is a multitude 
of philosophical thinkers, but no dominant system of 
philosophy. Isolated problems, conflicting tendencies, 
a search for a reliable basis for system, criticism, eclec- 
ticism, and all the uncertainty and mere tentativeness, 
so common in crises, are characteristics of philosophic 
thought in this age. The present neglect of philosophy 
is not so significant when it is remembered that Kant 
and Hegel also complained of this neglect in their day. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 379 

The lack of unity and continuity in the philosophic 
literature of the day is cause for greater regret. 

The status of philosophy can be learned from the phil- 
osophic literature of the day, particularly from the vari- 
ous philosophical journals.* While the problems of 
philosophy are always the same, peculiar circumstances 
may make special demands for the solution of particu- 
lar ones. The very uncertainty prevailing at present, 
respecting the criteria and the limits of knowledge, 
makes noetics especially valuable. The importance of 
metaphysic, and the suspicion with which it is viewed, 
attach peculiar interest to the question whether we can 
really get behind phenomena to the underlying reality. 
Theism and atheism, spiritualism and materialism, are 
of as momentous significance now as ever. The prob- 
lems of realism and idealism, of empiricism and ration- 
alism, also press for solution. Perhaps the exclusivism 
in past tendencies has made it evident that systems are 
apt to err rather in what they deny than in what they 
affirm, and that now the time has come for the union 
and harmonious co-operation of tendencies formerly 
regarded as hostile. Thus the a priori and the a poste- 
riori elements in knowledge are both essential factors; 
realism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism, really 
seem to be complements to each other, rather than 
antagonistic. The philosophic movements within a cen- 
tury have at least proved that systems supposed to be 
opposite may both have elements of truth. In Germany 
there is a tendency toward English empiricism ; in Eng- 
land and America there is a tendency toward German 
speculation, — certainly a hint that each by itself is not 

* The philosophical tendencies in Germany, since the death of Hegel, 
are given in a woi'k just puhlished: Die Philosophie der Gegemoart, by 
Dr. Mor'tz Brasch. 



380 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sufficient. A narrow and exclusive method cannot 
meet the demands of the day. The one-sided tenden- 
cies of particular systems in the past may have served 
to produce a greater development of certain phases of 
thought than would otherwise have been possible ; but 
the development of a principle to the utmost may also 
serve to prove that it is not comprehensive enough to 
include and explain what was expected of it. Thus a 
one-sided course, by exhausting itself, may prepare the 
way for a synthesis of what was before repellant. 

The synthesis necessary for that comprehensiveness 
and unity which are so urgent a demand on philosophic 
thought, may require a much more thorough elabora- 
tion of particular concepts, as a preparatory stage. 
The exhaustive treatment of particular thoughts is as 
fruitful now as ever, and may be more impartially per- 
formed than when a reigning system demands solutions 
according to its own peculiar principles. 

Among the multitude of problems demanding solu- 
tion, those suggested by natural science are made espe- 
cially prominent. Aside from materialism and evolution, 
the question of design demands attention, also the lim- 
its of scientific accuracy, and the reliability of thought 
transcending the domain of science. The very tend- 
ency to specialization in science also suggests the need 
of the unity of the various sciences, as Avell as the 
ultimate unity of all thought. Pessimism, agnosticism, 
and the great interests of faith and hope, also present 
numerous important problems. From all that has been 
said in the various chapters, it is evident that the criti- 
cal demands of the age are such as to place the empha- 
sis in philosophic thought on laying the basis rather 
than on rearing superstructures. 

The philosophical problems have become so numerous 



SPIBIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 381 

in our clay as actually to be bewildering, and the stu- 
dent may be puzzled to decide which to take up for 
study. Where so many seem to be urgent, the tempta- 
tion may be strong to make the study comprehensive 
rather than thorough. The two methods do not ex- 
clude each other, however ; there ma}^ be a comprehen- 
siveness which is a preparation for thoroughness, and 
thoroughness in a limited sphere may be the road to 
comprehensiveness that is thorough throughout. 

Those who make a specialty of philosophy will of 
course regard their studies at college or in the univer- 
sity as merely laying the foundation on which they 
hope to build in after-life. Even they may find it 
advisable to concentrate their efforts on a particular 
department after completing the general study of phi- 
losophy. Others, who cannot make a specialty of it, 
may yet want to master some one of its divisions. 
Which to choose will depend mainly on capacity, taste, 
aim, and calling. Psychologv, as an introduction to 
the whole, cannot be omitted, whatever part may be 
selected for special investigation. Of philosophy proper, 
the theory of knowledge and ethics are the most essen- 
tial. Were the theory of the emotions fully developed, 
it might take its place beside (or between) these, as 
almost or quite as important. The subject of aesthetics 
has special significance for artists, critics, literary men, 
and public speakers. The theologian, besides ethics, 
will find metaphysics indispensable. 

Thus far the attention has been directed chiefly to 
the study of philosophical systems, and to the training 
of the mind in philosophizing. A philosopher may add 
no new contributions to the stock of knowledge, but 
he must, as we have seen, be an independent thinker. 
With the laws of thought as his sole guide, he cannot 



382 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

be the slave of any system, not even of his own, except 
so far as slavery means absolute subjection to the truth. 

The exalted aim of the student to become an inde- 
pendent thinker is worthy of highest commendation. 
He does not merely want to learn what has been said 
about a subject, but what is actually in it. For the 
method necessary to realize this aim of the original, 
independent thinker, we must refer to the full discus- 
sion of the theory of knowledge, but preliminary hints 
may here be given. 

The notion that philosophy has a method peculiar to 
itself, is false. The laws of the mind are always the 
same, but the objects to which they apply differ. Thus 
there are objects of sense, and objects of pure thinking. 
Our reasoning respecting objects is of course condi- 
tioned by their nature. Thus mathematical reasoning 
is valid only for mathematical objects. But we are 
tempted to postulate in the mind itself such divisions 
as pertain only to the nature of the objects contem- 
plated. The same laws of thought are seen in differ- 
ent lights, according to the difference of the objects. 
The process of reasoning in all thinking is that of 
induction and deduction, the one never wholly separated 
from the other. While in its reasoning, in its analyti- 
cal and synthetic judgments, philosoplrv does not differ 
from science, the aim and objects (phenomena) of sci- 
ence attach it more closely to observation, and the 
results of its reasoning can consequently be more 
readily tested by experience. Science thus has means 
of verification which philosophy cannot have. 

The fact that its conclusions cannot be verified by 
experience, makes it the more necessary that the reason- 
ing in philosophy should be infallible. Its method is 
absolutely reliable ; if, then, its start is equally so, there 



SPIBIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 383 

is no reason for questioning the results legitimately 
obtained. The result of scientific investigation would 
require no verification if it were not for the liability to 
error in the process itself. The same is true of philoso- 
phy. With a firm basis and a reliable method, there 
is a possibility of error only when the method itself is 
not strictly followed. 

In philosophizing, the first aim should consequently 
be to secure a starting-point which is absolute!} 7- reliable. 
Without such a foundation, the validity of the entire 
superstructure will be doubtful ; or, if the basis is false, 
the system which rests upon it must be so likewise. 
Therefore both in examining other systems, and in 
independent philosophizing and constructing new ones, 
the beginning or seed of all must be subjected to the 
most thorough scrutiny. 

Modern philosophy began with an effort to find a 
basis whose validity cannot be questioned. If here 
scepticism is not rooted out, it can never be done. 
Without stopping to consider the value of the results 
of Descartes' investigations on this point, it is enough 
for our purpose that the one thing which cannot be 
questioned, even if all others may, is the fact given in 
consciousness. That there are such facts ; that I am 
conscious of something, or that there is a consciousness 
of something, — is beyond all doubt. What these facts 
mean, is of course a different question. 

With this consciousness we start in philosophy, as 
well as in science. But while the latter asks, How am 
I to explain the thing experienced ? philosophy asks, 
The experience being given, what do the laws of mind 
(reason) require ? Science attends more to the external 
conditions of experience, philosophy more to the inter- 
nal ; science attempts to explain phenomena by discov- 



384 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ering their laws, philosophy seeks to get at their essence 
by finding what the laws of mind must infer from the 
phenomena. To science the phenomena themselves are 
the principal subject of consideration, being the centre 
around which all the investigation moves ; to philosophy 
they are but the occasion for deeper inquiry, the start 
for the speculative work of reason. 

Philosophy thus, like science, beginning with experi- 
ence, with the given and the real, which it seeks to 
interpret, has a perfectly reliable basis. Its proper 
sphere is the real ; only so far as related to the real 
does it consider the imaginary and the possible. Begin- 
ning with what is given, philosophy carries its induc- 
tions as far as thought can go. The phenomena given 
to philosophy are of course not those pertaining merely 
to the external world ; they include also the subjective 
elements in thought, feeling, and volition, all of which 
are made objects of rational inquiry. Any germinal 
thought legitimately obtained may be made the nucleus 
of a system ; but the comprehensiveness of the germinal 
power is also the limit of the system. 

A critical study of philosophical systems proves that 
many of them rest on mere assumptions. Their char- 
acter as assumptions is not changed by the fact that 
their authors regarded them as intuitions or self-evident 
truths. Particularly respecting what is deepest, most 
mysterious, and of greatest concern, has an effort been 
made to secure axioms or some kind of intellectual 
vision. The repeated failure of attempts to found phi- 
losophy on such a basis has made thinkers suspicious of 
all systems constructed on a priori principles. No one 
doubts that truths are more valuable isolated than when 
spuriously connected so as to form a false system. 
There is, however, great fascination in the idea of 



SPIBIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 385 

developing all philosophy from a single principle ; and, 
indeed, it is the only ideal method for completeness of 
system. The aim in such cases is to make philosophy as 
much as possible like mathematics. Having adopted its 
principle, it calls in the aid of axioms and definitions to 
evolve the system. The most perfect example is found 
in Spinoza's Ethics. A system thus constructed is, of 
course, valid for those only who accept the premises and 
definitions ; and by successfully attacking these, the 
whole superstructure falls. In view of the imperfections 
and limitations of philosophy, the application of this 
ideal method has thus far been found more valuable for 
attaining unity, or at least system, than absolutely 
reliable conclusions.* 

After the principles have been found, this method is 
comparatively easy. Thus the germinal notion may be 
that of substance, monads, the ego, the subject-object, the 
unity of thought and being, the unconscious, or some- 
thing else ; all that is required being the unfolding of 
the seed-thought. Any fruitful thought, if comprehen- 
sive enough, cau be made the basis of a system ; great 
ingenuity may be displayed in developing the principle 
adopted, and the logic can be rigid as in mathematics : 

* Instead of banishing the a priori method from philosophy, as Kant 
aimed to do, it flourished most vigorously among his immediate suc- 
cessors. Thus Reinhold laid stress on the establishment of one supreme 
principle from which the whole of philosophy is to he evolved. Fichte 
eagerly seized this idea, and wrote to him that he looked on him (Rein- 
hold) as having introduced among men the conviction that all inquiry 
must proceed from a single fundamental principle. And then the search 
for this principle began. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sought to find 
the idea which contains the explanation of the universe. Absolute 
knowledge, and the knowledge of the absolute, have an irresistible 
attraction for the eager student; and it is not surprising that the prom- 
ises made by these men, especially the last, aroused great hopes and 
enthusiasm. The culmination of all philosophy was supposed to have 
been reached, and the key which unlocks the mysteries of the universe 
to have been found. 



386 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY.^ 

yet as an interpretation of reality the whole may be 
worthless, explaining not what is, but only what would 
be if the assumptions were true. The essential ques- 
tions in determining the beginning are not sufficiently 
weighed : Is the basis true ? Is it adequate ? Is it 
fruitful? Systems depending on definitions are in dan- 
ger of being purely verbal, explanatory of words but of 
nothing real, thus defeating the very aim of philosophy. 
The starting-point of a system being assumed, instead 
of being found as something given, or instead of being 
demonstrated, it may become necessary to construct the 
system for the sake of proving the assumptions. Thus 
if an unconscious something is assumed as the reality 
behind phenomena, it may require the philosophy of 
the unconscious to justify the assumption of the uncon- 
scious, or to prove that the assumption is inadequate. 
It must not, however, be supposed that in philosophy 
any more than in science we can dispense with hypoth- 
eses and theories. Much as philosophy may accomplish, 
it never can, by any induction, reach the absolute begin- 
ning of all things. Thus far all efforts have failed to 
ascend, step by step, from the infinite variety of phe- 
nomena to the ultimate unity of all being. In our 
efforts to do so, we soon become painfully conscious of 
our limitations. Not satisfied with isolated truths, we 
seek completed systems ; in order to construct these, 
we need principles which cannot be discovered by 
induction. But if theories become a necessity, there 
must be some valid basis for them, depending on reality 
and reason, not on imagination. The mind finds in the 
phenomena themselves hints of what must be behind 
them ; but they are mere hints. All the suggestions 
and hints given must be weighed in forming the theo- 
ries ; and after being formed, every possible test must 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 387 

be applied to them. Thus, a theory must be consistent; 
it must accomplish all that is required of it ; and it 
must not come in conflict with any known truth. And 
after all these conditions are complied with, it must be 
regarded as what it really is ; namely, a mere theory. 
Other theories may also comply with these conditions, 
and yet they cannot all be true. 

By claiming for its statements only what they are 
worth, philosophy will gain in modesty, but also in 
reliability. Whatever is demonstrated must be held 
as immovably fixed; many things may be true which 
cannot be mathematically demonstrated, but we must 
not hesitate to treat assumptions and theories according 
to what they really are. It may require some sacrifice 
to take this position with reference to a pet theory, 
but it is the only safe and honest course. Theories are 
to be held as continually subject to verification ; but 
whether or not held as such by their advocates, suc- 
ceeding systems will not fail to test them according to 
their worth. If under these severe conditions a final 
system is impossible, philosophy has the consolation at 
least of sharing the same fate with all subjects of human 
inquiry : there will always be a contrast between the 
real and the ideal. 

It is respecting the ultimate of all thought, that the- 
ories are most prevalent. This x unknown to philoso- 
phy, however apprehended by faith, is too far removed 
to be an object of observation; nor can we ever hope 
to extend the chain of our logic to that x. Hence the 
resort to theory. The theories proposed can, perhaps, 
neither be demonstrated as true, nor proved false ; yet 
their origin and grounds, their consistency with them- 
selves, and their application to reality, are valuable 
tests; and the history of philosophy consists largely 



388 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of the critical tests to which the various theories have 
been subjected in the progress of thought. 

The mind cannot rest in a void. If unable to pene- 
trate to the essence of the reality behind phenomena, 
and to the ultimate basis and source of the universe, 
it may be obliged to resort to postulates or hypotheses 
as a practical rest for thought. Plato's realm, in which 
ideas have a metaphysical existence, may be fiction ; 
but even fiction may contain truth, and even a myth 
may be but the clothing of a precious philosophic 
thought. The various functions attributed by theistic 
thinkers to God may not be mathematically demonstra- 
ble as realities ; but there must be a First Cause of that 
which reveals itself as not primitive but derived ; and 
is there not a deep philosophy, to say nothing of theol- 
ogy, in the very effort of the mind to find a Being in 
whom all truth and beauty and goodness inhere, and 
from whom finite minds derive their fragmentary con- 
ceptions of them? Less, perhaps, in the final results 
attained does the mind reveal its true character, than 
in its strivings and tendencies ; and even in its aspira- 
tions and postulates the philosopher beholds reflections 
of the otherwise hidden depths of the soul. 

These considerations justify the conclusion that phi- 
losophy is ideal, and that the real systems must be 
viewed as aspirations and essays, riot as realizations. 
Nevertheless, systems which are not final may have 
valuable truths and needed aspects of truth ; and the 
fundamental principle adopted may be true, even if 
not demonstrable. The value of philosophic thought 
by no means consists solely, or even chiefly, in the 
completed systems produced ; it may do the best ser- 
vice in removing existing errors, and in establishing 
individual truths and principles. Even the fragments 



SPIBIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 389 

of philosophy may be very precious, though the master- 
builder is uot found to form of them a symmetrical 
structure. In philosophy the preconceived plan of the 
system does not determine how the materials must be 
shaped and fitted into it, but the character of the 
system is determined by the nature of the materials. 
If heretofore the architect has come first with his plan, 
and has made that the law for the selection and adapta- 
tion of the building material, we may henceforth be 
obliged to reverse the process, and make the careful 
gathering and shaping of the stones for the building 
the condition for the plan and structure of the edifice 
itself. The philosophic builder must be a qnarrier and 
a stone-cutter before he becomes an architect. 

It is frequently found that the principles adopted by 
philosophers are true, but that there is a mistake in 
their application ; they are taken as absolute and final, 
when they are relative and limited. May not spiritual- 
ism and materialism both have spheres in which they 
are true, while their application outside of these is 
false ? There is no doubt a harmony and unity under- 
lying the differences between matter and spirit ; but so 
long as the unity in the duality is not discovered, we 
must apply each to its sphere and limit it strictly to 
that. However stringently the mind may demand mon- 
ism, no monism brought about by violence can receive 
philosophical sanction. According to an innate impulse 
of our minds, we must aim at the final explanation of 
all things by discovering the ultimate principles ; but 
we must distinguish between the aim and the actual 
attainments. That this distinction must never be lost 
sight of, is a lesson taught both by the present status 
and by the whole history of philosophy. 

Another evil to be deprecated results from a desire 



390 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

to propose something new, and to develop original 
systems. Such a spirit may become a passion, in which 
case it is the philosopher's evil genius. The sole aim 
in philosophy is truth, no matter who its author, or 
whether it be old or new ; and whoever cannot sacrifice 
the itching for novelty, and the vanity of ambition, to 
this aim, lacks the requisites of a philosopher. Lotze 
justly remarks that in our day philosophy is less in 
need of originality than of exactness. A signal advan- 
tage in the natural sciences has been their continuous 
development. The results of past investigations have 
been made the beginning of new progressive move- 
ments. Scientists have worked with and for one an- 
other, and have thus co-operated in promoting organic 
growth in science. But in philosophy the spirit of 
individualism has largely prevailed. Instead of seek- 
ing to promote continuous development, philosophers 
seem rather to have been intent on the destruction of 
the labors of their predecessors, and on the construction 
of a peculiar system of their own. The destruction of 
systems was the more easy, because their foundation 
was not solid, or because they were badly constructed. 
Healthy growth and lasting results cannot be expected 
unless the conservation of old truth is regarded as 
sacred a duty as the discovery of new truth.* 

* The evil here deprecated has been deeply felt by philosophers, and 
repeated efforts have been made to secure more co-operation among 
<them, and more regular and steady progress in philosophy. Trendelen- 
burg, preface to Logische Untersuchunr/en, says, " Philosophy cannot re- 
gain its former power until it acquires permanence; and it cannot gain 
permanence until it grows in the same way as the other sciences, 
namely, until it develops continuously, not beginning and ending in 
every head, but historically taking up the problems and unfolding 
them." Various methods have been proposed to secure this continuity, 
such as conventions of philosophers to discuss philosophical questions, 
and philosophical associations. But the end can only be attained if 
philosophic minds themselves resolve to do this work. A philosopher 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 391 

The student is, however, in greater danger of an evil 
the opposite of this ; namely, the hasty adoption of the 
system of another as the embodiment of all truth. The 
authority which in philosophy belongs only to the truth 
is frequently transferred to an able and admired teacher. 
Intellectual receptivity and independent thinking, deep 
appreciation and a critical spirit, should be united in 
healthy proportion. The true teacher always makes 
his system and instruction subordinate to the truth. 
The very vigor and independence of a philosopher may 
serve to make mere disciples, as well as profound and 
original thinkers. The schools of Kant and Hegel have 
shown that the disciples of eminent philosophers may 
be blind in proportion to their enthusiasm, and that a 
philosopher's cloak may conceal an imitator and a fana- 
tic. Although in his lectures Kant continually warned 
his hearers against this spirit, he could not suppress it. 
The wise student regards all books and instructions as 
means of mental discipline, as well as for the communi- 
cation of truth ; and he will find it consistent with the 
deepest respect for teachers, to subject all that is taught 
to the severest tests of reason. Absolute dependence 
on the truth is the only true independence. 

The numerous conflicting systems, which have arisen 
from the fact that there was no continuous develop- 
ment, have added to the suspicion that philosophy is 
caprice rather than reason. If the scepticism of the 
day is not as deep as that of Greece, it at least doubts 
the ability of philosophy to discover the highest truth. 
The consequent criticism to which the systems have 
been subjected is cause for congratulation on the part 

need not produce a new system, but he must make truth the sole aim 
of his search, and recognize it according to its real worth wherever 
found. 



392 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of those who have confidence in the power of truth to 
maintain itself. The most thorough diagnosis may be 
required for the transition from disease to health. The 
sceptical spirit and critical method, connected with a 
conservative tendency, have given rise to eclecticism. 
This refuses to accept any system of the past, but claims 
that there is truth in all, and hence selects from all.* 
But if eclecticism is to be of philosophical value, it must 
have fixed principles to determine the method of its 
selections ; in other words, there must be a philosophy 
behind eclecticism, if it is to lay claim to rational pro- 
cedure. The ability to select the truth presupposes a 
standard by which it can be tested ; this standard, what- 
ever it may be, is itself the nucleus of a philosophical 
system. How far eclecticism is from being final, is 
evident from the fact that it may be based on either 
rationalism or empiricism. A man's philosophy is not 
determined by his eclecticism, but his eclecticism by 
his philosophy. Nevertheless, it has an important mis- 
sion. It proceeds on the supposition that all systems 
have truth, but that none has it all ; and it is an admis- 

* It has flourished most in France, under the leadership of Victor 
Cousin. It naturally promoted the study of the history of philosophy. 
Bigot (Eclecticism in France, Mind, 1877, 367) says, "Its fundamental 
principle was this: In philosophy every thing has heen said; the age 
of systems is past; all we have to do is to question history, to take what 
is true out of each system, and from all these elements to form aperen- 
nisphilo sophia. ... It was a doctrine without originality, and standing 
absolutely aloof from-the discoveries of science." Cousin's eclecticism 
is brilliant rather than deep, eloquent rather than definite or conse- 
quent, inspiring rather than convincing, and rhetorical rather than 
philosophical. Instead of seeking an immovable basis, it skips from 
one system to another, taking what pleases its fancy, but ignoring the 
rest. 

In all countries, eclecticism as a method rather than a system plays 
a prominent part. The prominence given to the history of philosophy 
is evidence of this. Even if no system is regarded satisfactory, scholars 
want to get what they can from the various systems. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 393 

sion that we are not yet prepared to construct the final 
system. It is a characteristic of the philosophic spirit, 
that it critically examines the various systems to dis- 
cover their truths and reject their errors. But this is 
only a preparatory process ; it trains the mind, and fur- 
nishes it with materials for reflection. The mind goes 
beyond eclecticism as soon as it inquires why it seeks, 
and how it knows, the truth. This inquiry leads to the 
root, while eclecticism is but the fruit. 

The criticism so much insisted on here is by no means 
the end in philosophical training ; it is but a method 
for attaining something better. Mere criticism is not 
production ; and it has been observed that critical 
minds are not usually productive ones. Filing is not 
a process of growing. When the critical habit is intent 
only on the discovery of error, what wonder if the 
truth itself is missed? The discernment of error is 
important on account of the hidden truth discovered in 
the process. The value of the scavenger consists in the 
cleanliness he promotes. Criticism for the truth's sake, 
and as promotive of productiveness, is therefore the 
aim. But even if criticism is only a handmaid, its work 
in a philosophic Babel may be of supreme importance 
when under the guidance of a wise mistress. 

As the start in philosophy is most difficult, the stu- 
dent may need something more specific respecting the 
beginning. It has been stated that we are to rise from 
psychology, science, and other departments, to philoso- 
phy ; but how ? Take any supposed knowledge, and 
test it to the utmost ; the tests applied to it will involve 
the theory of knowledge. Get what these tests imply, 
or the ultimate basis on which they rest, and you will 
have the theory itself. Each division of philosophy is 
like the side of a pyramid: thus, if we begin with 



394 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

any concept of knowledge, and trace it far enough, we 
come to the apex, the principles of knowledge. The 
same is true of being. All that is, must contain all 
the principles of being; and these are the objects of 
search in metaphysics. Concrete objects are infinite ; 
but follow the concept gained by studying any one to 
its utmost limits, and it will be found at every step 
to tend toward these principles. We find that this is 
also the law for aesthetics and ethics. The endless 
variety is unified in the principles. Thus every object 
termed sesthetical must contain all that is required to 
constitute aesthetic quality; and it is this element, and 
the system founded on it, which constitute aesthetics. 
Neither can any moral act be traced to its ultimate 
principle without attaining the primary thought of 
ethics. By thus taking any concept, and tracing it back 
far enough, we arrive at the principles of that division, 
of philosophy to which it belongs. This shows how any 
thought pursued far enough must lead to philosophy. 
Indeed, we shall not go astray if we view philosophy as 
an exhaustive elaboration of concepts ; the aim being 
to discover principles which cannot be exhausted any 
more, but which embrace, principiantly, the universe of 
thought, of being, of feeling, and of conduct. 

Since the rational laws, like reason itself, are unvary- 
ing, the method pursued in philosophy must always be 
the same in principle ; but there is abundant room for 
variety in details. There may be various processes in 
elaborating the concepts, but their ultimate results must 
harmonize. The details in the method may be left to 
each one who has the qualification for philosophical 
studies ; they may be largely determined by the pecu- 
liarity of the subject under consideration, and by the 
specific aim. While numerous avenues may be chosen, 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 395 

they must all lead to principiant truth. After the right 
beginning, the intellect is probably in greatest danger 
of taking as exhausted what is not exhausted, and in 
accepting as certain what has not been demonstrated. 
Not that the demonstrable is the limit of the true, nor 
philosophy the only sphere of human interest and 
human confidence ; but we must distinguish between 
knowledge and faith, between hypothesis and theory on 
the one hand, and demonstration on the other. The 
true method in philosophy is that in which reason 
beholds itself. 

For training the mind into this harmony with the 
truth, or to be true to itself, which is one of the prin- 
cipal aims of this Introduction, the following summary 
may be helpful : — 

1. Exert the mind to the utmost limit of its powers. 
In order to get the full length of a cable, it must be 
stretched as far as possible without breaking. Constant 
mental strain tends to weakness and final destruction ; 
but frequently to tax the healthy mind severely, but 
without overstraining, is a condition for promoting vig- 
orous health. For this discipline the deepest problems 
should be selected. Continuous exercise of the mind on 
them will train it for the most successful philosophical 
effort. Only in dealing profoundly with deep problems 
can the mind itself become profound. 

2. Learn by practice to rivet the attention on a sub- 
ject until you are through with it, or voluntarily aban- 
don it. Nothing is more destructive of philosophical 
thinking than to skip from subject to subject, touching 
each one tenderly. In such a course it is a lawless 
fancy, not reason, which holds the reins. The object 
chosen for reflection should be held up in every light, 
and viewed from every standpoint, by itself and in its 



396 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

relations, and all pertinent questions respecting it should 
be asked. A twofold power of abstraction is necessary ; 
namely, the subject must be abstracted (distinguished) 
from all others, and the mind must abstract its atten- 
tion from every thing else. This twofold power of 
abstraction is the condition for greatness of mind. 
Mental superiority consists largely in power of concen- 
tration. The mind must be its own lord ; it must be 
master of its thoughts, and must rigorously resist the 
inclinations and whims which make them wander. 
Distraction is the deadly foe of profundity. 

3. The most important subjects should be chosen, — 
subjects whose interest is such as to enlist all the ener- 
gies. Among profound themes, the mind should choose 
the most valuable, so that it may become supremely 
strong, and supremely fruitful in its strength. 

4. Get clear and distinct ideas, — clear, because what 
they are in themselves is apprehended ; and distinct, 
because they stand out boldly, sharply marked off from 
all their surroundings. Explain the compound by its 
simple elements, and relations by defining the related. 
Distinguish the word from the thought, the thought 
from the object for which it stands. Whatever severity 
it may require, the mind must give a strict account of 
itself. It will attain philosophic clearness in proportion 
as it heeds the ancient maxim : Know thyself. 

5. Fathom what is given, and, by fathoming, develop 
it. Then classify and systematize. Avoid heteroge- 
neity by discovering the unity in multiplicity. Philoso- 
phizing consists in unravelling the thought involved in 
thoughts. Not in the exclusivism of scepticism or dog- 
matism or criticism or eclecticism or intuitionalism or 
empiricism, but in the rational element in all of them, 
is the true method of philosophy formed. 



SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 397 

6. Many of the problems of philosophy are thrust 
upon it by science. In the co-operation of philosophy 
and science, not in their antagonism, is there hope for 
depth, comprehensiveness, exactness, and completeness. 
Between the facts of nature and of psychology, and 
the speculations of philosophy, there must be the rela- 
tion of foundation and superstructure. Phenomena are 
materials from which concepts are formed, but phe- 
nomena are not the law of philosophy. It speculates, 
in the etymological sense of looking about, beholding 
and investigating ; but the speculation of philosophy is 
the work of reason, not the play of fancy. Owing to 
the objects of philosophic contemplation, it may be 
misleading to speak of scientific exactness in philo- 
sophic thought ; but the method which leads to the 
philosophical investigation of what is, as in metaphys- 
ics, and of what ought to be, as in noetics, SBsthetics, 
and ethics, is as rigid as in science. The reason, and 
the general laws of thinking, with which the scientist 
operates, are also those of the philosopher. Not its 
method, but its principiant aim, namely to unify all 
thought in the ultimate principle or principles, and to 
form of all thought a system which, like an organism, 
consists of articulated members, — a system as rich in 
variety as it is perfect in unity, — constitutes the diffi- 
culty of philosophic inquiry. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Importance of the right Spirit in a study. Why 
study Philosophy ? Theoretical value. Practical value. 
Intellectual craving. Love of Truth. Enthusiasm in 
its pursuit. Power of prejudice. Mental power and 
energy. Penetrative, exhaustive thought. Abstraction. 
How does Philosophy begin ? Why do all thoughts 



398 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ultimately lead to Philosophy ? How does Philosophy 
unify Knowledge? Principiant Knowledge. How do 
Psychology, Science, and History furnish the problems 
of Philosophy ? Order in the study of the divisions of 
Philosophy. How study the History of Philosophy ? 
Philosophical works and systems worthy of special atten- 
tion. Relation of the student to teachers and systems. 
Original thought. Independent thinking. Relation of 
the Philosopher to his age and nation. What is neces- 
sary thought, and why is it final ? Truth and error in 
eclecticism. Define Speculation. Healthy Philosophy 
and baseless speculation. The learner, the scholar, and 
the thinker. Continuity of philosophical thought. 
Division of labor in Philosophy. Fruitful and empty 
concepts. Depth and narrowness, breadth and shallow- 
ness. Union of breadth and depth in philosophy. 
Concentration of thought. Scientific and philosophic 
clefiniteness and exactness. Summary of requirements 
necessary for attaining the right Spirit and proper 
Method in the study of Philosophy. 



APPENDIX. 



1. In an article on Philosophy at Cambridge, in Mind, 
1876, Mr. Sedgwick says, "The use of the general term 
4 philosophy ' to mean physics, which Continental writers 
have noticed as an English peculiarity, has been especially 
at home in Cambridge since the time of Newton. . . . Phi- 
losophy without qualification was generally understood to 
mean 'natural philosophy. ' That which is now usually un- 
derstood b}' philosophy was, therefore, not at all included. 
In 1779 Dr. Jebb speaks of the transition (in the examina- 
tion in the university) ' from the elements of mathematics to 
the four branches of philosophy, viz., mechanics, hydro- 
statics, apparent astronomy, and optics. . . . The modera- 
tor, having closed the philosophical examination, sometimes 
asks questions in Locke's Essay on the Human Understand- 
ing, Butler's Analogy, or Clarke's Attributes.'' " 

In the introduction to the History of the Inductive Sciences, 
Whewell frequently uses "philosophical" for " scientific." 
He also speaks of the "experimental philosophy of the 
Arabians." Yet the title of his work on the Philosophy 
of the Inductive Sciences implies that he wants to distin- 
guish between the two terms. Other writers also desire to 
make a distinction ; but in spite of their efforts, the old 
habit of confounding the terms gets the better of them. 
Thus Sir Alexander Grant, in the article "Aristotle," in 
the Ency. Brit, (ninth edition), refers to the different ele- 
ments of Greek thought, and pronounces "the one purely 

399 



400 APPENDIX. 

philosophical, the other scientific." Other expressions also 
indicate that he recognizes the difference. But, in the same 
article, he takes " natural philosophy " in the usual English 
sense, and speaks of u a modern physical philosopher." 
The English literature of the day abounds in similar exam- 
ples. 

Hegel ridiculed the looseness with which the English 
employ the words " philosophy " and " philosophical. "He 
sa}'s that they term thermometers, barometers, and simi- 
lar instruments philosophical, whereas nothing but thinking 
should be regarded as the instrument of philosophy. He 
also quotes the title of a pamphlet, " The Art of Preserving 
the Hair on Philosophical Principles." That confusion of 
the terms which Hegel regarded as a peculiarity of the Eng- 
lish was, however, formerly common on the Continent as well 
as in England. 

2. The prevalent view of philosophy in the leading sys- 
tems of Germany emphasizes the rational in distinction from 
the empirical. As purely rational, philosophy is theoretical 
as distinct from the practical, and speculative (the reason 
beholding all objects in its own light) as distinct from 
observation. As transcending experience, it is transcen- 
dental. It consequently deals with concepts (ideas, no- 
tions), not with percepts. Kant defines philosophy as 
rational knowledge by means of concepts ( Vernunfterkennt- 
nisse cms Begriffen) , and regards the following as its primary 
problems : What can I know? What ought I to do? What 
dare I hope? What is man? Hegel pronounces philosophy 
the science of reason comprehending itself (die Wissenschaft 
tier sich selbst begreifenden Vernunft). Herbart views it as 
an elaboration of the concepts (die Bearbeitnng der Begriffe). 
Struempell : Einleitung in die Philosophies 19-22. Fichte 
wanted the whole of philosophy to be a rational develop- 
ment of a single idea, and Schelling claimed that philosophy 
must construct even the real world according to concepts or 
ideas of reason. In a recent work on Philosophie als Be- 



APPENDIX. 401 

grijfsicissenschaft, G. Biedermann says, " Philosophy is, and 
always was, a science of concepts." 

3. However much we may dissent from the contents of 
this book, we must admit that in it Kant gives valuable hints 
respecting the province of reason in religion. The purely 
rational elements are, of course, legitimate subjects for phil- 
osophical inquiry. If the elements are only partly rational, 
then they belong to philosophy only so far as rational. If 
a philosophical system claims that all the contents of religion 
must be rational, it fails to distinguish between knowledge 
and faith, between speculation and history, and between the 
facts of experience and rational inferences. Much of the 
confusion of philosophical speculation respecting religion 
arises from the failure to distinguish between the exact 
sphere of each. I cannot believe what is in direct conflict 
with reason ; but I can, and may even be obliged to, believe 
much which I cannot raise from faith into knowledge, and 
which, consequently, I cannot subject to purely philosophical 
or rational tests. In religion the emotions have a right to 
be heard ; and it is important for philosophy, as well as for 
religion, to determine the significance of their voice. Emer- 
son truly says, " The affections are the wings by which the 
intellect launches on the void and is borne across it. Great 
love is the inventor and expander of the frozen powers, the 
feathers frozen to our sides. It was the conviction of Plato, 
of Van Helmont, of Pascal, of Swedenborg, that piety is au 
essential condition of science, that great thoughts come from 
the heart." 

4. Those who treat religion with levity are justly chargea- 
ble with a crime against human nature itself, to say nothing 
of a higher Being. A system which ignores what has affected 
humanity most deeply, and involves man's highest interests, 
cannot even be regarded as a serious inquiry into man's 
nature, and is surely neither a deep nor a broad philosoplry. 
To treat God, the soul, sin, and immortality, as if they were 



402 APPENDIX. 

trifles and unworthy of regard, proves a man wholly unfit for 
philosophic thought. We must not, however, confound with 
the trifler the man who has thought profoundly on these sub- 
jects, and come to conclusions different from ours. Ear- 
nest thought is always worthy of respect, regardless of its 
consequences, and may demand the deepest research to con- 
firm or refute its conclusions. But the frivolous spirit should 
be as mercilessly expelled from the fraternity of philosophers, 
as a traitor from the assembly of patriots. 

5. "The hypothesis that there is a Creator, at once all- 
powerful and all-benevolent, is pressed, as it must seem to 
every candid investigator, with difficulties verging closely 
upon logical contradiction. The existence of the smallest 
amount of sin and evil would seem to show that he is either 
not perfectly benevolent, or not all-powerful. No one can 
have lived long without experiencing sorrowful events of 
which the significance is inexplicable. But if we cannot 
succeed in avoiding contradiction in our notions of element- 
ary geometry, can we expect that the ultimate purposes of 
existence shall present themselves to us with perfect clear- 
ness ? I can see nothing to forbid the notion that in a higher 
state of intelligence much that is now obscure may become 
clear. We perpetually find ourselves in the position of finite 
minds attempting infinite problems ; and can we be sure that 
where we see contradiction, an infinite intelligence might not 
discover perfect logical harmony? " — Jevons, Principles of 
Science, 3d ed. 736. 

6. With his merciless criticism, Kant, just because so 
rigid, denied the ability of philosophy to determine a priori 
that revelation and miracles are impossible. If any one 
claimed that they were impossible, he himself offered to 
show the fallacy of his reasoning. He wanted the rational, 
therefore he opposed the narrow dogmatism of philosophy 
as well as of religion. See his book on Religion within 
the Limits of Pare Reason. The dogmatic spirit is gencr- 



APPENDIX. 403 

alh' found to rest on assumptions which are the very points 
in dispute. If we despise bigotry in religion, let us not 
deem it less despicable when it is dubbed "philosophical " or 
"scientific." Jevons (Principles of Science, 736) sa} T s, 
"There are scientific men who assert that the interposition 
of Providence is impossible, and prayer an absurdity, be- 
cause the laws of nature are proved to be invariable. Infer- 
ences are drawn, not so much from particular sciences as 
from the logical nature of science itself, to negative the 
impulses and hopes of men. Now, I may state that my own 
studies in logic lead me to call in question such negative 
inferences. Laws of nature are uniformities observed to 
exist in the action of certain material agents ; but it is logic- 
ally impossible to show that all other agents must behave 
as they do." Men are apt to take their prepossessions for 
demonstrations. In speaking of God as acting on nature, 
W. B. Carpenter (Contemp. Rev., vol. 27, 281) says, "I 
deem it presumptuous to deuy that there might be occasions 
which in His wisdom may require such departure. I am not 
conscious of any such scientific ' prepossession ' against 
miracles as would prevent me from accepting them as facts 
if trustworthy evidence of their reality could be adduced." 
See also Lotze, Grundziige der Religionspliilosophie, 60-63. 

7. At the close of his volume on the Principles of Science, 
Jevons says, " Now, among the most unquestionable rules 
of scientific method is that first law that whatever phenom- 
enon is, is. We must ignore no existence whatever ; we 
may variously interpret or explain its meaning and origin, 
but, if a phenomenon does exist, it demands some kind of 
explanation. If, then, there is to be competition for sci- 
entific recognition, the world without us must yield to the 
undoubted existence of the spirit within. Our own hopes 
and wishes and determinations are the most undoubted phe- 
nomena within the sphere of consciousness. If men do act, 
feel, and live as if they were not merel} T the brief products 
of a casual conjunction of atoms, but the instruments of a 



404 APPENDIX. 

far-reaching purpose, are we to record all other phenomena 
and pass over these? We investigate the instincts of the 
ant and the bee and the beaver, and discover that they are 
led by an inscrutable agency to work towards a distant pur- 
pose. Let us be faithful to our scientific method, and inves- 
tigate also those instincts of the human mind by which man 
is led to work as if the approval of a higher Being were the 
aim of life." 

8. That Bacon was far from giving a specific and com- 
plete scientific method, is admitted in England as well as in 
German} 7 . Thus we read in Jevons's Principles of Sci- 
ence, 506, "Bacon's method, so far as we can gather the 
meaning of the main portions of his writings, would corre- 
spond to the process of empirically collecting facts, and ex- 
haustively classifying them. . . . The value of this method 
may be estimated historically by the fact that it has not been 
followed by any of the great masters of science. Whether 
we look at Galileo who preceded Bacon, to Gilbert his con- 
temporary, or to Newton and Descartes, Leibnitz and Huy- 
ghens, his successors, we find that discovery was achieved by 
the opposite method to that advocated b} r Bacon. Through- 
out Newton's works, as I shall show, we find deductive rea- 
soning wholly predominant ; and experiments are employed, 
as they should be, to confirm or refute hypothetical anticipa- 
tions of nature." 

The right beginning is so important to students, that the 
principles here advocated cannot be too strongly emphasized, 
particularly at a time when so many expect success by ignor- 
ing them. The mere collector and classifier of facts must 
be content with the position of a journeyman to the thinker, 
instead of attaining the heights of science. The leaders in 
science are, and ever must be, the thinkers, — those who 
esteem facts sufficiently to regard them worthy of pro- 
foundest thought. I acid another quotation from Whewell : 
"Invention, acuteness, and connection of thought are ne- 
cessary, on the one hand, for the progress of philosophic 



APPENDIX. 405 

knowledge ; on the other hand, the precise and steady appli- 
cation of these faculties to facts well known and clearly con- 
ceived. . . . The facts, the impressions on the senses on 
which the first successful attempts at physical knowledge pro- 
ceeded, were as well known long before the time when they 
were thus turned to account, as at that period. The motions 
of the stars, and the effects of weights, were familiar to man 
before the rise of the Greek astronomy and mechanics : but 
the ' divine mind ' was still absent ; the act of thought had 
not been exerted, by which these facts were bound together 
under the form of laws and principles. And even at this 
day, the tribes of uncivilized and half-civilized man over the 
whole face of the earth, have before their eyes a vast body 
of facts, of exactty the same nature as those with which 
Europe has built the stately fabric of her physical philoso- 
phy ; but, in almost every other part of the earth, the pro- 
cess of the intellect by which these facts become science, is 
unknown. The scientific faculty does not work. The scat- 
tered stones are there, but the builder's hand is wanting." 

9. Those who imagine that reason is liable to err, but that 
knowledge obtained through sensation is absolutely reliable, 
agree neither with philosophers nor with the leading scien- 
tists. The history of science shows that observation is 
very apt to make mistakes ; and what is termed the scien- 
tific method is intended to prevent these mistakes, as well as 
to make the observation as full as possible. Reason and 
sense must co-operate, but the supremacy of the former is 
unquestioned ; " reason acting as interpreter as well as judge, 
while the senses are merely the witnesses, who may be more 
or less untrustworthy and incompetent, but are nevertheless 
of inconceivable value to us, because they are our only 
available ones." — Tait, 347. 

10. Whewell says, " Man is not a practical creature 
merely ; he has within him a speculative tendency, a pleasure 
in the contemplation of ideal relations, a love of knowledge 



406 APPENDIX. 

as knowledge. It is the speculative tendency which brings 
to light the difference of common notions and scientific ideas. 
. . . The mind analyzes such notions, reasons upon them, 
combines and connects them ; for it feels assured that intel- 
lectual things ought to be able to bear such handling. Even 
practical knowledge, we see clearly, is not possible without 
the use of reason ; and the speculative reason is only the 
reason satisfying itself of its own consistency." 

Zoellner, in the strange volume Ueber die Natur des 
Cometen, 51, says, " In the present state of natural science, 
the need of speculation is so deeply felt that the English, a 
people now almost exclusively devoted to induction, cannot 
resist the temptation to speculate even on mathematico- 
physical hypotheses." Sometimes in reading certain scien- 
tific works we wonder whether the fancy is not aroused to 
assert itself by the very rigors of science, so luxuriantly 
does it flourish in those works. There is no end to inter- 
esting illustrations of this, but the} 7 are too evident to the 
thoughtful reader to require special notice. 

11. Helmholtz, 363, says, "During the first half of the 
present century we had an Alexander von Humboldt, who 
was able to scan the scientific knowledge of his time in its 
details, and to bring it within one vast generalization. At 
the present juncture, it is obviously very doubtful whether 
this task could be accomplished in a similar way, even by a 
mind with gifts so peculiarly suited for the purpose as 
Humboldt's was, and if all his time and work were devoted 
to the purpose." 

Professor Roscoe (address before the British Association, 
1884) pronounces the progress of organic chemistiy fn the 
last twenty 3 r cars " so vast, that it is already impossible for 
one individual, even though he devote his whole time and 
energies to the task, to master all the details, or make him- 
self at home with the increasing mass of new facts which 
the busy workers in this field are daily bringing forth." 
The president, Lord Rayleigh, at the same meeting referred 



APPENDIX. 407 

to mechanics, electricity, heat, optics, acoustics, astronomy, 
and meteorology, and said, "Any one of these may well 
occupy the lifelong attention of a man of science ; and to be 
thoroughly conversant with all of them is more than can be 
expected of any one individual, and is probably incompati- 
ble with the devotion of much time and energy to the actual 
advancement of knowledge." 

12. Professor Zoellner (p. ix.) declares that he has come 
to the conclusion " that the majority of the representatives 
of the exact sciences in our day lack a clear knowledge of 
the first principles of the theory of knowledge." It became 
the habit to gather mere facts, and those who gathered them 
were unable to use them in drawing conclusions from them. 
"Yes, it even came to this, that the most modest effort to 
raise a part of the gathered facts, by means of inductive 
generalization, to a law or a principle, w r as branded by 
specialists as savoring of philosophical speculation." He 
holds, that, with all the mass of materials gathered by obser- 
vation, our age is behind that of Newton in the conscious 
application of logical inductive principles. These facts have 
been so keenly felt by eminent scientists, that they have 
found it incumbent on them to connect with their scientific 
lectures, instruction on the laws of reasoning, and hints on 
the theory of knowledge. In 1874 Wundt said, "How one 
would have been astonished twenty years ago, to have dis- 
covered, in a work purely physical, an excursus on the prob- 
lem of knowledge ! Or how would it have been thought 
possible for a teacher of physics to have felt the need of 
giving his pupils a special lecture on the logical principles 
of his science?" (Wundt, Aufgabe der Philosoplue in der 
Gegenwart, 5.) The fact that attention is now paid to these 
problems is regarded by Wundt as evidence that scientists 
are beginning to appreciate the need of a nearer approach 
to philosophy. 

13. Wundt, Aufgabe, 19, says, "The science of our day 
strives to obtain an harmonious view of the world, and has 



408 APPENDIX. 

already gathered many stones for the structure. But the 
requirements of the special sciences are not met by any 
of the existing systems, for they lack that circumspect use of 
scientific experience which the special sciences, and particu- 
larly the natural sciences, have a right to demand according 
to their present degree of development." That which the 
special sciences demand but cannot do, he regards as lying 
within the province of philosophy. Everywhere in the nat- 
ural sciences he sees philosophical problems proposed, which 
accounts for the revival of interest in philosophy on the 
part of scientists. "The interest in philosophy has again 
been revived in the more general spheres of the scientific 
world, in which for a considerable time it was almost wholly 
neglected." Paulsen says, "The impulse to seek ultimate 
knowledge is the soul of all inquiry, even in the special 
sciences." 

14. My study of Comte left the impression of breadth 
without depth and thoroughness and earnestness. There is 
a lack of sharp distinctions, of critical acumen, and of pene- 
tration to the ultimate consequences of the processes of 
thought. The most essential poiuts are often treated super- 
ficially, and the disposition made of them shows that the real 
problems involved are not appreciated. Instead of regard- 
ing Comte as one of the main pillars of science, he has more 
properly been classed with the ancient sophists. All this 
can be admitted without depreciating his merits, especially 
in sociology ; his works have been valuable as a ferment. I 
find my view of Comte confirmed by Huxley (Lay Sermons, 
"The Scientific Aspect of Positivism"). Comte's works 
had been recommended to him as a mine of wisdom ; but he 
says, "I found the veins of ore few and far between, and 
the rock so apt to run to mud, that one incurred the risk of 
being intellectually smothered in the working. . . . That 
part of M. Comte's writings which deals with the philosophy 
of physical science appeared to me to possess singularly 
little value, and to show that he had but the most superficial 



APPENDIX. 409 

and merely second-hand knowledge of most branches of what 
is usually understood by science." 

15. Reuschle, Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft , 28, 
gives some interesting illustrations how the extremes of 
speculation fifty years ago promoted the opposite extreme 
of empiricism. The journals on natural science, as a rule, 
published only empirical articles. Thus J. R. Mayer's 
article on The Powers of Inanimate Nature was rejected 
by one of the most prominent of these journals, because of 
its speculation. Yet that paper, which afterwards appeared 
in Liebig's Annals of Chemistry, contained the first pub- 
lished information of the mechanical theory of heat, one of 
the greatest discoveries of the nineteenth century. " Mayer 
was led to his discovery of the mechanical equivalent of 
heat, by means of speculative considerations." Reuschle 
mentions as particularly prominent in connecting philosophy 
with natural science, the names of Helmholtz, Zoellner, 
Du Bois-Reymond, Hering, Darwin, Wallace, Faraday, 
Fechner, Liebig, and Haeckel. The list might be greatty 
increased by eminent names from America, England, France, 
and German} 7 . 

16. The quotation is from Mind, 1876, 5. How little 
agreement there is among scientists, is evident, among other 
things, from the controversies occasioned by the address of 
Du Bois-Re}*mond on The Limits of Natural Science. The 
disputes connected with evolution and Darwinism are so 
well known that they need no special mention. When we 
come to questions pertaining to experience and necessary 
truth, there is any thing but agreement among scientists. 
The fact is, few of them are at home in philosophical ques- 
tions. Some agree with Wundt, who says (Aufgabe), 
" However high the natural science of the day places experi- 
ence, not a few physicists agree that in our knowledge of 
nature certain a priori elements are actively concerned, 
among which is found especially the principle of causality." 



410 APPENDIX. 

Others agree with Jevons (738): "I demur to the assump- 
tion that there is any necessary truth even in such funda- 
mental laws of nature as the indestructibility of matter, the 
conservation of energy, or the laws of motion." Can agree- 
ment be expected among scientists so long as there is no 
agreement on the principles? And if scientists cannot agree 
respecting the philosophical principles on which all their in- 
vestigations depend, can they blame philosophers for their 
disagreement ? 

17. The fundamental problems in Hume's philosophy 
were discussed by the author in an address on Grundprobleme 
in Hume, before the Philosophical Society of Berlin, and 
published by that society (Philosopliische vortraege: R. 
Strieker, Halle). 

Professor Adamson, mEncy. Brit., article " Hume," refer- 
ring to the influence of Locke and Hume in determining the 
course of English philosophy, says, " It was left for Hume 
to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness 
from the psychological point of view, and to work out the 
final consequences of that view, so far as cognition is con- 
cerned. The terms which he employs are not those which 
we should now employ ; but the declaration, in the introduc- 
tion to the Treatise, that the science of human nature must 
be treated according to the experimental method, is, in fact, 
equivalent to the statement of the principle implied in 
Locke's Essay, that the problems of psychology and of the 
theory of knowledge are identical. And this view is the 
characteristic of what we may call the English school of 
philosophy." Mr. Sedgwick (Mind, 1876, 228) also holds 
that English thinkers, with few exceptions (Berkeley and 
Coleridge), are psychologists, not philosophers. They take 
it for granted that there is a world external to the mind, 
hence they do not enter into a critical examination of the 
existence of an external world. "All our philosophical writ- 
ers are dominated by the notion of a separation between 
consciousness and its objects, and approach philosophical 



APPENDIX. 411 

questions with the notion of settling what we can know of 
objects, with what certainty we can know it, and what our 
wisest course of action is in consequence. But this is to 
adopt the distinction between the mind and its organism, and 
the world external to the mind, as an ultimate one. Our 
English writers are thus psychologists in the above-explained 
sense of the term, and not philosophers in the strict sense." 

18. Although there is no agreement among thinkers 
respecting the exact nature of psychology, it is generally 
admitted that it should be taken wholly out of metaphysics. 
Mansel holds that psychology inquires, " what are the acutal 
phenomena of the several acts and states of the human mind, 
and the actual laws or conditions on which they depend." 
Sedgwick (Mind, 1876, 223) claims that " the main purpose 
of psychology is to investigate the laws by which different 
states of consciousness either co-exist or follow one 
another." A clear distinction between consciousness and 
its contents is made by Hodgson (Mind, 1884, 70) : "Psy- 
chology has nothing to do with consciousness qnd content, 
or with the relations of its parts as content, in which aspect 
it is the mirror or subjective side of the universe of things. 
That is the domain of philosophy. The business of psychol- 
ogy is with sentient beings, with the classification and exam- 
ination of their faculties, the genesis of the various modes 
of their sentience and intelligence, and generally the real 
actions and relations between them and their environment." 
Similar views prevail to some extent in Germany. Steinthal 
declares, " Psychology is altogether an experimental science, 
and its aim cannot extend further than to determine the 
conditions under which by experience a certain result may 
be expected. Further than this natural science also does 
not extend, and every step farther in the direction of causa- 
tion or teleology belongs to metaphysics and the philosophy 
of religion." Benno Erdmann says, " The general, formal 
science of mind, that is, the science of the laws of the 
psychical processes of development, is psychology." 



412 APPENDIX. 

Other views of psychology also prevail. Thus Ueberweg 
defines it as "the science of the nature and natural laws of 
the human mind." Spencer makes his ps} T chology in part 
what others have termed a theory of knowledge ; that is, a 
theory of the relation existing between sensation and the 
object producing it, or between thought and its external ob- 
ject. (Psychology, I. 132, 133.) Volkmann (Grundriss der 
Psychologie, 3) defines psychology as " aiming to describe the 
several activities of the soul, to interpret their laws, and to 
throw light on the nature of the soul." Without making psy- 
chology itself metaphysical, it is but natural that its results 
should be used for a better understanding of the soul itself. 
Hoffding, the Danish psychologist, pronounces psychology 
the doctrine of the soul, or the doctrine of that which thinks, 
feels, and wills, in distinction from physics, which treats of 
what moves in and fills space. Just as in physics the begin- 
ning is not made with determining the essence of matter, so 
in psychology the nature of the soul is not the starting-point. 
He treats the subject as purely empirical, and wants facts to 
be carefully distinguished from theories. Bain declares that 
"the only account of mind strictly admissible in scientific 
psj^chology consists in specifying three properties or func- 
tions, — feeling, will or volition, and thought or intellect, — 
through which all our experience, as well objective as 
subjective, is built up. This positive enumeration is what 
must stand for a definition." (Mental and Moral Science, 2.) 
Sully (Outlines of Psychology, 1) says, "What mind is in 
itself as a substance, is a question that lies outside psychol- 
ogy, and belongs to philosophy. As a science, psychology 
is concerned only with the phenomena of mind, with mental 
states, psychical facts, or whatever else we choose to call 
them. Bowne (Introduction to Psychological Theory, 1) 
says, " Psychology deals with mental facts and processes. 
It aims to describe and classify those facts and processes, to 
discover and state their laws, and to form some theory 
concerning their origin and cause." 



APPENDIX. 413 

19. Utterances similar to those given in the text might be 
quoted from numerous scientific authorities. In his address 
before the British Association, the president, Professor All- 
mann, said, "Between thought and the physical phenomena 
of matter there is not only no analogy, but no conceivable 
analogy. . . . The chasm between unconscious life and 
thought is deep and impassable, and no transitional phe- 
nomena can be found by which, as a bridge, we may span 
it over." I shall add a quotation from Romanes, a Darwin- 
ist : " And here I may as well at once give it as my opinion 
that, of however much service the theory of materialism 
may be made up to a certain point, it can never be accepted 
by any competent mind as a final explanation of the facts 
with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as its use may 
be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine, 
it is wholly inadequate as an hypothesis in philosophy." In 
an address on Descartes, Professor Huxley also admits the 
inadequacy of materialism to account for mental phenomena. 
In Germany, popular scieutists like Buechner have popular- 
ized materialism ; but among the deeper scientists they 
have no standing, and they cannot claim to speak in the 
name of science. The leadiug physiologists admit that 
matter does not explain the facts of mind. 

20. T. M. Lindsay {Mind, 1877, 481) says that the phi- 
losopher loses much if " he attempts to confine his philo- 
sophical observations either to the working of his own mind, 
or to an examination of the writings of previous or contem- 
porary thinkers. It is his duty to measure the pulse of 
human thought, to note its movements, its expressions, to 
understand its nature, and to describe it. His task is 
to reduce thought and its movements to scientific formulae. 
But if he isolates the problem, if he examines mind only by 
the introspective method, if he measures its movements in 
some narrow technical fashion, if he overlooks the upheav- 
als of mind in art, poetry, and science, or its crystallization 
in political and ecclesiastical institutions, he has wantonly 



414 APPENDIX. 

and arbitrarily limited the sphere of his observation, and his 
attempt must be abortive. . . . The professional metaphysi- 
cian who keeps within merely technical limits is liable to 
make a caricature, not the living reproduction of thought.' ' 
This applies especially to the psychologist, whose views 
should be broad as well as deep, comprehensive as well as 
thorough. He must aim to give an account of the operations 
of mind, not merely of a mind. 

21. " Even if it explains the form of thought, logic leaves 
unanswered another fundamental question of rational self- 
criticism, namely, whether and how far the content of con- 
sciousness corresponds with reality ; that is, the question 
respecting the possibility and validity of knowledge. For 
this another subject is necessar} 7 , namely, the Theory of 
Knowledge. . . . It is the first task of this theory to explain 
how we happen to refer the content of our consciousness, 
which is produced by us, and which we therefore recognize 
as ours, to something which we are not, so as to be able to 
speak of knowing and comprehending a reality different from 
ourselves." (Schaarschmidt in Philos. Monatsh., 1878, 7.) 
Benno Erclmann holds that it is the aim of this theory to 
determine the relation of the object to our knowledge of it ; 
" to give the laws of the relation of knowledge to things." 
Ulrici held that the theory is to determine whether by cor- 
rect thinking we attain a knowledge of reality. There 
might be correct thinking, even if there were no external 
world. 

22. Intuitionalism has been used in various senses ; but 
the disputes respecting it are on the ground and validity 
rather than on the fact of intuitions. On the use of the 
word, H. Calderwood (Mind, 1876, 201) says, "Intuition is 
a direct beholding of an object or a truth. It is immedi- 
ate knowledge of the thins: itself. It stands in contrast with 
knowledge of one thing through means of another, as in 
reasoning ; and also in contrast with admission of real 



APPENDIX. 415 

existence without personal observation of the thing, as in 
belief. It is direct vision. . . . Intuition, then, is percep- 
tion in contrast with comparison or judgment, though the 
term has been applied to the notion obtained by simple com- 
parison. It is a single and direct act in contrast with a men- 
tal process." Applying the doctrine of intuitions to morals, 
he says, "Let me begin with a concise statement of the 
intuitional theory of moral distinctions. Self-evident laws 
of conduct afford the only rational basis for distinguishing 
the moral qualities of actions ; and self-evident moral laws 
are intuitively known by men, that is, directly recognized by 
the reason. Or, to throw it into another form, moral laws 
are applied by all men, and are recognized as essentially 
true and authoritative, though their validit} T has not been 
determined by personal induction, nor established by expe- 
rience of past ages, nor by the consensus of opinion among 
the more intelligent and civilized nations, but is self-evident 
to the reason." Dr. M-Cosh (Princeton Review, Novem- 
ber, 1878, 895) says of the " marks and tests of our intui- 
tions : " "Their primary and essential character is not 
necessit} T , as Leibnitz held, nor necessity and universality, 
as Kant maintained ; but self-evidence. The}' look immedi- 
ately on things, and contain their evidence within them- 
selves. Being so, they become necessary, that is, have a 
necessity of conviction, which is the secondary test ; and 
universal, that is, entertained by all men, which is their terti- 
ary corroboration." The essential points are the reality, the 
reason, and consequent authority, of their "self-evidence." 
One man ma}* reject what another pronounces " self-evident 
to the reason." How, then, shall the dispute be decided? 

23. Whately says, " Logic is entirely conversant about 
language," which is true so far as language is the instrument 
used in reasoning. De Morgan says, "Formal logic deals 
with names, and not with either the ideas or things to which 
these names belong." " Names are exclusively the objects 
of formal logic. " Mill claims that logic has to do with 



416 APPENDIX. 

facts or things themselves, rather than with our ideas about 
them. Jevons says, "We may therefore say that logic 
treats ultimately of thoughts and things, and immediately of 
the signs which stand for them." Venn says, " Every one, 
it is to be presumed, will admit that a proposition is a state- 
ment in words of a judgment about things.'' I should say, 
no proposition ; thus making the sense the very opposite. 
A proposition is always a statement in words of a judgment 
about concepts. Herbert Spencer's peculiar view of logic, 
as distinct from the process of reasoning, is found in his 
Psychology, II. 87. These conflicting views respecting the 
very nature of logic and its subject-matter will show the 
student how much is yet required to bring harmony and unity 
into this study. In spite of the great attention devoted to 
the subject, its sphere and fundamental principles are not 
even agreed upon. 

24. In Mind, 1883, 18, the editor states that the sense 
of metaphysics best justified historically is " ontology or 
theory of being." While physics is concerned with "the 
being of things as they appear," " metaphysic, as going 
beyond plrysic, has then to do with the being of things as 
they are, or with their being as the ground of their appear- 
ing." Speaking of transcendental metaplrysics, J. S. Mill 
(Logic, first edit. I. 9) says, "To this science appertain 
the great and much-debated questions of the existence of 
matter ; of the existence of spirit, and the distinction between 
it and matter; of the reality of time and space, as things 
without the mind, and distinguishable from the objects which 
are said to exist" in them." Unfortunately, later English 
writers have used the term so vaguely, or have made it so 
general, that it can hardly be claimed to represent a definite 
sphere of inquiry. There are definitions in which scarce a 
trace of the historic use of the word is found. Professor 
Bain (Cont. Rev., 29, 928) says, " By metaphysical study, 
or metaphysics, I mean — what seems intended by the desig- 
nation in its current employment at present — the circle of 



APPENDIX. 417 

the mental or subjective sciences. The central department 
of the field is Psychology ; and the adjunct to psychology is 
logic, which has its foundation partly in psychology, but still 
more in the sciences altogether, whose procedure it gathers 
up and formulates. The outlying and dependent branches 
are, the narrow metaphysics or ontology, ethics, sociology, 
together with art or aesthetics. There are other applied 
sciences of the department, as education and philology." 
Another writer (C. E. Appleton, Cont. Rev., vol. 28, 925) 
makes the ''collective ego " the subject of metaphysics. 
"This collective ego, this best self, this element of common 
consciousness in man as a member of society, standing 
behind and operating through the ordinary individual con- 
sciousness, is precisely, and from first to last, and nothing 
else than, the subject-matter of metaphysic as it has been 
understood since Kant. Metaphysic is the science conver- 
sant with the collective consciousness of man as a member 
of society." 

25. This view, particularly promiuent in Vischer's Aes- 
theiik, is by no means confined to the Germans, but is gen- 
erally accepted by those who make beauty more than the 
agreeable and mere sentience. Thus Cousin in his Lectures 
on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good (Wight's transla- 
tion, 149), says, " Form cannot be simply a form : it must be 
the form of something. Physical beauty is, then, the sign 
of an internal beauty, which is spiritual and moral beauty ; 
and this is the foundation, the principle, the unity of the 
beautiful." He quotes Reid's Essay on Taste, in which 
the Scotch philosopher also argues "that sensible beauty is 
only the image of moral beauty." Cousin repeatedly states 
the same thought. Thus he says, "The foundation of the 
beautiful is the idea ; what makes art is before all the reali- 
zation of the idea, and not the imitation of such or such a 
particular form" (158). " Every work of art that does not 
express an idea, signifies nothiug ; in addressing itself to 
such or such a sense, it must penetrate to the mind, to the 



418 APPENDIX. 

soul, and bear thither a thought, a sentiment, capable of 
touching or elevating it" (171). " Genius is a ready and 
sure perception of the right proportion in which the ideal 
and the natural form and thought ought to be united. This 
union is the perfection of art." He also says, "that all 
arts are such only so far as they express the idea concealed 
under the form, and are addressed to the soul through the 
senses" (178). The idea or ideal, as the essential element 
in beauty, dates back to the philosophy of Plato. 

26. Ideals, as we have seen, are purely mental products, 
though iu their formation the mind receives important help 
from existing objects. They do not inhere in things, nor 
can they be produced by any energy in things. Of much 
that is, I declare that it ought not to be ; and of much which 
is not, that it ought to be. Experience is necessary to 
form these ideals, but they are not given by the experience 
of what is. We meet real, not ideal men ; from the past and 
present we learn what governments have been and are, not 
what they should be. We place the ideal against the real, 
and condemn the latter in the interest of the former. Nor 
are these ideals a composition, a conglomeration formed by 
choosing the most perfect elements from what exists. The 
perfections in ideals are not scattered about in that way, 
they do not at all exist externally. But even if they existed, 
how could the mind discover and select them, and form them 
into unity, unless it had in itself a standard of perfection? 
All such eclecticism implies a principle of selection and uni- 
fication. How could a compound be recognized as the ideal 
unless the mind had a standard with which to compare it? 
Pushing our inquiries back into matter itself, we cannot find 
in that the explanation of morality. Combine the chemical 
elements as we please, we can never get anything from them 
except what is really (though perhaps only in embryo) in 
them. By multiplying these elements, or by subjecting them 
to any known laws of physics, we never rise above what 
is to what ought to be. Nor is the ideal even an inference 



APPENDIX. 419 

drawn from things. If a certain thing is, I ma} r infer that 
something else must be ; but, that something else ought to be, 
is not a logical deduction from things, simply because it is 
not in things. We may call it the logic of the entire per- 
sonality, but not merely of the intellect. If so absurd a 
notion as this were advocated, that the ideal is inherited, 
it would not meet the case at all. It is not merely the trans- 
mission of the ideal which is to be accounted for, but also its 
first origin. If only an inheritance, I may reject it ; only if 
it is rational, am I bound by it. Does inheritance make it 
rational ? Does environment, or histor} 7 , or training ? These 
things become clear as soon as the question is answered : 
What ultimately determines the ideal of morality ? 



INDEX. 



Abstraction, 227, 228. 

Abstract and Concrete, 190. 

Esthetics, 268. 

^Esthetics — Definition, 271. 

^Esthetic Appreciation, 301. 

^Esthetic Emotion, its Sphere, 296. 

^Esthetics and Ethics, 294. 

Agnosticism, 70. 

Analysis and Synthesis, 238. 

Art, 287; Characteristic in, 290, 

292. 
Arts, Divisicfo of, 293; Fine, 289. 
Atoms, 123. 

Beauty, 273. 

Beauty and the Agreeable, 276, 280. 
Beauty as Form and Substance, 282. 
Beauty in Objects, 284. 

Categorical Imperative, 323. 
Causation, 211. 
Character, 330. 
Communism, 321. 
Conscience, 321. 
Consciousness, 145, 149. 
Criticism, 285. 

Eclecticism, 392. 

Eleatics School, 27, 29, 44. 

Emotion, 268, 275. 

Epicureans, 30. 

Equality, Law of, 215, 226. 

Ethics: Aim, 310; Conditions of, 
311, 315; Philosophical and Theo- 
logical, 314; Principles of, 316. 



Experience, 203. 

Experience and General Laws, 211. 

Faith, Rational, 58, 83. 
Feeling, Religious, 63, 74. 
Feeling and the Will, 334. 
First Cause, 70. 
Force, 124. 

Freedom of the Will, 340. 
Freedom, Philosophical, 90; Re- 
straints of, 80. 

Hedonism, 327, 333. 
Heredity, 212. 
History, 231. 
Hypotheses, 263. 

Idaals, 214. 

Imagination, 299. 

Inferences, 236. 

Innate Aptitudes and Ideas, 196. 

Intuition, 199. 

Intuitionalism, 246, 317. 

Knowledge, Completion of, 229; 
Definition, 183; Development of, 
230; Limits of, 193; Origin of, 195, 
219; and the Real World, 206, 219; 
Unity of, 159. 

Laws, Mental, 213. 
Logic, 181, 224. 



Materialism, 72, 141. 
Materialists, 202. 



421 



422 



INDEX. 



Memory, 145, 147. 

Mental Faculties, 170. 

Mental States, 152. 

Metaphysics, 29, 30, 34, 242; Basis 
of, 261; Definition, 247; Divisions, 
252; Growth in, 263; Importance 
of, 253, 259; Necessity of, 254; 
Needs of, 257; and Noetics, 244; 
Problems of, 250. 

Mind, 130, 135. 

Mind as Entity, 264. 

Monism, 139. 

Morality, Evolution of, 323. 

Morality and Religion, 342. 

Mysterious Mental Phenomena, 
136. 

Mysticism, 199. 

Noetics, 173. 

Notions, General, 191, 215. 

Opera, The, 293. 

Pantheism, 72. 

Penetrative Method, 233. 

Peripatetics, 30. 

Philosophize, 24. 

Philosophy, Definition, 13, 45; Di- 
vision of, 159, 165; Etymology, 21 ; 
in the Catholic Church, 78; His- 
tory of the Term, 20; How regard- 
ed in Greece, 23; How regarded 
in the Middle Ages, 30 ; How re- 
garded in England, 31; How re- 
garded in America, Scotland, 
Germany, and other lands, 37; 
Method of Study,. 367; National- 
ity in, 358; in the Protestant 
Church, 80; Popular View of, 12; 
Problems leading to, 7; reduced 
to Psychology, 134; Scientific, 93; 
its Sphere, 12; Spirit in its Study, 
349; Subjects included, 42; Vague- 
ness of the Term, 16. 

Physics among the Ancients, 162. 

Positivism, 3, 111, 255. 

Principles, 46. 



Psychology, Abstract Terms in, 150; 
Applications of, 154; Definition, 
129; Experimental, 188; and Nat- 
ural Science, 138; Metaphysical, 
133, 139; Propaedeutics to Philoso- 
phy, 156; its Sources, 146; Spe- 
cialists in, 148, 153; Value of, 155. 

Psycho-Physics, 154, 168. 

Rational, 47. 

Reason, Limits of, 69, 83. 

Reasoning, Analogical, 141. 

Religion, 60, 63; Conflicts with Phi- 
losophy, 83; its Origin, 61; Rela- 
tion to Philosophy, 57. 

Right, 331. 

Rightness, 339. 

Sacrifice, 330. 

Scepticism, Philosophical, 69, 178. 

Sceptics, 30. 

Science, Definition of, 94; Limits of, 

105, 120; and Philosophy, 96, 112; 

and Religion, 73. 
Sensation, 208. 
Sensationalism, 210. 
Socialism, 4. 
Socratic School, 28. 
Sophists, 23, 28, 41, 44. 
Soul, 132; its Activity, 144. 
Specialization, 228, 232. 
Stoics, 30. 
Sublimity, 287. 
Substance, 233. 
System, 47, 237. 

Taste, 302. 

Tendencies, Empirical and Ideal, 2. 
Theory of Knowledge, 175; its Re- 
lation to Logic, 180. 
Things per se, 222. 
Thinking, Pure, 233. 
Thought, 225; Energy of, 231. 

Utilitarianism, 317. 

Wisdom, 25, 28, 30, 44. 




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